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THE POLITICS OF COALITION BURDEN-SHARING:  
THE CASE OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 
By  
A.S.M. Ali Ashraf, MSS, MPIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why do states join military coalitions? After joining wartime coalitions, why do states contribute 
differently to support the coalitions? What influences the decision process and the burden-
sharing outcome of coalition countries? This dissertation investigates these questions by 
reviewing the contributions of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan to the U.S.-led War in 
Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2010. 
Conventional wisdom focuses on neo-realist and strategic culture theories to analyze a 
country’s coalition behavior. The neo-realist theory of international relations suggests a systemic 
level explanation, and argues that the distribution of power in the international system 
determines the coalition behavior of states. Strategic culture theorists reject systemic level 
explanations, and argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the same international 
system, behave differently. They embrace a domestic level analysis, which emphasizes national 
strategic decision makers, their belief systems, and the organizational culture of the military—in 
short a ‘national style’ of coalition behavior. 
This study demonstrates that both neo-realism and strategic culture fail to offer sufficient 
explanations for analyzing and predicting the coalition behavior of states. Taking a middle 
ground, it proposes a neo-classical realist model of coalition burden-sharing. It argues that 
international systemic incentives and constraints are channeled through domestic political and 
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culture-induced processes to produce unique burden-sharing behaviors for states. My theoretical 
model examines the effect of three systemic variables – alliance dependence, balance of threat, 
and collective action; and three domestic level variables – domestic political regime, public 
opinion, and military capability – in explaining the politics of coalition burden-sharing. I test the 
model in the cases of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan.  
My research provides empirical support for the integrated burden-sharing model. It shows 
that among the coalition countries in Afghanistan, Britain pursued a policy of ‘punching above 
the weight.’ The British forces in Afghanistan’s Helmand province were overstretched, with few 
troops and few resources. By contrast, the German forces in Kunduz had mostly pursued a risk-
averse strategy. This was due to the imposition of national caveats or restricted rules of 
engagement, which constrained the ability of the German forces to participate in offensive 
military operations against the Taliban insurgents. Pakistan joined and supported the war in 
Afghanistan by severing diplomatic relations with the Taliban; and deploying up to 150,000 
troops along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Despite providing critical logistical support, and 
conducting numerous military offensives against Al Qaeda and Taliban militias in its tribal areas, 
Pakistan was widely labeled as an uncertain partner with conflicted goals. This was due to 
Pakistan’s overt contribution to the war on terrorism, and its covert support for various Afghan-
focused insurgent groups.  
This dissertation concludes with a brief discussion on the theoretical and policy 
implications of coalition burden-sharing. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: 
THE CHALLENGES OF COALITION BURDEN-SHARING IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Coalition burden-sharing is one of the central features of modern warfare in the 21st 
century. Why do states join military coalitions? After joining wartime coalitions, why do states 
contribute differently to support the coalitions? What influences the decision process and the 
burden-sharing outcome of coalition countries? The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate 
these questions by reviewing the varying level of contributions by Britain, Germany, and 
Pakistan to the U.S.-led coalition warfare in Afghanistan (2001-2010).1 States’ burden-sharing 
behavior can be observed in three phases of a coalition’s life span: formation, maintenance, and 
disintegration.2
                                                            
1 The terms ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ refer to multilateral military cooperation. However, there are conceptual 
differences between them. Strictly speaking, alliances are defined as formal, treaty-based arrangements, while 
coalitions are defined as ad hoc security agreements among states. While most coalitions are built to fight a war, 
most alliances are, by contrast, formed for defensive purposes, that is, to prevent a war. This dissertation argues that 
instead of looking at the differences between alliances and coalitions in irreconcilable terms, it is more useful to 
consider alliances and coalitions as part of a security continuum, in which formal alliance members may join a 
wartime coalition, and wartime coalition members may become part of an alliance system, or act like a formal ally. 
Chapter Two discusses the conceptual differences between alliances and coalitions, and addresses the issue of 
coalition burden-sharing.  
 This dissertation focuses on burden-sharing during the first two stages of the 
U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.  
2 According to Glenn Snyder, one of the leading alliance and coalition theorists, during the formation phase, 
prospective coalition members bargain and negotiate their burden-sharing commitment for contingent scenarios. By 
contrast, during the maintenance phase, allies bargain over the crisis-time burden-sharing role, such as war plans. 
Snyder does not address the issue of coalition disintegration, but George Liska, another leading alliance theorist, 
discusses how peacetime alliances or wartime coalitions may disintegrate by the “internal strains and external 
pressures” as well as over unequal distribution of gains and liabilities among the members of the alliance. Writing in 
the context of the Cold War era, Holsti et al suggest that alliance duration and disintegration may be associated with 
a number of factors, such as, the advent of nuclear weapons, disarmament politics, the end of the external threat 
which created the alliance, and certain alliance attributes, such as, size, structure, purposes, and ideology. See Glenn 
H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 3; George Liska, Nations in Alliance: 
The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns  Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 175; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrance 
Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 25-28.  
2 
 
The Afghanistan War coalition included both NATO and non-NATO allies, who made 
direct and indirect contributions. Direct contributions include troops and military assets 
deployment in Afghanistan, whereas indirect contributions include military deployment in the 
Afghan-Pakistan borders, as well as, basing access, and overflight rights to U.S. and NATO 
forces in non-Afghan theaters.3 Between 2002 and 2010, the number of countries joining the 
U.S.-led military coalition increased significantly from 18 countries in 2002 to nearly 50 
countries in 2010. The number of coalition troops on the ground in Afghanistan also increased 
significantly from 5,000 in 2002 to nearly 40,000 in 2010.4
Among the Afghanistan War coalition countries, Britain maintained a strong combat role 
by consistently supporting the U.S. efforts to create and manage the coalition.  This was done in 
two phases of the War: by participating during the initial airstrikes and covert operations to 
topple the Taliban regime, and later deploying a 9,500-strong military force to the Taliban-
controlled Helmand province.
 This figure does not include troops 
and military assets deployed outside Afghanistan for the prosecution of the war on terrorism. 
5 In contrast to Britain’s robust combat role, Germany maintained a 
principally non-combat and peace-keeping role by deploying a 4,900 strong military force in the 
relatively peaceful Kunduz province. 6
                                                            
3 Nora Bensahel, “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2006), pp. 35-49. 
 While the British forces took active part in combating the 
Taliban insurgency, the German forces were restricted to mostly non-combat stabilization 
missions.  
4 See Appendix 1.A for a list of countries contributing troops to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan , 2002-2010.   
5 Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan,” 
International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp. 311-332. 
6 Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Oct-Nov 
2009), pp. 71-90. 
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Unlike Britain and Germany, Pakistan did not deploy any military force in Afghanistan. 
However, Islamabad’s security cooperation was critical for the U.S.-led war efforts in 
Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.7 By 2010, Islamabad deployed more 
than 120,000 military forces in the Taliban insurgent-prone Federally Administered Tribal Area 
(FATA), and its adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (previously North West Frontier 
Province).8 This troop deployment was geo-strategically important, as senior Al Qaeda and 
Taliban commanders, used the FATA as a safe haven for attacking the U.S. and NATO forces 
[International Security Assistance Force, ISAF] in Afghanistan.9 Pakistan made three other 
contributions: it provided U.S. forces access to its military bases; it authorized the use of its 
territory for the trans-shipment of military logistics for NATO forces in Afghanistan; and finally 
it offered tacit support for the escalation of U.S. drone strikes in the FATA.10 Despite such 
critical security cooperation, Pakistan maintained clandestine supports for three Afghan Taliban 
groups –the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezbe Islami Gulbuddin 
network.11
                                                            
7 C. Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 2004) 
 While Pakistan hoped support for these Afghan Taliban groups would offer greater 
strategic depth in future Afghanistan, to counter any undue Indian influence in the post-Taliban 
8 Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March 5, 2010), p. 5; Interviews with retired Pakistani military 
officials, July 2009.  
9 See “Waziristan: The Last Frontier,” The Economist, January 2, 2010, pp. 17-20; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into 
Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 
pp. 265-292. 
10 U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism,” June 7, 
2002 (Washington, D.C.: DoD Office of Public Affairs), p. 9. 
11 Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. 
Forces, Afghanistan, Commander’s Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, International Security 
Assistance Force, August 30, 2009), pp. 10-11. 
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era, the U.S. and NATO viewed this clandestine support as state sponsorship of terrorism, and 
detrimental to the overall coalition war efforts.12
This brief discussion of the British, German, and Pakistani contribution (or lack thereof) 
demonstrates the challenge of coalition cohesion and its effect on burdensharing behavior of 
coalition members. Burden-sharing is defined here as “the distribution of costs and risks among 
members of a group [or coalition] in the process of accomplishing a common goal.”
  
13 This 
dissertation examines the burden-sharing behavior of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, 
where the common goals were: defeating the transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda; denying it a 
safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan; toppling the Taliban regime for hosting the Al Qaeda 
militants, and suppressing the Taliban insurgency.14
The issue of coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan is important and interesting. This 
has raised important questions about NATO’s alliance cohesion and the joint war fighting 
  
                                                            
12 Ashley J. Tellis, “Pakistan’s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance,” 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2008): 7-32. 
13 Peter Kent Forster and Stephen J. Cimbala, The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing (London and New 
York: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 1. 
14 There are compelling reasons for analyzing the Al Qaeda and Taliban-focused counterterrorism strategy. 
Most scholarly and policy works on terrorism and national security focus on the evolving threats from Al Qaeda, 
and its associated groups, including the Taliban. Prominent terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman offers a typology of 
four Al Qaeda related threats to international security. This typology includes: (a) Al Qaeda Central; (b) Al Qaeda 
Affiliates and Associates; (c) Al Qaeda Local’s Dispersed Cells; and (d) Al Qaeda Network. Hoffman notes that Al 
Qaeda Central is composed of the remnants of pre-9/11 Al Qaeda organization and its core leadership, with a few 
“new players”, based in Afghanistan and the Pakistani border area. The second category – Al Qaeda Affiliates and 
Associates—refers to Al Qaeda-trained or -inspired terrorist and insurgent groups in various places, including 
Indonesia, Morocco, the Philippines, and Uzbekistan. The third category refers to Al Qaeda-trained or -indoctrinated 
individuals, including Europe’s Muslim youths, who have either fought in Algeria, Chechnya, the Balkans, and 
recently in Iraq, or recruited into Al Qaeda’s local cells. The fourth category includes “homegrown Islamic radicals” 
in North Africa, Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, who are mostly ideologically inspired, than actually 
recruited by Al Qaeda. Hoffman argues that “The most salient threat posed by these four categories continues to 
come from Al Qaeda Central and its affiliates and associates.” See Bruce Hoffman, “From the War on Terror to 
Global Counterinsurgency,” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 695 (Dec. 2006), pp. 424-426. Interestingly, the 
European and U.S. national security and counterterrorism strategies have also prioritized fighting the Afghanistan 
and Pakistan-based Al Qaeda Central. See: The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: National Security Council); The European Council, The European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy (Brussels: The European Council Presidency and CT Coordinator, 2005); UK Government, UK Policy in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Way Forward (London: The Cabinet Office, 2009). 
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capability of traditional NATO allies in an ad hoc military coalition.15 It has also raised serious 
questions about the political resolve and military capability of non-NATO allies in sharing the 
military risks of the Afghanistan War.16 Broadly speaking, these questions relate to the command 
and control of the overall mission, the national restrictions over the use of force, and the 
political-military support of coalition partners. Political and military assessments of the 
Afghanistan War highlight the challenges of burden-sharing between the U.S. and its allies in the 
‘coalition of the willing’ in Afghanistan.17
The ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is becoming war weary, and 
signs of a rift are emerging within the alliance over the issue of burden sharing: 
some countries such as the U.S., U.K., the Netherlands, and Canada operate in the 
dangerous southern and eastern areas of the country, whereas other countries 
appear less willing to expose their troops to armed conflict.
 For instance, in a political analysis of the Afghan 
War, Nasreen Ghufran, a South Asian scholar, describes Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound” 
where NATO countries demonstrated “signs of rift” over military burden-sharing:  
18
                                                            
15 Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers, “Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing or Disunity?” 
Briefing Paper 07/01 (London: Chatham House, 2007), pp. 1-8; John M. Swartz, “The ISAF Coalition: Achieving 
U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan?” Strategic Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), pp. 1-
28. 
  
16 David Ochmanek, Military Operations aginst Terrorist Groups Abroad: Implications for the United Sdtates 
Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Project Air Force, 2003); Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: 
Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003). 
17 According to Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul D. Williams, “Coalitions of the willing are groups of actors that 
come together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to particular crises. They may 
operate with or without formal authorization from regional or other international organization. Since NATO’s 
Kosovo campaign in 1999, coalitions of the willing have undertaken peace operations in Afghanistan, the DRC 
[Democratic Republic of Congo], East Timor, Haiti, and the Solomon Islands. In these cases, pivotal states 
constructed coalitions to serve two primary purposes: share the material costs of the operation (the primary goal in 
East Timor) and provide a degree of legitimization (the primary goal in Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands).” See 
Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace 
Operations,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), p. 169. 
18 Nasreen Ghufran, “Afghanistan in 2007: A Bleeding Wound,” Asian Survey, Vol.  48, No. 1 (2008), p. 163. 
Emphasis added. 
6 
 
 While Ghufran discussed NATO’s intra-alliance rift over burden-sharing, others have 
gone on to analyze the cause of such rift. The 2010 issue of Military Balance, an annual 
assessment of world’s military capabilities and defense economics, published by the London-
based think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies, offers a succinct analysis of the 
coalition burden-sharing challenge in Afghanistan. It says:   
Afghanistan remained a thorny operational challenge for NATO in 2009, with 
security and stability in the country still lacking. Operations continued to be 
hampered by an inability to hold territory and by the absence of a truly common 
and comprehensive approach among allies and the international community at 
large. Elusive success means that a number of problems are resurfacing which 
threaten to undermine NATO’s political and military cohesion. Questions about 
burden-sharing are increasing once more as the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) becomes visibly Americanised . . . persistent caveats, 
interoperability problems and capability shortfalls suggested that not all allies 
were willing or able to make the same kind of contribution in quantitative terms.19
Despite the importance of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, and the persistent 
challenges to the U.S.-led coalition fighting the war, there is a lack of scholarly work analyzing 
alliance contributions to the Afghanistan War. My dissertation addresses this research gap by 
presenting and testing a theoretical model of coalition burden-sharing. My theoretical model 
takes a neo-classical realist position, which incorporates the insights from both neo-realist and 
strategic culture theories. 
   
                                                            
19 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routeledge for IISS), pp. 
105-106. Emphasis added. 
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Conventional wisdom focuses on the neo-realist and strategic culture theories to explain 
the politics of coalition burden-sharing. Neo-realists argue that the structural distribution of 
power in the international system determines a country’s coalition behavior.  Strategic 
culturalists reject the international level explanation, and argue that the domestic political 
culture, norms, and elite perception determine a country’s attitude toward military coalitions. 
The neo-realist and strategic culture theories offer useful insights into coalition politics. 
However, they tend to be mutually exclusive, and without the help of one another, they cannot 
provide adequate explanations for analyzing the burden-sharing decisions and outcomes of 
coalition countries.  In contrast to the neo-realists and strategic culturalists, my burden-sharing 
model takes a neo-classical realist position, and argues that international structural constraints 
are channeled through the domestic political processes to determine states’ burden-sharing 
behavior in ad hoc coalitions.20
My theoretical model modifies the existing burden-sharing decision models developed in 
two recent studies of coalition warfare: the Bennett et al. study on the First Iraq War coalition 
(1990-1991); and the Auerswald study on NATO’s Kosovo air campaign (1999).
 First, I examine the effect of three international level variables – 
alliance dependence, threat perception, and collective action. Next, I explore the effect of three 
domestic level variables and constraints – domestic political regime, public opinion, and military 
capability—in analyzing the decision processes on the Afghanistan War coalition.  
21
                                                            
20 For a neo-classical realist analysis of alliance politics, see Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political 
Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).  
 I argue that 
the existing models provide a useful starting point for analyzing the complex decision process of 
21 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burdensharing in the Persian 
Gulf War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); David Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated 
Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Sept. 2004), pp. 631-
662. In a study of the Iraq War coalition, Daniel Baltrusaitis examines the utility of the Bennett et al. model. See 
Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics and the Iraq War (Boulder and London: First Forum Press, 2010). 
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coalition countries. But they cannot sufficiently explain why coalition members act differently in 
responding to the needs of combat and non-combat operations. My dissertation addresses this 
theoretical gap by offering a better model for analyzing burden-sharing behavior in wartime 
coalitions.22
 This dissertation has seven chapters. Chapter Two presents a conceptual discussion on 
alliance, coalition, and burden-sharing. Chapter Three reviews the existing theories of coalition 
politics, and presents a theoretical model for analyzing coalition burden-sharing. The next three 
chapters test the empirical validity of my integrated burden-sharing model.  
 
Chapter Four analyzes the British decision process on Afghanistan. It finds that among 
the non-U.S. coalition members, Britain maintained a strong burden-sharing behavior in 
Afghanistan. This was evident in London’s proactive diplomacy, a modest stabilization role, and 
an interest in fighting the Taliban insurgency. Four factors influenced the British decision 
process—two systemic level factors and two domestic level factors. First, Britain’s ‘special 
relationship with the United States and its alliance solidarity with NATO created a strong 
commitment to multilateral missions. NATO’s invocation of Article 5 collective defense 
mechanism further reinforced this alliance solidarity, encouraging a strong coalition role for 
Britain. After alliance solidarity, balance of threat presented the second systemic level incentive 
to encourage Britain’s entry into and support for the coalition. This study shows that Al Qaeda, 
WMD proliferation, Taliban insurgency, and drug trafficking posed four inter-related threats to 
                                                            
22 Like Bennett et al., and Auerswald, I argue that integrating the international and domestic level factors into a   
burden-sharing model best captures the two-level games played by states in forming and supporting a military 
coalition. For a theoretical discussion on the two-level game in international bargaining, see Robert D. Putnam, 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 
9Summer 1988), pp. 427-460; Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged 
Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkely and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993). 
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the British and international security. Britain pursued a strategy of balancing against the threats 
by joining the coalition, and providing robust supports for the U.S.-led war efforts, especially in 
the insurgent-prone Helmand province. These systemic incentives of alliance solidarity and 
balance of threat were channeled through the British domestic political processes, in which two 
factors played a crucial role: the office of the chief executive and the military force. As the chief 
executive, prime ministers Tony Blair and his successors Gordon Brown and David Cameron 
enjoyed royal prerogative in the declaration of war and the use of force. The discretionary power, 
coupled with elite consensus in the British parliament, made the British prime ministers so 
powerful that they ignored any dissenting public opinion, and directly looked into the military 
capability in shaping London’s Afghanistan policy. In the final stage, as the capability of the 
British forces increased in Helmand, with more troops and more resources, and the introduction 
of a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the British military pursued a robust burden-
sharing strategy in Afghanistan.  
Chapter Five examines Germany’s risk-averse strategy in Afghanistan. First, it describes 
Germany’s military and non-military contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. It then 
analyzes why Germany gradually increased military and civilian boots on the ground, but 
resisted the NATO pressures for participating in the offensive military operations against the 
Taliban insurgents. It argues that two international systemic and three domestic level factors 
influenced the German burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. First, the NATO-centric alliance 
commitment, and the balance of threat presented two systemic incentives to encourage 
Germany’s coalition participation. Second, these systemic incentives were transmitted through 
the unique German political processes, in which the German chancellors’ power to use force in 
foreign policy was seriously constrained by the constitution (Basic Law) and the parliament. 
10 
 
Unfavorable public opinion acted as the second constraint discouraging Germany’s participation 
in offensive military operations. Despite such negative constraints, both the mainstream political 
parties, and the German public supported a defensive reconstruction role for the German forces 
in Afghanistan. Finally, the German military’s weak counterinsurgency capability—defined by 
the lack of deployable, suitable, and interoperable forces—had seriously affected Berlin’s ability 
to participate in combat military operations against the Taliban insurgents. These weaknesses 
began to remedy in 2008 and 2009—in response to the growing dangers posed by the Taliban 
insurgency in northern Afghanistan, where most of the German troops were located. In 2009, due 
to pressures from the commanders on the ground, the German government relaxed some of the 
rules of engagement, and authorized the German forces to use force against insurgents. In 2010, 
the United States recognized the weaknesses in German mission, and sent additional troops into 
the German area of operation to engage the insurgents, and to train the Afghan national security 
forces.  
Chapter Six analyzes Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior. First, it shows Pakistan’s 
diplomatic, military, and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan War coalition. Then, it 
explains the Pakistani decision process on Afghanistan. It argues that two systemic incentives 
encouraged Pakistan to join and support the coalition. These are alliance dependence and balance 
of threat. Pakistan’s dependence on an informal alliance with the United States had strongly 
influenced its decision to join the coalition. Pakistan did so to avoid any direct confrontation with 
the United States, and to reap the benefits of U.S. foreign aid. Although Pakistan gradually 
increased its forces along the borders with Afghanistan, its divergent threat perception had a 
negative effect on the U.S. and NATO war goals in Afghanistan. From 2001 until 2010, Pakistan 
supported the U.S. and NATO assessment that Al Qaeda’s foreign militias, and indigenous 
11 
 
Pakistani Taliban groups posed the most pressing threats to Pakistani security. Despite such 
shared threat perception, Pakistan had reportedly supported various Afghan Taliban groups.  
Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban groups was premised on the belief that it 
would provide Islamabad a strategic depth in a future conflict with India. This chapter argues 
that the positive and negative incentives of alliance dependence and the balance of threat 
perception were transmitted through the Pakistani political processes. In Pakistan’s domestic 
politics, the chief executive and the military forces made and shaped the ultimate decisions 
regarding the country’s Afghanistan policy. Because of a longstanding military rule, Pakistan’s 
civilian institutions lacked any effective control over the foreign policy formulation process. 
Instead, the military and its powerful intelligence agency ISI gained strong power in shaping the 
country’s foreign policy. After the departure of Musharraf from presidency, and the restoration 
of democracy, since 2008, the civilian and military elites in Pakistan had supported the U.S.-led 
coalition in Afghanistan, without sacrificing their perceived national interests. As the War in 
Afghanistan progressed, the United States and its NATO allies found that conflicted national 
interests and competing priorities between the Pakistani and U.S. war goals had seriously 
affected Islamabad’s burden-sharing behavior..  
 Chapter Seven discusses the theoretical implications of the research. The empirical 
evidence presented in this dissertation provides support for my coalition burden-sharing model. I 
show that once joining a military coalition, states make varying level of contribution to support 
the coalition. I concur with neo-classical realists that variation in states’ burden-sharing behavior 
can best be analyzed by incorporating the domestic level intervening variables into the analysis 
12 
 
of foreign and security policy.23
 
 My research shows the limits of the collective action theory, 
which suggest that the United States is likely to bear most of the burdens of the Afghanistan 
War, while others are likely to ride free. I argue that most NATO member states, such as Britain 
and Germany were not free-riders in Afghanistan. The U.S. offers of incentive or coercive 
pressures played a negligible role in defining the alliance behavior of principal members in the 
Afghanistan War coalition. Instead, the domestic factors, such as legal-constitutional provisions 
in the case of Germany, and prime ministerial influence in British defense policy, were 
significant factors in shaping the major NATO allies’ coalition commitment. This might not be 
the case for other coalition countries, not studied in this dissertation.  I conclude this chapter with 
a note on further academic and policy oriented research on coalition burden-sharing.  
 
 
 
                                                            
23 Bennett et al., Friends in Need; David Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice;” Baltrusaitis, Friends 
Indeed? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COALITION BURDEN-SHARING: CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter discusses the concepts of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing. It has four 
sections. The first section examines the conceptual differences between alliances and coalitions. 
The second section reviews the definitional and measurement issues in coalition burden-sharing. 
The third section provides a brief historical account of coalition burden-sharing in U.S. foreign 
and security policy in the post-Cold War era. The fourth section discusses how this dissertation 
measures coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan. 
 
I. Alliances and Coalitions: Conceptual Differences 
The terms ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ are often used interchangeably. Strictly speaking, alliances 
are defined as formal treaty-based multilateral security arrangements between two or more 
countries to counter a common threat. By contrast, coalitions are defined as ad hoc cooperation 
and coordination among nations addressing a common threat or security issue. The distinctions 
between them are often ignored or thought to have little analytical value. For instance, 
Christopher Bladen conflates alliances with coalitions and notes, “Alliances, like coalitions in 
broader form, grow out of coercive and conflict situations.”1 Stephen Walt also uses the term 
interchangeably: “states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose 
superior resources could pose a threat.”2
                                                            
1 Christopher Bladen, “Alliance and Integration,” in Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, 
Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), p. 121. 
 Others propose a broader definition of alliance and 
2 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 
(1985), p. 5. Emphases added. 
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coalition to allow for such a conflation. For instance, in their discussion of alliances, Holsti, 
Hopmann and Sullivan note that “There is little to gain from a restrictive definition, and a broad 
one offers the distinctive advantage of enlarging the scope” of a scholarly review.3
Although the terms alliance are coalition are used interchangeably, there are at least three 
major differences between them. The first difference involves the formalization versus ad hoc 
nature of military cooperation; the second involves the defensive versus reactive nature of 
military cooperation; and the third relates to the coverage of single issue versus multiple issue 
areas.  
 
First, alliances refer to formalized and institutionalized cooperation arrangements, 
whereas coalitions are defined as informal agreements between states.4 According to Robert 
Osgood, an alliance is “a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their 
military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the 
signatories to use force.”5 Holsti et al offer a similar definition emphasizing the formalization of 
the alliance process: “an alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations to 
collaborate on national security issues.”6
                                                            
3 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 3. 
 Why are formal and institutional arrangements the pre-
requisites for military alliances? George Modelski argues that the conception of alliance 
connotes “military collaboration concerned with a third power” and because such collaboration 
4 Some scholars note that alliances are not always formalized agreements. They can also include informal 
relations among states. For instance, Friedman argues that although an alliance is usually understood as a formal 
treaty-based arrangement among states, it also refers to an informal process of the community of nations. He writes: 
“alliance is usually revealed in the form of a treaty with or without protocols and letters explaining intentions and 
obligations. In this version it is static and formal…alliance is also part of a general process, and in this version, is 
informal, functional, and dynamic.” See Julian R. Friedman, “Alliance in International Politics,” in Julian R. 
Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 
1970), p. 15. 
5 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 17. 
6 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances p. 4.  
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requires “preparedness for joint military action and the actual involvement in hostilities on the 
same side…they are more frequently formalized” in treaty-based agreements.7 Glenn Snyder 
proposes a similar explanation: “The formalization adds elements of specificity, legal, and moral 
obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking in informal alignments.”8
In contrast to alliances, military coalitions are mostly informal and of ad hoc nature. As 
Terry Pudas notes, “Ad hoc coalitions are unique in that they are based on temporary agreements 
and normally are less formal than standing alliances.”
  
9 Although the purpose of creating wartime 
ad hoc coalition is to maximize the power of allies against an adversary, Wayne Silkett argues 
that intra-alliance “friction and inefficiency” are the inevitable outcome of a coalition, which 
often weaken the coalition military strategy.10 Christopher Coker and Andrew Pierre offer a 
similar view. They stress that avoiding friction and inefficiency and fighting a successful 
coalition war requires political cohesion, which is the central challenge in most military 
coalitions.11
                                                            
7 George Modelski, “The Study of Alliances: A Review,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1963), 
p. 775. 
 I agree with Sylkett, Coker, and Pierre that achieving the political cohesion is 
critical to fighting a successful coalition war. This was evident in NATO defense ministers’ 
meetings, and international conferences on Afghanistan, where the United States and its coalition 
partners worked on creating a common stance on Afghanistan. 
8 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 8. 
9 Terry J. Pudas, “Preparing Future Coalition Commanders,” JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 3, (1993-1994), 
p. 41.  
10 Wayne A. Silkett, ”Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” Parameters , Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 81. 
Jonathan Colman offers a similar perspective on intra-coalition friction. Colman  notes that “while coalitions are 
often sought for the purposes of burden-sharing and  legitimacy, they also invite conflicting interests from coalition  
partners and inhibit the effective coordination of policy. Burden-sharing may be fine in theory but it can hinder war-
planning.” See Jonathan Colman, “The Challenges of Coalition Building: The Vietnam Experience, 1964-1969,” 
RUSI Analysis 2010. . 
11 Christopher Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Cooperation, Afghanistan and Strategic 
Culture,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 151, No. 5 (2006), p. 16.; Andrew J. Pierre, Coalition: Building and Maintenance 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2002), p. 2. 
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Second, alliances are formed for defensive purposes, for instance, to prevent a war. But, 
coalitions are formed in response to a war or a war like scenario.12 According to Glenn Snyder, 
alliances are formalized military agreements for the use of force in “specified circumstances.”13 
Bueno de Mesquito and Singer offer a similar definition of alliances: they are coordinating 
mechanism for dealing with “specified contingencies.”14 These two definitions of alliances, 
couple with Osgood’s conceptualization of alliances, mentioned before, as agreements pledging 
the use of force indicates that alliances are peace-time and pre-war military agreements. By 
contrast, most definitions of coalitions emphasize the nature of ad hoc military cooperation 
created in response to an existing or specific contingency.15 Unlike alliances, which may survive 
even after a crisis is over; most coalitions are likely to disintegrate in the aftermath of the 
specific contingency, which has formed it. A classic example is the First Iraq War coalition 
(1990-1991), which dissolved after the Iraqi forces were forced to withdraw from Kuwait. 
George Sprowls notes that “Coalitions are relatively short-lived alignments to meet a particular 
contingency and rapidly disintegrate once that situation is resolved.”16
                                                            
12 Nora Bensahel, “The Coalition Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University, 1999), pp. 8-10. 
 This is true for most of 
the cases. However, the Afghanistan War coalition and the Second Iraq War coalition appear to 
be two notable exceptions. The Afghanistan coalition was formed in October 2001, and 
continues to operate as of writing this dissertation in December 2010. The Iraq coalition 
originated in March 2003, and the combat phase of the war lasted until mid-2010, when the 
United States declared an end to the war. 
13 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4. Emphasis original.  
14 Bruce Bueno de Meesquita and J. David Singer, “Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis,” 
Political Science Annul, Vol. 4 (1973), p 241.  
15 Bensahel, “The Coalition Paradox,” p. 9. 
16 George Sprowls, “States and War Coalitions: A Case Study of the Gulf War,” Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Morgantown, West Virginia: West Virginia University), p. 6.  
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Third, coalitions are mostly conceived as dealing with a single issue area, such as to deal 
with an emerging threat. In contrast, alliances have a much broader scope, which is not limited to 
wartime threat, but includes a broad range of security relationship, such as, peace time defense 
cooperation, joint military exercise, arms trade etc. According to the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD):  
Coalitions are different from alliances inasmuch as they tend to be more loosely 
structured and often focus on a single objective. Alliances are more often 
agreements to promote the allies’ security in whatever situations arise for an 
extended period.17
In summary, alliances and coalitions share a basic characteristic – they are both 
concerned with multilateral military cooperation. However, they have some sharp differences. 
Instead of looking at these differences in irreconcilable terms, alliances and coalitions can be 
broadly understood as part of a three-dimensional security strategy. The three dimensions are: 
formalization, time horizon, and coverage of issue area. When states join a peacetime formalized 
security arrangement, which includes a wide range of military cooperation issues, such 
agreement falls into the category of an alliance. By contrast, when states join a formal or 
informal wartime military agreement, with the explicit purpose of fighting an adversary, it would 
fit the definition of an ad hoc coalition. The lines between these two concepts will be blurred, if 
members of a peacetime alliance enter into a war, or if wartime coalition members establish a 
post-war alliance to institutionalize their security cooperation. Because of these blurring lines 
and conceptual similarities, this dissertation will use many of the insights drawn from the 
 
                                                            
17 U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense), p. 478. http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf, accessed November 27, 2010. 
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alliance literature, but use the term coalition only to refer to ad hoc military cooperation among 
states.  
 
II. Coalition Burden-sharing: Definitional Contours and Measurement Issues  
There is no universally accepted definition of burden-sharing. This dissertation defines burden-
sharing as the distribution of military and non-military risks of fighting a coalition war. Military 
risks include the dangers of combat operations, whereas non-military risks include the economic 
costs of a war, and the hazards of participating in non-combat reconstruction and development 
operations. Non-military risks also include diplomatic and political frictions among the coalition 
members over the goals of the war, and the means to achieve it.  
An important challenge in coalition politics is the lack of a standard operating procedure 
to determine how the military and non-military risks of a coalition war would be distributed 
among the coalition members, or whether one type of risk is more important than the other. This 
study shows that the nature of a military operation, the international environment in which it is 
carried out, and the domestic political culture of a coalition member are all likely to influence 
whether the military risks would be privileged over the non-military risks. In the Afghanistan 
War context, the most important issue was whether America’s principal NATO and non-NATO 
allies, such as Britain, Germany, and Pakistan were sharing the military risks of fighting the 
Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies. Thus, participating in combat operations, and 
gaining success in such operations appeared to be the key benchmarks, upon which some 
coalition partners’ burden-sharing contributions were evaluated.  
19 
 
How do the alliance and coalition literatures conceptualize burden-sharing? According to 
George Liska, one of the most prominent alliance theorists, burden-sharing is about “sharing 
liabilities” among members of an alliance or coalition.18 Liska’s conceptualization of burden-
sharing as liabilities sharing is quite vague, and does not offer any insights into the types of 
liabilities to be shared by allies and coalition partners. A broader definition is offered by former 
U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who notes that burden sharing is the “fair 
distribution of political, manpower, materiel and economic costs of maintaining our [U.S.] 
alliance postures.”19
 Although Weinberger emphasizes the issue of “fair distribution” of costs, most of the 
alliance and coalition literatures demonstrate the challenges of equitable or fair sharing of costs 
and the risk in pursuing a common defense policy. The measurement problem is pertinent here.  
Should burden-sharing commitment only focus on military contribution, or include non-military 
contribution as well? These questions dominated the U.S. national security discourse during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War era. In a broad overview of burden-sharing assessment in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a DoD report on allied contributions emphasized the 
diverse forms of cost-sharing measures, such as “defense spending, military manpower, and cash 
 Weinberger’s definition should be understood in the context of allied 
commitment to the security of the transatlantic alliance, in which the United States and its West 
European allies were committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for defense 
against the threats from former Soviet Union and its communist allies. It thus refers to a cost 
sharing mechanism within the structure of a formalized and institutionalized military alliance. 
                                                            
18 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1962), p. 26. 
19 See U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Allied Commitments to Defense Spending (Washington, D.C.: 
DoD, 1981) p. 4. 
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contributions to offset stationing costs.”20
 A close look at the burden-sharing literature suggests two types of cost and risk 
distributional issues – one related to treaty-based alliance commitment, and the other related to 
informal coalition commitment. Writing in the context of U.S. and NATO’s alliance 
commitment, Forster and Cimbala define burden-sharing as the “distribution of costs and risk” in 
the attainment of a common security goal. These risks may be military and non-military. Forster 
and Cimbala stress that NATO’s central purpose is to promote collective security. They observe 
that in the context of NATO:  
 The report stressed that such military contributions are 
tangible and measurable. But there are other non-military – largely social, economic, and 
political contributions – which are intangible, and thus cannot be quantifiably measured. These 
non-tangible contributions include “political and financial support for shared international goals; 
the social, economic, and political costs of hosting foreign troops; and in-kind contribution to 
mutual defense.”  
[B]urdens that have to be shared include costs of raising and supporting arms of 
service, deploying them overseas, and using them in combat or peace operations. 
Costs of military intervention are not only economic. Wars and other military 
operations can influence public opinion and, in some cases, cause governments to 
fall.21
Forster and Cimbala’s remark touches on an interesting issue – the political and indirect 
costs of alliance commitment, such as eroding public support and collapse of government, as a 
result of a country’s military contribution to “wars or other military operations.” This was 
 
                                                            
20 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the United 
States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C., 1992), p. 1 
21 Forster and Cimbala, The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing, p. 1. 
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particularly salient during the course of the Afghanistan War, in which the Dutch coalition 
government collapsed over the issue of its Afghan war commitment.22 Similarly, the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair had to leave power in 2007 due to his controversial decision to 
participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.23
While most of the burden-sharing literature has tended to focus on the NATO alliance, 
there is a growing body of scholarly works on burden-sharing in ad hoc coalitions and 
multilateral operations for conflict prevention and crisis management. In their analysis of 
burden-sharing during the First Iraq War, Bennett et al focus on three types of coalition 
contributions: political, economic, and military.
 The Dutch and the British cases show the 
political cost of coalition burden-sharing. They highlight that the political commitment of a troop 
contributing nation’s incumbent government is important in creating and managing a wartime 
coalition.  
24
                                                            
22 The Dutch coalition government of Christian Democratic Party, Labour Party, and Christian Union Party 
failed to reach a consensus over the extension of the mandate of Dutch troops in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province. 
The left Labour Party withdrew support from the coalition and insisted that the government must withdraw the 2,000 
man strong Dutch forces from Afghanistan by a previously decided deadline of August 2010. The Dutch pull out 
created a rift in the Afghan War coalition at a time when NATO’s European Members were expected to make an 
additional 10,000 troop contribution to match a surge of 30,000 U.S. troops. See, “Dutch Government Collapses 
Over Afghanistan Mission,” Voice of America News, February 20, 2010. 
 Daniel Baltrusaitis adopts this three-tiered 
conceptualization of burden-sharing, and applies it to the discussion of the Second Iraq War 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Dutch-Government-Collapses-Amid-Disagreement-on-Afghan-Troop-
Withdrawal-84830287.html, accessed November 24, 2010; Reed Stevenson and Aaron Gray-Block, “Dutch 
Government Falls Over Afghan Mission,” Reuters, February 20, 2010. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE61J02H20100220, accessed November 24, 2010; Robert Marquand, 
“Dutch Government Collapse: Will Other European Troops Now Leave Afghanistan?” Christian Science Monitor, 
February 22, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0222/Dutch-government-collapse-Will-other-European-
troops-now-leave-Afghanistan, accessed November 24, 2010.  
23 Matthew Tempest, “Blair to Stand Down on June 27,” The Guardian, May 10, 2007. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/may/10/tonyblair.labour, accessed November 24, 2010; Heidi Blake, 
“Tony Blair: ‘Iraq War Became a Nightmare I Failed to Foresee,’” The Telegraph, September 1, 2010. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/tony-blair/7974621/Tony-Blair-Iraq-war-became-a-nightmare-
I-failed-to-foresee.html, accessed November 24, 2010.  
24 See Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burdensharing in the Persian 
Gulf War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 
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coalition.25
Why care about multilateral coalition operations? Forster and Cimbala offer an 
interesting note:  
 This dissertation is largely modeled on the Bennett et al, and the Baltrusaitis studies 
on coalition burden-sharing. It uses the term diplomatic contribution, instead of political 
contribution. This semantic change is premised on the fact that coalition countries are constantly 
engaged in diplomatic negotiations and bargaining to coordinate their activities and to avoid the 
possible frictions among themselves. 
Multilateral operations introduce unique burdens, including the responsibility for 
developing and maintaining coalitions, compromising on the use of force, 
establishing clear and agreed upon mission objectives, determining operational 
command and control, which heretofore have received little attention, assessing 
financial viability, and assuming the burdens of reconstruction after hostilities 
have eased.26
 A closer look at the two major post-9/11 coalitions – in Afghanistan and Iraq - 
demonstrates the validity of the Forster and Cimbala remarks. In both cases the challenges of 
equitable or fair burden-sharing were present during the formation and maintenance of the 
coalitions. Critics in the United States often alleged that their European allies were not doing 
enough. They wanted Europe to contribute more troops and participate more in combat 
operations to fight the terrorists and insurgents. The European leaders often ignored such critics, 
and resisted the pressures of more troop commitment and more kinetic operations. 
 
                                                            
25 See Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics and the Iraq War (Boulder and London: First Forum Press, 
2010).  
26 Forster and Cimbala, The US, NATO and Military Burden-Sharing, p. 2. 
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The typology of alliances or coalitions has important bearing upon the burden-sharing 
role of members. Liska notes that there are two major types of alliances: defensive and offensive. 
Defensive alliances are built for deterrence purposes, and aimed at opposing a common threat, 
while offensive alliances are built for coercive purposes, and aimed at changing the status quo.27
 What are the principal tasks of a military coalition? How did the U.S.-led coalition in 
Afghanistan come into being to perform one or more of those tasks?  
 
This difference between defensive and offensive alliances has important implications for 
coalition burden-sharing. Peacetime defensive burden-sharing behavior stresses the need for 
proportional defense expenditure, whereas coercive coalition commitments emphasize the need 
for more substantive cost- and risk-sharing, which may include troop contribution for combat 
war fighting purposes, economic aid for sharing the war-related costs, and diplomatic initiatives 
to induce or coerce a country for joining a coalition or abandoning a rival coalition. This study 
shows that the Afghanistan War coalition combines the attributes of both offensive and defensive 
alliances. Although it was primarily created to fight terrorism, it later embraced the defensive 
reconstruction and stabilization operations.  
Osgood’s analysis on the functions of alliances is worth discussing here to understand the 
accomplishments of the Afghanistan War coalition.  Osgood stresses that alliances are created to 
accomplish four principal tasks: “accretion of external power, internal security, restraint of allies, 
and international order.”28
                                                            
27 Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, p. 30. 
 First, an alliance increases the cumulative power of the allied 
countries vis-à-vis any perceived threat. Second, it can be used to suppress any internal dissent 
and ensure the regime survival of a weak ally. Third, an alliance commits its member states to a 
28 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, p 21.  
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policy of mutual respect for sovereignty and restraint in the use of power against each other. 
Finally, an alliance can play an important role in creating a stable international order.29
 The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan appeared to serve two of the four purposes 
described by Osgood: external power accretion, and the maintenance of international order. It 
aggregated the power of the coalition countries for the stated purpose of combating terrorism and 
containing insurgency. One can rightly argue that the coalition in Afghanistan served another 
purpose, by acting as an instrument for legitimizing multilateral operations, which is not 
mentioned in the Osgood’s typology of alliance functions. It was obvious that the formation of 
the coalition was critical for the United States to demonstrate the legitimacy of its actions in 
Afghanistan.
 
30
Rice [Condoleezza Rice,  U.S. National Security Advisor and later Secretary of 
State during the Junior Bush administration] turned to the allies who were 
clamoring to participate. Getting as many of them invested with military forces in 
the war was essential. The coalition had to have teeth…But Rumsfeld [The then 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld] didn’t want other forces included 
 However, the motivation for ‘accretion of external power’ played an important 
role in creating the coalition. This was evident during the discussions among the members of 
Bush administration’s war cabinet. The war cabinet discussed whether the United Sates should 
only encourage countries with strong military power, and the ability to stabilize the international 
order by fighting transnational terrorism. In Bush at War, Bob Woodward writes:  
                                                            
29 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, p 21-22. 
30 John M. Swartz argues that “Without the legitimacy that the ISAF coalition provides, the U.S. would find 
itself isolated from, and criticized by, the rest of the world. It would also be hard pressed to showcase the Afghan 
government as legitimate, both to internal and external audiences.” See John M. Swartz, “The ISAF Coalition: 
Achieving U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan?” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 
2010), p. 14. Bellamy and Williams also note that ISAF provides a “degree of legitimization” for U.S. military 
actions in Afghanistan. See Allex J. Bellamy, and Paul D. Willams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and 
Contemporary Peace Operations,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), p. 169. 
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for cosmetic purposes. Some German battalion or a French frigate could get in the 
way of his operation. The coalition had to fit the conflict and not the other way 
around. They could not invent roles. Maybe they didn’t need a French frigate.31
 Woodward also writes that in building the coalition, the U.S. policy makers were cautious 
in making sure that coalition members do not constrain the autonomy of U.S. forces on the 
ground in Afghanistan. Speaking about former Vice President Dick Cheney, Woodward 
comments:  
  
Cheney countered that the coalition [against terrorism] should be a means to 
wiping out terrorism, not an end it itself—a view that others shared. They wanted 
support from the rest of the world, but they did not want the coalition to tie their 
hands.32
The quotes from Woodward show a mixture of hawkish and dovish attitudes toward the 
Afghanistan War coalition. The doves in the Bush administration wanted to encourage greater 
participation from coalition partners. For them two issues were of most importance: U.S. 
leadership of the coalition and coalition partners with an ability to fight and fit to the conflict.  
 
In summary, coalition burden-sharing is defined by multiple concepts. Some scholars call 
it liabilities sharing. Others call it cost, or risk sharing. This study adopts the second 
conceptualization. It defines burden-sharing as the distribution of the costs and risks associated 
with the military and non-military operations of a coalition war. Although some alliance theorists 
offer a dichotomy between offensive and defensive alliances, the Afghanistan coalition shows 
the attributes of both types of alliances. This was evident in the coalition operations aimed at 
                                                            
31  Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 179-180. 
32 Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 48-49. 
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capturing or killing Al Qaeda and Taliban militias, as well as reconstruction and stabilization 
operations in the areas, recovered from terrorist and insurgent control. Since the United States 
was the key leader of the coalition, this study examines a target country’s coalition contribution 
from U.S. perspective.  
 
III. Coalition Burden-sharing in U.S. Foreign and Security Policy  
Coalition burden-sharing occupies a central position in U.S. military and foreign policy planning 
processes. A glaring example is the U.S. Military’s Joint Vision 2020, which recognizes the 
importance of multinational coalition operations in the 21st century.33
                                                            
33 Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 15-16. 
 It also emphasizes the need 
to achieve dominance in full spectrum of warfare, and close partnership with allies and coalition 
members with varying level of technological capability. Although the origin of wartime military 
coalitions can be traced back to the Greek city states, military alliances and coalitions dominated 
the history of international relations during the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, the two 
World Wars, and the post-War era. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of its 
archrival – the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the lone superpower in the 
international system. This ‘unipolar moment,’ has brought the United States an opportunity to 
conduct unilateral military operations. Nevertheless, most recent U.S. Presidents –from George 
H.W. Bush to Barack H. Obama – have demonstrated a preference to build or maintain military 
coalitions for the pursuit of foreign and security policy. This is evident in the U.S.-led coalitions 
during the First Iraq War (1990-1991), the NATO air campaign in Kosovo (1999), the War in 
Afghanistan (2001-present), and the Second Iraq War (2003-2010).  
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 In all of the four cases listed above, the United States constructed the coalitions and made 
the disproportionately largest military contributions. Yet, allies and coalition partners also made 
significant military and non-military contributions to the wartime coalitions. For instance, during 
the First Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Egypt, and Syria made significant military 
contributions by deploying nearly 200,000 troops, who have joined the 697,000 U.S. troops to 
compel the Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait.34 The economic contribution of coalition partners was 
also quite significant. The top five economic contributors to the First Gulf War were Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, Germany, and United Arab Emirates.35 They incurred most of the costs 
for the military operations against the Iraqi forces. During the Kosovo campaigns, the U.S. air 
and naval forces carried out most of the airstrikes. However, the French, German, and Italian 
military services also assumed significant burden-sharing role during the campaigns.36
 The United States continued its lead role in post-9/11 military coalitions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but encouraged a strong role for the coalition partners.  By November 2010, 48 
countries contributed to nearly 131,000 troops to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Of the 
131,000 troops, the United States alone contributed 90,000 troops, which constitutes nearly 70% 
of foreign forces in Afghanistan.
  
37
                                                            
34 Lyla M. Hernandez, Jane S. Durch, Dan G. Blazer II, and Isabel V. Hoverman, eds., Gulf War Veterans: 
Measuring Health (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Press, 1999).  
 By contrast, the NATO Member States and non-NATO allies 
contributed the remaining 40,000 troops, which accounted for 30% of the foreign forces in 
Afghanistan. During the Second Gulf War coalition against Iraq, the U.S. forces dominated the 
35 Executive Office of the President, United States Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and Foreign Contributions 
to Offset Such Costs (Washington, D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, 1992), pp. 13-16.  
36Michael Lamb, Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns (Alabama: Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Air War College, Air University, 2002); Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice.” 
37 NATO International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, “International Security Assistance Force: Troop 
Contributing Nations,” Updated November 15, 2010. 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/15%20NOV.Placemat%20page1-3.pdf, accessed December 
5, 2010. 
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war. At the peak of the foreign forces in Iraq War II in November-December 2005, there were an 
estimated 183,000 international troops in Iraq. Of the 183,000 foreign troops, the United States 
contributed nearly 160,000 troops. This accounted for 87% of all troops in the Iraq War. By 
contrast, coalition partners contributed only 20,000 of the peak time troops, which constitute 
only 13 % of the total foreign troops in Iraq.38
The measurement of coalition contribution by looking at the absolute number of troops 
can be misleading. This is due to the fact that, when compared with the absolute number of U.S. 
troops, coalition contribution by individual countries seems only a small fraction of the total 
number of foreign troops in Afghanistan. However, deployed troop as a percentage of total active 
forces could give an alternative measure, and perhaps a better picture of coalition burden-sharing 
behavior.
  
39 For instance, by early 2010, the United Kingdom deployed nearly 10,000 troops in 
Afghanistan. This was more than 5% of UK’s active military forces. During the same time the 
United States deployed 67,000 troops, which was only 4% of its active military forces. Two 
other coalition partners – Canada and the Netherlands – had also contributed nearly 4.5% of their 
active military forces, which was slightly higher than the U.S. military contribution, when 
compared with the Afghanistan deployment as a % of total active military forces in contributing 
nations.40
                                                            
38 Michael O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-
Saddam Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, November 20, 2010), p. 19.  
 By the end of 2010, the active versus deployed force ratio changed significantly for the 
United States, while coalition troop ratio remained almost the similar. This was due to the fact 
that in 2010, the United States sent more than 30,000 troops in 2010, making the total U.S. 
39 Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters 
for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 2010), p. 200. 
40 International institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London, IISS, 2010).  
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troops to Afghanistan nearly 100,000.41
 The foregoing discussion shows the importance of coalition operations in U.S. foreign 
policy, and the issue of troop commitment as a measure of coalition burden-sharing. This study 
shows that although troop commitment offers a simple and measurable indicator of burden-
sharing, it does not capture the intricate challenges involved in a military coalition.  I argue that a 
comprehensive analysis of coalition politics requires a much broader discussion on what the 
troops are asked to do, and not to do; and how they partner with the civilian actors in a conflict 
zone. The diplomatic and political contribution made by the heads of states is also important in 
understanding coalition burden-sharing. It is in this context, the next section discusses how we 
measure burden-sharing outcomes during the Afghanistan War. 
  This was 6.7% of the total U.S. active force deployed in 
Afghanistan.  
IV. Measuring Burden-Sharing Outcomes in Afghanistan 
This dissertation examines three types of burden-sharing during the Afghanistan War: (a) 
diplomatic contribution to the coalition war efforts; (b) participation in offensive military 
operations to combat terrorist and insurgent groups; and (c) defensive civilian and military 
operations to stabilize Afghanistan. Stabilization covers a wide range of activities. Two such 
activities are the most important: economic reconstruction and development projects through the 
provincial reconstruction teams; and rebuilding the Afghan military and police.   
First, diplomatic contribution is measured by looking at the bilateral and multilateral 
meetings, and international conferences dealing with the War in Afghanistan. I examine whether 
a country pursues a proactive or a reactive diplomacy. The entrepreneurial role of key decision 
                                                            
41 “Obama to Send 30,000 More US Troops to Afghanistan,” BBC News, December 2, 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8388939.stm, accessed March 21, 2011. 
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makers and the organizational capability of a country to host an international conference are two 
major indicators of proactive versus reactive diplomacy.  
Second, offensive military contribution is measured by three major factors. These include 
troop deployment, area of operation, and participation in offensive military operations. First, I 
examine the absolute number of troops deployed by a country; and the deployed force as a 
percentage of a country’s active combat force. Next, I explore whether the deployed forces are 
located in the relatively peaceful areas, with low Al Qaeda and Taliban militia activities, or the 
restive areas with high militia activities. Finally, I investigate whether a coalition country leads 
or participates in combat operations, targeting the Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents. 42
My discussion on coalition contributions in offensive military operations draws heavily 
from the literature on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 
These latter two issues—troop deployment in hostile areas, and participation or leadership in 
combat operations—are considered the most challenging tasks, involving the greatest risk-
sharing in coalition operations. This is due to the fact that troop deployment in hostile areas and 
participation in combat operations expose the military personnel to the dangers of enemy actions, 
which may result in serious casualties and fatalities.  
43
                                                            
42 This is also defined as the direct approach to counterterrorism. The goal of the direct approach is to defeat a 
terrorist group or threat and deny it a safe haven. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009). 
 I offer a range of combat 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf, 
accessed December 29, 2010. The rules of engagement governing lethal use of force has come under intense 
scrutiny in recent years. See: Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: NATO Troops Apply ‘Robust New Rules of 
Engagement,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, February 6, 2006. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065518.html, accessed December 29, 2010; “NATO Tightens Rules of 
Engagement in Afghanistan,” VOA News, January 14, 2009. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-01-
14-voa58-68666337.html, accessed December 29, 2010. 
43 For a discussion on counterinsurgency in Pakistan, see: C. Christine Fair, Counterterror Coalitions: 
Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004); Seth G. Jones, and C. Christine Fair, 
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010). For a discussion on the ISAF counterinsurgency 
operations in Afghanistan, see Theo Farrell,  and Stuart Gordon, “COIN Machine: The British Military in 
Afghanistan,” Orbis, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 665-683; Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa 
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performances a country may demonstrate in ground offensives. These include: weak or 
negligible, improved, and strong combat roles. A weak combat role is defined by the inability of 
security forces to defeat the terrorists and insurgents in a given military operation. By contrast, a 
strong combat role is defined by the ability of military forces to defeat the enemy, and to hold the 
areas controlled by the enemy. In between these two outcomes, improved combat role captures 
the learning and adaptation in military forces. It indicates that a country’s military forces has 
learned from its past mistakes, and makes significant progress in defeating the insurgents, and in 
holding (controlling) the areas. As shown in this dissertation, the British, German, and Pakistani 
forces went through a process of learning and adaptation, which resulted in improved combat 
performance in the years between 2008 and 2010.  
Third, defensive reconstruction contribution is measured by looking at the civil-military 
initiatives to support the process of stabilization in Afghanistan. For the NATO ISAF troop 
contributing nations, reconstruction contribution includes the delivery of development aid, the 
training of Afghan national police, and the armed forces, and the construction of infrastructures, 
such as bridges, dams, schools, and hospitals.44
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Monica, RAND, 2008); Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in 
Afghanistan,” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp. 311-332; Sean Maloney, Enduring the Freedom: A 
Rogue Historian in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005); Sean Maloney,  
A Violent Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province 2003-07,” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2008.), pp. 201-220; Timo Noetzel, and Thomas Rid, “Germany’s Options in 
Afghanistan,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5 (2009), pp. 71-90. 
 For Pakistan, a distinct measure of reconstruction 
contribution is applied. This includes the hosting of Afghan refugees, and the coordination of 
refugee repatriation processes, the provision of aid commitment to Afghanistan, and the level of 
bilateral trade with Afghanistan.  
44 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, No. 3000.05, November 28, 2005.  
http://fhp.osd.mil/intlhealth/pdfs/DoDD3000.05.pdf, accessed December 29, 2010.  
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The preceding discussion shows that coalition burden-sharing can take three major forms: 
diplomatic, offensive military, and defensive civil-military reconstruction contributions. Did 
coalition partners, especially, in Afghanistan give an equal priority to each of these three types of 
burden-sharing? The answer is no.  
Interestingly, coalition burden-sharing is often equated with sharing the military risks of 
combat operations. The United State, Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands shared this view, and 
since 2006, they shouldered most of the military burdens of offensive operations in eastern and 
southern Afghanistan.45
How did the United States, as the coalition leader manage the competing demands of 
offensive and defensive operations in Afghanistan? The U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, 
 In contrast, Germany and Italy opposed the importance of combat 
operations, and insisted that defensive stabilization operations were as important as the offensive 
military operations. The effect of such German and Italian view was enormous. They adopted a 
risk-averse strategy, and resisted the U.S. and NATO pressures for redeployment in southern 
Afghanistan. As the War in Afghanistan progressed, it became apparent that the domestic 
political constraints, such as, the legal-constitutional provisions, and public opinion, had often 
influenced how a coalition country defined its Afghanistan mission. 
                                                            
45 In paper, the United States provides a strong emphasis on stability operations. For instance, a Pentagon 
directive on stability operations says non-combat stabilization operations are a core military mission which “shall be 
given priority comparable to combat operations” and shall be integrated across all spectrum of military planning. In 
practice, the United States failed to do so. From 2001 until 2006, the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan had neglected 
stability operations, and mostly prioritized kinetic operations, which focused on an enemy-centric strategy. For a 
U.S. official view on stability operations, see U.S. Department of Defense, Directive: Military Support for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, p. 2; For a review of the U.S. and coalition war in 
Afghanistan, see Valentina Taddeo, “U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan 
Campaign,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010), pp. 27-38; Bernard Finel, “A Substitute for Victory: 
Adopting a New Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, April 8, 2010; Sloan Mann and 
James Derleth, “Unschooled: Howe to Better Train Our Nation Builders,” World Affairs, Vol. 173, No. 6 (March-
April 2011), pp. 81-88.  
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released in 2006, suggests that combat and stabilization operations are not mutually exclusive. 46 
Instead, they should be understood as mutually reinforcing. Widely known as a population-
centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the 2006 doctrine suggests a three-staged clear-hold-build 
strategy for coalition operations. This means that the U.S. and coalition forces should first 
concentrate on clearing an area from insurgent control. This phase will be dominated by 
offensive operations. Next, they will assist the indigenous forces to hold the territory to extend 
the writ of the local government. In the final stage, coalition countries should invest their civil-
military resources for the building the areas, recovered from insurgent control. In essence, this 
clear-hold-build strategy was tested in the Iraq War, and later became the mantra of coalition 
operations in Afghanistan.47
In summary, this chapter accomplishes four tasks. First, it shows that the conceptual 
differences between alliances and coalitions. Second, it defines coalition burden-sharing as the 
distribution of the military and non-military costs and risks among ad hoc coalition partners 
fighting a joint war. Third, it discusses why coalition warfare remains a salient feature in U.S. 
foreign and security policy. Fourth, it shows that states’ burden-sharing behavior can be 
observed in three areas of cooperation: diplomatic contribution, participation in offensive 
military operations, and involvement in defensive reconstruction and stabilization operations.  
  
 
 
                                                            
46 See United States Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
pp. 174-187; Alexander Alderson, “Learning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and  Practice,” 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 6 (2007), pp. 12-19.  
47 Alexander Alderson, “US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s Perspective,” Parameters, Vol. 37, No. 4 
(2007), pp. 33-45; Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters, 
Vol. 39, No. 3 (2009), pp. 5-17. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
COALITION BURDEN-SHARING: A THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
There is a vibrant debate in the alliance and coalition literature regarding the sources of a state’s 
coalition behavior, and the determinants of a state’s burden-sharing commitment. The neo-realist 
theory of international relations suggests a systemic level explanation, and argues that the 
distribution of power in the international system determines the coalition behavior of states.1 
Strategic culture theorists reject such systemic level explanation, and argue that neo-realism 
cannot explain why states, under the similar international system, behave differently. Taking a 
domestic level analysis, with an emphasis on national strategic decision makers, their belief 
system, and organizational culture of the military, proponents of strategic culture suggest a 
‘national style’ of coalition behavior. 2 This chapter shows that neither neo-realism nor strategic 
culture offers sufficient explanations for explaining and predicting the coalition behavior of 
states. Taking a middle ground between neo-realism and strategic culture, it proposes a neo-
classical realist explanation of coalition burden-sharing. It argues that international systemic 
incentives and constraints are channeled through the domestic political, and culture-induced, 
processes to produce a unique burden-sharing behavior for states.3
                                                            
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Stepen Walt, The 
Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). For a neo-realist account of the war on terrorism, 
and the role of the Unite States as the coalition leader, see ; Thomas Donnelly, and Frederick Kagan, Lessons for a 
Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2010). 
  
2 Christopher Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Cooperation, Afghanistan and Strategic 
Culture,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 151, No. 5 (2006), pp. 14-19; Christopher Coker, The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture 
and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2007); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military 
Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: 
Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010), 
pp. 567-594; 
3 For a general discussion on neo-classical realism, see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of 
Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), pp. 144-177. An excellent analysis of coalition burden-
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Although the neo-classical realist theory of IR has gained some currency in recent years, 
it is yet to provide a satisfactory answer to the challenges of coalition politics in the war on 
terrorism in Afghanistan. This chapter addresses this research gap by modifying the existing 
theoretical models of coalition burden-sharing, and by offering a better theoretical model. My 
theoretical model specifies three international systemic variables—alliance dependence, balance 
of threat, and collective action, and argues that any of these systemic factors will present an 
incentive to encourage a state to join and to support the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. After 
the systemic level incentives are controlled for, the domestic level intervening variables are 
likely to influence the decision process and the burden-sharing commitment of coalition 
members. I specify three domestic level variables and structural constraints – domestic political 
regime, public opinion, and national military capability. Like other neo-classical realists, I do not 
reject either the neo-realist or the strategic culturalist explanations; instead, my theoretical model 
refines them by offering a better causal process to predict and explain the complexities of 
coalition politics in Afghanistan.4
This chapter proceeds in several stages. The first section presents the neo-realist, and 
strategic cultural explanations of coalition burden-sharing. Next, it argues why a neo-classical 
 I argue that the discussion of coalition burden-sharing must 
start at the systemic level, but it should incorporate the domestic level cultural-political 
constraints, to analyze the variations in burden-sharing behavior of coalition members. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
sharing from a neo-classical realist perspective can be found in Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics and the Iraq 
War: Determinants of Choice (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2010). Although Baltrusaitis does not claim to be a 
neo-classical realist, his analysis clearly falls into the category of neo-classical realism, as he shows how domestic 
level factors act as a causal link between systemic incentives and unit level state behavior. Also see Patricia 
Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral 
Prosecution of Wars,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2010, pp. 111-136. 
4 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006); Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American 
Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 20. 
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realist theory offers a better and richer explanation of coalition politics. The fourth section 
examines two existing models of burden-sharing, and discusses their limitations. The next 
section offers a better specified neo-classical realist model of burden-sharing. My theoretical 
model suggests that international systemic incentives are channeled through the domestic 
political-cultural processes to produce diverse coalition behaviors and outcomes for states. The 
sixth section discusses the research method, and case selection issues. It also discusses the 
limitations in this study, and the theoretical contribution of this dissertation.  
 
I. Neo-Realism and Coalition Burden-Sharing 
Neo-realism offers a systemic level theory of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing. The 
central premises of neo-realism are the anarchic nature of the international system and the effect 
of the distribution of power in the international system in shaping states’ behavior. According to 
Kenneth Waltz, the most influential neo-realist theorist, “[A] theory of international politics … 
can describe the range of likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given 
system and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change.”5 For neo-realists, the 
interactions of states and the outcomes of such interactions are the dependent variable, whereas 
the nature of the international system—whether bipolar or multipolar—is the independent 
variable.6
 There are two major variants of neo-realism: defensive realism, and offensive realism. 
Defensive realists argue that states do not necessarily seek to maximize their relative power; 
  
                                                            
5 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, fn. 1, pp. 71-72. 
6 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” p. 144. 
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however, if threatened, states would pursue a policy of increasing their military power. The 
Waltzian balance of power theory is essentially a defensive neo-realist theory.7 In his seminal 
work, Theory of International Politics, Waltz argues that states either rely on their own power, or 
join a formal alliance to ensure their security. The first refers to internal balancing, while the 
latter refers to external balancing. The formation of alliances and counter-alliances for the 
purpose of maintaining the balance of power are, Waltz argues, the defining feature of 
international politics.8 The problem with a defensive realist strategy is that other states might 
misconstrue the defensive motivation of states, and seek to maximize their power, and thus 
create an offense-defense a security dilemma.9
Offensive realists offer an alternative view. They argue that great powers are always 
uncertain about how much power would make them secure. This uncertainty motivates them to 
ensure their security by achieving a hegemonic status now, and by preventing others from 
challenging their power later. The leading proponent of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer, 
argues that “A great power that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave 
more aggressively.”
  
10 Stephen Brooks takes a similar position, and argues that in the anarchical 
international system, states always seek to “advance their power over other nations, taking 
military advantage of weaker states whenever they have the chance.”11
The central difference between defensive and offensive realism is simple: the first argues 
that states seek to survive in an anarchical system; while the latter stresses that states, especially 
  
                                                            
7 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118. 
8 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
9 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 406-407. 
10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 37. 
11 Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1997), p. 462. 
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great powers, are not content with the existing status quo or survival; instead, the international 
system offers them an incentive to gain power at the expense of others.12 Despite such a 
difference, the most common point among the defensive and offensive realism is their emphasis 
on the systemic sources of state behavior. Unlike classical realists, such as, Hans Morgenthau, 
who believe that the struggle for power among nations originate from animus dominandi – men’s 
lust for power to dominate others;13 defensive and offensive realists argue that the search for 
security is “forced by the anarchic structure of the international system.”14
In analyzing the burden-sharing behavior of coalition countries, Bennett et al, Daniel 
Baltrusaitis, and David Auerswald discuss the effect of three systemic level explanatory 
variables, derived from the neo-realist theory of IR.
 
15
 
 These are alliance dependence, balance of 
power/balance of threat, and collective action.  
Alliance Dependence. Alliance dependence presents the first system-induced incentive or 
constraint to shape a state’s coalition decisions. A central feature on alliance politics is the 
dilemma of alliance dependence. In the context of an ad hoc military coalition, alliance dilemma 
presents a unique problem: if a state joins an ad hoc coalition, it might be entrapped for the 
duration of the conflict; if it does not join the coalition, it might be abandoned.16
                                                            
12 For an interesting discussion on Waltz’s defensive realism, and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, see Glenn 
H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” International Security, Vol. 
27, No. 1 (2002), pp. 149-173.  
 Entrapment 
13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1948), first chapter. 
14 Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” p. 151. 
15 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Dany Unger, eds., Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian 
Gulf War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics; David Auerswald, “Explaining 
Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
48, No. 3 (2004), pp. 631-662. 
16 Glenn Snyder calls this “alliance security dilemma,” whereas Michael Mandelbaum calls this fear of 
entrapment and fear of abandonment. See: Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World 
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refers to a situation of involving in an unwanted conflict – a scenario in which one becomes 
entangled in a conflict, in which alliance interest prevails over national interest. In contrast, 
abandonment implies a situation, in which an alliance partner may defect by withdrawing from 
the alliance, or by aligning with an adversary, or by failing to share the burden of alliance 
commitment.17
According to Glenn Snyder, the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment create a 
security-autonomy trade-off. For instance, a possible remedy for abandonment would be 
increasing alliance commitment, which would enhance one’s security. However, increased 
commitment to an alliance might result in entrapment and possibly dragging onto an unnecessary 
war, reducing one’s autonomy of actions.
   
18
Alliance dependence was a standard picture of the Cold War era international politics, 
dominated by the U.S.-led NATO and the USSR-led Warsaw Pact countries. This dissertation 
shows that although the Cold War ended, the basic principles of alliance dependence may still be 
applicable to formal and informal alliance members. For instance, Britain would find 
transatlantic alliance solidarity with NATO and the United States, rather than alliance 
dependence, guiding its foreign policy. Similarly, unified Germany would assert alliance 
commitment rather than alliance dependence as a defining feature of its transatlantic relations. 
Given the fact that both Britain and Germany are formal treaty-based NATO members, they 
would strongly share the idea of the indivisibility of alliance security, codified in Article 5 of the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Politics, Vol. 36, No. no. 4 (1984), p. 466; Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics 
Before and After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
17 This dilemma of entrapment and abandonment is more precarious for formal treaty-based alliance members 
than ad hoc coalition members. This is due to the fact that unlike alliance members, coalition members do not have 
any pre-existing commitments to support the coalition leader. See: Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. 180-182. 
18 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 181. 
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North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty holds that the security of a member 
state is the security for all. Or, an attack on one is an attack on all.19
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the invocation of Article 5 made it obligatory for the 
NATO members to join the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism. For the United States, no such 
obligatory provision exists for encouraging non-NATO countries, such as Pakistan, to join the 
coalition. Instead, as this dissertation discusses, the United States adopted a quiet diplomatic 
approach to encourage Pakistan’s participation in the coalition.  
  
What is the causal link between alliance dependence and a country’s incentive to 
participate in a coalition? The answer is straightforward: alliance leaders often use carrots and 
sticks to persuade a country to take a specific course of action. A state might be offered some 
incentives to join an ad hoc coalition. Conversely, it might be threatened with the withdrawal of 
certain benefits, if it does not join the coalition. Since the United States is the leader of the 
Afghanistan War coalition, the effect of alliance dependence can be measured by looking at the 
extent to which a state allies with the United States in fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in 
Afghanistan. 
 In the Afghanistan War context, alliance dependence can be measured by a state’s 
economic, military, and political ties to the United States, “or other assistance that would be hard 
to replace.”20
                                                            
19 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty says, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized 
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” See The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 
D.C., April 4, 1949. 
 Thus, NATO members in the Western Europe are likely to align strongly with the 
United States due to their longstanding political and security ties, and their dependence on the 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed March 2, 2011.  
20  Bennett et al., Friends in Need, p. 13. 
41 
 
U.S. nuclear umbrella.21
Unlike the traditional NATO allies, Pakistan is likely to be dependent on U.S. economic 
and military assistance for its support in the fight against terrorism and insurgency. Although not 
a formal alliance member in NATO, but an informal ally in the Afghanistan War coalition, 
Pakistan is likely to face the dilemma of abandonment and entrapment: if it fails to provide 
strong support for U.S. counterterrorism strategy, the U.S. might align with India, and thus 
abandon Pakistan. In contrast, if Pakistan fears entrapment, it might offer the less controversial 
nonmilitary assistance, instead of providing direct military support to the war on terror.
 By contrast, non-NATO allies, such as Pakistan would be expected to 
contribute to U.S. and NATO forces’ operations in Afghanistan by providing basing access and 
logistics transshipment through the Pakistani territory.  
22
 
  
Balance of Power and Balance of Threat. Both classical and neo-realists argue that 
states join alliances and coalitions as a balancing strategy. Hans Morgenthau defines alliances as 
an instrument of foreign policy.23 Kenneth Waltz argues that in the anarchical international 
system, states pursue a self-help strategy, which encourages a balancing behavior by forming 
alliances against a powerful state. Both Morgenthau and Waltz see alliance formation as a 
strategy to maintain balance of power.24
                                                            
21 Dieter Mahncke, Wyn Rees, and Wyne C. Thompson, Redefining Transatlantic Security Relations: The 
Challenge of Change (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), , pp. 1-14; . For an insightful discussion on 
the special case of NATO in U.S. nuclear deterrence, see:  James Schlesinger et al., Report of the Secretary of 
Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of DoD Nuclear Mission 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), pp. 14-17.  
  
22  C. Christin Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 2004). 
23 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.  
24 Although Waltz argues that states join alliances as a balancing strategy, he stresses that systemic pressures 
offer little incentives for states to cooperate with each other. T his is due to two reasons: first, states are always 
concerned about relative gains from cooperation; and states are also concerned about being dependent on an ally, 
which would constrain their autonomy of actions.  
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 Stephen Walt offers a refined notion of balancing. In his seminal work, The Origins of 
Alliances, Walt proposes the theory of balance of threat to better understand alliance behavior.25 
Walt argues that states do not necessarily balance against a power; rather they balance against a 
threat. He introduces the differences between balancing and bandwagoning: Strong states are 
likely to join  an alliance to balance against a threat, while weak states are likely to bandwagon 
with a dominant threat to ensure their security.26
In Walt’s view, the differences between balance of power and balance of threat are 
important. The first posits that states want to aggregate their national power by forming alliances 
to challenge a powerful state. By contrast, Walt argues that states align or re-align to defend 
against an existential or perceived threat. The mere possession or accumulation of material and 
military power does not make a state a rival state, or a target of balancing activity. Instead, 
several factors contribute to the rise of a threat: aggregate power, geographical proximity, 
offensive power, and aggressive intentions of a state.
 
27
Using Walt’s balance of threat theory, Patricia Weitsman has shown that variations in 
threat perceptions can explain states’ varying level of attitudes toward alliance formation and 
burden-sharing commitments. Weitsman argues that a state perceiving a strong threat will 
contribute more toward a coalition than a state perceiving less threat. In Dangerous Alliances, 
Weitsman writes, “Low levels of threat will produce certain alliance patterns, while moderate 
 Walt’s balance of threat theory explains 
why France and the United Kingdom aligned to balance against the threat of an expansionist and 
revisionist Germany during the First and Second World Wars. 
                                                            
25Walt, The Origins of Alliances.  
26 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 147-180. 
27 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 22-26. 
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and high level will yield different results. By examining the actual level of threat from one state 
to another we can forecast the types of alliances that will materialize.”28
Weitsman argues that symmetric threats, what I call convergent threat perception, play an 
important role in analyzing alliance cohesion and burden-sharing behavior among coalition 
members.
  
29 In a more recent article on alliance cohesion Weitsman writes, “Cohesion is fostered 
and maintained during wartime by clear objectives, threats that are perceived similarly by 
member states, and when attention is paid to cultural differences; even in the absence of a unified 
chain of command…”30
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, there are 
fewer traditional military threats, which would qualify as existential threats to the security of the 
United States and its NATO allies. However, two principal security threats dominate the 
discourse of U.S. and transatlantic security: international terrorism, and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) proliferation. For instance, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(QDR) notes that “the rise of non-state terrorist network is one of the defining characteristics of 
the last decade.”
 In brief, Weitsman provides a better specification of the balance of 
threat theory by saying that the level of threat posed by an enemy, and the level of threat 
convergence among coalition partners have strong effects on coalition burden-sharing. 
31
                                                            
28 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, pp. 3-4. Emphasis added. 
 Regarding WMD proliferation, the QDR says, “Today, the United States faces 
a greater danger from an expanding number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups, which seek 
29 Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente,” pp. 79-113. 
30 Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare,” p. 132. 
31 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: 2006), p. 20. 
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to acquire and use WMD.”32 This is a standard view of international security shared by the 
United States, and its European allies.33
For the purpose of this dissertation, the question is the extent to which the actual or 
perceived threats from terrorism, insurgency, and WMD proliferation influence the burden-
sharing behavior of coalition countries in Afghanistan. It would be expected that convergent or 
symmetric threat perception—defined as the existence of similar types and levels of external 
threats—would encourage the United States and its coalition partners to pursue a strong burden-
sharing behavior.  The reverse would also be true with divergent threat perception resulting in 
weak military cooperation in Afghanistan.  
 
 
Collective Action. In the analysis of coalition burden-sharing, the notion of collective 
action is an offshoot of the neo-realist theory of hegemonic stability. Prominent neo-realists 
Robert Gilpin and Stepen Krasner identify the effect of the structural distribution of power on 
international stability.34
                                                            
32 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Re view Report, p. 32. 
 They argue that the presence of a hegemon or a preponderant power in 
the international system can stabilize the system. Although Gilpin and Krasner popularized the 
notion of hegemony, the famous economic historian, Charles P. Kindleberger, offers the most 
33 Most documents on U.S. and European national security strategy, military strategy, and intelligence strategy 
define transnational terrorism and WMD proliferation as the principal threats facing the United States and Members 
of the European Union. See The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, 2002); The White House, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, 2006); Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, The National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (Washington, D.C.: 
National Intelligence Council, 2007); The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, 2003); The European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy (Brussels: The European Commission, 2003); The European Council, The European Union Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (Brussels: The European Council, 2005); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defense Against 
Terrorism Programme,” (Brussels, NATO Headquarters) Updated October 26, 2010. 
34 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Economy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp. 134-138, 173-175; Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), pp. 15-16, 358.  
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articulate theory of hegemonic stability. In his magnum opus, The World in Depression, 1929-
1939, Kindleberger provides three attributes of a hegemon: the control over vast economic 
resources, the ability to provide leadership in the international system, and the willingness to 
share the responsibility of maintaining the global order.35
Neo-realists argue that the causal link between hegemony and stability is straightforward: 
the dominant country in the international system serve as a coordinator and enforcer of the rules 
of the international economic and political system. Great Britain assumed this role during the 
nineteenth century, and the United States acted as a hegemon during the post-war era. Under 
British and U.S. hegemonic systems, the international economy was relatively stable, with the 
expansion of economic openness, the rise of multinational corporations, and the creation of 
international trading regimes. Neorealists claim, the absence of hegemony had a negative effect 
on the international economic and political system. During the inter-war period, the absence of a 
hegemonic state gave rise to protectionist trade policy, and a massive economic depression. 
  
36 
The relative decline of U.S. economy in the 1960s and 1970s resulted into the abandonment of 
the fixed exchange rate system and the introduction of the flexible exchange rate system, which 
raised concerns about the stability of the world economy.37
Drawing on the neo-realist assumption of hegemony, neo-liberal internationalists advance 
the collective action theory. In international security, collective action refers to group motivation 
for the pursuit of a common security goal, which is defined as a public good. The public good is 
non-excludable, which means that once the good is provided by joint action, no state can be 
  
                                                            
35 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 
1986). 
36 Helen Milner, “International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability,” Foreign Policy, No. 110 
(1998), pp. 114-115. .  
37 Milner, “International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability,” p. 115. 
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refrained from enjoying the benefit of it.38 The theory posits that in dealing with international 
security threats such as transnational terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda, the dominant power and 
a few interested states are likely to make disproportionately larger contribution, while small 
states will be free-rider. The leading collective action theorist Mancur Olson calls this free riding 
behavior a “tendency for the exploitation of the great by the small.”39 Bruno Frey agrees with 
Mancur Olson, and writes that, “A world without terrorism is a public good from which all 
countries can benefit. But each country has an incentive to free ride: the most favorable policy 
for each country is to let the others carry the costs of fighting terrorism and come to its own 
arrangement with the terrorists.”40
Another major collective action theorist, Russell Hardin, suggests that several factors 
affect the pursuit of a public good. These are the size of a small interested group; the group’s 
perceived benefit from the desired public good; and non-monetary nature of the good. First, a 
small group of countries (defined as the K-group) interested in pursuing the public good may be 
more efficient in promoting transparency, and reducing the coordination problems among the 
group members.
 
41
                                                            
38 According to Russell Hardin, “Public goods are defined by two properties: jointness of supply and 
impossibility of exclusion.” See Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), p. 17.  
 As the size of the small interest group pursuing the public good increases, 
there will be increasing lack of transparency, and a higher degree of coordination problems. The 
free-riding possibility may also amplify with the increasing size of the K-group. This is due to 
the fact that additional members may think that they can enjoy the public good without making 
any contribution to the pursuit of it. Second, some group members may value the good higher 
39 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 3. 
40 Bruno S. Frey, Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot? (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2004), p. 57. 
41 Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” p.  636. 
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than others and willing to pay more to see it provided. This may create an incentive for others 
within the group to ride free. Third, if the public good under question cannot be monetized, it 
may be hard to get the group members motivated for the pursuit of the good.   
 In analyzing coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan, a key question is how coalition 
members view the provision of a public good and a private good.  A public good is non-
excludable, whereas a private good is excludable. The first is accessible to all members of a 
community, whereas the second is available to only select members of a community. For most of 
the NATO countries involved in the Afghanistan War, the public good is securing the world 
from the threats of Al Qaeda’s transnational terrorist network;42 and the private good is 
establishing NATO as a relevant security alliance in the post-9/11 era,43 or establishing a strong 
relationship with the United States to reap the benefits of its economic and military aid.44
 In summary, neo-realists argue that international systemic constraints and incentives 
strongly determine the burden-sharing behavior of states. Three systemic level constraints and 
 
Consistent with the collective action theory’s assumptions, we would expect that the pursuit of 
public and private goods would strongly determine whether a coalition member would tend to 
ride free or make important contributions to support the coalition, regardless of a hegemonic 
state forming and leading the coalition.  
                                                            
42 For a discussion on counterterrorism as a public good, see Frey, Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot, 
pp. 57-58. This discussion is heavily game-theoretic.  
43 For an analysis of NATO as a private good, see Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Analyzing NATO Expansion: An 
Institutional Bargaining Approach,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2002), pp. 63-82; Todd Sandler, 
and J.C. Murdoch, “On Sharing NATO Defense Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond,” Fiscal Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
(2000), pp. 297-327. 
44 The provision of foreign economic and security aid is best defined as side payments, which is offered to small 
coalition partners to dissuade them from free-riding.  Tollison and Willett conceptualize side payments as issue 
linkages. See R. D. Tollison and T. D. Willett, “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in 
International Negotiations,” International Organization, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1979), pp. 425-449. Also see, Charles K. 
Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, eds., The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 1 (New York: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2004), pp. 175-180; For a classical discussion on the effect of issue linkages on international 
cooperation, see Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regime,” World Politics, Vol. 
32, No. 3 (1980), pp. 357-405.  
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incentives are pertinent here: alliance dependence, balance of power or threat, and the free-riding 
motivation of a collective action effort. The foregoing discussion shows that the membership in a 
formal alliance, or the offensive power and intention of an enemy would strongly encourage a 
state to join a coalition, and to support the unity of the coalition by making a strong burden-
sharing contribution. In contrast, the presence of a hegemonic state or a strong coalition leader 
may encourage most of the coalition members, or non-hegemonic states, to ride free, unless the 
pursuit of public and private goods presents an incentive to share the military and non-military 
risks of a coalition war. 
 There are two major shortcomings of the neo-realist explanations of coalition politics. 
First, they cannot explain why countries under a particular systemic constraint behave 
differently. Second, they completely ignore the domestic level political and cultural constraints, 
through which systemic incentives and pressures are filtered to shape states’ decisions on 
burden-sharing. It is in this context, we now turn to the strategic culture theory, which offers a 
domestic level explanation of coalition burden-sharing.  
 
II. Strategic Culture and Coalition Burden-Sharing 
In contrast to the systemic theory of neo-realism, strategic culture offers a domestic level theory 
of alliances, coalitions, and burden-sharing. On coalition burden-sharing, the strategic culture 
theorists argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the similar systemic constraints 
and incentives, behave differently to a military coalition. Explaining the diverse attitudes of 
states to a military coalition requires, strategic culture experts suggest, a cultural understanding 
of war. It also requires an appreciation of how the cognitive beliefs and historical learning 
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influence the strategic decision-making process of a given country.45
According to Colin Gray, one of the leading proponents of strategic culture, “[C]ulture 
shapes the process of strategy-making and influences the execution of strategy, no matter how 
close actual choice may be to some abstract or idealized cultural preference.”
 While the neo-realists are 
interested in drawing law-like generalizations to analyze international politics, strategic culture 
theorists emphasize on the ‘cultural context’ and the ‘national styles’ of strategy adopted by 
states.  
46 He also notes that 
“Strategic culture matters deeply for modern strategy, because the culture of the strategic 
players, individuals, and organizations influences strategic behavior [of states].”47 Christopher 
Coker offers a similar view. Writing in the context of the War in Afghanistan, and the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fighting there, Coker notes that each state has a 
distinct military culture, which may produce a national style of coalition warfighting. Hence, the 
challenge for ISAF is to coordinate the military policies of member states “to mitigate the 
friction between the different national strategic cultures.”48
                                                            
45 For an excellent literature review on strategic culture, see Rashed Uz Zaman, “Strategic Culture: A “Cultural” 
Understanding of War,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2009), pp. 68-88. For a more nuanced discussion o 
the changing nature of irregular war fare and military culture, see Coker, The Warrior Ethos; Farrell and Terriff, The 
Sources of Military Change; Mikkel Vedby Ramsussen, “A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on 
Terrorism,” IIS Working Paper, No. 3 (2003), pp. 1-19;. 
 Others note that cultural differences 
have not only shaped the way the ISAF member states fought the War in Afghanistan, such 
differences have also shaped the conflict between the United States and the Al Qaeda in the war 
on terrorism. Mikkel Ramsussen sums up the differences as a clash between two distinct 
‘warfare practices:’ the first involves, “the high-tech warfare of the United States,” and the 
46 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), p. 55. Another leading first generation strategic culture theorist is Jack 
Snyder. See Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica, 
CA: Rand, 1977) 
47 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” p. 56. 
48 Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place,” 16. 
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second involves “the network based terrorism of al-Qaida.”49
Theo Farrell notes that military transformation, what he calls ‘technological fetishism,’ 
explains only a part of U.S. strategic culture. A broader understanding of U.S. strategic culture 
should also include two aspects of U.S. U.S. war practices: casualty aversion and illegal 
pragmatism.”
 Ramsussen details the discourse of 
technology-intensive military transformation, and its effect on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.  
50 Farrell argues that after the Vietnam and Somalia debacles, during the Cold War 
and post-Cold War eras respectively, the U.S. policymakers have been keen on the effect of 
battlefield casualty on public support for a military mission. This has resulted into a risk aversion 
strategy, in which the United States avoids the deployment of ground troops for humanitarian 
peace keeping purposes.51 In Farrell’s analysis, the third component of U.S. strategic culture 
focuses on legal pragmatism. This was revealed in the way the Bush administration justified the 
use of force in Iraq in its pre-emptive military doctrine. Farrell argues that there is a sharp 
difference between pre-emptive and preventive use of force. In essence, the Bush administration 
twisted the interpretation of international law to justify its military intervention in Iraq in 2003.52 
There is a vibrant debate in the strategic culture literature regarding the methodological approach 
suitable for analyzing international politics.53
                                                            
49 Ramsussen, “A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on Terrorism,” p. 1. 
 On one spectrum of the debate epistemologists 
define strategic culture as a ‘context,’ which helps an analyst to understand and explain the 
strategic behavior of states. Colin Gray is the most prominent advocate of this ‘culture as 
50 Theo Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2005), pp. 8-10. 
51 Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire,” pp. 8-9. 
52 According to Farrell, pre-emptive use of force can be used to counter an imminent threat; and such force use 
is permissible under international law. However, preventive use of force addresses an emerging threat. Since 
preventive use of force may constitute an act of aggression, it is strongly prohibited in international law. See Farrell, 
“Strategic Culture and American Empire,” pp. 9-10. 
53 For a scholarly debate on the two approaches see, Alastair Ian Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 32-64; Alastair Ian Johnston, “Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply 
to Colin Gray,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1999), pp. 519-523; Gray, “Strategic Culture as 
Context.” 
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context’ approach. Gray argues that “Strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping 
context for behavior and itself as a constituent of that behavior.”54
This study sides with the positivist school of strategic culture, although it does not 
consider strategic culture as an independent variable. Instead, it treats strategic culture-induced 
variables and constraints as intervening factors through which systemic incentives and 
constraints are transmitted to shape the strategic decision of states, and the outcomes of their 
interactions. An important task in analyzing the effect of strategic culture on strategic behavior is 
to specify the key intervening variables, and their role as the transmission belt between 
international systemic incentives and state behavior. 
 On the other spectrum of the 
debate, positivists define strategic culture as a ‘cause’ to explain the strategic behavior of states. 
For positivists, culture and behavior are separated, and the former causes the latter. Alanstair Ian 
Johnston is the leading proponent of this positivist approach. Unlike the epistemologists, who are 
interested in the debate on what constitutes actor and behavior, and how they are intertwined; the 
positivists are interested in the empirical study of the causal effect of strategic culture on state’s 
attitudes and behavior.  
In analyzing coalition burden-sharing, at least three domestic level intervening variables 
can be deductively drawn from the theory (or multiple conceptions) of strategic culture. These 
are: domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability. These three (intervening) 
variables fit neatly with Colin Gray’s emphasis on “strategic players, individuals, and 
organizations” as the key sources of strategic culture.55
                                                            
54 Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” p. 50. 
 Following Gray’s analysis, one could 
55 Ibid, p. 56; Gray further develops his conceptualization of strategic culture in a monograph titled Irregular 
Enemies and the Essence of Strategy, which argues that a comprehensive analysis of strategic culture should take 
into account of (a) strategic culture; (b) public culture; and (c) military (organizational) culture. See Colin Gray, 
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argue that the chief executives in the domestic political regime are the key strategic players; and 
public opinion is nothing but the collective attitudes of individuals; while military services 
constitute a crucial component of state level bureaucratic organizations involved in the use of 
force for foreign policy purposes.56
 
 Each of these intervening variables, and the possible 
interactions among them, is likely to have a discernible effect on a state’s coalition behavior in 
Afghanistan. 
Domestic Political Regime. Domestic political regime acts as the first intervening 
variable in shaping a state’s coalition decisions. There is a rich body of domestic politics 
literature, which shows that key decisions regarding a state’s burden-sharing behavior are taken 
by the chief executive of an incumbent government.57 Hence, the strength of a chief executive’s 
decision-making power vis-à-vis other organs of the government will play a decisive role in 
shaping a state’s coalition contribution.58
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2006). Gray wrote about these three inter-linked components of strategic culture in the context of 
the U.S. forces fighting a protracted insurgency and irregular war in Iraq. Other strategic culture theorists have also 
identified similar culture-driven variables and their effect on national security and strategic behavior of states. For 
instance, Jeffrey Lantis argues that national elites, political institutions, and public opinion strongly influences the 
strategic behavior of states.  See Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” International 
Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2002), pp. 107-109. Bagby’s re-interpretation of Thucydides has shown how the 
“statesmanship or the lack thereof could change history.” See Lauri M. Johnson Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of 
Thucydides in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1994), p. 140. Elizabeth has 
identified military culture as an explanatory variable of military doctrine and the use of force practices. See 
Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 
(1995),pp.  65-94.  
 This means that the legislative or judicial oversight 
may act as a constraining factor in shaping a chief executive’s decision power on foreign policy 
issues, including participation in a military coalition.  
56 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. 
57 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders. 
58 Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” pp. 641-642. 
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Most domestic political regime theories examine the distribution of power among various 
political institutions such as the chief government executive and the legislature. In an analysis of 
states’ crisis time bargaining behavior, Susan Peterson defines executive strength as the relative 
autonomy of the office of chief executive from legislative pressures.59 Auerswald defines 
executive strength in relation to the entities that have the “power to terminate office tenure.”60 
Two such entities are more relevant: the mass public and the legislature. In Auerswald’s analysis, 
the support of the general voters as well as the members of the legislative assembly is crucial for 
a president, prime minister, or premier in a liberal democratic country. As discussed below, 
Sarah Kreps discards the importance of public opinion, and shows that elite consensus among the 
parliamentary parties matter more than public opinion.61
Auerswald’s typology of executive strength is useful in predicting coalition burden-
sharing. He suggests three types of executive strength—strong, weak, and medium. Each type of 
chief executive is likely to pursue a distinct burden-sharing policy toward a military coalition. 
First, a strong chief executive with less legislative oversight and strong elite consensus is likely 
to favor the use of force, if such a decision serves the national interests, or if such a decision is 
taken to please the domestic constituents. Second, a weak chief executive with varying degree of 
legislative control and elite disagreement will be constrained to take a bold decision on the use of 
force, and avoid participating in the coalition for fear of losing the election. Third, a medium 
executive will craft a policy that balances between the competing demands from legislature, elite 
consensus, and public opinion.  
  
                                                            
59 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State.  
60 Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” pp. 641.  
61 Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion,” pp. 119-215; For more discussions 
on elite consensus, see: John Zaller, “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War. In Taken 
by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War, edited by W. Lance Bennett, and 
David Paletz (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1994). 
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The effect of executive strength on coalition burden-sharing should be broadly 
understood by how the foreign policy elites define a state’s  national interests, and the costs-
benefits of a burden-sharing decision in the pursuit of a national interest. This means that the 
mere existence of a strong executive in a U.S. allied country would not necessarily imply that the 
chief executive will take a decision to deploy military forces for the prosecution of U.S.-led war 
in Afghanistan. Instead, the opposite could happen, where a strong executive firmly opposes the 
idea of use of force. As Nora Bensahel writes, this might happen when “domestic leaders face 
strong incentives to maintain fully autonomous control of their armed forces, since military 
operations place the lives of their citizens at stake.”62
In assessing the effect of domestic political regime on states’ burden-sharing behavior in 
the Afghan War coalition, a pertinent question is whether elite fragmentation and legislative 
pressures constrained the executive autonomy of decisions. Once the chief executive’s decision 
power is determined, the next task is to determine how an incumbent government weighs 
between the international expectations and domestic public opinion in pursuing its coalition 
policy.  
   
 
Public Opinion. Public opinion may act as a second domestic level constraint on 
coalition behavior of states. In one of the most influential writings on public opinion, Thomas 
Risse-Kappen argues that “Policymakers in liberal democracies do not decide against an over-
whelming public consensus.”63
                                                            
62 Bensahel, “The Coalition Paradox,” pp. 19-20. 
 He identifies two broad approaches to public opinion: the 
bottom-up approach and the top-down approach. The bottom-up approach suggests that public 
63 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign policy in Liberal Democracies,” 
World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July 1991), p. 510.  
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opinion influences foreign and security policy, whereas the top-bottom approach suggests 
powerful elites influence public opinion.64 Risse-Kappen argues that neither approaches offer 
sufficient explanations for analyzing the divergent effects of public opinion in comparable liberal 
democratic states. Risse-Kappen’s theory posits that public opinion determines foreign and 
security policy in liberal democracies in an indirect way, by influencing the “coalition building 
processes among elite groups.”65
What is the effect of public opinion on coalition warfare? There are at least two 
competing hypotheses. The first suggests that the mass publics are sensitive to battlefield 
incidents, especially troop casualties. They want to bring the troops home, and most governments 
are likely to comply with such public demands.
   
66 The second hypothesis posits that if the foreign 
policy elites, represented by the principal policymakers, as well as the senior politicians from 
major parliamentary parties, reach a consensus on a foreign policy issue, such elite consensus 
will encourage a government to bypass public opinion and take a decision in the name of greater 
national interests.  The latter is essentially a realist argument, which ignores public views on 
foreign policies. The central premise of bypassing or dismissing public opinion is simple: the 
mass publics are thought to lack sufficient knowledge of an impending or ongoing crisis.67
                                                            
64 For a discussion on these two approaches see Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public 
Opinion on Policy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 1 (1983), pp. 175-190. Ole R. Holsti and 
James N. Rosenau, “The Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 248-294; James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Random House, 1961); Noam Chomsky and Endward Herman, Manufacturing Consent (New York: 
Pantheon, 1988).  
 
65 Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign policy in Liberal Democracies,” p. 510 
66 Jefffrey Record, “Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War,” Parameters, 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2002), pp. 4-23; James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing 
the Casualties Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (1999), pp. 53-78; Steven Kull and I.M. 
Destler, Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), 
pp. 81-112. 
67 Harold Nicolson, “British Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 
(1937), pp. 53-63. 
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Recent studies of public opinion and alliance cohesion find support for the realist theory. 
Kreps’ study shows that declining public support had not effect in shaping the coalition 
contribution of four major NATO countries--Canada, France, Germany, and Italy—in 
Afghanistan. Douglas Kriner and Graham Wilson reach a similar conclusion in their study of 
British contribution to the war in Afghanistan. Kriner and Wilson argue that public opinion has 
no measurable effect in determining British foreign and security policy regarding the use of force 
in Afghanistan.68 Why do some governments ignore public opinion? Kreps argues that elite 
consensus on alliance solidarity and the pursuit of public good may be too strong to ignore the 
effect of public opinion.69
The studies by Kreps, Kriner and Wilson specify public opinion by looking at two major 
issues: domestic public opinion on the use of force, and its unintended consequence on civilian 
lives and properties; and public sensitivity toward troop casualties. Since NATO has declared 
2014 as the conditional deadline for the withdrawal of ISAF troops, public opinion data on 
several issues are also important. These include: opinion data on immediate troop withdrawal; 
combat operations; and economic reconstruction and stabilization operations.  
   
Military Capability. Military coalitions are often perceived as a unique mechanism to 
aggregate the national power of coalition members. This capability aggregation hypothesis 
dominates the alliance and coalition literature. Walt notes that “States seek to counter threats by 
                                                            
68 Douglas Kriner and Graham Wilson, “Elites, Events and British Support for the War in Afghanistan,” Paper 
Prepared for Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 
September 2-5, 2010. http://www.britannica.com/blogs/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/kriner-and-wilson-apsa-
2010.pdf, accessed November 3, 2010. For a discussion on the effect of public opinion on national security, see: 
Harold Nicolson, “British Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 1, no.1 (1937), pp. 
53-63; Christopher Hill, “Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy Since 1945: Research in Progress? Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (1981), pp. 53-62.  
69 Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for 
NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan,” pp. 201-203. Kreps also discusses how elite consensus on the costs of 
defection has influenced the decision making processes in major NATO countries. 
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adding the power of another state to their own.”70 Liska presents two alternate meanings of 
capability aggregation: an affirmative and a negative meaning. He notes that, “Put affirmatively, 
states enter into alliances with one another in order to supplement each other’s capability. Put 
negatively, an alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as 
pressure, which threatens one’s independence.”71 Glenn Snyder offers a similar perspective by 
equating alignment with capability aggregation: “Alignments are akin to structure, however, 
since they have to do with how resources and capabilities are aggregated in the system.”72
 In the context of alliance politics and coalition burden-sharing, the term capability may 
have multiple meanings. These include tangible and intangible resources, such as natural 
resources, military power, diplomatic skills, topography, and national morale etc. To what extent 
does such a broad conception of capability fit the need of a peacetime alliance entering a war, or 
a military coalition formed to fight an adversary?  
 
Snyder addresses this question by offering a better specification of military capability. He 
notes that most scholars define capability as “the amount of military forces and resources 
transformable into military forces that are controlled by individual states.”73 He argues that 
capability is “what a state can accomplish with its military forces against particular other 
states.”74 This latter conceptualization of capability stresses that aggregation of resources does 
not necessarily imply capability. Instead, it is “a potential result of using forces rather than an 
inventory of forces and resources. It denotes the potential outcome of a military interaction and 
thus forms an explicit link between system structure and interaction between units.”75
                                                            
70 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 149. 
  
71 Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, p. 26. 
72 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 22. 
73 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 28 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid.  
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How do we measure military capability for coalition purposes? Following NATO’s 
Defense Capability Initiative, this dissertation suggests that efficient burden-sharing involves 
several attributes of a country’s military forces and assets, such as deployability, interoperability, 
and suitability.76
For strategic culture theorists, the effect of military capability should be understood in the 
context of a country’s military culture. There are two major approaches to the study of military 
culture: one looks at the national level, the other at the organizational level. The national level 
strategic culture looks into effect of a country’s military culture on its strategic decision 
process.
 First, deployability is defined as the speed at which a country is able to deploy 
the requisite military forces, such as conventional and Special Forces, suitable for the war goals. 
Second, interoperability refers to the ability of military forces and equipments to be used for joint 
operations. Third, suitability refers to the availability of military troops and assets for defensive 
and offensive operations.  
77
                                                            
76 According to NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), alliance military capability has five attributes: 
(a) mobility and deployability; (b) sustainability; (c) effective engagement; (d) survivability; and (e) interoperable 
communications. My definition of coalition capability combines sustainability, effective engagement, and 
survivability to refer to suitability. For NATO’s discussion of alliance capability concepts, see North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, “The Transformation of the Alliance: NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Handbook, 
(NATO Publications, October 8, 2002), chapter 2. 
 By contrast, the organizational level military culture looks into the effect of various 
military services, such as the air force, army, marine, and navy, on the strategic decisions on use 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm, accessed 
January 3, 2011.  
77 See Farrell, “Strategic Culture and American Empire;” Theo Farrell, “Culture and Military Power,” Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1998), pp. 407-416. 
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of force.78  The organizational culture theorists also focus on the comparative study of military 
doctrines and use of force practices in analyzing the strategic behavior of states.79
The foregoing discussion suggests that a broad conceptualization of military capability 
has little utility in understanding and explaining coalition politics. It presents two distinct theory-
driven conceptions of military capability: a realist conception of capability, which focuses on 
deployability, suitability, and interoperability; and a strategic cultural understanding of 
capability, which stresses on the national and organizational level military cultures. This study 
combines the insights from these multiple conceptions of capability to account for the coalition 
behavior of states. Such a broad definition of capability sacrifices parsimony to offer a better and 
richer explanation of domestic level national military capability. Table 3.1 summarizes the six 
explanatory variables discussed above.  
 
In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests a strategic cultural explanation of 
coalition burden-sharing. It deductively draws three domestic level variables – political regime, 
public opinion, and national military capability – which influence the coalition behavior of 
states. For strategic culture theorists, an analysis of states’ coalition behavior starts at the 
domestic level. There are two major shortcomings with such cultural explanation of coalition 
politics. First, it ignores the influence of systemic incentives and constraints, which creates the 
demand for joining and supporting a coalition. Second, it fails to show the role of domestic 
                                                            
78 Jeffrey Legro’s seminal work on the organization culture of the British and German military’s policy of 
restraint during World War II is pertinent here. See Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German 
Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Also see, Chris C. Demchark, Military 
Organizations, Complex Machines: Modernization in the U.S. Armed Services (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991).  
79 Elizabeth Kier’s work on the British and French military doctrines is relevant here. See Elizabeth Kier, 
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997); Also see Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991) 
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political and cultural factors as a transmission belt through which the systemic incentives are 
channeled.  
Table 3.1 Summary of Systemic and Domestic Level Variables  
Variables Key Concepts Leading Proponent 
Systemic Variables 
Alliance Dependence • Economic, political, and military ties 
to the United States and NATO 
• Fear of entrapment versus fear of 
abandonment  
Mandelbaum ( 1981); 
Snyder (1984) 
Balance of 
Power/Balance of 
Threat 
• A hostile actor’s aggregate power, 
geographical proximity, offensive 
power, and aggressive intentions 
Walt (1987), Waltz 
(1979), Weitsman 
(2003) 
Collective Action • Pursuit of collective good; small 
group with shared interests; and free-
riding behavior of minor  participants 
Hardin (1993), Olson 
(1965) 
Domestic Level Variables 
Domestic Political 
Regime 
• Chief executive’s decision power vis-
à-vis legislature, elites, and public 
opinion 
Auerswald (2004), 
Paterson (1996); Kreps 
(2010) 
Public Opinion • Public attitudes toward the use of 
force; casualty sensitivity, troop 
withdrawal, combat role of deployed 
forces; non-combat stabilization role 
of deployed forces 
Kreps (2010), Kirner 
and Wilson (2010); 
Risse-Kappen (1991) 
Military Capability  • The actual inventory as well as the 
power projection ability; 
deployability, suitability, and 
interoperability of military forces and 
assets; Military culture, organization 
culture 
Walt (1987), Snyder 
(1984), NATO 
(undated); Farrell 
(2005); Legro (1995) 
 
This study argues that neither neo-realism nor strategic culture theory can sufficiently 
explain the coalition behavior of states. The problem with neo-realism, as discussed before, is it 
infers a direct causal connection between systemic changes and unit level behaviors. In doing so, 
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neo-realism ignores the role of domestic level constraints in deflecting the system-induced 
pressures and constraints. Such domestic level constraints often produce diverse foreign policy 
behaviors under similar systemic incentives, which cannot be explained by neo-realism.  
Strategic culture has its own problem. It ignores the existing distribution of power in the 
international system as a given constraint, and focuses, instead, on the cognitive, historical, and 
domestic level factors shaping the strategic behavior of states. A neo-classical theory of coalition 
politics can overcome these imitations by providing a better theory of foreign policy. Neo-
classical realism argues that international systemic incentives and pressure are filtered through 
the domestic political processes to shape the foreign policy behavior of states. The basic 
premises of neo-classical realism and its utility in analyzing coalition burden-sharing are 
discussed below. 
 
III. Neo-Classical Realism and Coalition Burden-Sharing 
Neo-classical realism offers a middle ground between neo-realism and strategic culture theories.  
Drawing on the insights from both theories, it argues that foreign policy analysis must involve an 
interaction between international systemic incentives and domestic political processes.80 This 
would offer “a much richer explanatory account of why states choose certain foreign policies 
over others.”81
                                                            
80 John Glenn, Derryl Howlett, and Stuart Poore, Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004); John Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?,” International Studies 
Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), pp. 523-551; Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” pp. 165-
171.  
 Like neo-realists and strategic culture theorists, neo-classical realists are 
interested in explaining the foreign policy of great powers. They concur with the neo-realists that 
international systemic incentives and the relative distribution of power should be the starting 
81  Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?” p. 524. 
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point for analyzing international politics. However, the central contention is that strategic culture 
and domestic politics act as an intervening variable in determining what specific foreign policy 
actions a state will pursue in international politics.82 Neo-classical realists reject the primacy of 
cultural factors in determining state behavior. As Colin Dueck argues, “Culture is best 
understood as a supplement to and not a substitute for, realist theories of strategic choice.”83 
Dueck also notes that “when political-military cultures come under intense international 
pressure, they adjust and adapt in the end.”84
Aaron L. Friedberg, a leading neo-classical realist, notes that “Structural considerations 
provide a useful point from which to begin analysis of international politics rather than a place at 
which to end it. Even if one acknowledges that structures exist... there is still the question of how 
statesmen grasp their contours from the inside, so to speak.”
 
85 Gideon Rose agrees with 
Friedberg, and contends that a neo-classical realist theory of foreign policy examines how 
systemic pressures are filtered through the intervening variables at the unit level.86
In analyzing the politics of coalition burden-sharing, Bennett et al, and Daniel Baltrusaitis 
discuss the effect of three systemic level independent variables, such as alliance dependence, 
balance of threat, and collective action. Although they never claim to be neo-classical realists, 
their study on the First and Second Iraq Wars (1990-1991, and 2003-2010) show how systemic 
incentives interact with the cognitive and domestic level variables--historical learning, public 
  
                                                            
82 According to Gideon Rose, neo-classical realists reject “the notion of a smoothly functioning mechanical 
transmission belt” through which international systemic incentives and constraints are transmitted to determine unit-
level behavior. See Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 158. 
83 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 20. 
84 Colin Dueck, “Realism, Culture, and Grand Strategy: Explaining America’s Peculiar Path to World Power,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2005), p. 204. 
85 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton, 
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 8. 
86 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” p. 146. 
63 
 
opinion, and domestic political regime—to determine the burden-sharing behavior and outcomes 
of states.87
Neo-classical realists agree with the neo-realists on one principal issue, that an analysis of 
the strategic behavior of states must begin at the systemic level. The central difference between 
the two theories (neo-realism versus neo-classical realism) concerns the causal pathways in 
which the international systemic incentives and constraints are transmitted. Neo-realists assume a 
direct causal link between the distribution of power at the international system, and the unit-level 
(state) behavior. Neo-classical realists reject such direct causality, and argue that system-induced 
incentives and constraints are transmitted indirectly through the domestic level strategic cultural 
factors.
 This is essentially a neo-classical realist theory of burden-sharing, which concludes 
that international systemic pressures are channeled through the domestic political processes to 
determine the coalition behavior of states.  
88
Neo-classical realists identify several intervening variables to connect the dots between 
systemic incentives and unit level behaviors. The most common intervening variables are 
domestic political regime, elite perception, elite consensus, social cohesion or fragmentation, and 
the mobilization power of the state. In their analysis of coalition burden-sharing during the U.S.-
led Gulf War, Bennett et al argues that “leaders of executive branches should be more likely than 
 Although they incorporate the strategic cultural issues into the analysis of foreign 
policy behavior, neo-classical realists consider culture-induced variables as epiphenomenal, or 
only of secondary importance. It is in this context, we need to examine how neo-classical realists 
specify the intervening variables, and the extent to which such specification imitate the strategic 
culture-specific variables. 
                                                            
87 Bennett et al., Friends in Need; Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics.  
88 The most notable neo-classical realists are Thomas Christensen, Colin Dueck, Aaron Friedberg, Melvyn 
Leffler, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth, and Fareed  Zakaria.  
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other domestic actors to want to participate in a coalition, if only because they are directly 
exposed to pressures from other coalition members, especially the United States.”89 In Coalition 
Politics and the Iraq War, Baltrusaitis takes a similar approach, and specifies domestic political 
regime as the relative autonomy of foreign policy executives from legislative, public, and elite 
pressures.90
In Reluctant Crusaders, Dueck shows how the elite belief systems on liberal 
internationalism and limited liabilities in international commitments have structured the U.S. 
grand strategy.
 Although the chief executive’s decision power vis-à-vis other administrative organs 
of a government, and the civil society have drawn considerable attention among the 
contemporary coalition theorists, analysts of grand strategy and balance of power have reminded 
that elite perception will significantly influence the executive authority.   
91 Melvyn Leffler specifies elite belief system as elite perception drawn from the 
national leaders’ historical experience. In A Preponderance of Power, Leffler argues that during 
the post-war era the United States sought to create a liberal trade regime, because of its leaders’ 
experience with the fragile free trade system and the rise of totalitarian states in the pre-WWII 
era.92
                                                            
89 Bennett et al, Friends in Need, p. 17. 
 Following Leffler’s analysis, William Wohlforth argues that the material distribution of 
power cannot provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the superpower tensions during the 
Cold War era. Instead, Wohlforth contends, one has to understand the perception of U.S. and 
Soviet policymakers to fully grasp superpower behavior during the Cold War. Wohlforth writes, 
“rapid shifts in behavior may be related to perceived shifts in the distribution of power which are 
90 Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics, pp. 25-27. 
91 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. 
92 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, Truman Administration, and the Cold War 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).   
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not captured by typical measures of capabilities.”93 Coalition theorist Patricia Weitsman also 
emphasizes the role of perceived threat,  in contrast to actual threat, in shaping a country’s 
alliance and coalition behavior.94
Like Dueck, Leffler and Wohlforth, Randall Schweller agrees on the role of elite 
perception, and adds that government or regime security, social cohesion, and elite cohesion, 
also act as important intervening variables in shaping the strategic behavior of states. In 
Unanswered Threats, Schweller shows why states do not always balance against a dangerous 
threat, and imprudently choose to bandwagon or underbalance against the accumulating power of 
an opponent. 
 
95 Schweller’s findings contradict the defensive neo-realist theory of balance of 
power, which assumes that states are coherent actors, which always seek to balance against the 
dangerous threats to survive as autonomous entities.96
 One common theme that runs across the strategic culture and neo-classical realists is the 
inclusion of mass public opinion in foreign policy analysis. Theo Farrell’s analysis of U.S. 
strategic culture stresses that public sensitivity to troop casualty has strongly influenced U.S. 
strategy of humanitarian military interventions.
 
97
                                                            
93 William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 302; Emphasis added. 
 This is essentially a bottom up approach to 
public opinion, which claims that mass public attitude (mass public opinion as understood by the 
94 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, pp. 3-4. 
95 Schweller, Unanswered Threats.  
96 Schweller draws his conclusions from the empirical studies of five cases, Anglo-French relations during the 
interwar period, French behavior from 1877 to 1913, and the War of Triple Alliance, involving Paraguay on one 
side, and Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay on the other. See Schweller, Unanswered Threats. Also see, Randall 
Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998) 
97 Farrell writes, [U.S. politicians] pulled the plug on the [Somalia] operation in anticipation of an adverse 
public reaction…politicians and senior military officers most keenly feel this sensitivity to casualties, having 
experienced the political fallout from Vietnam. …casualty aversion is all too evident in U.S. strategic culture, from 
the emphasis on “Full Dimensional Protection” in joint military doctrine, to the political refusal to deploy U.S. 
ground troops in risky humanitarian interventions (as in Rwanda in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999). See Farrell, 
“Strategic Culture and American Power,” p. 9. 
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elites) influences the government actions. Thomas Christensen has also discussed the importance 
of public opinion, albeit with a top-down approach, advanced by neo-classical realists. In his 
study on the Sino-Amrican conflict, Christensen explains the importance of the ability of U.S. 
and Chinese policymakers to mobilize mass public support behind their grand strategies. In 
Useful Adversaries, Christensen writes that the political mobilizational power of an incumbent 
government acts as a “key intervening variable between international challenges facing the 
nation and the strategies adopted by the state to meet those challenges.”98
 Neo-classical realists also offer a distinct conceptualization of military power and state 
power. Unlike neo-realists and strategic culturalists, who emphasize on the material and cultural 
definitions of power, neo-classical realists are interested in the political capacity of a state to 
mobilize its power for national security purposes. In his analysis of the growth of America’s 
world power, Fareed Zakaria explains the importance of state power, rather than military 
capability, in foreign policy. Zakaria defines state power as “the portion of national power the 
government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision makers 
can achieve their ends.”
  
99
  The foregoing discussion suggests that neo-classical realism offers a better explanation 
for analyzing the foreign policy processes, including the coalition burden-sharing decisions of 
 Zakaria’s conception of state power should be read in conjunction with 
Christensen’s mobilizational power to understand how the domestic level decision makers 
overcome the political constraints to convert the material capability into deployable and usable 
capability in the pursuit of national security interests.  
                                                            
98 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 13. 
99 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 9. 
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states. It shows that by combining the theoretical insights from neo-realism and strategic culture, 
neo-classical realism examines how international systemic incentives are channeled through the 
domestic and culture-induced political processes to determine the behavior of states. In closer 
inspection, the key innovation in the neo-classical realist theory is the transmission belt between 
international system, and unit-level behaviors. This transmission belt is composed of various 
domestic level intervening variables, and the causal linkages between them in shaping the 
foreign policy choices of states. What are the constituents of the transmission belt, and how do 
they connect the systemic and domestic level variables to determine the coalition behavior of 
states? Recent studies on coalition warfare have used theoretical models to answer this question. 
This leads us to an examination of the existing theoretical models, and their shortcomings, which 
will create a context for offering a better theoretical model of burden-sharing.  
 
IV. Integrated Models of Coalition Burden-Sharing: The Bennett et al. and Auerswald Models 
There are two major theoretical models in the study of coalition burden-sharing. These are (a) 
Bennett et al Model;100and (b) the David Auerswald Model.101 In their analysis of the 1990-1991 
Gulf War (referred to as the First Iraq War), Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny 
Unger, present a decision making model to analyze coalition contribution based on the 
perception of public good.102
                                                            
100 Bennett et al., Friends in Need. 
 The Bennett et al. model uses three systemic variables – collective 
action, balance of threat, and alliance dependence; and two domestic level variables – historical 
learning, and domestic institutions and politics. Their model presents three coalition contribution 
101 Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice.” pp. 631-662. 
102 Since coalition burden-sharing presents a unique set of problems, which are different from the traditional 
foreign policy issues, such as, trade or arms negotiations, the extant literature on foreign policy analysis has little 
utility, and hence ignored here.  
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outcomes: (a) no contribution; (b) contribution with public or state support; (b) no contribution in 
area(s) with public or state support.103 In contrast to the classical alliance theories, Bennett et al 
define their model as a typological theory, which identifies four types of coalition behavior: (a) 
states ride free; (b) states keep distance; (c) states reveal their preferences and pay up; and (d) 
states are entrapped and forced to pay anyway.104
 The Bennett et al. model finds empirical support for a wide range of case studies, which 
are divided into four major groups: major military contributors, major financial contributors, 
major political contributors, and a non-contributor. The major military contributors examined in 
the Bennett et al. study are: the United States, Britain, Egypt, and France. The major financial 
contributors are Japan and Germany. The leading political contributors are Turkey, Syria, former 
Soviet Union, and the Middle Powers – Australia, Canada, and the Nordic countries. Iran was the 
only non-contributor in the Bennett et al. study. 
  
The principal contribution of the Bennett et al. Model is that it addresses a gap in the 
existing theories of coalition warfare by providing a better conceptualization of the notion of 
‘burden-sharing.’ It does so by specifying the conditions under which states are likely to commit 
troops, financial aid, and diplomatic support for the execution of a collective action. A more 
recent study by Daniel Baltrusaitis, a disciple of Andrew Bennett, tests the utility of the Bennett 
et al. model in analyzing coalition burden-sharing in the Second Iraq War.105 Baltrusaitis refines 
the Bennett et al. model by better specifying the ‘domestic institutions and politics’ variable 
using Susan Peterson’s typology of executive-legislative relations.106
                                                            
103 Bennett et al., Friends in Need, p. 22. 
 In his study of coalition 
104 Bennett et al., Friends in Need, pp. 22-24. 
105 Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, “Friends in Deed? Coalition Burden Sharing and the Iraq War,” Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2008); Baltrusaitis, Coalition Politics.  
106 Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State. 
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politics in Iraq, Baltrusaitis finds empirical support by analyzing the coalition contributions of 
South Korea, Germany, and Turkey. 
 Using a theoretical framework, similar to the Bennett et al. model, David Auerswald 
develops an integrated decision making model to analyze the coalition behavior in NATO’s 
Kosovo air campaign (1999)—Operation Allied Force. Auerswald’s decision model uses two 
international level variables -- collective action and balance of threat; and two domestic level 
variables -- public opinion, and government structure. Auerswald excludes the alliance 
dependence variable from the model, by arguing that it is not applicable in the Kosovo case for 
one principal reason: “Abandonment [one of the principal assumptions of alliance dependence 
hypothesis] was not seen as a viable U.S. option.”107
 
 Instead, the Clinton administration worked 
toward the enlargement of NATO and the process of re-defining NATO’s strategic concept in the 
post-cold war era. The central goal of the Clinton administration was to allow for out-of-area 
operations, which indicated a strong NATO policy of the United States.  
Limits in the Existing Theoretical Models. There are several caveats in the existing 
models of burden-sharing. The Bennett et al. model on coalition burden-sharing in the First Iraq 
War (1990-1991) suffers from three major problems: two related to the explanatory (also defined 
as independent) variables and one dependent variable. First, it includes the ‘strategic belief and 
historical learning’ as an independent variable at the domestic level, but does not specify whose 
beliefs and learning matter more: foreign policy elites or the chief executives? Second, although 
the decision framework in the Bennett et al. model includes the ‘public opinion’ bloc, their study 
does not offer any systematic analysis of the public opinion data and the effect of public attitudes 
                                                            
107 Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” p. 635, fn. 19. 
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on coalition burden-sharing. Third, their model presents a broader definition of ‘burden-sharing’ 
which includes a wide variety of military and non-military contributions, such as troop 
deployment, economic assistance, and diplomatic cooperation etc. Their description of the 
military contribution do not offer any analysis of the major combat and non-combat operations, 
nor do they offer any analysis of whether the addition of new members had any discernible 
effects on the coalition operations.  
 The Auerswald study has several limitations, as well. First, the Auerswald model has a 
narrow scope. It only applies to the “wars of choice,” a conflict defined by the assumption that 
“no group member’s survival is threatened.”108 This limits the generalizability of the model by 
constraining its ability to analyze the “wars of necessity,” in which the existential security or 
core national interests are at risk. 109 For instance, one cannot utilize the Auerswald model to 
explain Saudi Arabia’s participation in the First Iraq War (1990-1991), in which the U.S.-led 
multinational forces fought against Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. This is due to the fact that Iraq’s 
forceful annexation of Kuwait in 1990 and its subsequent threatening activity in the Gulf region 
jeopardized Saudi interests in the region, and thus making Saudi participation in the War a 
necessity.110
The second limitation with the Auerswald model is its exclusion of the question of why 
non-alliance members may join a coalition. Instead, it solely focuses on the question of why 
members of a peacetime alliance engage in a coalition military operations in a third country. This 
is problematic, because, the model assumes that a small group of core countries, defined as “K 
 
                                                            
108 Auerswald argues that “Threats to survival should shift the relative emphasis away from the domestic-level 
variables toward the international level.” See Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice,” p. 643, fn. 48. 
109 For a discussion on wars of choice and wars of necessity, see Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of 
Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). Haass, who was on the U.S. National 
Security Council staff, describes the first Iraq War as a ‘war of necessity,’ and the second Iraq war as a ‘war of 
choice.’  
110 Baltrusaitis, Friends in Deed?, p. 108. 
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Group,” and their shared interest in the provision of a collective good (in this case stabilization 
of Kosovo and revitalizing the importance of NATO) are affected by the domestic institutional 
structure. From the structural realist and collective action perspectives, the reverse should be 
true: the core group will put pressures on, or present incentives to the prospective coalition 
countries to make increased burden-sharing contribution. Thus, in the Auerswald model, the bloc 
“K Group” should have preceded the ‘government and institutional structure’ variable, and not 
vice versa.  
 The third limitation in the Auerswald model is its exclusion of an important explanatory 
variable -- alliance dependence. Auerswald justifies this exclusion based on the evidence that the 
United States under Clinton administration played a strong alliance policy by investing its 
political capital in NATO’s expansion, and by redefining NATO’s strategic concept. The 
problem with the logic is that the NATO-centric transatlantic alliance may not imply that the 
United States will always be committed to utilizing NATO as a vehicle for pursuing its interest. 
Nor, does it indicate that it will allow NATO to have a strong role in every coalition operation. In 
fact, the reverse may also be true, in which NATO is neglected by the United States. Evidence 
shows how the United Sates ignored NATO during the formative years of the Afghanistan War 
and the Iraq War II. In Afghanistan, NATO did not assume a direct military role until August 
2003, when it took over the command of the UN Security Council mandated International 
Security Assistance Force.111
                                                            
111 Although the United States constrained any broader role for NATO in Afghanistan, the alliance played an 
important role in securing U.S. airspace by deploying seven NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control 
Systems) aircraft from October 9, 2001 until May 16, 2002. In Afghanistan, NATO did not assumed any formal 
military command role until August 2003, when the Joint Dutch-German command of the International Security 
Assistance Force was handed over to NATO. Prior to that ISAF was commanded on a rotation basis among NATO 
contributing countries. See “NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism,” NATO International 
 In Iraq, the United Sates ignored the oppositions from its key 
NATO allies—France and Germany—prior to the invasion of Baghdad in 2003. 
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 There are at least two other limitations, which relate to both the Auerswald and the 
Bennett et al. models. The first concerns the exclusion of the ‘capability’ variable from both 
studies, and the second focuses on the time frame covered in the existing studies.  
I argue that the inclusion of the military capability variable could provide important 
insights into the relative military contribution of alliance members to the coalition warfare. 
Military coalitions are defined as capability aggregators, since they allow forces from 
participating countries to engage in joint war fighting. Since the mere inventory of military assets 
and forces in a country’s national arsenal does not imply that they can automatically be 
integrated into a coalition operation, it is important to examine the effect of military capability on 
coalition burden-sharing.  
Finally, the existing studies on coalition behavior cover only conflicts with limited 
duration. For instance, the Auerswald study examines coalition contribution for the Operation 
Allied Force, which lasted for less than three months (March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999). On the 
other hand, the Bennett et al. study on the First Iraq War covers only seven months of actual war 
(August 1990-Feb 1991). By contrast, the Baltrusaitis study on the Second Iraq  War examines 
burden-sharing for a relatively longer period of 4 years (2003-2007). The biggest problem with 
such short-span conflict analysis is that their limited ability to account for in-country and cross-
country variations in burden-sharing behavior over a longer time frame.  
In summary, the existing models of coalition burden-sharing provide a useful starting 
point for analyzing the complex decision processes that explain the decisions of major countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Military Staff Issues, Updated April 14, 2005. http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm, accessed December 3, 
2010; “AWACS: NATO’s Eyes in the Sky,” NATO Online Library, November 24, 2004. 
http://www.nato.int/docu/awacs/html_en/awacs04.html, accessed December 3, 2010; International Security 
Assistance Force Afghanistan: History,” NATO, nd.  http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html, accessed December 3, 
2010.  
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in the formation and maintenance of a wartime coalition. But, they cannot sufficiently explain 
the divergent contributions made by coalition countries during a long war, such as the War in 
Afghanistan. My dissertation addresses this theoretical gap by offering a modified model for 
analyzing burden-sharing behavior in wartime coalitions.  
 
V.  A Modified Coalition Burden-Sharing Model 
Having observed the limitations in the existing theoretical models, I present a better burden-
sharing model for analyzing coalition behavior during the War in Afghanistan. My burden-
sharing model incorporates three systemic level variables and three domestic level variables 
discussed before. I argue that the three systemic level variables—alliance dependence, balance of 
threat, and collective action—are independent variables; and the three domestic level variables—
domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability— are intervening variables. 
 I make several unique contributions to the study of coalition burden-sharing. First, in 
contrast to the Bennett et al, and Auerswald models, my burden-sharing model includes a new 
intervening variable—military capability to explain the outcomes of coalition burden-sharing. 
Second, I depict a theoretically-driven causal pathway that connects the systemic and domestic 
factors in the analysis of coalition burden-sharing. Third, I show the feedback effects of burden-
sharing outcomes at a particular historical point on subsequent foreign policy decision processes. 
Such findings contradict the conventional theories of foreign policy analysis, which end with an 
assessment of a particular foreign policy action, and do not investigate the after-effects of that 
action.112
                                                            
112 For an analysis of feedback effects in foreign  policy, see A.I. Dawisha, “Foreign Policy Models and the 
Problem of Dynamism,” British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1976), pp. 128-137; J. 
Bandyopadhyaya, A General Theory of Foreign Policy (Mumbai, India: Allied Publishers, 2004), pp. 25-26; Frank 
 My research shows that in the context of the Afghanistan War coalition, an analysis of 
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the feed-backs is useful to determine how the outcomes of military actions at an early stage of 
the war are fed into the decision process to change the course of a state’s coalition policy.113
Taking a neo-classical realist position, I argue that under the conditions of international 
systemic pressures or incentives (e.g. alliance dependence, balance of threat, or collective 
action), the chief executives and the national security elites make the critical decisions of 
whether or not to join a wartime coalition. After joining a coalition, they also decide whether or 
not to deploy troops in the combat zones without any national caveats. My theory is 
straightforward. The burden-sharing decisions are taken at three decision points: chief executive 
as the leader of the domestic political regime, domestic public opinion, and national military 
capability.  
 
Figure 3.1 presents the model. 
The first decision point is the chief executive. A strong chief executive with no legal-
constitutional restrictions, fewer legislative oversights, and strong elite consensus, is likely to 
ignore public opinion and directly look into the stock of national military capability to join and 
support a coalition. By contrast, a weak chief executive, who confronts rigid constitutional 
provisions, a hostile legislature and fragmented elites, is likely to avoid the coalition. In between 
these two, a medium executive with qualified support from the elites or the legislature will 
balance between the competing demands of elite consensus and unfavorable public opinion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Gardinger, Dirk Peters, and Herbert Dittgen, “Feedback Effects in US Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” 
Paper prepared for the panel America’s Mid East Policy at the WISC Conference in Istanbul, 24-27 August 2005;  
113 There is a rich body of literature that focuses on military learning and adaptation in the conduct of w ar. See 
Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010), pp. 567-594; Sameer Lalwani, “The Pakistan Military’s Adaptation to 
Counterinsurgency in 2009,” CTC Sentinel, January 31, 2010; Chad Serena, From Spectrum to Beam in Iraq 
Organizational Adaptation: Combat, Stability, and Beyond, Ph.D. Dissertation (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh, 2010); Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creaging and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the 
Changing Face of War (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2006).  
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Figure 3.1 An  Integrated Coalition Burden-Sharing Decision Model 
 
 
    Note: Illustrative examples of burden-sharing outcomes are shown in parentheses. 
The second decision point is public opinion. I take a realist “top-bottom” approach to 
public opinion, and argue that public opinion does not have any independent effect on foreign 
policy. Instead, the office of the executive and foreign policy elites shape public opinion on 
national security issues. Both strong and weak chief executives are likely to bypass the public 
opinion. An executive with overwhelming legislative support or elite consensus will be tempted 
to bypass public opinion, if the mass public opposes a foreign policy decision. The logic is 
straightforward here: either the mass public is considered unreliable and uninformed, or the elite 
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consensus will drive the government to take a policy first and shape public opinion later. While 
an assertive president or prime minister may care little about eroding public support for a war, 
due to an overwhelming elite consensus, public opinion is likely to give some feed-backs to the 
existing policy, which will result in some “lip service,” or rhetorical speeches, instead of altering 
the course of a state’s burden-sharing behavior. 
Unlike the strong executive, who cares little about unfavorable public opinion, a weak 
executive will pay a strong attention to public opinion in making key decisions on the use of 
force. The logic of such action is as follows: weak government leaders will be more concerned 
about their re-election prospects; lacking elite support or parliamentary approval, they will 
consider it a politically risky strategy to deploy military forces for coalition purposes. In contrast 
to these two extreme positions, the medium chief executive is likely to care about public opinion 
to the extent that balances between the competing demands of systemic pressures and domestic 
audiences.  
The third decision point is military capability. If a coalition country possesses a 
deployable, interoperable, and suitable military force, and has access to vital military assets and 
resources, it has the potentiality to play a robust burden-sharing role. At least three factors may 
determine the issues of deployability, interoperability, and suitability. These include a 
compatible military doctrine, sufficient troops and resources, and experience of joint exercises 
with multinational forces. A country lacking these qualities in its military arsenal is unlikely to 
pursue a strong burden-sharing role. The inability of a chief executive and the foreign policy 
elites to mobilize the public support behind a coalition policy is also unlikely to produce a strong 
burden-sharing commitment. 
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Having discusses the nuts and bolts of my burden-sharing model; I now concentrate on 
the methodological discussion.  
 
VI. Methodology and Case Selection 
This dissertation investigates the politics of coalition burden-sharing during the U.S.-led War in 
Afghanistan (2001-2010). Since the dominant theories of IR—neo-realism and strategic culture--
cannot provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the coalition behavior of states, this study 
presents an alternative – neo-classical realist – explanation of coalition burden-sharing. Taking a 
neo-classical realist position, it modifies the existing theoretical models of burden-sharing, and 
provides a better model. This study argues that the modified model of burden-sharing presents a 
better causal process to analyze the decision processes that influence the burden-sharing 
behaviors and outcomes of coalition members. It then tests the empirical validity of the burden-
sharing model in a comparative qualitative case study of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan. This 
study is, therefore, an academic exercise in theory-building and theory-testing.  
 
 Case Selection. There are several reasons for choosing Britain, Germany, and Pakistan as 
the country cases for this study. They all joined the coalition in 2001, and provided crucial 
military and non-military supports to maintain the coalition until 2010. By deliberately excluding 
the country cases, which did not join the Afghanistan coalition, or shirked away from the 
coalition, this study suffers from one caveat: it cannot establish the causal processes that explain 
the lack of coalition cohesion. Despite such shortfall, the focus of this study on the first two 
stages of a coalition’s lifetime – during the formation and maintenance of a coalition – offers two 
advantages in analyzing coalition cohesion. First, it offers a better explanation of the underlying 
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reasons that influence a state’s decision to join and to support a coalition. Second, it clearly 
specifies the decision process that influences a state’s burden-sharing behavior and outcome in 
the coalition. 
 What methodological criteria are adopted to choose the country cases in this study? In 
their seminal work on qualitative research, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Science, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett suggest several criteria for the selection of 
cases. These include: the selection of cases “to provide the kind of control and variation required 
by the research problem;” cases representing “instances of the same subclass” or “from different 
subclasses;” and cases with features of a most- or least-likely case, a crucial case, or a deviant 
case.”114
 Following George and Bennett, this study chooses cases to provide control and variation. 
It investigates the coalition contribution of countries during the post-9/11 era, in which the 
international system was dominated by the unmatched military power of the United States, and 
its key NATO allies.
 These criteria of case selection, outlined by George and Bennett, have become a 
standard benchmark for case study research.  
115 During the nine years of the Afghanistan War coalition (2001-2010), the 
structural distribution of power in the international system was constant, with no shifts in the 
balance of power.116
                                                            
114 Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA, and London, England: MIT Press, 2004), p. 83. 
 Thus, the systemic influence on coalition behavior of states was controlled. 
115 An excellent piece on the role of the United States as a provider of hegemonic stability is offered by Robert 
Kaplan. See Robert D. Kaplan, “A Gentle Hegemony,” Washington Post, December 17, 2008; Several pieces of 
evidence show why the United States is said to have “unmatched” military power. According to Bernd Debusmann, 
the United States accounts for five percent of the world’s population, around 23 percent of its economic output and 
more than 40 percent of its military spending. America spends as much on its soldiers and weapons as the next 18 
countries put together… The U.S., for example, has 11 aircraft carriers in service; the rest of the world has eight. 
China is building one but analysts say it won’t be completed before 2015. See Bernd Debusmann, “U.S. Military 
Power: When is Enough Enough?” Reuters, February 5, 2010. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/02/05/u-s-
military-power-when-is-enough-enough/, accessed December 21, 2010.\ 
116 For further discussion on U.S. preponderance and the global balance of power, see Rosemary Foot, S. Neil 
MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno, U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations (Oxford and New York: 
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Despite such controlled international environment, there were significant variations in the 
dependent variable – the burden-sharing contributions of coalition states.  
This study disaggregates coalition contribution into three variables: (a) diplomatic 
contribution; (b) offensive military contribution; (c) defensive civil-military reconstruction 
contribution. Based on the performance of a coalition state, each type of contribution has several 
possible outcomes. First, diplomatic contribution has two possible outcomes: proactive 
diplomacy, and reactive diplomacy. Second, offensive military contribution has three possible 
outcomes: weak, improved, and strong. Third, reconstruction and stabilization operations have 
two possible outcomes: weak and strong. The use of only a few categories of variances in the 
dependent variable offers a parsimony that fits well with my research goal.117
Since the central debate in the Afghanistan War coalition is why some countries share 
more military risks than others, my dissertation concentrates on the second and third type of 
coalition contributions — the offensive military, and defensive civil-military contributions — 
made by Britain, Germany, and Pakistan.
 
118
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Oxford University Press, 2003); Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, The Balance of 
Power in World History (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and 
Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2004). Critics of American hegemony have called for a scaling back of America’s global ambitions. Others 
have rejected such view, and suggested that the United States should remain the “guarantor of the international 
system” and should keep its standing global commitments to maintain the international stability. See Thomas 
Donnelly, Philip Gurr, and Andrew F. Krepinvevich Jr., “The Future of U.S. Military Power: Debating How to 
Address China, Iran, and Others,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 6 (2009), pp. 146-151.  
 Why, then, this study includes the discussion of 
diplomatic contribution? The answer is simple: the lack of political consensus may cause a 
117 George and Bennett remind that the choice between parsimony and richness in identifying variances in the 
dependent variable is determined by the research purposes in a given study. See George and Bennett, Case Studies 
and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 85.  
118 A nuanced analysis of the risk management approach to Afghanistan is discussed by M. J. Williams. See M. 
J. Williams, “Managing Strategic Risk Abroad: Afghanistan,” in NATO, Security and Risk Management: From 
Kosovo to Kandahar (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp.71-89. Also see Veronica M. Kitchen, “The 
Post-9/11 Alliance and Changing Notions of Mutual Defense in Afghanistan,” in The Globalization of NATO: 
Intervention, Security and Identity (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 96-110. 
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coalition to fall apart.119 Hence, it is important to investigate the extent to which the coalition 
members in Afghanistan used bilateral and multilateral meetings, and other diplomatic channels 
to achieve the political cohesion of the coalition to avoid the frictions over military strategy 
being employed.120
The country cases chosen for this study are unique in their attributes: they represent 
several sub-classes, yet may well be considered deviant cases. For instance, the Afghanistan War 
coalition was composed of two types of states: NATO members, who joined the coalition out of 
alliance solidarity; and non-NATO states, which were offered various incentives – positive and 
negative – to join the coalition. Britain and Germany represented the NATO members, whereas 
Pakistan represented a non-NATO ally of the United States. Despite, such representativeness, 
Britain, Germany, and Pakistan were all deviant cases, as they were the largest providers of 
military troops to the Afghanistan War coalition. For instance, by the end of 2010, Britain and 
Germany deployed 9,500 and 4,500 troops to Afghanistan, respectively, which were the second 
and third largest contingent of coalition forces under the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) command. During the same time, Pakistan deployed, under its own command, more than 
120,000 troops along the Afghan borders to suppress insurgency and terrorism in its tribal areas, 
which had emerged as a safe haven for Afghan insurgents.  
  
                                                            
119 An excellent research on this issue has been conducted by Nora Bensahel. See Nora Bensahel, The Coalition 
Paradox: The Politics of Military Cooperation.  Ph.D. Dissertation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1999).  
120 Christopher Coker, Jonathan Colman, Andrew Pierre and Wayne Silkett have emphasized the role of 
political consensus in avoiding friction and inefficiency in the military strategy of a coalition war. See Christopher 
Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Cooperation, Afghanistan and Strategic Culture,” RUSI 
Journal, Vol. 151, No. 5 (2006), p. 16; Jonathan Colman, “The Challenges of Coalition Building: The Vietnam 
Experience, 1964-1969,” RUSI Analysis 2010; Andrew J. Pierre, Coalition: Building and Maintenance (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University, 2002); Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” Parameter, Vol. 23, No. 
2 (Summer 1993), pp. 74-85.  
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 There are several advantages and disadvantages of a deviant case analysis. The most 
important benefit of deviant cases is their utility in probing for new and unspecified variables.121
Despite the advantage in probing for new variables, deviant cases have a serious problem 
of lack of representativeness. According to John Gerring, “The representativeness of a deviant 
case is problematic, since the case in question is, by construction, atypical.” However, Gering 
notes, such problem “can be mitigated if the researcher generalizes whatever proposition is 
provided by the case to other cases.”
 
This is exactly what this study wishes to accomplish. It introduces a new variable—military 
capability, and better specifies the public opinion variable– to the coalition burden-sharing 
model, and probes their utility in predicting and explaining the decision process and the outcome 
of coalition burden-sharing.  
122
 One might possibly question whether the country cases in this study lack any empirical 
puzzle.  Such question may be founded on an over-generalized observation that Britain has 
 This study addresses the concerns of generalizability by 
testing the burden-sharing model in cases, with significant variations in the dependent variable. 
For instance, among the coalition countries, Britain had pursued a robust military strategy by 
taking significant risks of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda militias. Germany was mostly 
reluctant to pursue an offensive military strategy, and instead adopted a risk-averse strategy. 
Although Pakistan did not deploy troops to Afghanistan, it carried out several military operations 
to fight Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, while 
maintaining clandestine support for various Afghan insurgent groups.  
                                                            
121 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 107; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
p. 81.  
122 Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, p. 107. 
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always been a most-likely case of a strong coalition partner; Germany a case for a risk-averse 
ally, and Pakistan an ally with conflicted goals. Since none of them behaved, one might argue, in 
a way that would counter their predicted generalized behavior, what research purposes are then 
served by the choice of case selection?  
The answer to this question is simple: although the country cases examined in this study 
can be over-generalized – Britain as a strong contributor, Germany as a weak contributor, and 
Pakistan as a reluctant contributor – there are significant, and quite puzzling, within-case 
variations in each of the coalition countries. A central goal of this study is to explain and predict 
these within-case variations, as well as cross-case variations. This is done by adopting a 
historical approach to longitudinal study. In a longitudinal study, researchers can conduct 
controlled comparison of a case by dividing it into two cases -- before-case and after-case.123
 Finally, I also select cases on a key intervening variable – domestic political regime – 
specified by the decision power of the chief executive vis-à-vis other actors in the domestic 
political institutions. Following David Auerswald’s analysis, I categorize three possible types of 
executive power: strong, weak, and medium.
 
This study examines how the introduction of more troops and resources, and the introduction of a 
population-centric doctrine changed the British, German, and Pakistani coalition behaviors. 
Using changing domestic military capability as an intervening variable, this study, therefore, 
examines the before- and after-effect of military capability on the burden-sharing outcomes.  
124
                                                            
123 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 81.  
 Since a weak chief executive is unlikely to join a 
coalition, I exclude any case on this variable. Instead, I focus on two types of chief executive 
power:  strong and medium. Germany was selected as a case of a medium power, in which the 
124 Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice.” 
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legal-constitutional provisions, legislative politics, and civil society constrain the ability of an 
incumbent government to pursue a strong coalition policy. In contrast, Britain and Pakistan were 
selected as the cases of strong executives, albeit for two different reasons. In the British case, the 
longstanding practice of royal prerogative and discretionary power has historically allowed the 
prime minister to use force with less political constraints. In the Pakistani case, the practice of 
frequent military interventions, and weak democratic institutions, have allowed the military and 
its intelligence agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) to centralize the decision power to the 
office of president or the chief marshal law administrator. Lacking any significant constraint or 
political-judicial oversight, the Pakistanis presidents and military chiefs were expected to 
determine their Afghan policy without paying attention to the public opinion and civil society 
institutions.   
 
 Data Collection. This study is about developing and testing a neo-classical realist 
theoretical model of coalition burden-sharing. In the study of IR and foreign policy analysis, neo-
classical realists offer a number of techniques for data collection and analysis. Thomas 
Christensen suggests the importance of adequate knowledge about a country or area under 
study.125 Randall Schweller and Fareed  Zakaria have used archival research and primary source 
materials to generate their data.126 Others have emphasized the importance of foreign language 
skills, and historical background of a nation or region being studied.127
                                                            
125 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 248 
 The central purpose of 
such language skill, primary data, and historical background is required, neo-classical realists 
argue, to precisely understand how elite belief systems, leadership perception, and historical 
126 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. 
127 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” p. 166. 
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learning act as intervening variables between systemic incentive and states’ foreign policy 
outcomes.   
 Following the neo-classical realist tradition, data for this research were generated from 
the primary and secondary sources. These include academic journals and books, memoirs, print 
and electronic media reports, and military and civilian documents on the War in Afghanistan. A 
limited number of interviews were conducted with academic scholars and practitioners, to 
understand the mental maps of the strategic decision makers in the countries under question.  
Data for this study were also generated with face-to-face, and telephone interviews with retired 
and active government officials from the British, German, Pakistani, and U.S. security and 
intelligence services. The interviewees offered important insights into the perception of Al 
Qaeda’s terrorist threat to Europe and the United States, and the varying level of inter-
governmental cooperation among coalition countries in Afghanistan.  
 
Research Method. The empirical chapters in the dissertation employ three techniques of 
the qualitative research method: structured, focused comparison, and process-tracing.128
This study is structured, because it investigates the same sets of questions in the country 
cases, and uses a logical sequence to answer those questions. This involves standardized data 
collection and data analysis, which allows for the systematic comparison of the three cases.
  
129
                                                            
128 For a discussion on the methods of process tracing and structured focused comparison, see George and 
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chapter 3, pp. 67-72; chapter 8, pp. 151-180; 
chapter 10, pp. 205-232. 
 
For instance, each case study in this dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part 
provides a historical description of a country’s military and non-military contributions to the 
129 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, pp. 67-69; Alexander 
George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-Making,” in Robert F. 
Coulam and Richard A. Smith, eds., Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, 
Conn: JAI Press, 1985) pp. 21-58. 
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Afghanistan War coalition. The second part employs the integrated burden-sharing model to 
analyze a country’s coalition contributions. The third part offers a summary and conclusion.  
 This dissertation is highly focused. It asks only three research questions, which concern 
the formation and maintenance of coalitions, and the decision-processes that influence states’ 
coalition contributions, and burden-sharing outcomes. 130 According to George and Bennett, 
“Situating” one’s research in the context of the literature is key to identifying the contribution the 
new research makes.” 131
 Following the method of process-tracing, this study historicizes a country’s burden-
sharing behavior, and shows the causal links between various international and domestic level 
variables. The adoption of a neo-classical realist position offers a crucial advantage here. It 
allows the theoretical model to link “clearly specified independent, intervening, and dependent 
variables in a direct causal chain.”
 Following this principle, this study is theoretically located in the neo-
classical realist school of IR, and empirically in the literature on coalition burden-sharing. It 
discusses neo-classical realism and its rival theories in detail; and examines the relative merits of 
existing burden-sharing models. Taking a neo-classical realist position, it develops and tests a 
theoretical model of coalition burden-sharing. 
132 The use of historical data to build case study research, and 
to specify dependent, independent, and intervening variables, is a standard practice among the 
neo-classical realists.133 Social science research has also emphasized the importance of 
historicizing in small-n case analyses.134
                                                            
130 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, p. 67. 
  
131 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, p. 70. 
132 Rose, “Neoclassical Realism,” p. 166. 
133 See Christensen, Useful Adversaries; Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; Schweller, Unanswered Threats; Zakaria, 
From Wealth to Power. 
134 David Collier, “The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change,” in Ada Dinifter, ed., Political Science: 
The State of the Discipline (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 8-11; 110-112. 
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Alexander George and Andrew Bennett suggest that process-tracing is “an indispensable 
tool for theory testing and theory development.”135 They contend that an important part of the 
process-tracing task is to show how the intervening variables affect the outcome of a particular 
phenomenon.136 Following the methodological dictum of George and Bennett, this study offers a 
better specification of the domestic level intervening variables, deductively drawn from the 
theory of strategic culture. It shows how the systemic factors are transmitted through the 
domestic level intervening variables to produce a wide range of burden-sharing behavior for 
states.  One needs to remember that there are at least three types of causal processes: linear, 
complex, and path dependent. 137
 The research design employed in this study has several shortcomings. First, it concerns 
the study of a U.S.-led coalition. The study of other coalitions, led by the United Nations, or a 
regional power, may offer useful insights into, and a better test for, the integrated burden-sharing 
model. Second, the cases chosen for this study do not examine non-coalition countries, that is 
countries which did not join the Afghanistan War; or which joined the coalition, yet offered a 
few hundred troops and resources to support the coalition. The inclusion of such country cases 
could enable a researcher to examine the generalizability of the modified burden-sharing model. 
Third, this research briefly touches on the issue that the United States was waging two wars – in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq – with two distinct coalitions. It argues that the Iraq coalition had 
distracted the Afghanistan War efforts, especially for the coalition leader – the United States, and 
 My burden-sharing model uses the third type of causal process, 
in which the sequencing of events and the identification of key decision points help understand 
the policy choices made by a country during a war.  
                                                            
135 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, p. 207. 
136 Ibid, p. 207. 
137 Ibid, p. 212. 
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its principal ally – the United Kingdom. It also argues that counterinsurgency lessons learned in 
Iraq, and later applied to Afghanistan, and Pakistan, had significantly influenced the burden-
sharing behavior of the Afghan coalition members. In the next phase of the research, I plan to 
address these three unanswered issues to enhance the utility of my burden-sharing model. 
However, one needs to be aware that time and resource constraints are likely to determine the 
choice and case selection in any qualitative case study.  
 Despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, this dissertation makes several crucial 
contributions. First, drawing on the insights from neo-realism and strategic culture, it offers a 
neo-classical realist explanation of coalition burden-sharing. In doing so, it contributes to a 
collaborative research agenda, as suggests by John Glenn, which seeks to bridge between realism 
and strategic culture.138
                                                            
138 Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture;” Glenn, Howlett, and Poore, Neorealism and Strategic Culture. 
Gideon Rose also offers the utility of neo-classical realism in bridging the gap between realism and constructivism. 
See Rose, “Neoclassical Realism.” Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan follows the suits in her recent study on British foreign 
policy. See Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010). 
 Second, it modifies the existing theoretical models of burden-sharing and 
offers a better model for predicting and explaining coalition behavior. The refined model 
introduces a new intervening variable – military capability; and better specifies the public 
opinion variable. It then tests the empirical validity of the model in the cases of three core 
countries, which had formed and supported the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Finally, this 
study contributes to the foreign policy literature by showing the feedback effects of foreign 
coalition outcomes on the strategic decision processes.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BRITAIN:   
PUNCHING ABOVE THE WEIGHT 
 
Britain’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides a compelling case to test the 
burden-sharing model. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in 
the United States, British Prime Minister Tony Blair reassured U.S. President George Bush that 
Britain would stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the American people to fight the war on 
terrorism.1 In less than four weeks, on October 7, 2001, Blair committed troops to the U.S.-led 
coalition to defeat the Al Qaeda and deny it a safe haven in Afghanistan. 2 Since then, Britain 
had emerged as the United States’ “most enthusiastic junior partner” in the war on terrorism.3
                                                            
1 Michael White and Patrick Wintour, “Blair Calls for World Fight Against Terror,” The Guardian, September 
12, 2001. 
 
Between 2001 and 2010, the War in Afghanistan underwent profound transformations from a 
strong focus on combating Al Qaeda terrorists to a tough mission of countering Taliban 
insurgency. During this time, the British forces in Afghanistan remained firmly committed to this 
changing posture of the War. This was evident in the deployment of the British forces to the 
Taliban insurgent-prone Helmand province in 2006. Critics have often claimed that Britain was 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/sep/12/uk.september11, accessed January 11, 2011. 
2 According the British Ministry of Defense, the central purpose of British cooperation in the U.S.-led Coalition 
in Afghanistan is fourfold: denying Al Qaeda an Afghan base; denying Al Qaeda a base outside Afghanistan; 
attacking Al Qaeda internationally; and forming an international coalition to continue the fight against Al Qaeda. 
See: Ministry of Defense, “Operations in Afghanistan: Background Briefing,” 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBackgroundBriefing
.htm, accessed November 4, 2010. 
3 The label of most enthusiastic junior partner was used by Joseph Lepgold to describe British contribution to 
the First Persian Gulf War (1990-91). As this chapter explains, that label now equally applies to Britain’s post-9/11 
Afghan mission. See Joseph Lepgold, “Britain in Desert Storm: The Most Enthusiastic Junior  Partner,” in Friends 
in Need: Burdensharing in the Persian Gulf War, edited by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 69-90.  
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“punching above its weight” in Afghanistan, with many of its NATO allies doing too little to 
share the coalition burden-sharing. 4
The British case is puzzling for at least three reasons. First, compared to other major 
NATO countries, especially France, Germany, and Italy, Britain contributed more troops, and 
allocated a relatively large share of its defense budget for the prosecution of the Afghanistan 
War. Second, despite growing public dissatisfaction over the Afghan mission, Britain was deeply 
committed to the cohesion of the Afghan War coalition by reinforcing troops on the ground, and 
redeploying them in the restive southern Afghan province of Helmand. Third, as the number of 
British troop fatalities increased amidst controversies over equipment deficits, the British 
government had literally two choices: to reduce forces or to provide more equipments and 
logistics. Prime Minister Blair and his successors Gordon Brown and David Cameron chose the 
second option: providing more equipments and logistics to ensure that British soldiers were well-
resourced to get the job done.   
  
What explains Britain’s firm commitment to the formation and maintenance of the U.S.-
led coalition in Afghanistan?  Conventional wisdom focuses on the realist and historical 
explanations. By contrast, this chapter takes an integrated approach to analyzing British policy in 
Afghanistan. It examines the effect of the interactions between international systemic and 
domestic level factors in shaping British contribution to Afghanistan War. 
                                                            
4 “Britain Cannot Continue ‘Punching Above its Weight Militarily, Kim Howells Warns,” Guardian, January 
15, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/6992149/Britain-cannot-continue-punching-above-its-
weight-militarily-Kim-Howells-warns.html, accessed March 14, 2011; Former British foreign secretary Douglas 
Hurd coined the phrase “punching over the weight” to refer to Britain’s global responsibility, and military burden-
sharing in multilateral operations. For a brief discussion on Britain’s military contribution to coalition operations 
during the post-Cold War era, see “UK’s World Role: Punching Above the Weight,” BBC News, undated. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk_politics/2001/open_politics/foreign_policy/uks_world_role.stm, 
accessed March 14, 2011; Also see:  Elke Krahmann, “United Kingdom: Punching Above Its Weight,” in Global 
Security Management: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, edited by Emile J. Kirchner and 
James Sperling (New York, Routledge, 2007), pp. 93-112. 
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Realists emphasize on the role of power and prestige in British foreign policy. They 
argue that British policy in Afghanistan was the product of an interventionist foreign policy, 
which sought a great power status in international politics. Taking a realist position, Christopher 
Hill argues that since the end of the Second World War, British foreign and security policy has 
been premised on Winston Churchill’s doctrine of the ‘Three Circles of Power.’ Prime Minister 
Churchill envisioned a great power status for Britain and an assertive role for British military in 
shaping the world order.5 In essence, the notion of three circles of power refers to three 
geographical areas in the world – the former British colonies, Canada and the United States, and 
Europe.6 Afghanistan has long been a place of “Great Game,” a buffer zone between the rival 
British and Soviet empires.7
                                                            
5 In 1954 former British civil servant Oliver Franks observed that “it is part of our habit and furniture of our 
minds to be a great power.” According to Christopher Hill, critics of the orthodoxy, from both right and left, have 
tended to share these dominant assumptions: that Britain has the right, need and obligation to make a difference on 
the big issues of international relations; that we can perform on a broad front. See: Christopher Hill, “British Foreign 
Policy Priorities: Tough Choices,” The World Today, vol. 66, no. 4 (March 23, 2010), pp. 111-114. 
 Hill contends that Britain’s Afghanistan policy is thus a natural 
consequence of a realist foreign policy of interventionism. Oliver Daddow concurs with Hill and 
argues that Churchill’s successors, from Anthony Eden and Harold Mcmillan to Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown, had largely embraced the notion of the circles of power, and during their 
regimes, any major rethinking in foreign policy was undermined by their “global power 
http://tridentreplacement.net/node/1649, accessed November 11, 2010. 
6 In 1948, British Prime Minister Churchill contended that an assertive, and if required interventionist foreign 
policy should operate through three circles: the British Commonwealth and Empire; the English-speaking world – 
Canada, the U.S., and British Dominions; and the United Europe. Churchill remarked, “As I look out upon the future 
of our country in the changing scene of human destiny I feel the existence of three great circles among the free 
nations and democracies . . . The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that 
that comprise. Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British Dominions 
and the United States play so important a part. And finally there is United Europe . . . Now if you think of the three 
interlinked circles you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them.” See 
Winston Churchill, “‘What Will Happen When They Get The Atomic Bomb?”  Conservative Party Conference, 
Llandudno, Wales, October 9, 1948, in Winston S. Churchill, Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill’s 
Speeches (New York: Hyperion, 2003), pp. 448-449 
7 For a discussion on the historical background of Anglo-Russian competitions over Afghanistan, see Rosanne 
Klass, Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1990). 
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pretensions.”8 Daddow contends that, in recent years the search for a great power status has 
resulted in a “chronically over-stretched and under-equipped” mission in Afghanistan.910
Historicists make a similar case. They stress that Britain’s military and non-military 
contribution to the War in Afghanistan was an expression of the historical Anglo-American 
special relationship. In the British foreign policy discourse, special relationship refers to the 
extraordinary level of post-war security cooperation with the United States, especially in the 
areas of nuclear technology, and intelligence sharing. James Sperling argues that the special 
relationship played an important role in influencing British foreign policy in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Why evoking the special relationship? Sperling notes that having lost its imperial status and 
the global reach, Britain “retains a heightened sense of obligation for the maintenance of global 
order and to assume responsibility for it.”
 
11
The realists and historicists provide useful insights into Britain’s Afghanistan policy, but 
they cannot predict the varying level of burden-sharing commitments made by Britain to the 
Afghanistan War coalition. This chapter analyzes Britain’s coalition behavior from a third 
 American hegemony in the post war era and the 
Anglo-American special relationship provided Britain an opportunity to use or at least evoke the 
longstanding alliance with the United States. Britain used this relationship to formulate and 
execute its Afghanistan policy. For Britain and the United States, the Afghanistan intervention 
was necessary to combat international terrorism and counter nuclear proliferation – two most 
pressing threats to international security.  
                                                            
8 Oliver Daddow, “Dodging the Bullet and Ducking the Question: British Defense Policy and its Post-Imperial 
World Role,” RUSI Analysis and Commentary, July 19, 2010. 
http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4C6D0795721B3/, accessed November 11, 2010.  
9 Daddow, “Dodging the Bullet and Ducking the Question.” 
10 Patrick Porter, “Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship,” International 
Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp. 355-375.  
11 James Sperling, “Permanent Allies of Friends with Benefits? The Anglo-American Security Relationship,” in 
The Development of British Defense Policy, edited by David Brown (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), p. 31. 
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perspective. Using the integrated burden-sharing model, it argues that Britain’s contribution to 
Afghanistan has to be understood as a complex interaction between international systemic 
incentives and domestic political processes.  
Following the tradition of neo-classical realist theory of IR, this chapter argues that 
transatlantic alliance commitment and the threat of international terrorism presented two 
systemic level incentives for Britain to join and support the Afghanistan War coalition. These 
systemic incentives were transmitted through the British domestic political processes, in which 
the office of the prime minister exercised the discretionary power to use military force in 
Afghanistan. In doing so, Prime Ministers Blair, Brown, and Cameron enjoyed the elite 
consensus, and bypassed the dissenting public opinion. Once the political decisions regarding 
participation in coalition was taken by the chief executive, the strength of UK’s military 
capability strongly shaped Britain’s burden-sharing commitment to Afghanistan.  
 This chapter has three sections. The first section examines Britain’s diplomatic, military, 
and reconstruction contributions to the war in Afghanistan. The second section tests the utility of 
my integrated burden-sharing model in analyzing the British contribution in Afghanistan. The 
third section summarizes the central research findings.  
 
  
I. Britain’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan 
This section examines Britain’s diplomatic, military, and post-war reconstruction contributions 
to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010. First, it finds that, since 2001, Britain had pursued a proactive 
diplomacy to form and support the Afghanistan War coalition. Next it argues that, backed by a 
strong diplomacy, Britain was firmly committed to the offensive counterinsurgency and 
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defensive stabilization operations in Afghanistan. This was evident in the Helmand Province, 
where the British forces were leading and participating in military operations to contain the 
Taliban insurgents, and reconstruct the areas, secured from the Taliban.  
 
Diplomatic Contribution. Britain pursued a proactive diplomacy to form and manage the 
coalition in Afghanistan. This was evident in Britain’s crucial role in coordinating the diplomatic 
meetings on Afghanistan. After convening several high profile international meetings, the 
successive British prime ministers had paid visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that the 
coalition war efforts war moving in the right direction.  
Prime Minister Blair played a crucial role in forging a common European policy at the 
beginning of the Afghanistan War. On September 11, 2001, he spoke with the world leaders to 
discuss the international community’s response to the terrorist attacks in the United States. 
Among the world leaders, Blair spoke with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, French 
President Jacques Chirac, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and Russian President Putin.12 
After speaking with the European leaders, Blair flew to New York and Washington, and met 
President Bush to learn about the U.S. war plans in Afghanistan.13 By the time Blair was meeting 
Bush, the United States had moved 100 warplanes to military bases with close distance from 
Afghanistan. The purpose was to strike Afghanistan, if the Taliban regime refused to transfer Al 
Qaeda leader Laden to the U.S. authority.14
                                                            
12 White and Wintour, “Blair Calls for World Fight Against Terror.” 
  
13 George Jones, “Blair Visit Strengthens the ‘Special Relationship,” The Telegraph, September 22, 2001. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1341310/Blair-visit-strengthens-the-special-
relationship.html, accessed January 11, 2011.  
14 “Blair Heads for US Terror Talks,” BBC News, September 20, 2001. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1553735.stm, accessed January 12, 2011.  
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On October 7, 2001, the U.S. and British military forces attacked Afghanistan. At that 
time, Blair stressed that there were three equally important components to the Afghanistan War: 
military, diplomatic, and humanitarian. On the military front, the United States provided bulk of 
the forces and commanded the operation, while the British and other coalition forces rallied 
behind the U.S. forces to support the war. Blair claimed that there was a massive international 
diplomatic support behind the military actions against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces. He asserted 
that Britain was offering financial support for alleviating the Afghan refugee crisis.15
Four weeks after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan, major European leaders 
were disappointed at the unilateralist tendency in U.S. foreign policy. Although France, 
Germany, and Italy offered military support to the campaign in Afghanistan, the United States 
was virtually acting alone, and rejected any broad-level support from NATO and its European 
allies. 
  
16 Against this backdrop, on November 4, 2001, Blair hosted a mini summit of European 
leaders to discuss the potential European support for prosecuting the War in Afghanistan. Blair 
was very optimistic about the prospects for success in the military campaign. He said, “We want 
this campaign brought to a conclusion as swiftly as possible, but it has to be a successful 
campaign, in other words with the attainment of our objectives.”17
                                                            
15 “Tony Blair’s Afghanistan Speech,” October 7, 2001. 
 Blair’s mini-summit was 
attended by leaders from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain –the leading 
European countries which had offered troops and military support for the war on terrorism. The 
mini-summit had two major goals: to coordinate the European response to the War in 
http://www.putlearningfirst.com/language/20rhet/blair.html, accessed January 11, 2011. 
16 UK Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report: Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Section 2: The 
Role of the International Community in Afghanistan (London: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, July 
21, 2009) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/302/30205.htm#a6, accessed 
January 12, 2011. 
17 Jane Merrick, “Blair Holds Talks with Spanish Premier on Afghan War,” The Independent, November 9, 
2001. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/blair-holds-talks-with-spanish-premier-on-afghan-war-
616410.html, accessed January 11, 2011. 
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Afghanistan and to encourage George Bush to accept more European help in the war.18 Looking 
back at the course of Afghanistan War, it is safe to say that Blair’s European mini-diplomacy 
failed to change U.S. military strategy. This is due to the fact that until 2003, NATO did not have 
any formal role in Afghanistan, and until 2006, the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) did not pursue any offensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. As Sarah 
Kreps observes, until 2006, the United States had dominated the combat operations in 
Afghanistan, and bypassed a large coalition participation to avoid the coordination problems of 
military operations.19
After organizing the European mini-summit, Britain attended and hosted several 
international meetings on Afghanistan. In late November 2001, Britain participated in the Bonn 
Conference on Afghanistan to provide support for the newly constituted interim Afghan 
government of Hamid Karzai. The Bonn Conference devised a three-tiered political transition 
process for post-Taliban Afghanistan. The transition process began in 2002 and completed in 
2005. First, in 2002 the grand council of Afghan tribal elders met and elected Karzai as the 
interim Afghan President. Second, in October 2004 Karzai won the first presidential election in 
Afghan history. Third, in September 2005, Afghanistan held the first national parliamentary 
election, which nominated mostly independent candidates with little or no background in a 
democratic process.
 
20
Under Blair’s leadership, Britain co-hosted the first London Conference on Afghanistan 
in January 2006. Dubbed as “Bonn II”, the conference was a follow up to the 2001 Bonn 
  
                                                            
18 Stephen Castle and Andrew Grice, “Blair Will Urge Bush to Accept Europe’s Help,” The Independent, 
November 6, 2001. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/blair-will-urge-bush-to-accept-europes-
help-616043.html, accessed January 11, 2011. 
19 Sarah Kreps, “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and 
the Case of Afghanistan,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008), pp. 531-567. 
20 National Democratic Institute, “Afghanistan,” http://www.ndi.org/afghanistan, accessed January 12, 2011.  
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Conference, where the international community pledged their support for Afghan reconstruction. 
The 2006 London conference was crucial on several aspects: it devised a five-year plan, the 
Afghan Compact, as a long term strategy for the reconstruction and development.21 The 
Afghanistan Compact focused on several priority areas, such as, security, governance, counter-
narcotics, and development.22
Blair’s diplomatic efforts were not confined to mini summits and international 
conferences. He made several trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan to support the British forces, and 
encourage Afghan and Pakistani governments to help the coalition fighting terrorism. After the 
fall of the Taliban regime, he was the first western leader to visit Afghanistan in January 2002.
 On security, it planned for the creation of an ethnically 
representative Afghan national army of 70,000 troops, which was later capped to more than 
140,000 troops. On governance, it aimed to build an efficient public administration, with 
increased access for women in the political process. On counter-narcotics, it planned to cut the 
production of and supply of opium from Afghanistan. On economic and social development, the 
Compact aimed for accelerated economic growth, water and electricity supply, and the 
promotion of better education and healthcare services throughout Afghanistan. In terms of post-
war reconstruction financing, the conference was a great success: it generated nearly $10.5 
billion aid commitment for Afghanistan for the period up to 2011.   
23
                                                            
21 Ewen MacAskill, Britain Stages UN Summit in Attempt to Speed UP Reconstruction of Afghanistan,” The 
Guardian, January 19, 2006. 
 
In November 2006, he paid the second visit to Afghanistan, to bolster British military 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/jan/19/politics.afghanistan, accessed January 
12, 2011.  
22 The London Conference on Afghanistan, “The Afghanistan Compact,” January 31-February 1, 2006. 
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/AfghanistanCompact-English.pdf, accessed January 12, 
2011.  
23 “Blair Pledges Support for Afghan People,” January 8, 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1747783.stm, accessed January 11, 2011. 
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contribution to Afghanistan. 24 On both occasions he visited Pakistan to persuade President 
Pervez Musharraf to do more to fight international terrorism, and to defuse the tensions over 
Kashmir.25
Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, continued to pursue a strong diplomatic role for the 
prosecution of the Afghanistan War. In August 2009, Brown unveiled a new Afghanistan 
strategy, which called for a reconciliation process for Taliban and increasing the size of Afghan 
army to accelerate the transfer of security responsibility to indigenous Afghan forces.
  
26 As a 
follow-up to the 2006 London Conference, in January 2010, Brown co-hosted the second 
London Conference, which started the process of Afghanization, a term that refers to the gradual 
transfer of security responsibility from international forces to the indigenous Afghan forces. 27 
The second London conference had three principal aims: to create a reintegration fund for 
encouraging Taliban militias to reject violence; to foster better governance; and to persuade 
Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, such as Iran to participate in stabilizing Afghanistan.28
                                                            
24 “PM Vows to Stand by Afghanistan,” BBC News, November 20, 2006. 
 Critics 
say at the second London Conference, Prime Minister Brown wanted to assure the skeptical 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6164722.stm, accessed January 11, 2011; Ivan Watson and Renee Montagne, 
“Britain’s Blair Visits the Troops in Afghanistan,” NPR, November 20, 2006.  
25 “Blair Calls for Talks on Kashmir,” CNN News, January 7, 2002. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/01/07/pakistan.blair/index.html, accessed January 12, 2011; 
“UK and Pakistan Forge Terror Pact,” BBC News, November 19, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6161500.stm, accessed January 12, 2011. 
26 Mark Townsend and Gaby Hinsliff, “Gordon Brown in New Afghan Plan: Talk to the Taliban,” The 
Guardian, August 30, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/30/brown-afghanistan-troops-taliban-talks, 
accessed January 11, 2011. 
27 “Conference to Explore Handing Control Back to Afghan Locals,” CNN News. November 28, 2009. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-11-28/world/britain.afghan.conference_1_helmand-province-afghan-army-afghan-
government?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed January 12, 2011; Carsten Volkery, “War-Weary NATO Members Look for 
Morale Boost,” Der Spiegel, January 20, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674723,00.html, 
accessed January 12, 2011.  
28 “Aims of the London Conference on Afghanistan,” BBC News, January 28, 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8480368.stm, accessed January 12, 2011; Julian Borger, “Afghanistan Conference Sets 
Out Plan for Two-Tier Peace Process,” The Guardian, January 28, 2010. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/28/afghanistan-london-conference-analysis, accessed January 12, 2011; 
The London Conference, “Communiqué: Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership,” 
January 28, 2010. http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/Communique-final, accessed January 12, 2011. 
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British public that London had an exit strategy for Afghanistan, and that the British forces would 
not stay there for an indefinite period. From the coalition war perspective, these conferences 
were important to forge political cohesion among troop contributing nations, and to distribute the 
financial burdens of military operations and stabilization among participating nations and 
international institutions.  
Between 2008 and 2010, Brown made three visits to Afghanistan. The purpose was to 
boost the domestic support for the war and to express Britain’s continuing commitment to 
Afghanistan.29 Compared to his earlier two visits, Brown’s March 2010 visit was more important 
for the British military in Afghanistan, which had lacked critical military equipments and 
logistical supplies. During the trip, Brown announced that Britain would send 200 new patrol 
vehicles to replace the lightly-defended Snatch Land Rovers. The new vehicles would be 
delivered by late 2011. In addition, Britain would invest £18 million for the defense against 
improvised explosive devices (IED) or roadside bombs. The British government would spend the 
money on equipment and training for the Afghan forces. Britain would also send 150 new army 
and police instructors to train the Afghan police.30
When the Conservative Party came to power in May 2010, Prime Minister Cameron 
followed the path of his predecessors and paid two visits to Afghanistan. During his first visit in 
June 2010, Cameron encouraged the Afghan President Karzai to develop a political strategy to 
incorporate reconciliation with the Taliban; to speed up the training of Afghan security forces, 
 
                                                            
29 “Gordon Brown Makes Surprise Visit to Afghanistan,” The Guardian, December 13, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/dec/13/gordon-brown-afghanistan-troops-karzai, accessed January 11, 
2011.  
30 “Gordon Brown Makes Surprise Afghanistan Visit,” The Telegraph, March 6, 2010. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7384165/Gordon-Brown-makes-surprise-Afghanistan-
visit.html, accessed January 11, 2011.  
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and to ensure better coordination among civil-military-development personnel in Afghanistan.31 
During his second visit in December2010, Cameron focused on the issue of logistics supply for 
British forces. The prime minister announced that he planned to complete the withdrawal of 
British forces by 2015. In the meantime, Britain would inject more military logistics and 
resources to support the coalition war efforts. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced to 
double the drone capability in Afghanistan, and placed an order for 5 Reaper drones. The MoD 
also announced that 100 Warthogs armored vehicles would be deployed to Afghanistan.32
In summary, Britain pursued a strong diplomatic role toward the formation and 
maintenance of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. This was evidenced in Blair, Brown, and 
Cameron’s summits with the European and international leaders, where they discussed the future 
of Afghan reconstruction and development, as well as the war strategy. The London conferences, 
as well as the British prime ministers’ visit to Afghanistan indicated a proactive diplomacy in 
pursuing British strategy in Afghanistan.  
 
 
 Offensive Military Contribution. Backed by a strong diplomacy, Britain had gradually 
moved toward adopting a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Three 
factors illustrate Britain’s move toward a counterinsurgency role in Afghanistan: the decision to 
deploy forces in the insurgent prone Helmand province; the gradual escalation of military force 
in Helmand; and the sustained military offensives against hostile Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.  
                                                            
31 Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron Flies Into Kabul for Talks With Afghan President Hamid Karzai,” The 
Guardian, June 10, 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/10/david-cameron-kabul-afghan-hamid-karzai, 
accessed January 11, 2011.  
32 Polly Curtis and Richard Norton-Taylor, “David Cameron Signals Afghan Withdrawal,” The Guardian, 
December 7, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/07/david-cameron-afghanistan, accessed January 11, 
2011.  
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First, consistent with ISAF’s changing strategy, Britain’s area of operation in 
Afghanistan changed over time. Between 2002 and 2006, the British forces mainly operated in 
Kabul, and the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Mazar-i-Sharif in the north-east.33 The 
Kabul contingent had three functions: (a) to coordinate Britain’s military strategy in Afghanistan 
with the British Embassy in Kabul, and the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A); 
(b) to provide in-theater administrative support for British forces; and (c) to contribute to local 
security and force protection in Kabul.34 In April 2006, the British forces were redeployed to the 
Helmand province, where they assumed the rotational command responsibility for Regional 
Command South (RC-South). RC-South comprised the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, 
Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul.35 Britain’s Helmand deployment was necessitated for two reasons: 
to suppress the growing Taliban insurgency; and to share the risk of combat operations with the 
American forces. Prior to UK’s Helmand deployment, coalition force presence in the province 
was negligible, and this had resulted in a sharp increase in narcotics trade and Taliban insurgent 
activities.36
 
 Figure 4.1 shows the British forces’ area of operation in Afghanistan’s Helmand 
province.  
 
                                                            
33  UK Government, UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Way Forward (London: TSO, 2009), pp. 7-8. 
34 “Interview with COL Mark Neate, March 26, 2008,” Operational Leadership Experiences in the Global War 
on Terrorism. Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 3.  
35 Coalition forces in RC-South came from the United Kingdom, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Georgia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, UAE, and the United 
States.  
36 According to a testimony by Adam Holloway, the British Member of the Parliament, there were only 40 U.S. 
troops based at Lashkar Gah, Helmand, prior to the deployment of British forces in southern Afghanistan. See: UK 
House of Commons,  “House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 June 2008, Westminster Hall, David Taylor in 
the Chair,” Column 176 WH, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080617/halltext/80617h0001.htm, accessed 
March 14, 2011. 
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Figure 4.1 The British Forces’ Area of Operation in Southern Afghanistan 
 
Source: Defense Geographic Centre, The UK Ministry of Defense. 
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According to the UK Ministry of Defense, the British forces took charge of Helmand to 
ease the burden of U.S. forces, which were overwhelmed with the demands of fighting two wars 
simultaneously—in Iraq and Afghanistan.37
[T]he army seized on Helmand as a potential operation in 2005 because political 
and military leaders believed that the British commitment to Iraq was coming to 
an end. The inference was that the army needed a major new operation (preferably 
an intense one) in order to defend its budget against potential deployments by the 
other services.
 The British Army’s organizational preference for 
combat operations might also explain why the British forces went to the insurgent prone 
Helmand province. Anthony King notes that as the Iraq mission was coming to an end, the 
British Army was planning for a major combat role in Afghanistan to win the inter-service 
rivalry. Anthony King writes,  
38
 Second, with the changing area of operation, British military boots on the ground 
increased significantly from 1,800 in 2002 to 5,500 in 2006, and ultimately to 9,500 in 2010 (See 
Figure 4.2). This means that by the end of 2010, the United Kingdom deployed more than 5% of 
its active military force in Afghanistan. This was only second to the United States, which 
deployed nearly 6.7% of its active military forces (100,000 out of 1.48 million) in Afghanistan.  
 
Initially, Britain deployed nearly 2,000 troops during the first six months of the 
Afghanistan War. At one point, in the summer of 2002, Britain had nearly 2,100 soldiers in 
Afghanistan. In the next two years (2003-2004), the British troop presence declined significantly 
                                                            
37 These were the views broadly shared by the British Ministry of Defense. See UK Defense Committee, Fifth 
Report of Session 2005-2006, The UK Deployment to Afghanistan, JC 558, Para 45. 
38 Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan,” 
International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp. 328-329. 
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to only three to six hundreds. This was perhaps due to British forces’ participation in the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, which diverted many of the critical resources necessary for the 
successful prosecution of the Afghanistan War.39 Since 2005, Britain and other coalition 
members had steadily increased their troops, as part of a strategy of counterinsurgency and 
nation-building.  
 
      Sources: Military Balance; SIPRI Yearbook, various issues.  
 
Third, an inevitable consequence of the extended area of operation, and increasing troops 
was the British military’s participation in offensive military operations. Since 2001, the British 
forces in Afghanistan participated in numerous military offensives to counter the Al Qaeda 
terrorists, and the Taliban insurgents. When the U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 
2001, the British forces were among the first to provide critical support to target the Al Qaeda 
                                                            
39 UK House of Commons, “House of Commons Hansard Debates for 17 June 2008, Westminster Hall, David 
Taylor in the Chair,” Column 176 WH. 
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leadership, and to topple the Taliban regime.40
A closer look at Britain’s coalition strategy in Afghanistan shows that, the British 
military operations progressed in four stages. These are: 
 This initial campaign against the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban forces were carried out under the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
command. However, since December 2001, the large majority of U.K. forces in Afghanistan 
were deployed under the UN-backed ISAF command. In fact, when the ISAF was created as a 
stabilization force, the United Kingdom was the first country to lead the rotational command of 
ISAF from December 2001 until May 2002.   
• State I (October 2001-July 2002): A strong counterterrorism role; 
• Stage II (August 2002-March 2006): The neglect of Afghanistan due to the diversion of 
resources in the Iraq War, which began in March 2003; 
• Stage III (April 2006-Late 2007): A weak and limited counterinsurgency role in 
Helmand; 
• Stage IV (Early 2008-Late 2010): A strong counterinsurgency role in Helmand.  
In the first stage, the British forces participated in the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, 
which toppled the Taliban regime and significantly weakened the Afghan-based Al Qaeda 
terrorist group. This stage lasted for about ten months between October 2001 and July 2002, 
which saw some of the most intensive ground offensives, followed by the initial aerial bombings. 
The United States dominated this stage, with a strong support from a loose coalition of countries, 
including the United Kingdom. The central goal of the U.S. and coalition forces was to combat 
                                                            
40 U.K. Ministry of Defense, “Defense Factsheet: Operations in Afghanistan: Background Briefing.” 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBackgroundBriefing
.htm, accessed September 17, 2010. 
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terrorism, and not fighting insurgency. The U.S. military officials wanted to pursue these goals 
with a light footprint, and avoid the ‘Soviet mistake’ of injecting more ground troops.41 It was 
also perceived that nation-building would not be the goal of coalition forces in Afghanistan.42
Several high profile military campaigns illustrate the British military’s strong burden-
sharing role during the initial months of the Afghanistan War. When the War began with the 
Operation Crescent Wind (October 2001), the British military provided support to U.S. airstrikes 
over key Afghan provinces -- Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Zaranj and Balkh.
   
43 The Royal Navy 
submarines fired Tomahawk cruise missiles, and the Royal Air Force provided reconnaissance 
and air-to-air refueling capabilities. The American forces flew missions from the British Indian 
Ocean Territory in Diego Garcia. In November 2001, the British marine commandos helped 
secure the Bagram Air Field. Soon, the United Kingdom deployed Task Forces Jacana, a 
battlegroup of 1,700 troops based around Royal Marines from 45 Commando. According to the 
British Ministry of Defense, the British forces “destroyed bunkers and caves” and provided 
humanitarian assistance during the early days of the Afghan mission.44
                                                            
41 The notion of ‘Soviet mistake' refers to the presence of a heavy military footprint in Afghanistan, which 
encouraged a strong indigenous resistance, backed by the support Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. For 
a discussion on the light footprint, see General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 
p. 324; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan Stabilization and Reconstruction: A Status 
Report, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 2d sess., January 27, 
2004, pp. 14, 17-18;  
  
42 See Seth G. Jones, “Getting Back on Track in Afghanistan,” Testimony presented before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia on April 2, 2008. 
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/Jon04022008.pdf, accessed March 18, 2011, pp. 4-8; James Dobbins, After the 
Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2008).  
43 Leigh Neville, Ramiro Bujeiro, Special Forces Operations: Afghanistan and Iraq (New York: Osprey 
Publishing, 2008); “Operation Enduring Freedom: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States 
Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, February 7 and July 31, 2002 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
GPO, 2002); Sean Maloney, Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2005). 
44 The UK Ministry of Defense, “Operations in Afghanistan: Background Briefing,” Defense Factsheet, 
undated. 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBackgroundBriefing
.htm, accessed March 18, 2011.  
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After the initial airstrikes weakened the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda leadership, the 
British Special Forces participated in several ground offensives in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan. In late November 2001, troops from the British Special Air Service launched 
Operation Trent in southern Afghanistan to collect intelligence and destroy opium facilities.45 At 
that time the Special Boat Service soldiers were collaborating with the U.S. Special Forces in the 
Battle of Qala-i-Jangi to suppress a Taliban prisoners’ uprising. In mid-December 2001, the 
Royal Signals soldiers collaborated with the U.S. and German Special Forces in the Nangarhar 
province to capture the Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden. Laden escaped the military campaign in the 
Tora Bora Mountains, and possibly infiltrated into Pakistan via the Khyber Pass.46
After the fall of the Taliban regime, in March 2002, the U.S. and coalition forces 
launched Operation Anaconda, the first large-scale ground offensive, in which the British and 
allied Special Forces moved into the Paktia province to eliminate the residual Al Qaeda and 
Taliban forces.
 
47 From April to July of 2002, the British Special Forces led Operation Jacana in 
the Khost and Paktika provinces.48
                                                            
45 Mark Nicol, Ultimate Risk  (London: Macmillan, 2003); “SAS (Special Air Service),” undated. 
 The purpose was to ‘clear and search’ the areas dominated by 
Al Qaeda and Taliban militias. This brief discussion of military campaigns provides an example 
of British contribution to the U.S.-led OEF mission.  
http://specialforce.info/uk-special-ops/sas/, accessed March 18, 2011.  
46 Alex Perry, “Inside the Battle at Qala-I-Jangi,” Time, December 1, 2001. 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,186592,00.html, accessed March 3, 2011; Gary Bernsten and Ralph 
Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), p. 252. 
47 For a detailed description of the Operation Anaconda, see, The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation 
Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Center for Military 
History, 2004), http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm, 
accessed March 2, 2011. 
48 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Scores Killed by SAS in Afghanistan,” The Guardian, July 5, 2002. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/05/september11.afghanistan, accessed March 1, 2011; “Marine Wins 
Military Cross,” BBC News, April 29, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/2984201.stm, 
accessed March 2, 2011.  
107 
 
During the second stage, the British military backtracked from its Afghanistan 
commitment. This was accompanied by the U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq in 2003, where the 
United Kingdom initially deployed nearly 46,000 troops. The Iraq War diverted the resources 
needed for the prosecution of the Afghanistan War. The second stage of British operations in 
Afghanistan lasted from mid-2002 to early 2006. This period saw the decline of British troop 
presence in Afghanistan to 300, up from 1,800 in 2002. Due to a strategic neglect, caused by the 
Iraq War, the British forces were engaged in limited scale non-combat stabilization operations in 
Kabul and northern Afghanistan.  
The process of stabilization in Afghanistan began on a limited scale in January 2002, 
when the United Kingdom led the first contingent of the ISAF. Since then, most of the British 
forces were deployed under the ISAF mission. The ISAF was created as a multinational coalition 
force, agreed in the Bonn Summit, and mandated by the UN Security Council. Its initial purpose 
was to provide assistance to the newly constituted Afghan Transitional Authority of Hamid 
Karzai, and to maintain the security of Kabul and its surrounding areas. In August 2003, NATO 
formally took over the command of the ISAF, but did not adopt an offensive military posture 
until 2006.  From an operational perspective, until 2006, there was a strict division of labor 
between the U.S.-led OEF mission, and the NATO-led ISAF mission. The first was conceived as 
a counterterrorism force, while the later was created as a peacekeeping force. This strict division 
worked well until early 2006, when the two missions began to merge to ensure a unified 
command in Afghanistan. Since 2006, a dual hatted U.S. military commander had been in charge 
of both the OEF and the ISAF missions, and the priority of the war moved to fighting 
insurgency, rather than just combating terrorism. This change in the military strategy was 
necessitated by the increasing Taliban insurgent attacks in eastern and southern Afghanistan.  
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The third stage in the British military operation in Afghanistan began in April 2006 and 
continued until the end of 2007. This stage saw the deployment of British forces in the Helmand 
province. During the first two years in Helmand, the British forces commanded and participated 
in several high profile military campaigns, which had mostly targeted in clearing areas controlled 
by the insurgents, but failed to hold those areas after the removal of the insurgents.49
The town of Musa Qala was a tough battlefield for the British forces, as well as for 
coalition forces from Canada, Denmark, Estonia, and the United States.  The coalition forces 
launched two major military operations in Musa Qala—the Operation Snakebite (May-Oct. 
2006), and the Operation Snakepit (December 2007).
 The epic 
battles in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas illustrate the British forces’ limited success 
in counterinsurgency operations from 2006 to 2007.  
50
                                                            
49 Data on Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan are generated from various press reports, and military 
reports from NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the British Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).  
 During the Operation Snakebite, the 
British platoon house near Musa Qala came under sustained attacks from Taliban fighters and 
their local collaborators. The platoon house was created as isolated coalition outposts composed 
of several civilian or military compounds.  The British forces were drawn into the conflict to 
respond to a request from Helmand’s provincial governor Mohammed Daoud. The governor 
needed support from NATO forces to extend his rule into a city of nearly 20,000 people. Since 
Musa Qala was a strategic center for opium production and heroin trade, the British forces in 
Helmand conceived of fighting narcotics facilities as an additional goal of the operation. In 
October 2006, the battle ended indecisively, with a truce brokered by the tribal elders. Under the 
50 “UP in Flames…Troops Destroy £200 M Haul of Warlords’ Heroin,” Sunday Mirror, December 16, 2007. 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/sunday-mirror/2007/12/16/up-in-flames-troops-destroy-200m-haul-of-warlords-heroin-
98487-20255897/, accessed May 28, 2010; Mark Townsend, “Fierce Battle Rages for Taliban Stronghold,” 
Guardian, Dec. 9, 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/09/afghanistan.theobserver, accessed May 28, 
2010. 
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terms of the truce, the British forces would withdraw from Musa Qala, and the Taliban would re-
enter the town.51
The fragile peace deal in Musa Qala lasted for only four months. In February 2007 the 
Taliban militias resurfaced, and regained control of the town. In early December 2007, the 
British and other NATO forces launched the second campaign—Operation Snakepit to regain 
control of Musa Qala.
  
52 The Operation Snakepit saw the deployment of about 6,000 troops— 
3,000 from the U.K., 1,500 from other NATO members, and 1,500 from the Afghan security 
forces. On December 12, 2007, the British forces declared their victory in Musa Qala. NATO’s 
decisive victory in Musa Qala was marked by the Taliban retreat from the area. After the Taliban 
retreat, the Afghan and UK forces recovered a huge cache of small arms, explosives, and a large 
bomb factory—all used as Taliban military logistics. They also destroyed £150 to £200 million 
worth of herion.53
Like Musa Qala, Sangin was a strategically important town in Helmand. The first battle 
of Sangin was Operation Augustus, which began in July 2006.
  
54
                                                            
51 Bill Roggio, “The Taliban Return to Musa Qala,” The Long War Journal, November 2, 2006; Michael Smith, 
“British Troops in Secret Truce with the Taliban,” The Sunday Times, October 1, 2006. 
 It was part of a broader 
coalition-led combat operation named Operation Mountain Thrust, which involved an estimated 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article656693.ece, accessed March 4, 2011. 
52 Nick Meo, “British Troops Set to Retake Taleban Stronghold – But Face Big Challenge to Hold On To It,” 
Times Online, Dec. 10, 2007. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3025029.ece?print=yes&randnum=1151003209000, accessed May 
28, 2010. 
53  Mark Townsend, “Fierce Battle Rages for Taliban Stronghold,” Guardian, Dec. 9, 2007. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/09/afghanistan.theobserver, accessed May 28, 2010; Sean Rayment, and 
Tom Coghlan, “Thousands of UK Troops in Afghan Assault, Telegraph, Dec. 9, 2007. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1572002/Thousands-of-UK-troops-in-Afghan-assault.html, accessed May 
28, 2010. 
54 Paul Wiseman, “Revived Taliban Waging ‘Full-Blown Insurgency,” USA Today, June 20, 2006.. 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-06-19-taliban-afghanistan-cover_x.htm, accessed May 30, 2010. 
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300 British troops, supported by 700 U.S. and Canadian troops.55 The British Ministry of 
Defense characterize Augustus as a “cordon and search” operation, in which UK helicopters 
came under Taliban rocket propelled grenade attacks. The British forces responded to Taliban 
attacks with missiles and several rounds of 30mm cannon.56
In April 2007, the British forces launched Operation Silver in the northern Sangin Valley, 
and Operation Silicon in the southern Sangin Valley. These operations were part of a large-scale 
coalition military campaign named Operation Achilles. Its main aim was to suppress the Taliban 
insurgency to stabilize Afghanistan.
 The military offensive weakened the 
Taliban force, but failed to expel them from the Sangin valley.  
57 By May 2007, the British forces secured the Sangin Valley 
with the support of the Afghan and NATO coalition forces. The tactical victory in Sangin paved 
the way for the reconstruction and development of an important area of Helmand.58
Like Musa Qala and Sanign, the Kajaki dam area was important to the British and NATO 
forces for two reasons. First, it provided the water for the irrigation of the Helmand Valley. 
Second, it supplied the electricity for the whole Helmand province.  Prior to the deployment of 
British forces to Helmand in April 2006, the Kajaki dam area was guarded by a weak Afghan 
police presence, backed by an American contractor. Mortar attacks by Taliban militants near the 
  
                                                            
55 Bill Roggio, “Three Days of Operation Mountain Thrust in Kandahar,” Long War Journal, June 14, 2006. 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/06/three_days_of_operat.php, accessed June 1, 2010. 
56 “UK Troops Take  Taleban Stronghold,” BBC News, July 16, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5183052.stm, accessed June 3, 2010.  
57 About 6,000 NATO and Afghan troops were involved in Operation Achilles in the northern Helmand. Among 
them an estimated 1000 NATO (mostly UK) and Afghan troops were involved in Operation Silver, and another 
1,000 forces in Operation Silicon to retake the control of Sangin Valley. Raymond Whitaker, “The Battle of Sangin: 
British Forces Lead Fight to Recapture Key Town,” The Independent, April 8, 2007. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-battle-of-sangin-british-forces-lead-fight-to-recapture-key-town-
443819.html, accessed June 3, 2010.   
58 UK Ministry of Defense, “UK-led Operation Helps ISAF Take Control in Northern Helmand (Video),” 
Defense News, May 31, 2007. 
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dam area were a frequent phenomenon, which seriously threatened the servicing of the dam, and 
the maintenance of one of the two turbines.  In 2007 and 2008, the British forces led two military 
campaigns targeting the Kajaki dam. In February 2007, during Operation Volcano, the Royal 
Marines engaged the Taliban in a fierce battle.59
This brief description of the British forces’ operations in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki 
districts show the flaws of pursuing a strategy that mostly focused on clearing areas, and not 
holding them. As I discuss in this chapter, the British forces lacked enough boots on the ground 
and adequate equipment and logistics during the early stages of their Helmand campaign. This 
capacity gap had seriously affected their performance in Helmand until 2007.  
 The Taliban forces fired from small arms, 
mortars, and rockets. The British forces responded heavily with air assets, artillery attacks, and 
lightweight mortars.  In the end, the British forces cleared the Kajaki area, and maintained a 
troop presence to prevent the Taliban from re-taking it.  
The fourth stage of British military operations in Helmand was marked by improved 
success in clearing, holding, and building territories. At least four high profile military 
campaigns illustrate the improved burden-sharing role of the British forces. The first concerns 
the British forces’ participation in a large-scale route clearing operation from Kandahar to 
Helmand. The remaining three focuses on military operations in the Nad Ali, Babaji, and Marjah 
districts.  
In August-September 2008, the British and other NATO coalition forces launched the 
Operation Eagle Summit to transport a turbine from Kandahar airfield to the Kajaki dam area in 
Helmand. The Eagle Summit was a big success, and it is considered to be the largest route 
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clearing mission the British military had carried out since the Second World War.60 After the 
transportation of the turbine, the British forces concentrated on the protection of the Kajaki dam. 
They were supported by the Afghan National Police force, and a British private security 
contractor. Despite that, the lack of security had constrained the possibility of bringing a third 
turbine to the Kajaki dam area, which was needed for its full-scale operation.61
After participating in Eagle Summit, in December 2008, the British forces led Operation 
Sond Chara in Nad Ali district.
  
62 The operation saw the concentration of nearly 1,500 British 
forces, supported by the multinational forces from Denmark and Estonia. The purpose of the 
operation was to provide security for the Lashkar Gah and its surrounding areas. According to a 
BBC report, the Royal Marines fought a WWII-style trench battle in Nad Ali, which secured the 
Taliban stronghold after intense fighting with the insurgents.63 Later, in the summer of 2009, the 
British forces launched Operation Panther Claw, which saw the deployment of nearly 3,000 
British troops to establish the control of the Babaji and Nad Ali districts—the two most critical 
Taliban strongholds.64
In February 2010, the British and coalition forces undertook Operation Moshtarak – a 
large-scale military offensive in the Taliban controlled Marja district. According to an ISAF 
  The operation saw the use of massive airpower and ground forces, which 
had a decisive effect in weakening the Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan.  
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press release, Moshtarak was a joint operation involving some 15,000 troops, led by five 
brigades of the Afghan forces, and supported by the coalition forces from Britain, Canada, 
Denmark, Estonia, and the United States.65 The British forces contributed attack helicopters, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, and Special Forces to the Marja operation. Using a strategy of force 
concentration, instead of force dispersal, they gained significant success in securing and holding 
territories controlled by the insurgents. After the initial success in defeating the Taliban 
insurgents, the British and coalition forces moved toward building the areas.66 According to 
NATO military commanders, Operation Moshtarak was a great success story for the UK and 
coalition forces. They had successfully held the territory for a year, reopened schools and local 
markets, and reduced the flow of narcotics trafficking.67
The foregoing discussion shows the British forces’ participation in coalition military 
operations in Helmand. The British forces paid a heavy price for its Helmand campaign. During 
the nine years of the Afghanistan War (October 2001-December 2010), the United Kingdom lost 
348 soldiers.
  
68
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 After the American troop fatalities (1,446), this was the second largest coalition 
troop fatalities in Afghanistan. Of the 348 British soldiers killed, nearly ninety percent were 
killed in enemy actions in the Helmand province. Figure 4.3 shows the British troop fatalities in 
Afghanistan. It shows that most of the soldiers were killed in Helmand.  
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2010-02-CA-059-
Backgrounder-Operation%20Moshtarak.pdf, accessed May 27, 2010. 
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               Source: iCasualties.org.  
 
In summary, since 2008, the British forces had pursued a strong offensive military 
strategy in Helmand province. The route-clearing operation from Kandahar to Helmand and 
subsequent military offensives in the Nad Ali, Babaji, and Marja districts illustrate this strong 
burden-sharing role. A strong burden-sharing role is defined here as a successful offensive 
against terrorists and militants. According to British defense experts, the injection of more troops 
and equipment, and the adoption of a population-centric counterinsurgency enabled the British 
forces to achieve significant success from 2008 onwards. This success came at a high price, with 
increasing fatalities from combat operations.  
 
Defensive Civil-Military Reconstruction Contribution. Britain also made a modest 
contribution to the non-combat stabilization mission in Afghanistan. Three major areas of 
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stabilization operations are important for our discussion: military and police training, provincial 
reconstruction, and economic development.  
First and foremost, Britain was strongly committed to the U.S.-led process of rebuilding 
the Afghan armed forces. Canada, France, Germany and New Zealand were the other major 
coalition countries involved in the process. The initial goal was to build the Afghan army of 
70,000 troops, which was later extended to nearly 140,000 troops. This indigenous Afghan force 
would take over the security responsibility by 2014, when NATO forces plan to begin 
withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
The Afghan military training focused on three types of soldiers: commissioned officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and soldiers.69
Since March 2003, the British military trainers were engaged in mentoring the junior 
non-commissioned officers for the Afghan National Army. It was later supplemented with junior 
officers’ training program in Kabul, and operational mentoring and liaison teams in Helmand. 
Seasoned British non-commissioned officers trained the Afghan military mentors. The training 
module focused on battle lessons and indoor classroom lessons on fire and manoeuvre, military 
skills, map reading, sentry duties, and command training. The training also focused on various 
 After seven weeks of initial training, recruits in the 
Afghan army were divided into two groups: soldiers with leadership potential were given a 
junior non-commissioned officers’ training; while the remaining soldiers were given advanced 
individual training. After the officers, trainers, and soldiers are trained separately, Canada 
offered validation training for enhancing the compatibility of various ranked soldiers. In a similar 
vein, France offered in-service training for Afghan soldiers.  
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types of patrolling: ambush, planned attack, team attack, pair attack, and company attack. In 
addition to training non-commissioned officers, the British trainers selected Afghan officer 
candidates for a 20-week rigorous training for commissioned officers. The officers’ training 
module included basic military skills, leadership, command and management of capabilities.70
The entry level training of Afghan military forces took place at the Kabul Military 
Training Centre (KMTC), with several military schools out of Kabul.
  
71 The British military 
opened an infantry school outside Kabul to teach Afghan soldiers how to use their weapons in 
support of other military units. 72
Overall, the reconstruction of Afghan military forces went well, with a few systemic 
problems in the Afghan army. These problems concerned the low morale and high desertion rate, 
and a sharp divide between the commissioned and non-commissioned officers.
 The school, which conducted ‘train the trainer program,’ had 
three wings. The first wing provided platoon commanders’ training. The second wing offered 
non-commissioned officers’ training for platoon sergeants. The third wing provided training in 
reconnaissance and support weapons, such as mortars, heavy machine guns, RPG (rocket-
propelled grenade), and SPG anti-tank missile. 
73
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 The British and 
coalition forces addressed these issues in their mentoring process. But, the Taliban insurgents 
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often took opportunity of the systemic problems in Afghan military, to persuade them to join the 
insurgent rank and file.  
 Apart from training the Afghan armed forces, the British military was also engaged in 
training the Afghan police in defusing road side bombs and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). Soldiers from the UK Counter-IED Task Force trained up the Afghan police members 
into an explosive hazard reduction team. 74
After military reform, the second major stabilization role focused on reconstruction and 
development at the provincial level. Since 2003, the British civil-military experts had operated 
three provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The British-run PRTs incorporated a 
‘comprehensive approach’ which focused on interagency collaboration among the development, 
foreign, and defense ministries. As a result, the Department for International Development 
(DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) were 
resourced together to operate the British PRTs in Afghanistan. 
 The purpose of the training was to improvise the 
Afghan security forces’ ability to detect and defuse the roadside bombs, which became a 
powerful weapon of Taliban insurgents.  
 Britain established its first PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif in July 2003, and handed over its 
responsibility to the Swedish forces in March 2006. Under the British command, the Mazar PRT 
focused on improving the security sector reform, by mentoring the Afghan national security 
forces, and monitoring the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former Afghan 
insurgents. While many PRTs worked only on quick impact projects to win the hearts and minds 
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of the local population, the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif also focused on improving the security 
by targeting the Afghan capacity building.  
According to Jackobsen, the British-led Mazar PRT is a success story, and there are 
several reasons for its success.75
After the initial success in Mazar-e-Sharif, in 2004, the United Kingdom established the 
second PRT in Mymana, Faryab province. Later, the responsibility for the Maymana PRT 
operation was handed over to Norway in 2005. Under the British command, the Maymana PRT 
combined the military, development, and diplomatic resources to establish governance and 
security in the Faryab province. 
 First, the British government focused on a pre-deployment 
consultation with NGOs, UN, and the grassroots community. Second, when confronted with 
fighting between two warlords—the Uzbek militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Tajik 
leader Mohammad Atta, the British forces negotiated a ceasefire and facilitated partial 
disarmament, that showed their diplomatic skills in a volatile situation. Third, the British PRT 
personnel understood the local conflict dynamics, which enabled them to shape the environment. 
Fourth, the British security forces undertook joint patrolling with Afghan police, and often 
served as back up forces.  
In 2006, Britain assumed responsibility for the Lashkar Gah PRT in Helmand. The 
Lashkar Gah PRT was established by the American forces in 2004. Unlike other NATO-run 
PRTs, where civilian experts represented a small component of the overall PRT staff, the British 
PRT in Lashkar Gah was an exception. For instance, by the end of 2010, the Lashkar Gah PRT 
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was manned by 165 personnel, including 80 civilian officials.76 According to the British 
Ministry of Defense, the U.K. PRT in Lashkar Gah implemented more than a hundred quick 
impact development projects to win the hearts and minds of Taliban sympathizers and local 
population. These quick projects encompassed a wide range of development programs, and 
included the construction of schools and windmill-powered wells, emergency food distribution, 
and water infrastructure works.77
The third leg in British stabilization mission focused on economic development projects 
led by DFID.
  
78 Andrew Mitchell, Britain’s international development secretary, succinctly 
assesses the role of DFID in Afghanistan: “While the military is there [in Afghanistan] to bring 
much-needed security, peace will only be achieved through political process backed by 
development.”79 This assessment fits into the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign of a 
counterinsurgency strategy, adopted by the British forces. The DFID projects in Afghanistan fell 
into three broad categories: stabilizing insecure areas, stimulating the economy, and extending 
the effectiveness of Afghan government.80
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 As part of a donor coordinated counter-narcotics 
program, the U.K. government provided wheat seeds, fertilizer, and expert advice to promote 
legal farming. The DFID claims that in the designated food zones, where farmers grow wheat 
seeds, there was a 37% drop in poppy cultivation in the year 2009. At that time, Afghanistan as a 
whole registered a 10% decrease in opium production. 
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Support for the diverse development projects came from a sustained flow of British aid to 
Afghanistan.81 According to Brookings Afghanistan Index data, between 2002 and 2008, Britain 
was the third largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, after the United States and Japan. During 
this time, Britain provided Afghanistan with $1.3 billion aid to help the reconstruction and 
stabilization operations in the war-torn country.82 This figure excludes the $188 .9 million UK 
aid committed but not disbursed to Afghanistan during the years 2002-2008. How does the 
British development aid to Afghanistan compare with the country’s military costs of the war in 
Afghanistan? According to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the cost of 
UK’s military operations in Afghanistan increased from £750 million in 2006-07 to £1.5 billion 
in 2007-08, and eventually to £2.6 billion in 2008-09. Thus, compared to the war funding, British 
development aid to Afghanistan was much lower, but increased over the years from £154 million 
in 2006-07, to £166 million in 2007-08, and to £207 million in 2008-09.83 In July 2010, the 
British government decided that it would reduce its global aid commitment, but increase aid for 
Afghanistan from £500 million to £700 million over the next four years.84 This would constitute 
roughly 40% increase in British aid to Afghanistan.85
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What are the effects of British aid and development support in Afghanistan? The 
government as well as its development ministry claimed improvement in school enrollment, and 
expansion of healthcare centers and social justice as crucial indicators of success. However, the 
British parliamentarians, and the aid agencies often reported serious shortcomings in the 
government’s use of aid money for counterinsurgency purposes. In 2008, during a House of 
Commons debate, Adam Hollow MP from Gravesham noted serious deficiencies in the 
coordination between British military and development efforts in Afghanistan. Mr Holloway 
stressed that the DFID had a policy of investing in long-term development in a country, which 
did not fit with the military’s need for short-term quick impact projects. To support his claim, 
Mr. Holloway, quoted a military officer saying, “the military secure areas, but the civilians are 
way behind the military effort…we are lagging behind the rhetoric…The problem is that the 
DFID do not see themselves as part of our foreign policy.”86
The British NGO Oxfam GB criticized the military’s use of development aid for 
counterinsurgency purposes. In October 2010, in written evidence to the British Parliament, the 
Oxfam observed that “there is scant evidence to support the notion that using aid for short-term 
counter-insurgency objectives, force protection, or to win hearts and minds is actually 
effective.”
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 The Oxfam observed that although the DFID had spent the lion share of its foreign 
aid outside of the Helmand province (which has been Britain’s principal area of operation since 
2006), the FCO and other departments had prioritized “short term security objectives” of 
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counterinsurgency campaign, and spent aid money inefficiently. This had resulted in the 
diversion of aid money that could benefit the Afghan needs and the recipient community. Oxfam 
concluded that the use of aid money for civil-military reconstruction activities had militarized the 
domain of humanitarian aid agencies. Based on its field reports, Oxfam recommended that the 
British government ensure “military actors and assets should only deliver humanitarian aid as a 
last resort,” while civilian NGOs should be the main actor in development process.88
In summary, the foregoing section analyzes Britain’s military and non-military 
contributions to the Afghanistan War coalition. First, it shows that Britain pursued a proactive 
diplomacy to consolidate the European position on Afghanistan, and to ensure that a NATO-
centric multilateral crisis management mission is in place under the U.S. leadership. Second, it 
shows that Britain deployed a sizable military force in Afghanistan, especially in the Helmand 
province. The British forces’ Helmand campaign shows the military risks of fighting the Al 
Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban insurgents. Finally, it argues that participation in offensive 
military operations was only part of Britain’s burden-sharing commitment in Afghanistan. 
Britain’s coalition role also included a sustained interest in reconstruction and development 
activities. Although the British military wanted to use development aid for security purposes, the 
British development agencies criticized the militarization of development aid. 
 
 
II.  Explaining Britain’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan  
This section employs the integrated burden-sharing model to analyze Britain’s contribution to the 
Afghanistan War coalition. First it reviews the effect of three international factors—alliance 
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dependence, balance of threat, and collective action—in shaping British choices in Afghanistan. 
It argues that among the systemic factors, transatlantic alliance commitment and balance of 
threat presented two strong incentives to the British government to pursue a robust coalition 
policy in Afghanistan. Next, it investigates how the systemic incentives were channeled through 
the three domestic level factors – political  regime, public opinion, and military capability—in 
producing a unique burden-sharing role for Britain. This section shows that among the domestic 
factors, only political regime and military capability played a strong role in shaping Britain’s 
burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan.  
 
Alliance Dependence. Alliance dependence did not present any systemic level incentive 
to persuade Britain to join and support the coalition in Afghanistan. Instead, alliance 
commitment strongly structured British choices in Afghanistan. Speaking about Britain’s 
burden-sharing behavior during the war on terrorism, General David Petraeus, the Commander 
of U.S. Central Command, and U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, described the United 
Kingdom as America’s “most trusted and important coalition partner” in Afghanistan and Iraq.89
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This was evident in British political, military, and economic contributions to the Afghanistan 
War, which began in October 2001, and continued through December 2010. There is no evidence 
that Britain made these contributions under pressures from the United States and NATO, or it did 
so in return for any economic gains or military aid. Instead, at least two aspects of Britain’s 
alliance commitment provided a strong incentive to support the Afghanistan War. The first 
focuses on the Anglo-American special relationship, and the second concerns Britain’s 
commitment to NATO as a guarantor of transatlantic security.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/europe/10britain.html, accessed November 5, 2010.  
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According to Theo Farrell, one of the unstated reasons for which the British forces were 
in Afghanistan was to ensure the “reputation and relationship with the US.”90 Farrell suggests 
that although Britain was not dependent on the United States or NATO, its concern for the 
reputation of its bilateral relationship with the United States played a strong role in shaping 
London’s Afghanistan policy. Patrick Porter makes a similar argument. He stresses that “Britain 
shoulders a heavy burden [in Afghanistan] because of it [the Anglo-American special 
relationship].”91 Porter suggests that London sought to project a military-strategic power via a 
coalition with America.92 Military officials concur with Farrell and Porter. In 2009, the then 
British army chief General Sir Richard Dannatt, argued that the United Kingdom should increase 
its military contribution to Afghanistan to enhance the credibility of its strategic partnership with 
the United States. General Dannatt also noted that the Anglo-American special relationship 
“offers a degree of influence and security that has been pivotal to our [British] foreign and 
defense policy.”93
How has the special relationship evolved, and what incentive did it present to encourage 
Britain’s coalition contribution to Afghanistan? I address these questions in two stages. First, I 
describe the evolution of special relationship in the intelligence, military, and political domains. 
Next, I discuss the causal link between special relationship and British contribution to 
Afghanistan.  
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The Anglo-American special relationship has evolved and strengthened mostly in the 
domains of intelligence and military cooperation. For instance, the American National Security 
Agency (NSA), and its British counterpart General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
work very closely and monitor the flow of communications and electronic intelligence.94 The 
British domestic and external intelligence agencies – the MI5 and the MI6 – also maintain strong 
and institutionalized cooperation with their American counterparts—the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  It is widely held that the CIA 
station chief in London attends the weekly meetings of the British Joint Intelligence Committee 
meetings. An obvious result of such strong intelligence cooperation is, the British Weekly 
Survey of Intelligence and American Presidential Daily Brief would “probably look very similar 
most weeks.”95 Critics contend that the Anglo-American intelligence partnership is 
interdependent, and founded on reciprocal benefits. The British intelligence services share their 
vast linguistic expertise and networks of outposts in the British Dependent Territories. In return, 
they get access to the U.S. intelligence resources and technical capabilities. Despite such 
reciprocity, it is said that “more than half the budget for GCHQ is paid for by American 
taxpayers.”96
In the military domain, the special relationship is strong and extensive. The two countries 
share common bases, military weapons, and technology. At the end of 2010, nearly 10,000 U.S. 
military personnel, mostly from U.S. Air Forces, were deployed in the United Kingdom.
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U.S. Strategic Command has a ballistic missile early warning system and Spacetrack Radar 
located at the Royal Air Force Fylingdales (RAF) Moor station in North York Moors.  In 2003 
the American and British governments agreed to use the RAF Fylingdales station for the purpose 
of U.S. National Missile Defense tracking facility.98 In 2004, the British government agreed to 
site American missile interceptors at RAF Fylingdales Moor. Those decisions are still valid 
today as of January 2011. Finally, Britain is reliant on the United States for the acquisition and 
maintenance of its submarine-based nuclear deterrence.99 As a RUSI analysis suggests, 
collaboration on “a strategic nuclear deterrent programme with the US is a significant part of the 
UK’s close strategic relationship with the US.”100
The Anglo-American special relationship in the intelligence and military domains has 
been cemented and strained by the personal relations of key leaders from both countries. This 
includes the wartime close relationship between Churchill and Theodore Roosevelt; and later the 
ideological affinity between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In recent years, Blair’s 
warm relationship with Bill Clinton and George Bush had consolidated the Anglo-American 
relationship. While Churchill, Thatcher, and Blair maintained the close relationship with 
American presidents in projecting an assertive foreign policy, other British leaders downplayed 
the importance of America’s special place, and defined the bilateral relationship as ‘close,’ and 
‘normal’, not ‘special.’ For instance, the tenures of Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and John 
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Major were marked by serious tensions in relations with the United States. 101
To what extent has the special relationship influenced Britain’s foreign policy of coalition 
contribution? The answer is straightforward. The two countries have developed a deep and long-
standing commitment to coalition operations in the areas of mutual interests. After the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United Kingdom and the United States shared 
a common interest in defeating Al Qaeda, and denying it a safe haven in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. A close look at the British strategic reviews supports this thesis of collaboration in the 
areas of mutual interest. For instance, prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 1998 Strategic 
Defense Review (referred hereto as 1998 SDR) emphasized greater European burden-sharing as a 
pre-requisite for engaging the United States in European and transatlantic security.
 For them, the 
bilateral relations with the United States were a ‘natural relationship’ based on shared culture, 
history, and foreign policy goals.  
102
For Britain, coalition operations in Afghanistan required a strategy involving proactive 
diplomacy, sustained offensives, and reconstruction activities. The 2002 New Chapter to the 
Strategic Defense Review notes that the British actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere should be 
understood as part of a broader mission “to eliminate terrorism as a force in international 
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affairs.”103 The New Chapter to SDR also notes that Britain’s “ability to operate alongside the 
US (and with other partners, particularly in Europe but also elsewhere) will be key to future 
success” in the war on terrorism. The 2003 and 2004 Defense White Papers assert that Britain 
should seek to shape the outcome of coalition operations; and greater interoperability with the 
U.S. forces would be a ‘major focus’ of UK’s military transformation.104 The 2010 Strategic 
Defense and Security Review (referred hereto as 2010 SDSR) has a similar emphasis on coalition 
operations. It notes that, Britain seeks to contribute to “international military coalitions to focus 
on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States.”105 
The 2010 SDSR also stresses that Britain’s intelligence and military capability are most likely to 
benefit U.S. and coalition operations.106
Is Afghanistan the only case where Britain’s credibility and reputation to its principal ally 
had to be secured? The answer is no. The Anglo-American special relationship had also 
influenced Britain’s burdensharing decisions during the two Persian Gulf Wars: the First Iraq 
War (1990-1991), and the Second Iraq War (2003-2010).
  
107
                                                            
103 UK Ministry of Defense, The Strategic Defense Review: A New Chapter (London: TSO, 2002), p.  4. 
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secure the flow of oil from the Gulf region; and to enforce Iraqi compliance with international 
nonproliferation regime.108
How has Britain’s commitment to NATO influenced its Afghanistan mission? The 
answer is simple. According to the 1998 SDR, the end of the Cold War has transformed the 
international security environment, in which there is no direct threat to the territorial security of 
Europe and the United Kingdom.
 It is in this context, Britain deployed the second largest military 
forces (nearly 50,000) in both Iraq Wars.  
109 Despite the absence of a territorial threat to the Euro-
Atlantic area, NATO has not lost its relevance. Instead, its peace support operations in Bosnia 
have shown that a revitalized NATO can play a significant role in international security.110 The 
defense review stresses that “the fundamental purpose of defending the freedom of all its 
[NATO] members remains as simple.” With regard to military participation in allied operations, 
the strategic review makes it clear that “Under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Britain would 
assist any NATO Ally or Allies under armed attack in Europe or North America by taking 
appropriate action, including the use of armed force.”111  It also notes that “The full range of 
Britain's military capabilities, including our [British] nuclear forces, is available to NATO.”112
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to withdraw troops from Kuwait, and to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty. While restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty was an 
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support U.S. invasion of Iraq on faulty and politicized intelligence assessment that Saddam Hussein had covert 
weapons of mass destruction program, and that was the main reason for Iraq’s non-cooperation with international 
weapons inspection teams.  
 
Thus, Britain’s long-standing commitment to the collective security of the NATO alliance 
encouraged a strong coalition contribution in Afghanistan and other conflict prone areas.  
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HMSO, 1998), p. 11 
110 UK Ministry of Defense, The Strategic Defense Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World, p. 11. 
111 UK Ministry of Defense, The Strategic Defense Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World, p. 156. 
112 Ibid. 
130 
 
Two questions in the UK-NATO relations are important in understanding British 
contribution to the NATO-led ISAF mission. The first involves how Britain responded to 
NATO’s strategic transformation in the post-Cold War era. The second focuses on whether those 
relations have presented Britain with any systemic incentive to support the coalition in 
Afghanistan.  
During the post-Cold War era, Britain remained strongly committed to the North Atlantic 
Alliance. London’s policies on three issues illustrate the preeminence of NATO in British 
defense policy- NATO’s eastward enlargement, Europeanization, and adaptation.113  First, on the 
question of enlargement, Britain is a strong supporter of eastern enlargement and an 
institutionalized relationship with Russia. The Blair and Brown governments have seen three 
waves of enlargement in 1999, 2004, and 2009, with a total 12 East European nations joining 
NATO.114 At the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, it was decided that Georgia and Ukraine 
would be extended full membership of NATO. Britain offered bilateral defense cooperation to all 
NATO member aspirants. This defense cooperation was based on the assumption that an 
“enlarged and effective NATO contributes to enhanced security and stability in Europe.”115
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 On 
the question of Russia, in 2001 Britain supported the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for 
114 During the first wave of NATO enlargement in 1999, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO. 
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engaging Russia in the transatlantic security dialogue.116 Since then Russia has participated in 
North Atlantic Council discussions, but cannot vote on NATO policy.117
On Europeanization, Britain has strongly supported the process of European Security and 
Defense Policy, while remaining firmly committed to NATO. Following the failure of the EU to 
effectively manage the crisis in Kosovo, Britain supported the development of NATO Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF), and the Berlin Plus Agreement in enhancing EU-NATO cooperation. 
The purpose of CJTF and Berlin Plus Agreement is to allow the EU to use NATO, and by 
extension, American resources in EU-led crisis management operations.
 
118
Finally, Britain has strongly supported NATO’s transformation. In the post-Cold War era, 
NATO has prioritized improved alliance capability to deploy a rapid response force, which can 
be deployed in five days and sustain itself for 30 days and longer with re-supply. This requires 
improved air-, and sea-lift capabilities to transport allied troops, and military assets and 
equipments across the globe.
  
119  The NATO Response Force is a multinational and multi-service 
readily deployable and technologically advanced force with three components: a command and 
control structure, an immediate response force of 13,000 troops from NATO allies, and a 
Response Forces Pool to supplement the immediate response forces, when necessary.120
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Britain is a strong supporter of NATO’s military capability and transformation agenda. 
Over 95% of British national military capabilities are available for NATO; and Britain is the lead 
nation for NATO’s multinational ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, one of NATO’s six high readiness 
force (land) headquarters, deployed in Afghanistan in 2006. Britain has also provided one of the 
three maritime high readiness headquarters for NATO. More tellingly, British aircrafts comprise 
nearly 25% of NATO airborne early warning force.121
Britain’s commitment to NATO has had a strong effect on its Afghanistan mission. 
Nearly all of Britain’s strategic and security reviews place an importance on NATO as a premier 
security alliance. The 2002 New Chapter to SDR presumes that NATO’s alliance military 
capability development and strategic partnership with the EU and Russia will play a strong role 
in addressing the threats to international security. The New Chapter also asserts that NATO has 
played a key role “in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, including from the threat of international 
terrorism.”
   
122
Why has Britain maintained a strong commitment to NATO? And, what explains its 
commitment to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan? There are at least two possible 
answers: one focuses on NATO as a guarantor of European and Euro-Atlantic security; and the 
other highlights NATO as a vehicle for projecting Britain’s global interests.  
  
First, Britain gives utmost priority to the security of Europe, and it sees a strong NATO 
as an ultimate guarantor of European security. Thus, participation in NATO-led operations in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere enhances the credibility of the alliance in maintaining security in an 
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uncertain era. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the United Kingdom and other 
NATO allies re-affirmed their commitment to rebuild a strong Afghan national security force, 
which would be able to defend Afghanistan. Second, Britain has always pursued a global 
responsibility, and it regards NATO as a vehicle for projecting its global ambitions.123 The 2008 
UK National Security Strategy stresses that “we expect our Armed Forces to operate in most 
cases as part of NATO or in coalitions.” The 2010 SDSR takes a similar stance on NATO. It 
asserts that Britain “will continue to contribute to NATO’s operations and its Command and 
Force Structures, to ensure that the Alliance is able to deliver a robust and credible response to 
existing and new security challenges.”124 James Sperling notes that when it comes to dealing 
with international security issues, Britain gives more importance to NATO than the EU. This is 
due to the fact that since the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain has perceived its strategic partnership with 
the United States as an inevitable element in projecting power outside Europe. Moreover, NATO 
provides an institutional forum to maintain a close partnership with the United States, and “an 
opportunity (rather than the ability) to influence U.S. foreign policy in times of crises.”125
In summary, Britain’s commitment to the United States and NATO presented a systemic 
incentive to join and maintain the coalition in Afghanistan. Malcom Chalmers’ note is very 
relevant here. An expert on British defense policy, Chalmers stresses that “the UK did not see 
Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a counter-terrorist strategy; it saw it as part of an Alliance 
commitment.”
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relationship has developed a longstanding commitment to deploy military forces in areas of 
mutual interest.127
 
 Additionally, Britain’s commitment to NATO as a guarantor of European and 
transatlantic security has supported NATO’s capabilities and enlargement in the post-Cold War 
era. The 1998 and 2010 strategic defense reviews made it clear that alliance commitment 
presented a unique incentive for Britain to participate in the U.S. and NATO-led coalition 
operations around the world, especially in Afghanistan. To what extent has the balance of threat 
provided an additional incentive to encourage Britain’s participation in the Afghanistan War 
coalition? This question is discussed below with a reference to the threats posed by Al Qaeda’s 
transnational terrorist network, WMD proliferation, Taliban insurgency, and narcotics 
trafficking.  
Balance of Threat. After alliance commitment, balance of threat presented the second 
systemic level incentive for Britain to join and support the coalition in Afghanistan. Threat is 
defined here as the actual and perceived threat from state and non-state actors. My burden-
sharing model predicts that convergent threat perception—the presence of similar threats facing 
the United States and its NATO allies—would encourage Britain to pursue a strong coalition 
contribution to Afghanistan. By contrast, divergent threat perception would reduce the chances 
for greater contribution, unless Britain faces domestic and external pressures to keep its 
commitment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
obligation to support the United States within the transatlantic alliance. David Brown argues that Chalmers stressed 
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Evidence suggests that transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda, and Taliban militants in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan did not pose an existential threat to British, U.S., or NATO security. 
Despite that, during the Afghanistan War (2001-2010), the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and NATO shared the perception that Al Qaeda’s radical ideology and its transnational Islamist 
militants posed the most pressing threat to international security. During the same time, growing 
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan posed a significant threat to the British and coalition forces in 
Afghanistan. This resurgence in Taliban activities, coupled with the threat of opium trade, 
encouraged Britain to maintain a strong support for coalition operations in Afghanistan.  
Four threat assessments show the incentives for Britain to join and support the 
Afghanistan coalition. The first two focus on Al Qaeda related threats, and the rest concentrate 
on Taliban-related threats.  
The first threat relates to WMD terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the British and 
American officials publicly addressed the concerns over Al Qaeda’s intent to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction for a catastrophic terrorist attack. On September 14, 2001, former prime 
minister Blair spoke about the potential threat of WMD terrorism. During a parliamentary 
debate, he stressed that Al Qaeda terrorists were fanatics, with the ability and intentions to 
commit mass murder. He warned that:  
We know, that they [Al Qaeda fanatics] would, if they could, go further and use 
chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We know, 
also, that there are groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the 
technology and capability of such weapons. It is time that this trade was exposed, 
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disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by the events of 11 September, 
and we should act on the warning.128
Former CIA director George Tenet confirms such fear about Al Qaeda’s WMD 
intentions.
 
129 In his memoir At the Center of the Storm, Tenet warns that Al Qaeda’s ultimate 
goal is to detonate a nuclear device in an American city.130 He claims that on two separate 
occasions – in 1998 and 2000 – Al Qaeda leaders attempted to acquire nuclear weapons from 
Pakistan. In a significant breakthrough in August 2001, Al Qaeda’s top leader Osama bin Laden, 
and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar met with senior Pakistani nuclear scientists 
involved in charitable activities for Afghan refugees.131 Tenet writes that the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban leaders’ meeting with the Pakistani scientists indicated Laden’s interests in acquiring 
nuclear weapons.132 Tenet also writes about the Taliban’s interests in acquiring biological or 
chemical weapons and their delivery methods.133
In 2002, U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld stressed that the United States did not 
have any “hard evidence” that Al Qaeda or Taliban forces possessed weapons of mass 
destruction. However, he indicated that extensive searches by the U.S. forces had discovered 
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“diagrams, materials, reports” that pointed to Al Qaeda’s intention to obtain or use weapons of 
mass destruction.134 Despite the lack of hard evidence, the speculation over Al Qaeda and 
Taliban militants acquiring, or aspiring to acquire WMD materials continued to surface in 
scholarly reports and intelligence assessments. In 2009, a U.S.-based think tank report stressed 
that the rise of Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan might increase the potential for Al Qaeda and 
Taliban to seek WMD capability to inflict casualties on U.S. and NATO forces.135 In 2010, the 
annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence community reported that the United States and 
the international community were concerned about terrorists gaining access to WMD. The threat 
assessment also reported that U.S. intelligence community did not know if any country was 
deliberately providing WMD support to terrorists.136
After the perceived danger of WMD terrorism, Al Qaeda’s successful terrorist attacks 
and foiled plots around the world forged a shared threat perception with the United States. 
General Petraeus, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, spoke about the 
effect of such shared threats on coalition operations. In June 2010 during a remark on land 
warfare, he observed that:  
  
Of course, I don't have to explain to anyone here the common threats that emanate 
from the CENTCOM AOR (Central Command Area of Responsibility).  9/11, 
7/7, and the 2006 jets plot were masterminded by, or linked to, extremists now 
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operating in the same zone along the Durand Line.  Elsewhere, al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
which blew up hotels in Amman, Jordan and may have sought to attack next 
month's World Cup in South Africa, is the same group that inspired the attack 
against the Glasgow Airport in 2007.137
 
 
General Petraeus’ assessment makes several claims. He argues that  Al Qaeda symbolizes 
the threat of global Islamist terrorism. He also notes that the United States and the United 
Kingdom are the main victims of Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks.138
The UK Intelligence and Security Committee (referred hereto as ISC) had consistently 
reported that between 2001 and 2010, the threat of Islamist terrorism remained much higher, 
compared to the domestic threat of Irish insurgency.  In its 2001-2002 annual report, the ISC 
claimed that that prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the British and American intelligence 
agencies had achieved some “notable successes against UBL (Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin 
Laden) related terrorism.”
 With regard to the Afghanistan 
coalition, Petraeus argues that  the Durand Line – the disputed frontier between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan— has emerged as a sanctuary for Al Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban sympathizers. 
The annual reports from the British intelligence oversight committee, as well as the periodic 
threat levels released by the British intelligence agencies indicate the heightened threat from Al 
Qaeda.  
139
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states to terrorists…was not understood.”140 In 2003, the ISC reported that the threat from 
Islamist terrorism heightened after the October 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia, which killed 
more than 200 people, including 24 British citizens. The parliamentary oversight committee 
blamed the domestic intelligence agency MI5 for “a serious misjudgment, when it did not raise 
the threat to general UK interests in Indonesia from SIGNIFICANT to HIGH.”141 The 2004 ISC 
report claimed that the British intelligence agencies had identified “increased number of 
[Islamist] terrorists, together with their sympathizers and financiers.”142
As General Petraeus remarked, the July 2005 London bombings and the 2006 
transatlantic airline bombing plot revealed that homegrown terrorists and their international 
connection was a real threat to the British and global security.
  
143 During the 2005 bombings, four 
suicide attacks were carried out in the London transport system, which killed 52 people, 
including four Al Qaeda-affiliated perpetrators, and injured more than 770 people.144
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143 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2005-2006, Presented to Parliament by the Prime 
Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 2006); Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 
2006-2007, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 2008); 
144 See “7 July Bombings: Overview,” BBC News, July 8, 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/, accessed February 4, 2011; The 
attacks were perpetrated by four Al Qaeda associated individuals: Mohammed Siddique Khan, Hasib Hussein, 
Shazad Tanweer, and Jermaine Lindsay. For an official account of the investigation on the 2005 London bombings, 
see UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the  London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (London: 
TSO, May 2006), p. 10. 
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plot. Initially the British police arrested 24 people, of whom 3 were convicted in a lengthy trial 
that ended in 2009.145
The 2005 London bombings and the 2006 airline bombing plot exposed the vulnerability 
of the United Kingdom to threats from international terrorism, in which the British citizens were 
strongly involved. In January 2007, during oral evidence to the parliamentary oversight 
committee, the then chief of Britain’s external intelligence agency MI6 stressed that “we have to 
think creatively to illuminate… the interface between al-Qaeda and radicalized British Muslims, 
essentially to catch the connection between… the domestic aspect of the threat and the overseas 
aspect of the threat.”
  
146 The 2009 and 2010 ISC reports presented a consistently heightened 
threat assessment. They claimed that individuals and groups affiliated with and motivated by Al 
Qaeda continued to pose serious threats to British national security and overseas interests.147 In 
November 2010, Sir Malcom Rifkind, the chairman of British Intelligence and Security 
Committee remarked that Britain was no longer concerned about the state-centric threat. Instead, 
international terrorism had emerged as the top priority for British national security. 148
 
  
                                                            
145 This was the largest counterterrorism trial in Britain’s history, which involved strong cooperation between 
American and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency had collaborated with the British Scotland Yard, Secret 
Service (MI5), and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) during the lengthy investigation and prosecution process. See: 
John F. Burns, “British Court Convicts Three in Plot to Blow Up Airliners,” New York Times, September 7, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/europe/08britain.html?ref=2006transatlanticaircraftplot, accessed 
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146 Cited in Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2002-2003, Presented to Parliament by the 
Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 2003), p. 11. 
147 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2008-2009, Presented to Parliament by the Prime 
Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 2009), p. 7; Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual 
Report 2009-2010, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: TSO, 
2010), p.4.  
148 “Intelligence Oversight in the UK: The Intelligence and Security Committee,” The Rt. Hon. Sir Malcom 
Rifkind MP, Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Royal United Services Institute, November 16, 
2010, p. 3. http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/16november2010, accessed January 31, 2010.  
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Table 4.1 Threat Levels Issued by the British Intelligence Agencies 
Date Threat Level 
August 1, 2006 Severe [a terrorist attack  is highly likely] 
August 10, 2006 Raised to Critical [an attack is expected imminently and indicates high level 
of threat] 
August 13, 2006 Lowered to Severe [a terrorist attack  is highly likely] 
June 30, 2007 Raised to Critical [an attack is expected imminently and indicates high level 
of threat]149
July 4, 2007 
 
Lowered to Severe [Attacks are still highly likely, but no longer though to be 
imminent]150
July 20, 2009 
 
Lowered to Substantial [the treat of a terrorist attack remains a strong 
possibility and may occur without warning]151
January 22, 2010 
 
Raised to Severe [a terrorist attack  is highly likely] 
Sept. 24, 2010 • Northern Ireland – Severe 
• National – Lowered to Substantial 
Notes: Pre-2006 data on the threat levels are not publicly available. In September 2010, the MI5 first issued Irish 
terrorism related threat level 
Source: The UK Security Service, and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center.  
 
The third threat assessment concerns the rise of Taliban insurgency. It captures the 
dangers posed to the British and coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to the Brookings 
Afghanistan Index data, since 2004, there was an average 100 attacks per week in 2004, which 
increased to 200 attacks in 2006, 400 in 2008, and eventually to 700 in April 2010. Figure 4.4 
shows the Taliban insurgent attacks by type and by weeks. Three types of attack were more 
                                                            
149 Security Service, “Threat Level Increased to ‘Critical,’” https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/news/threat-level-
increased-to-critical.html, accessed January 31, 2011. 
150 Security Service, “Threat Level Lowered to ‘Severe,’” https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/news/threat-level-
lowered-to-severe.html, accessed January 31, 2011. 
151 Security Service, “UK Threat Level Lowered,” https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/news/uk-threat-level-
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prevalent: (a) attack by mortar, rocket,  and surface to air attack; (b) Ambush, grenade, RPG, and 
other small arms attack; and (c) bombs (IED and Mines) explosion.152 The U.S. and coalition 
fatalities from IEDs increased significantly. In 2001, there was no reported fatality (of U.S. and 
coalition forces) from IEDs.153 In 2002, only 9 troops were killed in IEDs. This number 
increased to 58 in 2006, 280 in 2009, and 372 in 2010. After IED attacks, the second most 
important cause of coalition troop fatalities was hostile armed attacks carried out with rockets, 
grenades, and/or mortars. Accidental death or death caused by mechanical failure was the 
principal cause of coalition fatalities until 2004, and since then, it had gradually declined.154
The growing insurgent attacks were responsible for increasing troop fatalities for the UK 
and coalition forces. This had provided an impetus for keeping the foreign forces in Afghanistan 
to fight the insurgents and simultaneously to train the Afghan national security forces. Between 
2001 and 2010, nearly 2,400 U.S. and coalition forces were killed in Afghanistan. More than a 
quarter (nearly 647) of all fatalities took place in the Helmand province, in British-controlled 
area of operation, and its adjacent areas controlled by the U.S. and NATO forces. Since 2006, the 
UK and coalition troop fatalities in Helmand increased significantly, from 31 in 2006 to 79 in 
2008 to 288 in 2010. Figure 4.5 shows the coalition troop fatality data for Helmand. As stated 
before, the British military and civilian personnel suffered nearly half of all Helmand fatalities 
(299 out of 647). The U.S. troops and civilian personnel suffered roughly the equal fatalities 
 
These insurgent attacks related data indicate that, once the British and other coalition forces were 
deployed in Afghanistan, they had a strong incentive to support the U.S.-led coalition to suppress 
the Taliban insurgents, and their Al Qaeda allies.  
                                                            
152 Livingston et al., ““Brookings Afghanistan Index,” January 30, 2011, p. 12. 
153 Ibid. 
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(304) in Helmand. Troop fatality data generated by BBC News show that nearly 90% of all 
British fatalities in Afghanistan occurred in Helmand, and most of them due to enemy attacks.  
Figure 4.4 Taliban Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-April 2010 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Brookings Afghanistan Index, October 2010, p. 10. 
 
 
   
      Source: iCasualties.org.  
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According to Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, Helmand was a “tough nut to crack” for 
the British forces.155 Several factors contributed to the resurgence of Taliban insurgency in 
Helmand. Farrell and Gordon stress that insurgents in Helmand were more supportive and loyal 
to the Taliban ideology, and more cohesive compared to the Taliban insurgents in other Afghan 
provinces. Besides, the prevailing socio-economic conditions in Helmand created a fertile 
ground for the rise of Taliban activities.156
The United Kingdom and its key NATO allies had two principal options to deal with the 
growing insurgency in Afghanistan: to withdraw troops, or to deploy additional troops to fight 
the Taliban. As described in the earlier section, Britain, and a handful of NATO allies chose the 
second option. The central logic behind such force escalation was to increase the pressures on the 
Taliban insurgents, and their Al Qaeda collaborators, and to enable the Afghan security forces to 
take responsibility for the country’s security. The British government had come under increasing 
pressures from the domestic populace to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. The government 
responded to such pressures by asserting the importance of a strong military presence to secure 
the areas from Taliban control, and to extend the authority of the nascent Afghan government 
beyond the capital Kabul. Britain’s 2010 National Security Strategy: Report on Progress 
provides a compelling case for staying in Afghanistan:  
 These included widespread corruption, criminal 
activities, and the presence of a massive narco-trafficking network embedded within the higher 
echelon of society and government.  
To leave Afghanistan now would not only abandon the Afghan people, it would 
give AQ [Al Qaeda] a strategic victory…helping them to attract more adherents 
                                                            
155 Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, “COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Vol. 53, No. 
4 (2009), p. 667. 
156 Farrell and Gordon, “COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan,” pp. 667-669. 
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and adding significantly to the threat they can pose to the UK people and our 
interests abroad. While AQ is in some difficulties, we must keep up the pressure 
to degrade severely their capability, and to make a lasting and significant 
reduction in the threat they pose.157
Eight years ago, in 2002, the British policymakers made a similar justification for 
continued military presence in Afghanistan. After the Al Qaeda leadership was weakened and the 
Taliban regime toppled, in March 2002, the then British defense secretary Geoff Hoon spoke 
about the necessity to remain in Afghanistan to get the job done.  At that time, Hoon claimed 
that:  
 
The recent Operation ANACONDA in the Paktia province, led by the United 
States, tackled one group of Al Qa’ida terrorists and Taliban fighters. They 
showed that these people are still in Afghanistan in large numbers and that they 
are heavily armed. Left alone, these groups would threaten all that the Afghan 
people and their supporters in the international community have achieved so far 
and would strive to retain Afghanistan as a base for training and organizing 
terrorism. They do not recognize the Afghan Interim Authority and will work to 
destabilize the situation across Afghanistan.158
 
 
The fourth threat concerns the illicit drug trade, and its connection with terrorism and 
insurgency. Despite the Afghan government’s anti-drug policy, and the international 
                                                            
157 National Security Strategy: Report on Progress, p.10. 
http://gees.org/files/documentation/05042010171152_Documen-07807.pdf, accessed November 21, 2010. 
158 Statement by the Secretary of State for Defense, Geoff Hoon, to the House of Commons, Westminster, 18 
March 2002. Quoted in The Henry L. Stimson Center, “Views on Security in Afghanistan: Selected Quotes and 
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community’s support behind it, Afghanistan remained the world’s largest opium producing 
country. In 2002, Afghanistan produced 76% of world’s opium. This increased to 82% in 2006, 
and 88% in 2010.159 During this time, Helmand remained the largest opium producing province 
in Afghanistan. In 2004, Helmand produced nearly 22% opium produced in Afghanistan. This 
increased to 58% in 2009.160 In January 2010, participants at the London conference on 
Afghanistan expressed their concerns about the deadly links between “the narcotics trade, the 
insurgency and other criminal activity, including corruption and human trafficking.”161 The 
London conference also called for the continuation of the Paris-Moscow process in countering 
the threats of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorist financing.162
For Britain, illicit drugs trafficking from Afghanistan posed a direct national security 
threat to Afghanistan and coalition countries operating there. According to the 2009-2010 British 
organized crime threat assessment report, “drug trafficking is carried out primarily for criminal 
gain, but in Afghanistan it is also directly linked to the insurgency by providing financial and 
logistical support, enabling attacks on British and other coalition forces.”
  
163 An additional harm 
is caused by the corrupting influence of drug traffickers to the reconstruction and stabilization 
operations of UK and NATO forces.164
                                                            
159 Livingston et al, “The Brookings Afghanistan Index,” January 2011, p. 24.  
 The trafficking of heroin into the United Kingdom posed 
another threat –a direct threat to the public health and wellbeing of heroin consumers.  
160 Livingston et al, “The Brookings Afghanistan Index,” October 2010, p. 26. 
161 “The London Conference 2010, “Communiqué,” p. 9. 
162 For a discussion on the Paris-Moscow process in countering transnational organized crime, see UN Security 
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164 SOCA, The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organized Crime 2009/10, p. 23.  
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According to the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), more than 90% of the 
heroin sold in the UK comes from the opium poppies grown in Afghanistan.165 This is processed 
and trafficked into Britain and other European countries via several ‘route countries, such as, 
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Far East.166 The SOCA conducted operational intelligence in 
Afghanistan, and offered mentoring and support to Afghan authorities into the investigation and 
prosecution of Afghan drug traffickers.167
In summary, the foregoing discussion shows several global threats facing Britain and its 
allies -- the threat of WMD terrorism, Al Qaeda’s high profile terrorist attacks, growing Taliban 
insurgency, and drug trafficking. I argue that Al Qaeda’s intent to acquire WMD materials, and 
its high profile terrorist attacks were perceived by the United States and the United Kingdom as 
the most urgent threat to international security. Britain joined the Afghanistan War as an act of 
alliance solidarity with NATO, enshrined in the Article 5 collective defense provision of the 
Washington Treaty. After joining the coalition, the continued threat of Al Qaeda and Taliban 
 This complemented the works of the British and 
NATO forces engaged in counter-narcotics operations in Helmand and other provinces. As the 
lead country for the counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan, Britain was engaged in targeting 
the disruption of drugs production and trafficking from Afghanistan. The British 
counternarcotics efforts also focused on the discontinuation of drug processing by combating the 
spread of precursor chemical used for converting morphine into heroin. This offensive anti-drug 
strategy was coupled with a defensive strategy that included the provision of alternative 
livelihood assistance for poppy farmers to engage them in productive economic activities.  
                                                            
165 Serious Organized Crime Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2009/10 (London: TSO, 2010), p. 13.  
166 HM Revenue and Customs, “Drug Smuggling,” 
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presented a serious challenge to coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Britain and its NATO allies 
responded to this challenge by deploying more forces and taking a proactive counterinsurgency 
strategy. Finally, the growth in opium and heroin production in Afghanistan posed a direct threat 
to British and coalition strategy. Britain agreed with its allies to deal with the drug trafficking 
threat by investing in offensive and defensive strategies designed to stem the flow of opium and 
heroin from Afghanistan. To what extent did Britain perceive the tasks of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency as a collective good, for which it could ride free? I address this question 
below to investigate if the free-riding motivation played any role in determining Britain’s 
Afghanistan policy.                          
                        
 Collective Action. Collective action did not present any systemic incentive in shaping 
British policy on Afghanistan. The collective action hypothesis posits that a core group of 
countries will support the coalition leader in the pursuit of a public good. But, in the long run, 
these core group members, and junior coalition partners will tend to ride free. This free-riding 
motivation is the central premise of the collective action theory. In the context of the War in 
Afghanistan, the public good is the reduced strength of Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgent 
at present and future. If the collective action hypothesis is correct, America’s junior partner 
Britain would demonstrate a free-riding behavior, or most likely to make a contribution lower 
than expected. At the same time, the United States would to play the dominant role and bear 
most of the military burdens of offensive and defensive operations. Evidence shows that while 
the United States shared most of the burdens of offensive and defensive operations in 
Afghanistan, Britain did not ride free.  
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 As discussed before in this chapter, Britain pursued a proactive diplomacy, and a strong 
coalition role in Afghanistan. At least three pieces of evidence support this robust coalition 
policy, which shows the weakness of the free riding hypothesis in predicting Britain’s coalition 
behavior. The first two concern the number and location of troops, while the rest focus on the 
economic and human costs of the war.  We shall cautiously interpret this, as the British case does 
not represent the more than 45-nation strong coalition countries, many of which may rode free in 
Afghanistan.  
First, as the conflict with the Taliban escalated, Britain supported NATO’s strategy to 
increase ISAF forces in Afghanistan. In 2009, Britain had nearly 9,000 troops in southern 
Afghanistan, which was 5.1% of its active forces. At that time, this was the highest percentage of 
active forces deployed by a coalition country, followed by 4.24% of its U.S. forces, 4.3% of 
Canadian forces, and only 1.74% of German forces in Afghanistan.168
Third, maintaining a large contingent of military force, and equipping them with the right 
military logistics put an enormous pressure on British economy. Since 2001, the British war 
funding for the Afghan mission increased significantly, which accounted for a large share 
Britain’s military spending. Figure 4.6 shows Britain’s cost of war in Afghanistan. It shows that, 
 Second, Britain not only 
maintained a higher level of troop commitment, but deployed its forces to the hostile Helmand 
province. The decision to deploy its forces to Helmand indicated that the British government was 
willing to share the risks of offensive military operations in Afghanistan, whereas Germany and 
Italy had resisted the NATO pressures for redeployment in the insurgent-prone southern 
Afghanistan.  
                                                            
168 Appendix 4.A presents the data on military expenditure, active-deployed force ratio for top ISAF troop 
contributing countries.  
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Britain’s total cost of the Afghan war was less than ￡1 billion during the first five years—from 
2001 until 2005. However, since 2006, the British war-funding for Afghanistan increased rapidly 
from ￡738 million in 2006 to ￡3.5 billion in 2009-2010.  
 
 Source: UK Ministry of De169
As the war progressed, it put a huge pressure on Britain’s defense budget. In 2009-2010, 
the United Kingdom spent nearly 9% of its total defense budget to resourcing the Afghanistan 
War. This was significantly higher, when compared with the combined budgets of France, 
Germany, and Italy for the Afghanistan War. According to SIPRI defense spending experts:   
fense; SIPRI Yearbook. 
For most countries, the cost of these [Afghanistan] deployments represents a 
relatively small share of their overall military spending. Germany budgeted €570 
million ($792 million) for operations in Afghanistan in 2009, and France €330 
million ($458 million), while Italy budgeted €242 million ($336 million) for the 
first 6 months of 2009. For Germany this represents 1.7 per cent of total military 
                                                            
169 In 2009-2010 fiscal Britain’s defense budget was $62.4 billion, which was nearly 2.8% of its GDP. 
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spending and for France less than 1 per cent, while for Italy the implied annual 
cost is 1.8 per cent of total military spending. The costs are much more significant 
for the UK, which budgeted ￡3.5 billion ($5.4 billion) for Afghanistan 
operations for the 2009/10 financial year, 9.2 per cent of total military spending. 
British spending on Afghanistan has increased exponentially from just ￡46 
million ($75 million) in 2003/2004, especially since the deployment of forces in 
the Taliban stronghold of Helmand in 2006.170
 
  
 Fourth, the human cost of the war was also enormous. Among the coalition countries, 
Britain suffered the second largest troop fatalities in Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2010, 
coalition forces lost 2,281 soldiers in Afghanistan. The United States lost the highest number of 
troops (1,446), followed by the United Kingdom (348). Together the U.S. and British forces 
suffered nearly 80% of all fatalities. The British Special Forces suffered the worst loss since 
WWII. Nearly 80 members of the British Special Forces were killed or seriously injured in 
Afghanistan. This accounted for one sixth of full combat capability of British SOF.171
   Why did the free riding motivation not present an incentive for Britain? The answer is 
straightforward. Like the United States, Britain perceived fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban as a 
public good, and maintaining alliance solidarity with NATO as a private good. The pursuit of 
public and private goods fit very well with British foreign policy, which has always had a global 
ambition. For instance, the 2010 defense and security review begins with an assertion that “Our 
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2010 (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), chapter 5, pp. 193-194.   
171 Michael Smith, “SAS in Afghanistan Suffers Worst Losses in 60 Years,” The Sunday Times, March 7, 2010. 
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country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions.”172 It then goes on to say 
that “We remain fully committed to succeeding in the difficult mission in Afghanistan, and there 
will as now be extra resources to meet the full costs of that campaign.” 173
British defense expert Michael Codner observes that Britain had two options in 
Afghanistan: either to act as a “normal European country that does not take hard power 
seriously,” or to project a great power status that requires considerable “financial and human 
costs.”
 
174 Obviously, Britain pursued the second strategy, which required a significant political, 
military, and economic investment, and a huge human sacrifice. Why would Britain invest so 
heavily in Afghanistan? Codner argues that the quest for great power status had strongly shaped 
Britain’s coalition participation in Afghanistan, as well as past missions in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, 
East Timor, and Iraq.175 He concludes that Britain is likely to pursue a strong coalition strategy 
in Afghanistan until 2014. This is evident in the fact that the Afghanistan war has dominated the 
2010 strategic defense review process, which had struggled to cut the defense expenditure, while 
ensuring that the Afghanistan mission remains well-resourced.176
 In summary, among the three systemic factors discussed above, the free-riding 
motivation of collective action did not present any incentive to encourage Britain’s participation 
in the Afghanistan War coalition. The United Kingdom did not pursue a risk-averse strategy, nor 
did it demonstrate a free riding behavior in Afghanistan. Instead, it partnered with the United 
States in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation-building tasks. The preceding 
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discussion shows that alliance commitment and balance of threat presented two systemic 
incentives to pursue a strong coalition policy. How were these systemic incentives transmitted 
through the domestic political processes? The remainder of this chapter will answer this question 
by looking at three domestic level decision points: political regime, public opinion, and military 
capability.  
 
Domestic Political Regime. At the domestic level, the office of the chief executive is the 
first and most important decision point. My integrated burden-sharing model argues that in 
making crucial decisions on the use of force, and coalition participation, the central issue is 
whether the chief executive enjoys considerable discretion over the making of foreign policy, or 
whether constitutional provisions and legislative politics constrain his or her decision-making 
power. David Auerswald’s typology of chief executive strength is useful here. Auerswald 
identifies three types executive strength: strong, weak, and medium. Each type of executive is 
likely to pursue a distinct burden-sharing policy. My theoretical model suggests that a strong 
executive is likely to bypass public opinion and look at the stock of military capability before 
choosing a country’s coalition contribution. For the purpose of this chapter, the focus is on the 
decision making power of Prime Minister Blair, and his successors Brown, and Cameron.  
The British governments under Blair, Brown, and Cameron (until December 2010) fell 
into the category of a strong executive, in which the prime minister and his war cabinet enjoyed 
significant discretion in the use of force in Afghanistan. At least two factors explain this 
discretionary power of British Prime Minister’s office. The first relates to the lack of 
constitutional and legislative constraints. The second concerns the bipartisan elite consensus on 
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the use of force. The lack of constitutional and legislative constraint was evident in the way Blair 
handled his Afghanistan War decisions. As Britain’s chief executive during the first seven years 
of the Afghanistan War (2001-2007), Blair was mostly responsible for the decisions to join the 
war, and to maintain a strong coalition support.  His presidential style executive power pursued a 
strong diplomacy to forge the cohesion of the Afghan War coalition, and to build elite consensus 
in the parliament to support the war.  
Blair’s decisions to join and support the coalition did not confront any constitutional 
restrictions or parliamentary opposition. Instead, Blair enjoyed the discretion given by Britain’s 
uncodified constitution, and elite consensus in the British Parliament. As Peter Hennessy 
remarks, “War is intensely prime ministerial activity. Nothing defines or can offer so much 
historical insight into, the unique role of the [British] PM as his or her responsibilities and 
powers during war or the preparations for it.”177 The basis of this prime ministerial power 
derives from the fact that constitutionally, Britain’s Prime Minister can act through royal 
prerogative in declaring war against other countries.178
Blair used the royal prerogative in deploying forces in Afghanistan, and a few other 
countries.
 
179
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103. 
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behavior: five wars in six years,180 “and none of these five wars could be defined through the 
traditional concepts of national interest or repelling an invader.”181
According to Paul Williams, Blair and his New Labour Party was overtly Atlanticist in its 
foreign policy orientation. This Atlanticism in foreign policy meant a strategic alignment with 
the United States in the war on terrorism. At the tactical and operational level, the strategic 
alignment resulted into a strong military commitment to the prosecution of the Afghanistan War. 
In Williams’ words, 
 Instead, a rare combination of 
pro-Americanism and moralism guided Blair’s foreign policy and his penchant for using force. 
Like many of its predecessors, Blair’s government decided that UK’s interests 
were best served by remaining America’s closest ally and encouraging ‘effective 
US leadership’ to strengthen international institutions. It sought to do this by 
becoming a trusted voice within Washington politics. The underlying rationale 
was clear well before 9/11. As Blair put it, the UK would be stronger with the US 
if it was at the heart of European decision-making, and it would be stronger in 
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February 16, 2010. http://www.hmforces.co.uk/training/articles/2110-operations-palliser-barras-sierra-leone---part-
1, accessed October 30, 2010;  
181 John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London: Free Press, 2003), p. ix. 
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Europe because of the special relationship with the US. This strategic alignment 
culminated in Blair’s announcement in the aftermath of 9/11 that the UK would 
‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ with the US.182
Among the NATO leaders, Blair made a distinct contribution to the Afghan war 
coalition. As described before, he pursued a proactive foreign policy. His shuttle diplomacy at 
the beginning of the war is solid evidence.
 
183 Between September 19, 2001 and October 6, 2001, 
Blair visited Germany, France, the United States, Belgium, Russia, Pakistan, and India. His high 
profile visits to Europe was aimed to ensure that European NATO countries remain at the heart 
of coalition operations. His meetings with the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Russian 
President Putin were important to help “smooth the ground of invasion” in Afghanistan.184 
During his shuttle diplomatic visits to Islamabad and Moscow, Blair reportedly presented the 
evidence that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network were behind the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, and that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was complicit in the attacks for hosting and 
supporting the Al Qaeda network.185
Blair describes that the central purpose of his diplomatic blitzkrieg was to form a strong 
coalition, and to maintain political cohesion of the coalition, which would fight in Afghanistan. 
In his memoir, Blair writes:  
 The India trip was critical to ensure that the Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan did not distract the larger coalition operations in Afghanistan. 
                                                            
182 Williams, British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997-2005,p. 29; I am thankful to Paul Williams for 
further explaining me U.K.-U.S. special relationship in general, and Tony Blair’s foreign policy to support the U.S.-
led strategy in the war on terrorism, in  particular. Author’s interview with Paul D. Williams, October 28, 2010.  
183 “Blair’s Shuttle Diplomacy Vital for Building Coalition,” Breaking News.i.e. October 6, 2001. 
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October 29, 2010. 
184 Williams, British Foreign Policy under New Labour, p. 49; Anthony Seldon, Blair (London: Free Press, 
2004) 
185 “Blair Praises Pakistan’s Decisions,” CNN.Com, October 5, 2001. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/05/ret.blair.musharraf/index.html, accessed October 29, 
2010.  
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I saw my role as that of galvanizing the maximum level of support. I know that 
when the immediate impact of the event diminished, there was always a danger of 
backsliding; and I also knew the key thing was to assemble as broad a coalition of 
support for action as possible.186
 While Blair wanted to galvanize international cooperation to form the U.S.-led coalition, 
his cabinet offered a prompt support for the deployment of British troops to Afghanistan. This is 
evident in the fact that “The decision to deploy them [British forces] was taken after only two 
post-9/11 Cabinet meetings, none of which made any relevant debate.”
 
187
The roots of the Taleban, al-Qaeda, this type of global terrorism around the world, 
are deep and where they gained a foothold in a country like Afghanistan, it is 
going to take time to banish that for good.
 Once Blair helped the 
United States form the coalition, his administration provided unstinting support to attain its core 
goals of fighting terrorism and insurgency. As the coalition war efforts expanded in response to 
growing terrorist and insurgent activities, Blair stressed the importance of staying in 
Afghanistan. During a trip to Afghanistan in 2006, he said:  
188
After Blair’s departure, Prime Minister Brown (June 2007-May 2010) inherited a war on 
terrorism, which demanded more troops and more resources. Like Blair, Brown supported the 
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transatlantic alliance, which was fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. As a New 
York Times article describes, Brown “embraced the Afghan commitment as his own, making 
frequent visits to troops there and promising them whatever equipment they need.”189 During a 
parliamentary debate in July 2009, Brown justified the Afghanistan invasion as a strategy to 
“prevent” international terrorism. He claimed that the British troops on the ground possessed a 
“high morale” in the fight against Taliban insurgents.190 In response to the critique that British 
forces in Helmand lacked the necessary equipments, especially helicopters, Brown noted that the 
number of helicopters and the helicopter capacity had increased by 60% and 84%, 
respectively.191
As the United Kingdom was facing the global economic crisis, Brown could possibly 
reduce Britain’s coalition commitment to Afghanistan. This would require a drastic troop 
withdrawal, or a scaled down mission in Afghanistan. Evidence suggests that the Brown cabinet 
did not consider such options at all. Instead, his administration remained firmly committed to the 
U.S. security posture of “troop surge” in Afghanistan. This was premised on the belief that like 
the troop build-up in Iraq, the surge in Afghanistan would work. During Brown’s rule, the British 
troop level in Afghanistan increased by one third, from nearly 7,500 to 9,500 troops.  
 
Brown’s successor Cameron came to power in May 2010. Like Blair and Brown, 
Cameron strongly supported the Afghan mission. This was evident in the strategic defense 
                                                            
189 John F. Burns, “British Election Issues: Frugality and Afghanistan,” New York Times, April 13, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/europe/14britain.html?_r=1&fta=y, accessed  November 5, 2010.  
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/13/british-soldiers-afghanistan-bob-ainsworth, accessed October 29, 
2010. 
191 “Brown Defends Afghan Policy as Cross-Party Consensus Frays,” Guardian, July 13, 2009. 
159 
 
review, released by the Cameron administration. Cameron’s defense review cancelled some of 
the big ticket weapons purchase, but made sure the Afghan war was well resourced.192
The foregoing discussion shows the how the discretionary power enjoyed by Blair, 
Brown, and Cameron influenced Britain’s burden-sharing commitment to Afghanistan. An 
alternative, yet complementary, to this discretionary foreign policy process could be deliberating 
the burdensharing decisions at the war cabinet. This had never happened. Blair’s war cabinet 
rarely met for debating the Afghan war decisions. When the cabinet met, it only had a few 
discussions on the British and coalition strategy in Afghanistan. By the time Brown came to 
power in mid 2007, the war in Afghanistan was in the midst of a mess, with growing Taliban 
insurgency, corruption in the Afghan government, increasing NATO troop casualty, and meager 
success in the British-led counter-narcotics strategy.  
  
Senior military experts and British parliamentarians called for the creation of a war 
cabinet, which would coordinate the inter-departmental efforts in Afghanistan, and communicate 
to the British public the UK war efforts in Afghanistan.193
                                                            
192 Anthony Faiola, “Britain Announces Major Military Cutbacks,” Washington Post, October 19, 2010. 
 This debate over the creation of a war 
cabinet came in a moment, when top NATO commanders on the ground provided a grim picture 
of the coalition efforts, and called for a major troop surge—as much as 40,000 addition troops to 
join the existing 60,000 strong U.S. and NATO forces—to fight a successful counterinsurgency 
campaign. Evidence shows that the Brown administration did not form a war cabinet to 
deliberate coalition decisions on Afghanistan. In early May 2010, the Cameron government 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101904810.html, accessed March 14, 
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formed the first ever UK national security council, which held some discussions on Afghanistan 
and other key security issues. It is too early to assess the council’s decision-making role on 
Afghanistan.  
What role did the British opposition parties play in the parliament? Was there any strong 
resistance to constrain Britain’s Afghan policy? Or, did a consensus among major political 
parties strengthen the prime ministerial power in the execution of Afghan policy? Elite 
consensus among Britain’s major political parties offers the best possible answer to these 
questions. In the Afghanistan War context, elite consensus refers to the agreement among the 
New Labour and Conservative party leaders on the necessity to support the U.S.-led coalition 
fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban militants.194
[Compared to the Iraq War], The Afghan war has not generated any similar 
controversy, at least as far as Britain’s need to fight there; both Labour and 
Conservative have justified the war on the basis of denying Islamist terrorists a 
base for attacks on Britain.
 A New York Times report puts this very succinctly:  
195
The cabinets of Blair, Brown, and Cameron enjoyed a stable elite consensus. Prior to the 
deployment of British troops, Blair got the full support of the opposition Conservative leader 
Duncan Smith, who was well known for his “Republican party connections” in Washington.
 
196
                                                            
194 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a minor role during Blair and Brown administrations. In 2010 the 
Conservative-LDP coalition came to power, which did not alter the course of Britain’s Afghanistan policy.  
 
The other major political figure in the Parliament – the Liberal Democratic Party leader Charles 
Kennedy was consulted by the Prime Minister. Kenney did not express any dissent with regard to 
195 John F. Burns, “British Election Issues: Frugality and Afghanistan,” New York Times, April 13, 2010. 
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Britain’s coalition role in Afghanistan. He had reportedly asked Tony Blair to ensure that the 
United Kingdom does not give any “blank cheque” to the United States with regard to the 
military actions in Afghanistan.197
The British parliamentary debate over equipment shortage also demonstrates the nature 
of consensus that existed among British political parties. During a House of Commons debate in 
July 2009, the then opposition Conservative leader Cameron accused Prime Minister Brown of 
cutting the helicopter budget by £1.4 billion. Cameron alleged that Brown cut this budget during 
his tenure as the Chancellor of the Exchequer (head of the British treasury). Cameron also 
criticized the NATO countries for not providing adequate equipments for their forces on the 
ground in Afghanistan. This shows that the British elites did not debate whether or not the 
British forces should remain in Afghanistan, or whether or not they should be deployed in 
combat missions in the Helmand province. Instead, they debated whether the British forces were 
well equipped for the job they were asked to do. After the conservative-liberal democrat 
coalition government came to power in May 2010, the Cameron cabinet enjoyed the support of 
the major opposition party –the New Labour-- in pursuing its Afghanistan policy. This indicates 
the presence of a strong elite consensus to support Britain’s Afghanistan policy. 
 
Why elite consensus? The British foreign policy elites from the Conservative, and the 
New Labour parties agreed on the two systemic incentives described before. The first incentive 
concerns transatlantic alliance solidarity, and the second incentive relates to the balance of threat. 
This is a standard picture of elite perception in the United Kingdom. On alliance solidarity, the 
British elites believe in the centrality of NATO in pursuing a multilateral crisis management 
strategy. Senior leaders from the major political parties agree that a strong alliance with the 
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United States is a key to maintaining Britain’s global ambitions. On the nature of international 
security threats, members of the British foreign policy elites largely agree on the risks posed by 
Al Qaeda, Taliban, and narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan. They also agree on the need for a 
robust British contribution to Afghanistan.198
In summary, the office of the British prime minister enjoyed significant discretionary 
powers as well as a strong political consensus to join and support the war in Afghanistan. Unlike 
the constitutional and legislative constraints faced by the German chancellor, there were no 
major constitutional, legislative, or judicial restrictions on the British prime minister’s executive 
power,  which could constrain Britain’s fighting and stabilization role in Afghanistan. This lack 
of political constraints ensured that Britain would pursue a strategy, which would be consistent 
with its alliance commitment, global ambitions, and perceptions of international threat. The 
absence of any institutional constraint meant that the British government could ignore the mass 
public opinion, and instead, rely solely on elite opinion in choosing its Afghanistan policy, This 
leads to an important question of whether public opinion had any measurable effect on Britain’s 
Afghanistan policy.  
 Thus, elite consensus on alliance commitment and 
balance of threat consolidated the British prime minister’s authority to decide the nature and 
scope of Britain’s coalition contribution to Afghanistan.  
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Public Opinion. My coalition burden-sharing model predicts that a strong chief executive 
is likely to ignore public opinion in choosing his (or her) country’s Afghanistan policy. This is 
essentially a realist position on public opinion, which claims that the government and the foreign 
policy elites shape the public opinion, and the strategic decision makers are likely to ignore 
public opinion in pursuing a specific foreign policy.  
In analyzing the effect of domestic public opinion on coalition policy, this chapter 
examines the British opinion data on several issues. These include public attitudes toward the 
invasion of Afghanistan, the use of force, troop level, and Afghan reconstruction. It finds that a 
large majority of the British public supported the Afghanistan invasion, and a small but 
significant minority of the British public continued to support the Afghanistan mission. It also 
finds that as the Afghanistan War progressed, a large majority of the British public opposed the 
war, and demanded immediate troop withdrawal. For strategic culture theorists, these two 
seemingly contradictory trends in public opinion—a strong support for the initial intervention, 
and a strong opposition to the latter state of the war, can be explained by the elite opinion. The 
British foreign policy elites have historically favored a global role and a military interventionist 
foreign policy for the United Kingdom. This self-image of global responsibility has historically 
led the British foreign policy elites and the key decision makers to ignore any dissenting public 
opinion on foreign policy. Britain’s Afghanistan policy was no exception. Despite declining 
public support for the war, the successive British governments did not withdraw troops, nor did 
they shirk away from the coalition commitments.  
At least four discernible trends can be traced regarding the British public attitudes toward 
the Afghanistan War. First, initially a large section of the British public supported the 
Afghanistan invasion and the use of force so long it did not cause civilian casualties, and disrupt 
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the provisions of humanitarian assistance.199
Regarding the invasion of Afghanistan, in late September 2001, the Gallup Poll found 
that an overwhelming majority of the British people (75%) supported an extradition process and 
trial of those responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
 Second, since the 2006 troop surge, opposition to 
the war increased; with more than one-third of the British public had shown favorable attitudes 
toward British presence in Afghanistan. Third, since 2009, a large majority of Britons expressed 
their doubt about the Afghan mission, and thus demanded troop withdrawal. Fourth, public 
support for the post-war reconstruction efforts increased in 2008, but decreased in 2009.  
200 On October 12, 2001, just five days 
after the U.S. and coalition forces began bombing in Afghanistan, a Guardian/ICM poll found 
that 74% Britons supported the bombing.201 In less than three weeks, the support for bombing 
declined to 62%.202 This declining support for the war was attributed to reports of civilian 
casualties, and concerns over a humanitarian disaster. At that time a large majority of British 
people (54%) wanted a pause into the bombing, and more flow of foreign aid to Afghanistan.203
There is a paucity of opinion data for the years between 2002 and 2005. Since 2006, the 
British public support for Afghanistan War fluctuated over time, but opposition to the war was 
always greater than support for the war. For instance, in 2006, 53% Britons opposed the war, 
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while only 31% supported it.204 Opposition to the war declined to 47%, while support increased 
to 46% in July 2009.205 This was perhaps, due to the fact that more British people saw their 
troops making a positive effect in Afghanistan. In December 2010 an opinion poll found public 
opposition to the Afghan War increased to 57%, while support for the war declined to 34%.206
With increasing troop fatalities, and no signs of a decisive victory against the Taliban, 
more Britons wanted their troops back home, and only a few supported a troop buildup in 
Afghanistan. In 2009 and 2010, 27% Britons supported maintaining the current troop levels.
 At 
least two factors may explain this increasing opposition to, and declining support for, Britain’s 
Afghanistan mission. The first involves increasing troop casualty, and the second concerns 
Britain’s disproportionately larger coalition efforts, compared to major NATO allies, such as, 
France, Germany, and Italy. 
207 
During this time, support for troop buildup declined sharply from 11% in 2009 to 7% in 2010.208 
Most importantly, more Britons demanded the reduction or withdrawal of British forces from 
Afghanistan. In 2009, 60% Britons supported troop reduction or withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.209 In 2010, this increased to 65%.210
                                                            
204 Richard Notron-Taylor, Julian Glover, and Nicholas  Watt, “Public Support for War in Afghanistan Is Firm, 
Despite Deaths,” Guardian, July 13, 2009. 
 On the question of a withdrawal deadline, in 
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withdrawal immediately, or in 2011, if the conditions permit. 211 By contrast, only one fourth of 
those polled (26%) opined British forces should stay in Afghanistan as long as it took to finish 
the task of stabilizing the country.212
As the overall public support for the use of military force eroded, there was a sharp 
decline in the support for UK’s civilian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. In 2007, 69% 
Britons supported a strong reconstruction role for their country.
 
213 This registered a sharp 
increase to 81% in 2008, and a marked decrease to 48% in 2009. 214
Several questions emerge from the public opinion data presented above. The first 
question involves why a large majority of Britons supported the Afghanistan invasion in the first 
place, and why at least one-third of them supported the mission at any time between 2006 and 
2010. The second question concerns why the public support for the war eroded over time. The 
third question examines whether the British government responded to the declining public 
support and growing call for troop withdrawal.  
 The German public opinion 
data show a similar trend in declining public support for reconstruction activities. This might 
indicate that the British people became more concerned about the economic depression at home, 
and civilian and military casualties in Afghanistan. This might also indicate that the growing 
militarization of reconstruction activities, and the dangers to British aid workers had negatively 
influenced public opinion. 
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First, regarding support for the use of force, Alister Miskimmon suggests that the British 
strategic culture provides the best possible answer. Miskimmon argues that the British pubic and 
foreign policy elites share a common view that the UK has a global responsibility to conduct 
multilateral operations to promote international peace and security. This sense of global 
responsibility might have encouraged a sizable part—in this case nearly one-third—of the British 
public to support the Afghanistan War. This sense of global responsibility is the product of the 
country’s colonial history, and a strong multilateral foreign policy in the post-war era. In 
Miskimmon’s words: 
The UK’s colonial past, coupled with its institutional embedding in the 
international community, has created a sense of responsibility and global outlook 
in the minds of the British public and political elites regarding the UK’s 
international responsibilities for peacekeeping and crisis management. There are 
no obvious ‘no go areas’ for the UK armed forces in the way that the German 
armed forces are constrained.215
 
 
Second, on the question of declining public support for Britain’s Afghan mission, there 
are several explanations. They focus on the absence of tangible progress, casualty sensitivity, 
corruption in Afghanistan, and public distrust over Britain’s Iraq policy. Speaking about the lack 
of tangible progress, in 2008 Simon Jenkins, a senior columnist for the British daily, The 
Guardian, argued that the British forces “went there [in Afghanistan] to punish the Taleban, to 
capture Osama Bin Laden. We [British forces] failed to capture Osama Bin Laden, we failed to 
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Blair Government,” in Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda, edited by Kerry Longhurst 
and Marcin Zaborowski (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 95.  
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punish the Taleban - we should leave.” 216 On troop casualties, Jenkins notes that “British 
soldiers are dying and British taxpayers are spending an awful lot of money on them dying. 
There is no good reason for this war anymore.” 217 In 2010, a report of the European Security and 
Defense Assembly (ESDA) expressed a similar view. The ESDA report observed that “The 
substantial decline in [British] public support has been fuelled not only by the number of 
fatalities but also by the fact that the campaign has lasted so long and that the aims of the war, 
few of which have been achieved, seem blurred.” 218
While public dissatisfaction over the long war in Afghanistan was perhaps fuelled by a 
lack of measurable progress, there is no empirical validity of the casualty sensitivity hypothesis. 
In a study on the effect of public opinion on war, Kriner and Wilson find no association between 
troop fatalities and public opinion. Their study shows that British support for Afghanistan war 
began to decline long before a spike in troop fatalities was registered in 2006.
  
219 Moreover, 
public opposition did not increase in a substantial proportion, despite the fact that troop fatalities 
more than doubled from 51 in 2008 to 108 in 2009.220
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former Prime Minister Brown and his foreign secretary David Miliband had a successful 
communication strategy, which reached out to the people and explained that the Afghanistan 
mission was vital to British national interest.221
There were other reasons for declining public support as well. Corruption in the Afghan 
government, and distrust over the New Labour’s Iraq policy were two major contributors to 
declining British support for the Afghanistan War. According to the 2009 Transparency 
International corruption perception index, Afghanistan ranked as the second most corrupt 
country in the world. Critics claim that the Karzai government did little to fight rampant 
cronyism and bribery, which had fuelled the Taliban insurgency.
 
222 The American and British 
officials routinely warned that the state-sanctioned corruption and the proliferation of drug trade 
had a negative effect on the public perception of the Afghan war.223
Finally, the British media reports frequently discussed the negative effect of Iraq War on 
the Afghanistan War. Senior politicians in the United Kingdom also endorsed such views. In 
2008, during a House of Commons debate, Conservative party parliamentarian Adam Holloway 
observed that after the fall of the Taliban regime, “there was a massive opportunity to make 
progress and goodwill on the part of the Afghan people to accept and foreign aid.”
  
224
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Instead, we were focusing on a crazy and quite unnecessary invasion of Iraq.”225 The Liberal 
Democratic Party leader Nick Glegg shared the same view. Clegg warns that after losing “its 
moral credibility with the war in Iraq,” Britain was losing the public support for the war in 
Afghanistan.226
The foregoing discussion shows the varying level of British public opposition to the war, 
and the sources of such public opposition. Did unfavorable public opinion have any effect on 
British policy in Afghanistan? My burden-sharing model predicts no effect from the unfavorable 
public attitude. Such prediction is based on a top-down approach to public opinion, which claims 
that the government and foreign policy elites influence public attitudes, not the other way. 
History provides a strong support for such top-down approach to public opinion in analyzing 
British foreign policy process. 
  
Writing as early as in the 1930s, a prominent British diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, 
argued that members of the British public were yet to attain the judgment on foreign policy, 
which largely inhibited them from key foreign policy decisions. Contemporary authors, such as, 
Kenneth Younger and Christopher Hill, have also discussed how public opinion had little or no 
effect in shaping British foreign policy on three important issues in the post-war era: the military 
intervention during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1960s European integration policy, and the 1960s 
nuclear deterrence policy. In the first case, when the Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the 
Suez Canal, British Prime Minister Eden and a few Cabinet Ministers secretly authorized a 
                                                            
225 Ibid. 
226 See: James Kirkup, Thomas Harding,a nd Toby Harnden, “Bob Ainsworth Criticises Barack Obama Over 
Afghanistan,” The Telegraph, November 24, 2009. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/6646179/Bob-Ainsworth-criticises-Barack-Obama-
over-Afghanistan.htmlm, accessed October 3, 2010; Nick Clegg, “After the Economic 9/11, We will Face a New 
World Order,” The Yorkshire Post, October 18, 2008. http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/opinion/Nick-Clegg-After-
the-economic.4588451.jp, accessed October 3, 2010.  
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military intervention in the Suez without consulting the mass public or the informed public. In 
the second case, the mass public had no strong opinion on either British support for, or 
opposition to, the European Economic Community. In the third case, the popular campaign for 
nuclear disarmament was dampened by the British government’s firm commitment to a strong 
nuclear deterrent capability.227
Evidence supports the prediction of my burden-sharing model. Both Blair and Brown 
enjoyed strong executive power, and thus neglected the unfavorable public attitude toward the 
Afghanistan War. Instead of reducing Britain’s troop commitment to Afghanistan—as expected 
by a large number of British public—both Blair and Brown increased the military and non-
military contributions to coalition operations. After assuming office, Cameron made it clear that 
there would be no change to Britain’s Afghanistan policy, and his administration would support 
the U.S. and NATO strategy in Afghanistan.
  
228
Why did Blair and his successors choose to bypass public opinion? Sarah Kreps argues 
that elite consensus explains why the British policymakers were insulated from the public 
opinion, and remained committed to their Afghanistan mission.
 In response to the growing public demand for 
troop withdrawal, Cameron ensured that the British forces would remain in Afghanistan until 
2014, the conditional deadline for the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan 
government.  
229
                                                            
227 See: Lawrence Martin and John Garnett, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-
First Century (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1997); Also see Robert Self, British Foreign and 
Defense Policy Since 1945: Challenges and Dilemmas in a changing World (New York: Palgrave Macmmillan, 
2010). 
 Kreps defines elite consensus 
228 “Cameron: Afghanistan Most Important Foreign Policy Issue for Britain,” CNN News, June 10, 2010; 
“David Cameron: No Change in Afghanistan Policy,” BBC News, July 21, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-10715737, accessed February 9, 2011.  
229 Sarah Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters 
for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2010), p. 197. 
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as bipartisan agreement and the absence of any coherent opposition to the government policy. 
She notes that:  
[W]hether states  increase their commitment to NATO operations in Afghanistan 
has little to do with levels of public support…Leaders have not responded to the 
public’s foreign policy preferences by withdrawing troops. Rather, they have done 
just the opposite and increased support for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan 
by easing restrictions—or caveats—on the types of operations their militaries can 
conduct, extending their deployments, and increasing their troop numbers. The 
UK experience is representative, as it has steadily increased troops deployments 
to Afghanistan as public opinion has remained low…The reason why there is less 
of a connection between public support and withdrawal decision than might be 
expected is because of high degrees of elite consensus in the political leadership 
of troop contributing countries.230
There are other cases, in which the British government ignored public opinion, but relied 
on elite consensus to pursue a policy of military intervention. The Kosovo campaign in 1999 was 
a glaring example. As Andrew Dorman writes, “Although domestic public opinion was not 
convinced of the need for Britain to become involved [in Kosovo] Blair had … ensured that all 
three major political parties in parliament supported the proposed NATO action…”
 
231
In summary, consistent with the prediction of my burden-sharing model, public opinion 
did not have any effect in shaping Britain’s alliance commitment in Afghanistan. Armed with the 
royal prerogatives and backed by the elite consensus, Blair and his successors exercised a strong 
 
                                                            
230 Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion,” pp. 197-198, emphasis added. 
231 Andrew M. Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone (Surrey, England: 
Ashgate, 2009), p. 21. 
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control over the decision process on coalition burden-sharing in Afghanistan. Once they made 
initial decisions on the course of Britain’s Afghan policy, the final decision point was the 
strength of British military force—its ability and willingness to pursue a policy desired by its 
civilian commanders. The rest of this chapter discusses the effect of Britain’s military capability 
on its Afghanistan policy.  
 
 Military Capability. After the chief executive power, military capability was the most 
important decision point to shape Britain’s Afghanistan policy. My theoretical model predicts 
that the strength of a country’s military force would significantly influence its burden-sharing 
role.  In the context of Afghanistan, a strong military capability would allow Britain to make a 
robust contribution to fighting terrorism and insurgency, and securing the population centers.  
 How do we measure the strength of British military force, and what effect did it have in 
shaping Britain’s burden-sharing role in Afghanistan?  
 Since, the United Kingdom is a NATO member state, the strength of British military can 
be measured by looking at the concept of NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative (DCI). 
According to the DCI, three defining features of a country’s military forces are pertinent for 
coalition operations. These are suitability, interoperability, and deployability.232
                                                            
232 According to NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), alliance military capability has five attributes: 
(a) mobility and deployability; (b) sustainability; (c) effective engagement; (d) survivability; and (e) interoperable 
communications. My definition of a country's coalition capability combines sustainability, effective engagement, 
and survivability to refer to suitability. For NATO’s discussion of alliance capability concepts, see North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, “The Transformation of the Alliance: NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO 
Handbook, (NATO Publications, October 8, 2002), chapter 2. 
 First, suitability 
refers to the ability of British conventional or Special Forces to achieve their desired goals in 
fighting enemies and securing the population centers in its area of operation. Second, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm, accessed January 3, 2011.  
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interoperability refers to ability of British forces and equipments to integrate into joint 
operations, carried out by multinational forces in Afghanistan. Third, deployability refers to the 
speed at which military assets and boots can be deployed for coalition purposes. 
 This chapter has shown that the British contribution to the War in Afghanistan progressed 
in four stages: (a) a strong counterterrorism role (October 2001-July 2002); (b) a strategic neglect 
of Afghanistan due to participation in the Iraq War (August 2002-March 2006); (c) a weak 
counterinsurgency role in Helmand (April 2006-late 2007); and (d) a strong counterinsurgency 
role in Helmand (early 2008-late 2010). I argue that in each of the four stages, the issues of 
suitability and deployability had significantly influenced the outcome of British military 
operations, and subsequent burden-sharing decisions. By contrast, interoperability did not appear 
to be a problem, largely due to the British forces’ longstanding experience in joint military 
exercise with the NATO forces.233
                                                            
233 The British and American forces, along with a handful of allied forces have longstanding experience in 
addressing interoperability issues. This is largely due to NATO military doctrines and standardization programs, and 
joint military exercises among the ABCA countries, (America, Britain, Canada, Australia and later New Zealand). 
For instance, the 1998 SDR stressed that: “International operations have become the norm, and the Armed Forces 
regularly train alongside our allies to hone their interoperability. It clearly makes sense to have consensus on what 
the key technologies of the future are and how interoperability will be maintained.” See: UK Ministry of Defense, 
Strategic Defense Review, p. 103. 
 Hence, I exclude the discussion on interoperability, and 
instead focus on the effects of deployability and suitability on British burden-sharing role. I 
explain how improved military capability—defined by the adoption of a counterinsurgency 
doctrine and the deployment of more troops and more resources—had positive effects on British 
military operations from 2008 onwards. An analysis of the effect of military capability on 
Britain’s burden-sharing outcomes is important here to understand how lessons from a particular 
outcome, especially a weak military operation, had influenced the British decision process. 
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 The first stage of British military intervention in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and 
lasted until July 2002. During this time, the United Kingdom deployed up to 1,800 military 
boots, Nimrod surveillance aircrafts, and C-17 aircraft carriers, and fired Tomahawak cruise 
missiles in Afghanistan. The British commandos and conventional forces played a crucial role in 
defeating the Al Qaeda and overthrowing the Taliban regime. As Sarah Kreps describes, by late 
2001, the United Kingdom “was the only state other than the United States to participate in 
combat operations.”234
 The second stage began in August 2002, and lasted until April 2006. During this stage, 
Afghanistan became a forgotten war, largely due to the U.S. and UK-led Iraq invasion in March 
2003.
 By all criteria, the British military had a suitable, interoperable and 
deployable force to support the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. In summary, Britain’s strong 
military capability had contributed to a robust burden-sharing role during the initial air 
campaign—the Operation Crescent Wind, and the subsequent ground offensives—Operation 
Tora Bora, and Operation Jacana.  
235
                                                            
234 Sarah Kreps, “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2008), p. 
543.  
 During this time, the British forces in Afghanistan were concentrated in Kabul, and the 
northern province of Balkh. Their main focus was to provide security to the nascent Afghan 
government in Kabul, and to contribute to reconstruction and stabilization operations in the 
Mazar-i-Sharif PRT in Balkh. Due to limited soldiers, resources, and equipments, and a lack of 
counterinsurgency doctrine, the British forces pursued stabilization operations on a limited scale. 
This limited stabilization role focused on training the Afghan security forces, and investing in a 
few quick impact projects.  
235 British defense experts Farrell and Gordon argue that the British forces’ Helmand campaign had serious 
weaknesses, partly due to the “Whitehalls’ [British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or the foreign ministry] 
focus on Iraq and the resultant diversion of critical assets.” See: Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, “COIN Machine: 
The British Military in Afghanistan,” p. 670. 
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 The third stage began in April 2006 and lasted until late 2007. This period saw the 
deployment and expansion of British troops in Helmand, from 3,100 in April 2006 to nearly 
8,000 by 2008.236 Despite this troop escalation, the British forces lacked sufficient manpower 
and adequate resources, which had tremendously hampered the conduct of offensive operations 
in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas.237
Regarding the lack of a suitable military force, David Betz and Anthony Cormack notes 
that: 
 Experts on British defense and security policy 
contend that the British forces were not available in adequate numbers, nor were they suitable for 
the counterinsurgency operations. This lack of deployability and suitability had resulted in a 
weak burden-sharing role for British forces in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2008.   
Two of the factors that characterize counterinsurgency are its manpower-intensive 
nature and its generally extended duration. Counterinsurgency is a light 
infantryman’s war; but the structure of the British armed forces is not suited to 
maintaining this sort of commitment. Policy decisions, going back to the end of 
the Cold War, have tended to favor other parts of the military other than the 
infantry. Much of the investment in technology, in recent years, has been founded 
on the premise that enhanced technological capabilities in the fields of killing 
power and battlefield awareness will enable a lighter infantry footprint.238
                                                            
236 See Farrell and Gordon, “COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan,” p. 677.  
  
237 As described in the first section of this chapter, the British forces were fewer in numbers, and had few 
helicopters and other logistics, which had constrained their ability to clear the areas controlled by the Taliban 
militias in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas—all in the Helmand province. When they were able to clear an 
area, they could not hold it for a long period of time due to inadequate troop presence.   
238 David Betz and Anthony Cormack, “Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,” Orbis, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), p. 
328. 
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On the issue of deployability, Betz and Cormack highlight the adverse effect of 
manpower shortages on Britain’s Helmand campaign. They write: 
In the case of Afghanistan, manpower has also been lacking in the context of the 
strategy the British forces have been tasked with implementing. Early deployment 
in “platoon houses” that were intended to afford a British presence among the 
people, resulted in the Taliban being able to concentrate and launch repeated 
assaults at company level, which were  repelled with the employment of 
substantial amounts of airpower. This is self-defeating because British forces 
remain unable to clear and hold territory on the needed scale.239
The shortage of critical equipments, especially combat helicopters, had also affected the 
British mission in Helmand. In 2008, Stuart Tootal, the retired commanding officer of the 3rd 
Parachute Regiment, criticized the British government for not deploying enough helicopters, 
which could save the lives of many soldiers.
 
240
[H]elicopter capability is being seriously undermined by the shortage of 
helicopters, particularly medium-lift support helicopters, capable of being 
deployed in support of operations overseas. We believe that the size of the fleet is 
an issue, and are convinced that the lack of helicopters is having adverse 
 In 2009, the House of Commons Defense 
Committee acknowledged the adverse effect of helicopter shortages in Afghanistan. The 
Committee observed: 
                                                            
239 Betz and Cormack, “Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,” p. 329. 
240 Stuart Tootal, “SAS chief: Troopers find the MoD is not fit for purpose,” The Telegraph, October 31, 2008. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/3332486/SAS-chief-Troopers-find-the-MoD-is-not-fit-
for-purpose.html, accessed November 5, 2010. 
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consequences for operations today and, in the longer term, will severely impede 
the ability of the UK Armed Forces to deploy.241
The fourth stage in Britain’s Afghanistan mission began in early 2008, and continued as 
of 2010. During this time the military campaign in Helmand received more troops and more 
equipment, which increased the ability of the British forces to conduct successful offensive and 
stabilization operations. This robust burden-sharing role was evident in British military 
operations in Garmsir, Nad Ali, and Marza districts, where the coalition forces focused on 
translating short term tactical gains into long term success by investing in development and 
stabilization operations. 
 
According to Farrell and Gordon, several factors contributed to the success of British 
military from 2008 onwards. These included a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, the 
deployment of more troops and resources, and a comprehensive civil-military approach. First, 
since late 2007, the British forces in Helmand (especially the 52 Brigade) adopted a three-staged 
counterinsurgency doctrine, which focused on holding and building an area after securing it from 
Taliban control.242 This is widely known as a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, first 
developed in 2006 by the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24),243 and later codified in 2009 
in the British Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency.244
                                                            
241 SeeHouse of Commons Defense Committee, Helicopter Capability: Eleventh Report of Session 2008-2009, 
Report Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence (London: The Stationery Office, July 16, 2009), 
p. 3. 
 Both army field manuals 
incorporated the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stressed on the need for adapting to 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/434/434.pdf, accessed October 30, 
2010 
242 Farrell and Gordon, “COIN Machine: the British Military in Afghanistan,” pp. 674-675. 
243 See United States Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
pp. 174-187; Alexander Alderson, “Learning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and  Practice,” 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 6 (2007), pp. 12-19.  
244 British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10, Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876, October 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf, accessed March 16. 2011.  
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complex threats from insurgents and irregular warriors. The effects of these new doctrines were 
enormous. The British forces focused on protecting the population centers, and supporting the 
Afghan national government to extend its writ into remote areas. Their operations were 
supported by the renewed strength of the Afghan national army, which grew from 50,000 in 
2007 to 80,000 in 2008, and eventually to 150,000 in 2010.245
Second, after the introduction of a new doctrine, the deployment of more troops and 
resources had positive effects in shaping the British forces’ Helmand campaign. The number of 
British forces increased from 8,000 in 2008 to 9,500 in 2010. The withdrawal of British forces 
from Iraq made it possible to reprioritize the Afghanistan mission. As Farrell and Gordon write, 
“the Mastiff armored vehicle, was originally acquired for Iraq within five months under the UOR 
(Urgent Operational Requirements) scheme; some of these units were redirected to Afghanistan.” 
 
246 Better counterinsurgency training, supported by collective debriefing of soldiers, had also 
brought positive effects on the ground.247
 Third, the implementation, albeit on a slow speed, of a comprehensive civil-military 
approach had allowed the development, foreign, and defense ministries to coordinate their 
activities in Helmand. Farrell and Gordon note that the DFID’s post-conflict reconstruction unit 
(later renamed to Stabilization Unit) slowly recognized the need to develop programs for 
working in conflict zones.
 
248
                                                            
245 For data on the annual growth of Afghan National Army, see: Livingstone, and O’Hanlon, The Brookings 
Afghanistan Index, p. 6. 
 This was a paradigm shift for the development ministry, which was 
created for fighting poverty in a civilian space, and not promoting development in a war zone.  
The FCO had also needed to retool itself from a state-centric strategic diplomacy to a non-state 
246 Farrell and Gordon, “COIN Machine: the British Military in Afghanistan,” pp. 677. 
247 Ibid.  
248 Ibid, p. 681. 
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centric tactical diplomacy. The latter required the British foreign ministry personnel in Helmand 
to engage tribal leaders into the development process. Finally, the MOD personnel learnt how to 
coordinate the military operations with the works of the civilian development and foreign 
ministries in a conflict zone.  
 The preceding discussion shows the improved ability of British forces to share the 
increasing risks of fighting the Taliban and stabilizing the insurgent-prone areas. What explains 
the decision to improvise the capacity of the British forces, and what is the causal link between 
this improved capacity and robust burden-sharing role in Helmand?  
According to Anthony King, prior to 2008, the deployment of few troops and a strategy 
of forced dispersal had resulted in serious disasters in Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki dam areas. 
The British government learned from its past mistakes and increased its troops and resources to 
fight the Afghanistan War. Since 2008, the deployment of more troops and more resources had 
allowed the British forces to adopt a strategy of force concentration, in relatively small areas.249 
Using the strategy of force concentration, the British soldiers gained important success in 
securing and holding territories. This was evident in three major operations -- Operation Sond 
Chara (December 2008), 250 Operation Panther’s Claw (June-August 2009),251
                                                            
249 The main argument is that initially the British forces in Helmand adopted a flawed strategy of force 
dispersal. This required the small battle groups of British forces to be dispersed into remote areas to conduct 
offensive operations to combat the Taliban insurgents. Due to inadequate manpower, the British-run forward 
operating bases (FOBs) and mobile operations groups (MOGs) had struggled to clear an area, but failed to hold it. 
This was a standard picture from 2006 until 2007. Since 2008, the British forces had adopted a strategy of forced 
concentration, which had allowed the Helmand campaign to see some successes in securing and holding areas, and 
paving the ways for reconstruction works. See: Anthony King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British 
Military Operations in Afghanistan,” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (2010), pp. 311-332. 
 and Operation 
250 UK Ministry of Defense, “In Pictures: Op Red Dagger Strikes in Helmand,” Defense News, Jan. 5,2009. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.mod.uk:80/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOper
ations/InPicturesOpRedDaggerStrikesInHelmand.htm, accessed May 28, 2010; ISAF. 2009. Joint ANSF, ISAF 
Operation Leads to Hope in Helmand. ISAF Press Release, Jan. 3, 2009. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/01/pr090103-010.html, accessed May 28, 2010. 
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Moshtarak (February 2010).252 These operations were focused on the Taliban-controlled Nad 
Ali, Babaji, and Marja districts. King argues that “the success of the British campaign in 
Helmand is likely to depend now on concentrating forces in these areas so that they can be 
secured permanently.”253
Despite these important successes, the British military did not have sufficient troops on 
the ground to achieve more gains in fighting the Taliban insurgency in Helmand. Recognizing 
the inability of the United Kingdom to deploy more forces, in September 2010, the United States 
sent more marine soldiers, to take security responsibility of northern Helmand from the British 
forces.
  
254 As a result in late 2010, nearly 1,000 British Royal Marines were redeployed from 
Sangin to Central Helmand. For critics, the relocation of the British troops showed their 
weaknesses in Helmand. Senior NATO commanders defied such critics, and insisted that the 
relocation of British troops from northern to central Helmand was a “routine piece of battlefield 
relocation.”255
                                                                                                                                                                                               
251 “UK Forces in Major Afghan Assault”, BBC News, Jun 23, 2009. 
  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8114054.stm, accessed May 27, 2010; Richard Norton-Taylor, “Deadly, and 
Maybe Decisive. Officers Hail Panther’s Claw,” Guardian, July 27, 2009. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/27/panthers-claw-operation-afghanistan-taliban, accessed May 27, 2010; 
Thomas Harding, “Operation Panther’s Claw: How British Troops are Hunting Taliban to the End. Telegraph, July 
19, 2009. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5859653/Operation-Panthers-Claw-how-
British-troops-are-hunting-the-Taliban-to-the-end.html, accessed May 27, 2010.  
252 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 2010. Operation Moshtarak. News Release, February 13. 
Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF Joint Command. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2010-02-CA-059-
Backgrounder-Operation%20Moshtarak.pdf, accessed May 27, 2010; 252 Operation Moshtarak Day-by-Day. BBC 
News, February 19, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8516800.stm, accessed May 27, 2010; 252 Thompson, Mark. 
2010. U.S. Troops; Operation Moshtarak: At a Glance. Al Jazeera, February 13, 2010. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/02/201021343536129252.html, accessed May 27, 2010. 
253 King, “Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan,” p. 331. 
254 James Kirkup, “Afghanistan: British Troops to Hand Over Northern Helmand to US Marines,” The 
Telegraph, July 6, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7875855/Afghanistan-
British-troops-to-hand-over-northern-Helmand-to-US-Marines.html, accessed March 6, 2011.  
255 Ian Pannell, “UK Troops Leave Helmand’s Sangin,” BBC News, September 20, 2010. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11367931, accessed March 16, 2011. 
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 In summary, Britain’s contribution to sharing the military burdens in Afghanistan had 
evolved in four stages. In the first stage, from October 2001 to May 2002, the United Kingdom 
played a strong burden-sharing role. This was evident in the deployment of a strong military 
force, which had participated in the U.S.-led combat operations to defeat the Al Qaeda militants, 
and to topple the Taliban regime. In the second stage, between 2003 and 2006, Britain’s war 
efforts in Afghanistan were marked by a low level commitment, with British forces 
concentrating in Kabul multinational brigade, and a small provincial reconstruction team in 
Mazar-i-Sharif. In the third stage, although the British forces were deployed in a large scale to 
Helmand, it was not until 2008, when they began to show marked improvement in offensive and 
defensive operations.  
Finally, the British forces learned from their past mistakes, and adapted to the growing 
challenges of counterinsurgency operations. My research has shown that from 2008 to 2010, the 
British forces had pursued a strong burden-sharing role in Helmand. Several factors contributed 
to this belated success. The list includes the deployment of more troops and resources, the 
introduction of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, and the employment of a 
comprehensive civil-military approach to reconstruction and development. Following Anthony 
King, I argue that there was a causal link between a strong military and a robust 
counterinsurgency strategy. A strong military, defined as the deployment of adequate number of 
troops and sufficient resources, had allowed Britain to adopt an operational strategy of forced 
concentration in a relatively small area. This, in contrast to a strategy of force dispersal, had 
gained critical successes in securing and holding territories in the military operations in Nad Ali, 
Babaji, and Marja districts, which were the Taliban strongholds, and the centers of opium 
production in Helmand.  
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III. Summary and Conclusion 
The British case study illustrates the utility of my integrated burden-sharing model. Britain 
joined the Afghanistan War coalition in 2001 and provided unstinting support to manage the 
coalition until 2010. Britain’s overall contribution to the War in Afghanistan includes a proactive 
diplomacy, a modest reconstruction role, and an evolving counterinsurgency strategy. As a major 
NATO member, and key U.S. ally, the United Kingdom had contributed the second largest 
contingent of coalition forces to Afghanistan, and deployed them to the volatile Helmand 
province. Since 2006, the British troops in Helmand increased up to 9,500, who were exposed to 
frequent insurgent attacks, and responded to these attacks with more troops and more resources.  
This chapter investigates the British decision process on Afghanistan. It examines why 
Britain joined the Afghanistan War coalition, and why it pursued a strong burden-sharing role to 
support the coalition. It also discusses how Britain’s decision process and the military capability 
shape the effectiveness of its burden-sharing outcomes. My research shows that two international 
systemic factors provided strong incentives to encourage Britain’s participation in the coalition. 
These were transatlantic alliance commitment, and the threats of international terrorism.  
First, Britain was strongly committed to its special relationship with the United States and 
its multilateral alliance relationship with the NATO. These bilateral and multilateral relationships 
had created a strong sense of alliance commitment, and global responsibility for multilateral 
crisis management operations. These pre-existing alliance commitments were further solidified 
after NATO invoked Article 5 collective defense provision. The invocation of Article 5 made it 
an obligation for Britain to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.  
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Second, the threats of international terrorism presented the second international level 
incentive to encourage Britain’s coalition participation. Two particular terrorist threats were 
important in this context: the first involved transnational terrorist group Al Qaeda, and its 
intention to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the second involved the Taliban insurgents 
and their connection to drugs trafficking. The incidents of high profile terrorist attacks, such as 
the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, and the London bombings of 2005 had showed the 
persistent threats posed to the British citizens and interests at home and abroad. In addition, the 
resurgence of Taliban   attacks, and the growth of opium production in Afghanistan 
demonstrated the threats posed by the Taliban to the British forces.  
 This chapter argues that these international systemic incentives were transmitted through 
the British domestic political processes and state-level military constraints to create a unique 
burden-sharing behavior. Within the domestic political processes, the roles of the chief executive 
and the military force had strong effects in shaping Britain’s Afghanistan policy. Figure 4.7 
shows the British decision process and burden-sharing outcomes in Afghanistan. 
 First, Prime Minister Blair and his successors, Brown and Cameron, enjoyed royal 
prerogative in the declaration of war, and the use of force in foreign policy. There was virtually 
no domestic legislative or judicial constraint in Britain, which could restrict the prime minister’s 
power on use-of-force decisions. Although the British parliament debated on Afghanistan and 
Iraq Wars issues, my research shows that there was no war cabinet from 2001 to 2010, which 
could deliberate decisions on force deployment. The effects of the lack institutional restraints 
were enormous. As Kampfner describes, Blair singlehandedly dragged Britain into the War in 
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Afghanistan.256
 
 Elite consensus among the major political parties had further strengthened the 
power of the British prime ministers. Using this literally unlimited power, the British 
governments of Blair, Brown, and Cameron continued to pursue their Afghanistan policy that 
lacked any massive public support.  
Figure 4.7 The British Decision Process on Afghanistan  
 
 
                                                            
256 Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, p. 129. 
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Second, after the British prime ministers ignored public opinion, they looked into the 
military forces to pursue their Afghanistan policy. At this point, the strength of British military 
forces and assets in Afghanistan determined the outcome of London’s burden-sharing behavior. 
As shown in Figure 4.7, and discussed in this chapter, the burden-sharing outcomes gave 
important feed-backs, which were taken into subsequent decision process to shape Britain’s 
Afghanistan policy. This chapter shows that when the British forces were deployed in Helmand 
in 2006, they did not have a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, and they lacked 
enough troops and equipments to pursue a strong offensive and defensive burden-sharing role. 
This lacks in doctrine, troops, and resources had contributed to serious capacity gaps. The effect 
was repeated failures in securing territories from Taliban controls. The scenario turned to change 
since 2008, when the introduction of a population-centric doctrine and the insertion of more 
troops and resources brought critical successes in clearing, holding, and building territories.  
In September 2010, the American marines relieved the British forces from northern 
Helmand. This had allowed the largely overreached and overstretched British forces to 
concentrate in central Helmand. In October 2010, the UK’s newly released strategic and defense 
review ensured that the massive budget cuts in the country’s defense expenditure would leave its 
Afghanistan commitment intact. This means that the British forces are likely to be well-
resourced, at least until 2014, when the international coalition forces are expected to hand over 
the security responsibility to the indigenous Afghan forces. As the Dutch forces left Afghanistan 
in 2010, and the Canadians have declared to withdraw in 2011, there are intense domestic 
pressures in the United Kingdom to scale back its military operations in Afghanistan. Despite 
such domestic pressures, the UK is likely “punch above the weight” in Afghanistan, at least to 
demonstrate that it is a global actor with the ability to project power in out of area operations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GERMANY:  
AN ALLY WITH A RISK-AVERSE STRATEGY 
 
Germany’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides an interesting case to test the 
integrated burden-sharing model. Germany joined the coalition in 2001 by declaring “unlimited 
solidarity” with the United States, and gradually reinforcing troops on the ground. Despite that, 
German burden-sharing behavior in the Afghan War appeared to be a puzzling phenomenon for 
its NATO allies. There were two facets of this puzzle: first, the deployment of German armed 
forces, Bundeswehr, in Afghanistan marked a gradual shift in German strategic culture, by 
slowly departing from a strategy of restraint in the use of force to a strategy of graduated force 
escalation. This was evident in the removal of some of the national caveats, which allowed the 
German forces to use force against the Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies. Germany 
defined such escalation as a critical tool of its multilateral crisis management strategy. Second, 
despite repeated requests from the United States and other NATO allies, Germany strongly 
resisted the redeployment of Bundeswehr forces into the restive southern Afghanistan, and 
avoided any plan for offensive military actions against the Taliban insurgents. In resisting 
NATO’s pressures for a combat role, senior leaders in the German government repeatedly 
defined their mission as a defensive reconstruction strategy, and rejected a combat mission for 
the Bundeswehr.   
What explains the puzzling phenomenon in Germany’s preference for a non-combat 
stabilization mission, and its antipathy to combat operations? Conventional wisdom focuses on 
the international systemic and strategic culturalist explanations in analyzing Germany’s burden-
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sharing behavior. In contrast, my burden-sharing model provides an integrated theory of 
coalition contribution. It claims that Germany’s Afghanistan policy has to be understood as 
interplay between systemic incentives and domestic politics. I examine the effect of three 
systemic variables – alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action – in structuring 
Germany’s options for Afghanistan. Next, I assess how the system-induced policy options were 
transmitted through three domestic level variables – political regime, public opinion, and military 
capability—in creating German burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan.  
 From a neo-realist perspective, the unified Germany would adapt to the post-Cold War 
realities, and resort to the use of force in the pursuit of foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz and John 
Mearsheimer have long predicted that the end of the Cold War would give rise to an assertive 
Germany, which would lead a European coalition and balance against U.S. power.1 Grunther 
Hellmann has observed that Germany’s increasing preference for the use of military power in 
peacekeeping missions demonstrates the attributes of a ‘normal power.’2
                                                            
1 Kenneth Waltz wrote that an “impatient” Germany leading a European coalition can possibly challenge the 
balance of power in the post-Cold War era. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41. In a similar vein, Mearsheimer wrote that a unified 
Germany would challenge NATO’s Cold War-era security posture, which saw German militarism as a threat to 
European security. He also argues that a nuclear Germany in the post-Cold War era might serve as a stabilizer in 
Europe. See John M. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; John M. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” 
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 2 (August 1990), pp. 35-50. 
 Others find limits to the 
neorealist and normalizing theses. For instance, Hanns Maull argues that defying the neo-realist 
2 Mary N. Hampton, “The Past, Present, and the Perhaps’ is Germany a Normal Power? Security Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 2 (Winter 2000/2001), pp. 179-202; Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of 
Contemporary Germany,” Mershon International Studies Review Vol. 40, No. 1 (1996), pp. 1-39; Gunther 
Hellmann, “The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who Is Listening?,” German Politics Vol. 6, No. 2 
(1997), pp. 29-57.   
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and normalizing schools’ predictions, post-Cold War Germany has emerged as a civilian power, 
and discounted the use of force in the pursuit of foreign policy.3
In contrast to the neo-realist scholars, proponents of the strategic culture theory argue that 
Berlin’s defense and security policy are deeply rooted in German political culture, which rejects 
the use of force, while maintaining a strong commitment to a multilateral crisis management 
strategy.
  
4 Ben Lombardi contends that Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mission has become a 
“hostage to German politics.”5 Others agree with such pessimistic account of Berlin’s political 
constraints in shaping Germany’s counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.6 For instance, 
Timo Noetzel and Benjami Schreer argue that the “missing link” between the Berlin-based 
politico-strategic leadership and the operational-tactical level leadership in Afghanistan has 
produced a dismal counterinsurgency performance for Bundeswehr forces.7
                                                            
3 Mull argues that a civilian power prioritizes the use of economic capability, instead of military capability. See: 
Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5 (Winter 1990-
1991), pp. 91-106; Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force. Still a Civilian Power?,” Survival, Vol. 42, 
No. 2 (2000), pp. 56-80; Oliver Meyer, “A Civilian Power Caught Between the Lines: Germany and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation,” Paper presented at the Conference on Germany as a Civilian Power – Results of Recent Research, 
Trier University, December 11-12, 1998. 
 Noetzel and Schreer 
http://www.bits.de/public/articles/trier98.htm, accessed December 30, 
2010.  
4 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003. 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004); Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and 
National Security in Germany and Japan,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, pp.317-356 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Thomas U. 
Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998); John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions, and 
German Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); John S. Duffield, 
“Political Culture and State Behavior. Why Germany Confounds Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 53, 
No. 4 (1999), pp. 765-803. 
5 Ben Lombardi, “All Politics is Local: Germany, the Bundeswehr, and Afghanistan,” International Journal, 
Vol.63, No. 3 (Summer 2008), p. 605.  
6 See Benjamin Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” Security Challenges, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 97-108; Markus Kaim, “Germany, Afghanistan, and the Future of NATO,” International 
Journal, Vol.63, No. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 607-623; Peter Rudolf, “The Myth of the ‘German Way’: German 
Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,” Survival, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2005), pp. 133-152; Timo Noetzel and 
Benjamin Schreer, “All the Way? The Evolution of German Military Power,” International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 
(2008), pp. 211-221. 
7 Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency 
Thinking,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 1 (2009), pp. 16-22. 
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contend that the root of the problem lies in the Berlin-based political leadership of the 
Bundeswehr, which “does not support a far-reaching debate and changes toward a 
comprehensive German COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy.”8 In short, the strategic culturalists 
stress that “the key determinants of German security and defense policy operate at the domestic 
level.”9
Although the neo-realist and strategic culture theories provide useful insights in 
analyzing German foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, they tend to be mutually exclusive, 
and cannot provide sufficient explanations for analyzing the German burden-sharing behavior in 
Afghanistan. Taking a neo-classical realist position, this chapter argues that an integrated 
burden-sharing model better explains Germany’s strategic decision process on coalition 
contribution to Afghanistan.  The burden-sharing model suggests that the threat of international 
terrorism and the need to maintain alliance solidarity with NATO presented two systemic 
incentives for Germany to join and maintain the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. These 
international systemic incentives were channeled through the peculiar German domestic political 
process, which severely constrained the power of the chief executives to initiate a combat role, 
but supported a strong non-combat stabilization role for the German forces in Afghanistan. In 
brief, I show that the peculiarities in German domestic politics as well as the legal-constitutional 
provisions strongly shaped the deployment of Bundeswehr by limiting its area of operation and 
constraining it offensive capabilities. I conclude with a note that NATO allies, especially the 
 
                                                            
8 Noetzel and Schreer, “Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking,” p. 16. 
9 Franz-Josef Meiers, “Crossing the Red Lines? The Grand Coalition and the Paradox of German Foreign 
Policy,” AICGS Policy Report No. 32 (2008), p. 8. Meiers examines the effect of politics on Germany’s foreign and 
security policy on Afghanistan, non-proliferation, and military transformation. Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid make 
a similar argument on domestic politics, but they add the Afghan factor in their analysis of German contribution in 
Afghanistan. They observe that “Germany’s contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan has been limited by 
political factors in Germany and military factors in Afghanistan.” See Timo Neotzel and Thomas Rid, “Germany’s 
Options in Afghanistan,” Survival, Vol. 51. No. 5 (Oct.-Nov. 2009), p. 71. 
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United States, are recognizing the dilemma in German politics, and adapting to the changing 
security landscape in Afghanistan.  
 This chapter has three sections. The first section examines the German contribution to the 
War in Afghanistan. The second section tests the empirical validity of my burden-sharing model 
to the German case. The third section summarizes the central findings.  
 
I. Germany’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan 
This section examines Germany’s military and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan 
War coalition. It shows that between 2002 and 2010, Germany pursued a strong diplomacy 
toward the coalition. This was evident in German diplomatic efforts at the Bonn (2001) and 
Berlin (2004) conferences, its increasing volume of foreign aid, and sustained focus on the 
Afghan police reform. During the nine years of Afghanistan War, Berlin steadily increased its 
military boots on the ground, making it the third largest ISAF troop contributing country. During 
the same time, Germany gradually increased its economic aid and civilian assistance to maintain 
the coalition. Despite an increasing military and civilian commitment, Germany did not respond 
to the allied calls for sharing the risks of combating Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents. 
Instead, it showed a keen interest in stabilizing Afghanistan through non-combat operations. 
 
Diplomatic Contribution. On the diplomatic front, Germany invested its political capital 
in forging a common European stance on fighting terrorism, and coordinating the future of post-
Taliban Afghanistan. After the U.S.-led forces invaded Afghanistan, the German foreign minister 
Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Schröder invested their political credibility in organizing two 
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high profile international conferences on Afghanistan. The first conference, held in Bonn, on 
November 27-Decembber 5, 2001, established the framework for an interim Afghan government, 
and laid the foundation for an international security force to be deployed to Kabul.10 The second 
conference, held in Berlin, on March 31-April 1, 2004, offered international legitimacy to the 
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the U.S.-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) mission. The Berlin conference was also notable, as it provided for the 
construction of additional provincial reconstruction teams, and committed $8.2 billion for the 
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan for the fiscal years 2004-2007.11
After assuming office in 2005, Chancellor Merkel continued to offer German political 
support for Afghanistan in various international conferences. Under Merkel’s leadership, Berlin 
participated in Tokyo (2002, 2006), Paris (2008), London (2006, 2010), and Kabul (2010) 
conferences on Afghanistan.
  
12
                                                            
10 “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions,” December 5, 2001. 
 The effects of these international conferences were enormous. 
Between 2001 and 2010, they generated an estimated $36 billion foreign aid toward the 
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Although these international meetings were 
regarded as UN-sponsored donor conferences, they had provided a venue for coordinating the 
http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm, 
accessed December 29, 2010. 
11 “Berlin Declaration, April 1, 2004,” International Afghanistan Conference in Berlin, March 31-April 1, 2004. 
http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/berlindeclaration.pdf, accessed December 29, 2010.  
12 “Co-Chairs’ Summary of Conclusions: The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan, January 21-22, 2002. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/summary.pdf, 
accessed December 29, 2010; “Co-Chairs’ Summary: The Second Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in 
Afghanistan (DDR/DIAG),” July 5, 2006;  “The Afghanistan Compact,” The London Conference on Afghanistan, 
January 31-February 1, 2006. 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/The_London_Conference_On_Afghanistan.pdf, accessed December 29, 
2010; “Communique: Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership,” Afghanistan: The  
London Conference, January 28, 2010. http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/central-content/afghanistan-
hmg/resources/pdf/conference/Communique-final, accessed December 29, 2010; “International Conference in 
Support of Afghanistan,” Paris, June 12, 2008. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/conference-afghanistan, accessed 
December 29, 2010; “Conference Endorses Afghan Goal for Security Handover,” BBC News, July 20, 2010. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10687527, accessed December 29, 2010.  
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political, military, and economic strategies of the United States and its coalition countries. The 
conference declarations and their implementation progress show that Germany and coalition 
countries made several crucial contributions to these diplomatic gatherings. First, at the Bonn 
(2001) and Tokyo (2002) conferences, they created the basis for a legitimate government for 
Afghanistan. Second, at the London (2006), Tokyo (2006), and Paris (2008) conferences, they 
re-affirmed the legitimacy of ISAF and OEF operations in Afghanistan, and specified the role of 
the coalition forces in providing security, governance, and reconstruction assistance to the 
nascent Afghan government. Third, at the London (2010) and Kabul (2010) meetings, they 
envisioned the complete transfer of security from international forces to indigenous Afghan 
security forces by the end of 2014. 
 
Offensive Military Contribution. Germany made several important military contributions 
to the War in Afghanistan. However, it was not until 2009, when the German forces adopted an 
offensive military posture, albeit on a limited scale, to fight the Taliban insurgency in 
Afghanistan. Prior to that, the German forces had mostly focused on defensive military 
operations. 
Germany assumed the rotational command of ISAF and commanded a regional 
contingent of ISAF troops. It also deployed sensitive military assets, and contributed to NATO’s 
rapid reaction capabilities. In February 2003 Germany and the Netherlands jointly assumed the 
lead nation status for the ISAF. After NATO took ISAF command in August 2003, Germany was 
the first NATO country to assume ISAF’s rotational command.  Since June 2006, Germany had 
been the lead country in the Regional Command North (RC-North) to command all multinational 
forces deployed in northern Afghanistan. RC-North comprised nine provinces, which border the 
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Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.13
Figure 5.1 The German Forces’ Area of Operation in Northern Afghanistan 
 Figure 5.1 shows the 
location of German troops in Afghanistan. 
 
      Source: Der Spiegel. 
 
Among the major NATO countries, Germany deployed the third largest contingent of 
ISAF troops. During the first five years (2002-2006), Germany maintained strict rules of 
engagement prohibiting the use of force against Taliban insurgents. Since 2007, the Bundeswehr 
forces began to respond to growing Taliban activities, which led to the relaxation of some of the 
strict rules of engagement in July 2009. In 2009-2010, Germany appeared to adopt an offensive 
military posture, with increased participation in kinetic operations targeting the Taliban 
insurgents in northern Afghanistan.  
                                                            
13 The nine provinces under the German area of responsibility are: Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, 
Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul and Faryab. See Institute for the Study of War, “Regions: Regional Command 
North,” http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-north, accessed December 30, 2010.  
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Data on German troop levels in Afghanistan presents an interesting picture. Since 
January 2002, German boots on the ground in Afghanistan increased significantly, from 1,200 in 
2002 to 2,800 in 2006, and eventually to 4,900 in 2010.14 By the end of 2010, Germany deployed 
nearly 2% of its active military forces to Afghanistan. This was significantly lower than the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, which deployed nearly 5% and 6.7% of their active 
forces, respectively, to Afghanistan in 2010. Despite such lower active-deployed force ratio, the 
German troop level in Afghanistan increased more than four times over the years (See Figure 
5.2). This troop surge was a response to growing insurgent activities, and allied calls for 
increasing troop commitments to stabilize Afghanistan.  
 
              Source: Military Balance, 2002-2010; ISAF Troop Placemat, Dec. 2010. 
 
The Bundeswehr forces in Afghanistan were divided into two military missions: the 
NATO-led ISAF command, and the U.S.-led OEF command. Nearly all of the German forces in 
                                                            
14 In February 2010, the German Parliament, Bundestag, mandated the expansion of the German forces from 
4,500 to 5,350. The most updated NATO ISAF Troop Placemat, released on December 14, 2010, reported that 
Germany had 4,877 troops in Afghanistan. See NATO, “International Security Assistance Force: Troop 
Contributing Nations,” http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/14DEC%202010%20Placemat.pdf, 
accessed January 6, 2011.  
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Afghanistan were deployed to the northern region under the ISAF command, while only a 
handful of 100 German Special Forces were attached to the OEF command. In order to bolster 
the intelligence capability of the ISAF, in April 2007, Germany deployed six Tornado 
reconnaissance aircrafts. Since July 2008, it had also deployed a contingent of NATO Quick 
Reaction Force (QRF), which replaced the Norwegian QRF. The strength of German QRF 
increased from 200 troops in 2008 to 350 troops in 2010. Until 2006-2007, the ISAF and the 
OEF maintained a strong division of labor, with the former working on reconstruction and 
development, and the latter conducting offensive military operations against the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban militants. This has led to the emergence of a “two-tier coalition,” in which the mostly 
European-led ISAF troops, including the German forces, had focused on non-combat 
peacekeeping missions in northern and western Afghanistan.15
German military deployment in Afghanistan was defined as an “out of area” operation, 
requiring parliamentary mandate for the deployment and subsequent extension. Since 2002, each 
year the German parliament Bundestag had voted to extend the mandate of the Bundeswehr’s 
Afghanistan mission. The mandates for the ISAF and the OEF missions, as well as the Tornado 
reconnaissance aircrafts had to be approved separately from the Bundestag members. Critics 
argue that the post-war German political culture has demonstrated strong preferences for a 
pacific and anti-militaristic foreign policy, which rejects the use of force. This had resulted in the 
 In contrast, the bulk of the U.S.-
led OEF forces, with the assistance of ISAF forces from Britain, Canada, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands conducted kinetic operations in eastern and southern Afghanistan.  
                                                            
15 The U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates characterized NATO’s Afghan mission as a two-tier alliance. 
See: Fred Attewill and Helene Mulholland, “Gates Demands More Troops Willing to “fight and Die’ in 
Afghanistan,” Guardian, February 7, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/feb/07/foreignpolicy.uk, 
accessed December 30, 2010; As of December 2010, the two major non-European ISAF troop contributors were 
Canada (2,913 troops) and Australia (1,550 troops). See NATO, “International Security Assistance Force: Troop 
Contributing Nations.” 
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smooth parliamentary approval of Bundeswehr’s ISAF mission; while support for the OEF 
mission and the Tornado jet deployment remained controversial. This is due to the fact that 
military deployment to the ISAF mission was sold to the German public as a non-combat 
stabilization mission. However, there were concerns that the German Special Forces and the 
Tornado reconnaissance jets could be used for combat purposes, and thus possibly violate the 
constitutional mandate of Bundeswehr mission.   
As a result of such domestic opposition, chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Angela 
Merkel had consistently defined Germany’s Afghan mission as a purely stabilization mission, 
with no combat role for the German military.16
Three examples illustrate the effect of national caveats on Germany’s Afghanistan 
mission. First, the German forces were required to carry an instructional handout with detailed 
rules of engagement. The rules were mainly designed to minimize the use of force and firepower. 
Until 2009, one of the rules instructed German soldiers to warn potential enemy targets in 
English: “United Nations – Stop, or I will fire!”
 For the United States and its NATO allies, such 
definition of defensive stabilization mission came with an unwanted consequence: the imposition 
of restrictive rules of engagement or national caveats, which constrained the ability of the 
Bundeswehr troops to carry out offensive operations.  
17
                                                            
16 Both Schroder and Merkel had led coalition governments. Schroder’s Social Democrat (SPD)-Green coalition 
ran Germany from 1998 to 2005). In 2005 Angela Merkel came to power and ran a Grand Coalition of Christian 
Democrat (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrat (SPD) until 2009. Since 2009, Merkel had run a coalition government 
of Christian Democrat (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrat (FDP). 
 The warning should also be given in Afghan 
Pashtun and Dari languages. German soldiers were also forbidden to shoot a fleeing enemy. 
Former German military chief of staff Wolfgang Schneiderhahn called such national caveats 
17 Roger Boyes, “New Rules Let Germans in Afghanistan Stop Shouting and Start Shooting,” The Sunday 
Times, July 29, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6730996.ece, accessed January 6, 
2011. 
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“well intended but unrealistic” in the context of Bundeswehr’s Afghan mission. Critics say that 
such rules often limited the operational capacity of soldiers to react in a tactical situation.18
Largely due to the national caveats and tightened rules of engagement, the German ISAF 
forces did not participate in any military offensive in Afghanistan until 2007. However, due to 
increasing insurgent attacks, and a growing need to use lethal force to respond to such attacks, 
since 2007, the German government had re-defined its Afghan mission as a ‘war-like situation,’ 
and an ‘armed conflict.’
 
Second, during the four years of deployment (2007-2010), the six Tornado jets were not allowed 
to participate in combat operations. Third, unlike the Norwegian QRF soldiers who were focused 
on pro-active combat operations, the German QRF soldiers were prohibited from carrying out 
offensive operations targeting militants and insurgents. From a joint warfare perspective, such 
restrictions on the use of force were criticized as a risk-aversion strategy, which eroded the 
efficiency of the Afghanistan War coalition.  
19 Such definitional change had accompanied the silent dropping of some 
of the national caveats, which allowed the German forces to engage in combat operations against 
Taliban and other hostile forces in northern Afghanistan. 20
Several military operations show Germany’s slow progress toward an offensive military 
posture in Afghanistan. In 2007, the German, Norwegian, and Afghan forces launched Operation 
Harekate Yolo (Straightening Path) to stabilize Badghis, Faryab and Badakhshan provinces. 
Germany provided the leadership and planning, while Norway provided the combat troops, and 
   
                                                            
18 Quoted in Boyes, “New Rules Let Germans in Afghanistan Stop Shouting and Start Shooting.” 
19 “Violence in Bundeswehr Deployment Area Increases Dramatically,” Der Spiegel, April 12, 2008. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,547037,00.html, accessed December 30, 2010; Siobhán Dowling, 
“The World From Berlin: New Evaluation on Afghanistan Long Overdue,” Der Spiegel, Feb. 11, 2010. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,677289,00.html, accessed December 28, 2010.  
20 Boyes, “New Rules Let Germans in Afghanistan Stop Shouting and Start Shooting.”  
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Afghanistan offered the support troops.21
In May 2008, the German-Norwegian-and Afghan forces launched Operation Karez to 
secure the insurgent-prone areas in the Badghis province. The German government delayed the 
authorization of the military operation on the ground that the area was too close to the Italian 
area of operation. Later, when Berlin authorized the operation, the Norwegian and Afghan forces 
had advanced, and the German forces were of little use.
 The operation was largely successful in clearing the 
areas of Taliban insurgents, but failed to hold it due to limited troop presence.  
22
In July-August 2009, an estimated 300 German QRF troops and 1,200 Afghan troops 
launched Operation Oqab in Kunduz. The goal was to clear the insurgent-prone areas; and to 
hold them for the peaceful conduct of the Afghan presidential elections.
  
23 Another goal was to 
provide the security for the NATO’s northern supply route. During the operation, the German 
QRF soldiers cordoned off the area, while the Afghan forces searched for guns and rebels.24
In late 2009 and early 2010, the German patrol teams in the Chachar Dara district in 
Kunduz came under attack from Taliban insurgents.
  
25
                                                            
21 Alexander Szandar andYassin Musharbash, “Anti-terrorism Operation: Bundeswehr in Fighting in Wes tern 
Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, November 9, 2007. 
  In response, the German forces, along 
with the U.S. and the Afghan security forces, launched combat operations to secure the Chachar 
Dara district from Taliban control. After the operations, it was reported that, some moderate 
22 Susanne Koebl and Alexander Szandar, “Not Licensed to Kill: German Special Forces in Afghanistan Let 
Taliban Commander Escape,” Der Spiegel, May 19, 2008. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,554033,00.html, accessed December 30, 2010.  
23 “German, Afghan Offensive in North Targets IMU,” Radio Free Europe, July 23, 2009. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/German_Afghan_Offensive_In_North_Targets_IMU/1783999.html, accessed 
December 30, 2010.  
24 Roger Boyes, “World Agenda: Germans Blitz the Taleban. Just Don’t Mention the Krieg,” The Times, July 
24, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/world_agenda/article6726192.ece#cid=OTC-
RSS&attr=797093 accessed December 28, 2010.  
25 Alan Cullison and Anand Gopal, “U.S., Afghans Target Taliban Region,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 9, 2009. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125770639148236881.html?mod=googlenews_wsj, accessed December 28, 2010.; 
“Bundeswehr Soldier in Combat in Taliban Stronghold Injured,” Der Spiegel, Jan. 29, 2010. 
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Taliban insurgents laid down their arms as part of a NATO strategy of disarmament, 
demobilization, and re-integration (DDR).26
This brief description of tactical operations of German ISAF troops in Afghanistan 
demonstrates that the Bundeswehr was slowly adopting an offensive counterinsurgency posture 
in Afghanistan. Until 2009, the German military forces were constrained by national caveats to 
carry out combat operations in Afghanistan. With the relaxed rules of engagement, approved in 
July 2009, the German forces were allowed to participate in combat operations against the 
Taliban militias.
 
27 Critics suggest that weaknesses in the Afghan national security forces and 
increasing dangers from the insurgent attacks had prompted this changing security posture, 
adopted by the German forces in northern Afghanistan.28
 
 Despite such incremental changes to a 
combat posture, Germany’s contribution to Afghanistan was largely defined as a non-combat 
stabilization mission.  
  Defensive Civil-Military Reconstruction Contribution. In contrast to a weak offensive 
military role, Germany had mostly pursued a strong defensive stabilization role in Afghanistan. 
Berlin’s Afghanistan mission was focused on three sets of activities: economic development, 
police training, and military reconstruction efforts.  
The first area of German stabilization contribution is development assistance. Germany 
gradually increased its economic assistance for the reconstruction and development of 
Afghanistan. After the United States, Britain, and Japan, Germany was the fourth largest bilateral 
                                                            
26 “25 Militants Lay Down Arms in N Afghanistan,” Xinhua, Feb. 22, 2010. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-02/22/c_13183154.htm, accessed December 28, 2010.  
27 “Changing the Rules in Afghanistan: German Troops Beef Up Fight against Taliban,” Der Spiegel, July 9, 
2009. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html, accessed January 1, 2011.  
28 Boyes, “World Agenda: Germans Blitz the Taleban. Just Don’t Mention the Krieg.”  
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donor to Afghanistan.29 German contribution to Afghanistan increased gradually from $120 
million per year in 2002 to $300 million per year in 2008. In January 2010, Chancellor Merkel 
declared that Germany would double its annual development aid for Afghanistan from the 
initially planned $330 million to $645 million until 2013.30 This aid increase was part of a 
German strategy of ‘development offensive’ in  northern Afghanistan, where the German 
military adopted a defensive stabilization strategy, compared to the  offensive military strategy of 
the British, Canadian, Dutch, and U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan.31 The German Federal 
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development was the lead agency for Afghan economic 
assistance. The German aid to Afghanistan was targeted in four critical areas of reconstruction: 
basic education, energy generation, job creation, and water supply.32
The second area of stabilization assistance was police training. Germany was the lead 
nation for training Afghan national police. Since 2002, Germany had maintained a bilateral 
Police Project Team, which deployed German police experts and provided financial assistance 
for the capacity building of Afghan police forces. Since June 2007, the German police training 
mission in Afghanistan had evolved into the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL 
Afghanistan). The number of German police boots on the ground increased from an average of 
40 trainers in 2002 to 200 in 2009. During the same time, German annual financial assistance for 
Afghan police cooperation increased from $18 million in 2002 to $48 million in 2008, and 
  
                                                            
29 Ingolf Vereno, “GTZ in Afghanistan,” p. 3. http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/akz/gtz2009en-akzente-2-
security-afghanistan.pdf, accessed January 4, 2011. 
30 “Afghan Reinforcements: Germany Pledges 500 Extra Troops Plus Big Aid Increase,” Der Spiegel, January 
26, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674116,00.html, accessed December 15, 2010. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For a detailed description of Germany’s reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, see German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, “Reconstruction and Security: Germany’s Commitment in Afghanistan,” http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Mission-Statement-AFG_node.html, 
accessed December 30, 2010.  
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eventually to $115 million in 2010.33 Building on the German police training initiative, the 
European Union launched the EUPOL mission in June 2007. Two years later, the EUPOL 
Afghanistan launched projects on improving the policing standards in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, 
and Mazar-e-Sharif provinces. The EUPOL also contributed to developing the anti-corruption 
prosecutors’ office of the Afghan government. Critics suggest that the German cooperation in the 
area of police training was understaffed and under-resourced. The German police trainers were 
criticized for not leaving their training compound; and the German financial contribution to 
Afghan police reform was considered insufficient.34
The third major area of Berlin’s stabilization mission in Afghanistan was civil-military 
reconstruction. Germany was the lead nation for two provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs): 
one in Kunduz and the other in Feyzabad. In December 2003, Germany took over the Kunduz 
PRT from U.S. control. In March 2004 it opened a new PRT in Feyzabad. Like other NATO-led 
PRTs, the German PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad were aimed at expanding the writ of the 
Afghan government by providing security and governance, and creating a safe zone for 
humanitarian aid agencies to operate.  
   
As part of their stabilization mission, the German forces in Afghanistan made an 
important contribution to the training of Afghan military and the disarming of the former Taliban 
militias. During the 2010 London conference on Afghanistan, Germany declared that it would 
                                                            
33 Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Oct.-Nov. 
2009), p. 73; German Federal Foreign Office, “Germany’s Support for Rebuilding the Afghan Police Force,” 
Updated December 7, 2010. http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/sid_3469F1F86AA6DE197BEE95B68579FD1E/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZen
tralasien/Polizeiaufbau-dt-Engagement_node.html, accessed December 29, 2010. 
34 European Union Common Security and Defense Policy, “EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL 
Afghanistan), Updated November 2010, Afghanistan/22. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/101123%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%
20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2022_EN.pdf, accessed December 29, 2010. 
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expand the size of the Bundeswehr military trainers in Afghanistan from 280 to 1,400 troops. 
According to Der Spiegel, the most popular German weekly, German army’s training strategy 
would change to follow a new U.S. training strategy. The new strategy emphasized international 
instructors “to live with the Afghan troops and train them in the course of [an ongoing] military 
operations.”35 This new model of training was quite different from the standard German model, 
in which the German forces would train their Afghan counterparts “in the safety of a base or 
from armored vehicles.”36 This new training model involved more risks, but the German forces 
adopted it.37
Germany also partnered with the Afghan and NATO allies to facilitate the process of 
disarming and reintegrating the Taliban militias. In January 2010, two days before the scheduled 
London Conference on Afghanistan, Chancellor Merkel pledged that Germany would contribute 
$70 million to a $500 million initiative for the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration 
(DDR) of Taliban insurgents. 
 The Spiegel report also noted that a German government strategy paper showed 
Berlin’s plan for partial hand over of security responsibility to the Afghan forces in early 2011. 
This transfer of security responsibility would concentrate on several districts in the northern 
regional, which were under the German area of operation..  
38
                                                            
35 “Afghan Reinforcements: Germany Pledges 500 Extra Troops Plus Big Aid Increase,” Der Spiegel, January 
26, 2010. 
 The aim of the DDR program was to offer cash support to 
former Taliban insurgents to lay down arms, sever connections with Al Qaeda and Taliban 
militias, and stop fighting the Afghan and NATO security forces. The program also envisioned 
reintegrating the former Taliban militias into the mainstream Afghan society.  
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674116,00.html, accessed December 15, 2010. 
36 “Draft Conference Communiqué: NATO Envisions Many More Years in Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, January 
26, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,674081,00.html, accessed December 15, 2010. 
37 “Afghan Reinforcements: Germany Pledges 500 Extra Troops Plus Big Aid Increase.”  
38 Ibid. 
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The discussion on Germany’s contribution to the War in Afghanistan would be 
incomplete without a brief reference to the troop fatalities. In assessing Germany’s military 
burden-sharing, an important question would be: Did the German forces suffer a high level of 
fatalities during their nine years of the Afghanistan War? The answer is no.  Since 2002, 
Germany lost 46 soldiers in Afghanistan (See Figure 5.3). Nearly a quarter of those 46 soldiers 
died in accidental incidents, such as helicopter crashes, and other non-hostile actions, like the 
handling of live ammunitions. This was in sharp contrast with the U.S. and British forces, which 
lost nearly 1,446 and 348 soldiers, respectively, but most of them in hostile enemy actions. 
Although Germany suffered a much lower troop fatality in Afghanistan, when compared with the 
U.S. and UK troop fatality data, Afghanistan was the deadliest military mission for the German 
forces in the post-Cold War era.  
 
 
In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests that until 2010, Germany had mostly 
pursued a risk-averse strategy, which focused on defensive reconstruction operations, and 
ignored the task of fighting the insurgents. As described below, due to historical sensitivity as 
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well as political constraints, Germany had strongly opposed the idea of deploying forces for 
combat missions. Despite such domestic constraints, the German forces had gradually changed 
their Afghan mission from a purely non-combat stabilization mission to a very limited combat 
mission.  
 
II. Explaining Germany’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan  
This section tests the validity of my burden-sharing model to analyze Germany’s contribution to 
the Afghanistan War coalition. First it examines the effect of three international systemic level, 
and three domestic level variables in shaping Germany’s burden-sharing behavior. Following the 
neo-classical realist tradition, it argues that the systemic pressures of alliance commitment and 
balance of threat were transmitted through the prisms of the German domestic political process 
to produce a unique burden-sharing behavior. It claims that despite strong public opposition, the 
presence of strongly guarded elite consensus in the German parliament provided the legal 
mandate for the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan. However, the legal-constitutional limits on 
the use of force in out of area operations, as well as the lack of a counterinsurgency capability 
seriously constrained Germany’s ability to participate in offensive military operations in 
Afghanistan.  
Alliance Dependence. Alliance dependence did not present any systemic level incentive 
to the German decision makers. The alliance dependence theory suggests that reliance on a 
formal, treaty-based alliance system presents a unique dilemma for a state: if it joins the alliance, 
it might be entrapped; if it avoids the alliance, it might be abandoned. Alliance leader may use 
the offer of incentive or coercive pressure to persuade a state to join a wartime coalition. This 
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was a standard picture of Cold War era international politics, dominated by the tight competition 
between the United States and the former Soviet Union and their rival military alliances – NATO 
and Warsaw Pact. In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and NATO’s changing strategic 
concepts suggested that Germany would no longer be dependent on NATO for its military 
security.39
Most defense analysts argue that in the changing security landscape of the post-Cold War 
era, the German leaders have responded to NATO’s out of area missions as an issue of alliance 
commitment and solidarity rather than alliance dependence. 
 Instead, it would be a leading provider of security for the transatlantic alliance insofar 
as security had to be provided.  
40
The politics of the Afghanistan War coalition shows that alliance dependence did not 
structure German decision on Afghanistan. Prior to deploying the Bundeswehr troops to 
Afghanistan, Germany was not confronted with the danger of abandonment by the United States, 
or entrapment in the U.S.-led coalition. Instead, the German leaders were conscious of their 
longstanding commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance, and framed Berlin’s Afghan 
 Germany’s Afghan mission 
provides strong support for such alliance commitment and solidarity thesis.  
                                                            
39 NATO re-defined its strategic concepts in the post-Cold War era. See The North Atlantic Council, “The 
Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” November 7-8, 1991. NATO E-Library Official Texts. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed January 4, 2011; The North Atlantic 
Council, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” April 24, 1999. NATO E-Library Official Texts. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, accessed January 4, 2011; The North Atlantic 
Council, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of 
the North Atlantic  Treaty Oraganisation, Adopted by the Heads of S tate and Government in Lisbon,” November 
19, 2010. http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, accessed January 4, 2011. 
40 Peter Rudolf, “The Myth of the ‘German Way’: German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations,” 
Survival, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2005), pp. 133-152; For a lucid analysis of Germany’s post-Cold War military missions, 
see Dieter Dettke, Germany Says “No”: the Iraq War and the  Future of  German Foreign and Security Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 71-
114. 
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policy within the context of alliance solidarity.41 For NATO, alliance solidarity has two principal 
meanings: indivisibility of the security of alliance members; and collective responsibility in the 
defense of national and alliance territory. For the purpose of this chapter, , Berlin’s sense of 
alliance solidarity was evident in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
United States. In response to the attacks, the German Chancellor Schröder declared ‘unlimited 
solidarity’ (uneingeschränkte Solidarität) with the United States in the fight against transnational 
terrorism. This alliance spirit was later manifested, when Germany strongly supported NATO’s 
Article 5 collective defense mechanism.42 The effect of supporting NATO’s collective defense 
provision was enormous. It recognized the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States as an act of 
armed attack on a NATO member state, and legitimized an armed response from NATO 
members against Al Qaeda and its state sponsor - Afghanistan.43
The German chancellor’s rhetorical stance on solidarity with the United was translated 
into a concrete military contribution, when Germany pledged the deployment of military forces 
in Afghanistan. In justifying the deployment of German troops, Chancellor Schröder and other 
proponents of his Afghanistan policy insisted that Germany was committed to a multilateral 
crisis management strategy. They also argued that Berlin’s Afghan deployment should indicate 
  
                                                            
41 Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid argue that Germany’s Afghanistan policy may be less focused on “strategy or 
even national interest than on alliance solidarity. See Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 87. 
42 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2004), p. 82. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,  The Parties agree that an armed attack against one 
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” See “The North Atlantic 
Treaty,” April 4, 1949. NATO E-Library Official Texts. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed January 4, 2011. 
43 Scott Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2003), p. 193. 
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to the international community as well as its NATO partners that Germany was a “reliable ally, 
able and willing to make contributions to international security alongside allies and partners.”44
Alliance solidarity is a historical phenomenon in U.S.-German relations. During the five 
decades of the Cold War (1945-1990), Germany was the central focus of U.S foreign policy in 
Europe. During that time, after the British military forces, the German Bundeswehr enjoyed the 
closest relationship with U.S. forces.
 
45 The ideological confrontation between Soviet 
communism and Western liberalism cemented that relationship. The end of the Cold War and the 
unification of Germany brought profound changes to the geopolitical and geostrategic realities of 
European and international politics. While dependence on U.S. security umbrella was a matter of 
defense priority for Germany and its West European allies during the Cold War, such alliance 
dependence was no longer a foreign policy concern in the post-Cold War era. Instead, Germany 
and its European allies embraced a policy of ‘effective multilateralism,’ which would guard 
against any unilateralist tendency in U.S. foreign policy.46
                                                            
44 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p. 85.  
 The French-German opposition to the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 only highlighted the changed mood of the post-Cold War 
realities, and the fear that unilateralism was taking a firm root in U.S. security policy under the 
45 AICGS New Security Study Group, “Redefining German Security: Prospects for Bundeswehr Reform,” 
German Issues, No. 25 (September 2001), Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies, p. 1. 
46 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, pp. 188-192. In the German foreign policy lexicon, 
‘effective multilateralism’ refers to a strong belief in multilateral institutions, such as, the European Union (EU), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and 
the United Nations (UN) in addressing international security issues.  The term ‘security’ broadly used here to refer 
to the social, political, economic, environmental, and territorial threats.  See: German Federal Ministry of Defense, 
Defense Policy Guidelines for the Area of Responsibility of the Federal Minister of Defense. Berlin, May 21, 2003, 
pp. 4, 8-9. 
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Bush administration.47 It also signaled that while Germany expressed solidarity with the United 
States, it would not participate in any military adventures in Iraq.48
 As stated above, the nature and meaning of alliance solidarity changed in German 
security policy. During the Cold War era, this meant unquestioned solidarity with and greater 
dependence on U.S. leadership. During the post-Cold War era, unquestioned solidarity was 
replaced by potential balancing against U.S. hegemony.
 
49 As evidenced during the Second Iraq 
War debate (2003), Germany pursued this balancing act by aligning with France and Russia, and 
by projecting a strong commitment to multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and 
the European Union in resolving international disputes.50
The 1994 German Defense White Paper describes the Bundeswehr as an “alliance army.” 
The White Paper notes that:  
 Despite such aberrations in the U.S.-
German relations during the Iraq Crisis, Germany’s unswerving support for NATO as the 
premier military alliance was the bedrock of German defense posture in the post-Cold War era. 
This was evident in the 1994 and 2006 versions of the defense white papers, which defined 
German armed forces as an alliance army, and German preference for NATO-coordinated 
military response to international security threats.  
                                                            
47 Dettke, Germany Says “No”: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security  Policy. 
48 See Graham Timmins, “Germany: Solidarity without Adventures,” in The Iraq War: Causes and 
Consequences, edited by Rick Fawn and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, pp?? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2006) 
49 Jackson Janes, “Challenges and Choices in German-American Relations,” German Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1 
(2008), pp. 5-7. 
50 Both Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer predicted such balancing trends in German foreign policy. See 
Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War;” Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the 
Cold War.” For a background on the Second Iraq War debate, see Daniel Benjamin, “Germany: A Questionable 
Ally,” in America and the World in the Age of Terror (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2005); Philip Gordon and 
Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004). 
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The Bundeswehr is an alliance army. It makes a major contribution to NATO's 
main defense forces and reaction forces. Military integration is being enhanced. 
European and U.S. forces are being linked together by multinational structures. 
Common goals and similarities in the way Allied forces view themselves are also 
manifesting themselves in structures, as a token of solidarity within the Alliance. 
Burdens and risks are being shared fairly, because responsibility is being borne by 
all the Allies and all are benefiting.51
Twelve years later, the 2006 version of the white paper re-iterated Germany’s principled 
position on alliance solidarity. Between 1994 and 2006, the strategic landscape in the 
international security system changed significantly. This change was evident in NATO’s alliance 
security agenda, which focused on terrorism, crisis management, proliferation, and a strategic 
partnership with Russia.
 
52
                                                            
51 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr (Bonn: The Armed Forces Office, 1994); Emphasis added. 
 In 2006, Germany was a principal member of the U.S.-led coalition in 
Afghanistan. It was no surprise that Germany continued to define its Afghanistan mission as a 
contribution to the UN-backed and NATO-led ISAF mission. The 2006 Defense White Paper 
emphasizes this spirit of multilateralism in German foreign policy:  
http://www.resdal.org.ar/Archivo/d0000066.htm, accessed December 17, 2010. 
52 NATO’s 1999 strategic concept highlighted the changing security environment in the post-Cold War era. See: 
North Atlantic Council, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Approved by the Heads of State and Government 
Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1999. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, accessed January 2, 2011.  At the 2006 NATO Riga 
Summit, alliance members invested much of their time and political capital devising a strategy for combating 
terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan. See: North Atlantic Council, “Riga Summit Declaration,” Issued by the 
Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga, November 29, 
2006. NATO Press Release (2006) 150, November 29, 2006. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm, 
accessed January 2, 2011. Another significant development was NATO’s strategic partnership with Russia. See: 
NATO-Russia Council, “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality,” Declarations by Heads of States and 
Government of NATO Members States and the Russian Federation,” in Rome Summit 2002 (Belgium: NATO Office 
of Information and Press, 2002), pp. 6-8. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf, accessed 
January 2, 2011.  
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National security planning calls for networked structures in Germany and close 
multinational coordination. German security policy is committed to effective 
multilateralism, based on the conviction that the challenges to international 
security can only be mastered together with partners. The observance and 
strengthening of international law as well as the multilateral orientation of 
German foreign and security policy are values that are explicitly anchored in the 
Basic Law.53
The forgoing discussion suggests that alliance solidarity, not alliance dependence, can 
explain Germany’s entry into the Afghanistan War coalition. Once Germany joined the coalition, 
there were pressures from the United States and other NATO allies for increased troop 
commitment and redeployment of German forces to southern Afghanistan.
 
54
 I worry a great deal about the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in 
which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security 
 This was more 
evident in NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit, and subsequent NATO summits and meetings of NATO 
defense and foreign ministers. In 2008, the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted that 
NATO’s ISAF mission emerged as a “two-tier alliance,” in which countries like the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands did most of the counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency fighting, while others like Germany were reluctant to engage in any offensive 
military operation. In Gates’ words:  
                                                            
53 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense), p. 24. 
54 “Afghanistan: NATO Pressure Increases on Germany Over Afghanistan,” Deutsche Welle, February 2, 2008. 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3103744,00.html, accessed December 18, 2010. 
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and others who are not. I think that it puts a cloud over the future of the alliance if 
this is to endure and perhaps even get worse. 55
Secretary Gates made such a blunt remark during a testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee hearing on February 6, 2008. During the testimony Gates stressed that 
Germany, among other nations, should lift the national caveats, and share the increasing risk of 
combat operations in Afghanistan.
 
56 Gates was later joined by his British and Canadian 
counterparts at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on February 7-8, 
2008. Both the British and the Canadian defense ministers pressed Germany to accept more 
military risks in Afghanistan.57 Germany received more pressures in 2009, when the U.S. 
President Barrack Obama declared a large escalation of 30,000 U.S. troops, and expected his 
European counterparts to provide 5,000-7,000 troops to match the U.S. troop buildup in 
Afghanistan.58
In addition to pressuring Germany for a higher troop contribution and redeployment in 
risky areas, NATO requested that Germany deploy a small contingent of combat forces to 
replace the 350-man strong Norwegian contingent to the NATO Quick Reaction Force (QRF).
  
59
                                                            
55 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Defense Authorization 
Request for Fiscal Year 2009, The Future Years Defense Program, and the Fiscal Year 2009 Request for Operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services), p. 14. 
 
Former German defense minister Franz Josef Jung rejected the U.S. and NATO pressures for a 
56 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Defense Authorization 
Request for Fiscal Year 2009, pp. 13-14.  
57 Konstantin von Hammerstein and Alexander Szandar, “NATO Turns Screws on Germany: The Coming 
Afghanistan Showdown,” Der Spiegel, February 11, 2008. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,534524,00.html, accessed December 18, 2010; Also see 
Canadian defense Minister Peter McKay’s  interview with Der Spiegel,  “The Afghan Insurgency: Germany Can Do 
More,” Der Spiegel, March 26, 2008. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,543480,00.html, accessed 
December 18, 2010.  
58 James Blitz, “French and Germans Face Afghan Pressure,” Financial Times, November 29, 2009. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/526a1d82-dd13-11de-ad60-00144feabdc0.html#axzz18VetAYPV, accessed December 
18, 2010. 
59 “Afghanistan: NATO Pressure Increases on Germany Over Afghanistan,” Deutsche Welle, February 2, 2008. 
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combat role for Bundeswehr in southern Afghanistan. Jung remarked that “We have agreed on a 
clear division of labor. I really believe that we really must keep our focus on the north.”60 
Although Germany refused to deploy its armed forces for combat operations, it authorized an 
additional troop surge, including the deployment of a Bundeswehr contingent of 200 troops to 
NATO’s rapid reaction force.61 Prominent German defense expert, Franz-Josef Meiers, argues 
that Germany’s decision to increase its troop commitment and expand its non-combat 
stabilization role in Afghanistan was not a response to the pressures from the U.S. and NATO 
officials. Instead, it reflected Germany’s alliance commitment and acceptance of the challenging 
tasks of rebuilding Afghanistan.62
In summary, alliance dependence cannot explain the German contribution to the 
Afghanistan War coalition. Instead, alliance commitment and alliance solidarity best explain 
Germany’s entry into the Afghanistan War. Out of solidarity with the United States and the 
NATO alliance, Germany supported the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense 
mechanism. The invocation of Article 5 made it an imperative for Germany to join the UN-
mandated and later NATO-led ISAF mission. If alliance dependence had any effect, we would 
 
                                                            
60 Jung refused to send German troops to the riskier southern Afghanistan in response to a letter from U.S. 
defense secretary Robert Gates, calling on Germany to send more troops and deploy them for offensive 
counterinsurgency operations. See: “Germany Rejects US Troops Appeal,” BBC News, February 1, 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7222989.stm, accessed December 18, 2010. 
61 In 2008, Germany agreed to an additional 1,000 troop deployment, which would make the country’s total 
troops in Afghanistan 4,500. See:  Judy Dempsey and Alan Cowell, “More German Troops to Afghanistan,” New 
York Times, June 25, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/world/europe/25iht-25german.13964407.html, 
accessed December 18, 2010. Despite the additional troop deployment, Germany remained adamant on limiting its 
troops’ area of operation to the relatively peaceful northern Afghanistan. See Markus Wacket, “Germany Rejects 
U.S. Pressure for Afghanistan Troops,” Reuters, February 1, 2008. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL0147441820080201, accessed December 18, 2010; “Afghanistan: NATO 
Agrees to Expanded Military Role in Afghanistan,” Deutsche Welle, February 6, 2008. http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,3111682,00.html, accessed December 18, 2010. 
62 The General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, General Schneiderhahn offered this opinion during his testimony 
to the Bundestag. See: Franz-Josef Meiers, “Crossing the Red Lines? The Grand Coalition and the Paradox of 
German Foreign Policy,” AICGS Policy Report 32 (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary 
German Studies, 2008), P. 21. 
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have expected that Germany would respond to the allied pressures for redeploying Bundeswehr 
forces into southern Afghanistan and participating in combat operations. However, Germany did 
not respond to such pressures, due to an independent foreign policy which focused on a risk-
aversion strategy. As described below, Germany did not move toward a combat burden-sharing 
role and abandoning its risk-aversion strategy, until the Bundeswehr troops in northern 
Afghanistan were confronted with a resurgent Taliban threat. 
 
Balance of Threat. After alliance solidarity, balance of threat presented the second 
systemic level incentive to encourage Germany’s participation in the Afghanistan War coalition. 
The balance of threat theory predicts that states join a formal alliance or informal coalition to 
balance against the offensive power of a state or a non-state actor. In the context of the 
Afghanistan War coalition, the presence of similar threats to the United States and its NATO 
allies would generate greater incentives for transatlantic burdensharing. By contrast, the lack of 
similar threats would minimize the chances of greater burden-sharing.   
The transnational threat posed by radical Islamist groups Al Qaeda and Taliban did not 
present any existential threat to German security. However, Germany found that Al Qaeda’s 9/11 
terrorist attacks in the United States, as well as subsequent attacks around the world posed a 
direct threat to secular western values and lifestyle. Thus, consistent with the predictions of the 
balance of threat hypothesis, Germany was expected to join and support the U.S.-led coalition 
against terrorism in Afghanistan. Similarly, growing Taliban insurgent attacks directed against 
the German forces would increase Germany’s vulnerability, requiring Bundeswehr to adopt an 
offensive counterinsurgency strategy.  
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At least four terrorism related assessments show the incentive for Germany to join and 
support the Afghan War coalition. The first three assessments examine the threat to German and 
transatlantic society from the German-based radical Islamist groups. The fourth concerns threats 
to German forces in northern Afghanistan.  
The first threat concerns Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell, which was instrumental in the 
planning and execution of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Concerns over Al Qaeda’s German-based 
cell surfaced in the media after it became apparent that some of the key planners of 9/11 attacks 
were based in the second largest German city Hamburg, where they formed a clandestine 
network of militant Islamists intent on attacking the United States.63 At least eight members of 
the Hamburg Cell played a crucial role during the 9/11 attacks. They were all radicalized in 
Germany, possessed strong anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments, and travelled to 
Afghanistan to meet Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Laden found the Hamburg cell members 
fluent in English, extremely westernized, and recruited them for attacking the United States.64
September 11 had a big effect on Germany. This is not surprising. The evidence is 
clear that terrorists used Germany as a major staging area for the September 11 
attacks. Three of the four pilots of the planes attacking the World Trade Center 
 
Prominent American political scientist Peter Katzenstein’s remark on the effect of 9/11 on 
German security is worth noting here:  
                                                            
63 “The Hamburg Connection,” BBC News, August 19, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2349195.stm, 
accessed December 17, 2010. 
64 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, four of the key Hamburg Cell members are Egyptian origin 
Mohammed Atta, Yemeni-origin Ramzi Binalshib, Lebanese-origin Ziad Jarrah, and UAE-origin Marwan al 
Shehhi,. The report also notes that prior to forming the cell, Atta, Binalshibh, Jarah, and Shehhi did not received any 
funding support from Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda leadership. However, once they joined the Al Qaeda’s plan to 
use civilian planes for inflicting terrorist attacks, they received funding from Al Qaeda to cover their expenses from 
a trip from Afghanistan to Germany, and from Germany to the United States. See: National Commission on the 
Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 153-173. 
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and the Pentagon came from Hamburg. German solidarity with New York and 
America was very strong. A quarter of million people showed up at a 
demonstration for New York in front of the Brandenburg Gate, the largest of 
scores of such demonstrations that occurred all over the country. Germany had a 
legislative history of forceful counter-terrorist policies. And the government was 
fully aware of both its own and Germany’s vulnerability.65
Second, although most of the Hamburg Cell members were either arrested or prosecuted 
by the German or U.S. authorities, Islamist activism and international terrorism remained a 
serious concern for German security.
  
66
According to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, transnational Islamist terrorism 
posed a serious threat to German and international security. The Ministry reports show that, 
between 2002 and 2008, the number of Islamist militants in Germany increased gradually from 
30,000 in 2002 to 35,000 in 2008. About ninety percent of all Islamist activists in Germany 
belonged to the Turkish-origin Muslim immigrants. The rest of the ten percent belonged to three 
 German interior ministry reports and public opinion polls 
indicate such heightened threat posed by Al Qaeda.   
                                                            
65 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Sonderbare Sonderwege: Germany and 9/11,” AICGS/German-American Dialogue 
Working Paper Series (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, American Institute for Contemporary German 
Studies, 2002), p. 6, Emphasis added. 
66 Philip Shenon and Don Van Natta, Jr., A Nation Challenged: The Hunted; 3 Fugitives Named as Part of 
Hamburg Cell, New York Times, October 24, 2001. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/24/world/a-nation-challenged-
the-hunted-3-fugitives-named-as-part-of-hamburg-cell.html, accessed December 18, 2010; Desmond Butler, 
Aftereffects: Briefly Noted; Germany: Sept. 11 Indictment, New York Times, May 10, 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/10/world/aftereffects-briefly-noted-germany-sept-11-indictment.html, accessed 
December 18, 2010; United States Department of State, Terrorism: Retrial of 9/11 Suspect Motassadeq, (Berlin: 
U.S. Embassy in Berlin, 2004). Unclassified Memo, Released in Full. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/132980.pdf, accessed December 18, 2010. 
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sub-groups: Arab-origin groups, including Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah 
supporters; Pakistani origin Tablighi Jamat movement; and Chechen separatists.67
The interior ministry reports note that while the large majority of these Islamist activists 
were non-violent, a small group of these Islamists maintained a strong connection to Al Qaeda 
and the international jihadi movement.
  
68 The reports stress that although the U.S. and NATO-led 
coalition forces broke down Al Qaeda’s core leadership structure in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda 
remained a serious threat to international security. The incidence of several high-profile terrorist 
attacks around the world – in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), and London (2005)—showed the 
deadly nature of Al Qaeda’s terrorist threat.69
The interior ministry assessments also revealed that although German-based Islamist 
groups did not pose greater threats than other Europe-based Islamist groups, such threats should 
not be under-estimated. Most intelligence assessments indicate that Islamist militancy in 
Germany was fueled by several factors. Among these radicalizing factors, the most notable were 
the anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian sentiments, anti-American zeal, as well as the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The reports also claimed that members of Al Qaeda in Iraq and other Al 
  
                                                            
67 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2003 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Berlin: 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2003, pp. 171-220); German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2004 Annual Report 
on the Protection of the Constitution (Berlin: Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2004), pp. 190-242; German Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, 2008 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Berlin: Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, 2008), pp. 172-220. 
68 Literally speaking, in the discourse of political Islam, the term Jihad refers to holy war, and Jihadi movement 
refers to a violent armed struggle, which endorses the use of terrorism as a political tool.  
69 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2008 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Berlin: 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2008), pp. 193-194; German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006 on 
German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), p. 18. 
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Qaeda supporters were active in Germany and other European countries, and posed a serious 
threat to German security.70
Third, the German public perception also indicates a heightened sense of insecurity from 
Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism refers to “the more radical stream of Islam,” 
which supports the use of violence for institutionalizing Islamic law around the world. It also 
refers to the use of violence as a tool to resist U.S. and Western political influence in the Muslim 
countries. During the formative periods of the Afghanistan War (2002-2005), an overwhelming 
majority of the German people reported that radical Islamism posed a serious threat to Europe 
and the United States in the next ten years. According to the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, polls conducted between 2002 and 2005 found that an average 62% Germans 
thought Islamist radicalism posed an ‘extremely important threat’ to transatlantic security. 
During the same time, nearly one in every three Germans thought that radical Islamists posed an 
‘important threat’ to EU and U.S. security.
  
71
The fourth terrorist threat concerns the German military forces in Afghanistan. It came 
from a resurgent Taliban, and various Al Qaeda-associated terrorist groups. During the first five 
years of Germany’s Afghanistan mission (2002-2006), northern Afghanistan was a relatively 
peaceful area. However, since 2007, the German and NATO forces in Kunduz and other northern 
provinces confronted a growing number of terrorist and insurgent attacks. Insurgent strikes on 
the German and NATO forces increased ahead of the 2009 German parliamentary elections (See 
  
                                                            
70 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2004 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, pp. 190-
193.  
71 The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Report 2006 (Washington, 
D.C.: The German Marshall Fund 2006), p. 28.  
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Figure 5.4).72 Apparently, the Taliban insurgents wanted to influence the German public opinion 
by inflicting casualties on German soldiers, in an attempt to force the German government to 
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Media reports confirm the rise in insurgent activities in 
Kunduz and its neighboring provinces. According to the Afghan government and NATO 
assessments, insurgents in northern Afghanistan belonged to three major militant groups: Islamic 
Movement Uzbekistan, the Pakistan-based Haqqani Taliban Network, and the Hezbe-Islami 
Gulbuddin Network. Chechen and Uzbek origin militants were also among the northern Afghan 
Taliban.73  
 
      Source: iCasualties.org. 
 
                                                            
72 Matthias Gebauer and Shoib Najafizada, “Situation Worsens in Northern Afghanistan: Taliban Makes Blitz 
Comeback Near Kunduz,” Der Spiegel, August 3, 2009. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,640142,00.html, accessed December 30, 2010; Matthias Gebauer, 
“Combat in Northern Afghanistan: German Armed Forces  Intensify Fighting Against Taliban,” Der Spieel, July 22, 
2009. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,637646,00.html, accessed December 30, 2010; Keith B. 
Richburg, “As Taliban Makes Comeback in Kunduz Province, War Spreads to Northern Afghanistan,” Washington 
Post, March 19, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805399.html, accessed December 30, 2010. 
73 Richburg, “As Taliban Makes Comeback in Kunduz Province, War Spreads to Northern Afghanistan;” 
Wahidullah Mohammad, “Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 36 
(Nov. 25, 2009), p. 9. 
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At least four factors contributed to this growing Taliban activity in northern Afghanistan. 
First, under pressure from U.S. and NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and Taliban 
militants in the south moved to northern Afghanistan to diffuse the threat and dilute the 
effectiveness of NATO’s counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan.74 Second, since 
German forces in the north were not engaged in offensive military operations in the first five 
years, Taliban militias took the opportunity of Germany’s weak counterinsurgency strategy to 
maximize their influence in the German area of responsibility.75 Third, corruption in the Afghan 
government, especially in the police also created an inroad for Taliban emergence in the north.76 
Fourth, after NATO’s southern supply route in Pakistan came under repeated terrorist attacks, 
the United States opened a northern route of NATO supplies via former Soviet territories and the 
Central Asian Republics.77 Taliban forces found this northern network of NATO supplies as an 
important target of terrorist attacks.78
This brief discussion of actual and perceived threat suggests that during the Schröder and 
Merkel governments, the threat of transnational Islamist terrorism presented a systemic pressure 
for Germany to take a strong stance at the domestic and international fronts. At the domestic 
front, Germany used its law enforcement, intelligence, and judicial instruments to investigate and 
prosecute various terrorist cells, including the Islamist terrorists, such as the Hamburg Cell. At 
  
                                                            
74 Mohammad, “Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan, p. 9; Richburg, “As Taliban Makes 
Comeback in Kunduz Province, War Spreads to Northern Afghanistan.” 
75 Kate Clark, an expert with the Afghan Analysts Network, made this observation. See Quil Lawrence, 
“Taliban Return to Northern Afghanistan,” NPR, August 9, 2010. 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129036420, accessed December 31, 2010.  
76 Lawrence, “Taliban Return to Northern Afghanistan.” 
77 For a detailed discussion on the NATO northern distribution network, see: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, “Northern Route Eases Supplies to US Forces in Afghanistan,” IISS Strategic Comments, Vol. 16, No. 23 
(August 2010).  
78 Mohammad, “Taliban Expand Insurgency to Northern Afghanistan,” p. 10; Zarif Nazar and Charles 
Recknagel, “Security Worsens as Taliban Move Into Northern Afghanistan,” Radio Free Europe, Sept. 24, 2009. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Security_Worsens_as_Taliban_Move_Into_Northern_Afghanistan/1830036.html, 
accessed December 31, 2010.  
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the external front, Germany allied with the United States and other NATO countries to form and 
maintain the ISAF coalition in Afghanistan.  
Both the Schröder and Merkel governments defined their Afghanistan mission as part of 
a multilateral strategy to counter the threat of Al Qaeda and Taliban. In fact, it was Schroder’s 
defense minister Peter Struck, who claimed in 2003 that German national security was being 
defended along the Hindu Kush –the mountainous regions covering northern Afghanistan.79
The 2003 Defense Policy Guideline stresses that fighting international terrorism has 
emerged as a top priority for the German armed forces.
 
Struck’s successors remained largely supportive of that assessment, and did not alter the course 
of German policy by withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, or limiting Germany’s support for 
the ISAF mission. This was evident in two defense ministry reports, one published during the 
Schröder regime, and the other during the Merkel regime: 
80
[T]he most immediate danger to our security currently emanates from 
international terrorism perpetrated methodically in transnational networks... 
Germany cannot escape this danger, there having been repeated instances where 
also German citizens have lost their lives in such attacks…Since November 2001, 
 The most recent defense publications 
also make a similar assessment on the heightened threat of international terrorism, and 
Germany’s commitment to balance against the threat. The 2006 Defense White Paper claims 
that:  
                                                            
79 Peter Struck, P., ‘Landesverteidigung findet auch am Hindukusch statt’ [National defense is also taking place 
in the Hindu Kush], German Parliament, stenographic record, 16th legislative period, 2nd session, Berlin, 8 Nov. 
2005, p. 43. See: Sebastian Merz, “Still on the Way to Afghanistan? Germany and its Forces in the Hindu K ush,” A 
SIPRI Project Paper, November 2007, p. 3, fn 9. http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/publications/merz, accessed 
December 22, 2010. 
80 German Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines for the Area of Responsibility of the Federal 
Minister of Defense. (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2003), p. 15. 
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Germany has been contributing naval and special forces, among other assets, to 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) to combat international terrorism.81
While the 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines and the 2006 White Paper justified the 
deployment of German forces in fighting international terrorism, it was not until 2009, when 
Berlin changed the rules of engagement, and authorized the Bundeswehr forces to take a 
proactive counterinsurgency strategy. These changing rules of engagement indicate a response to 
the heightened threats posed by the Taliban insurgency. In the end, such threat convergence 
caused Bundeswehr forces to take the increasing risks of combat operations.  
 
 In summary, balance of threat presented an important incentive to encourage Germany’s 
participation in the Afghanistan coalition. The existence of Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell and its 
involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks produced a shared threat perception, cementing 
Germany’s alliance commitment to join the war in Afghanistan. Although Germany joined other 
NATO countries in Afghanistan in 2002, domestic political constrains limited the ability of the 
Bundeswehr to share the military burdens of fighting the Taliban forces. Since 2007, growing 
insurgent attacks targeting the German forces provided an incentive to circumvent those 
domestic constraints, and allowed the Bundeswehr to use lethal force against the Taliban 
insurgents. As insurgent attacks in northern Afghanistan grew in 2009 and 2010, the German 
forces began to develop an offensive counterinsurgency strategy, by using force to repel the 
Taliban militias. Unlike the previous years, they also began to show a greater willingness to 
share the risks of fighting the Taliban insurgency.  
                                                            
81 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), pp. 18, 71. 
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Collective Action. The free-riding motivation of collective action did not present any 
systemic incentive to influence Germany’s burden-sharing decisions. According to the collective 
action hypothesis, the dominant power in the international system is likely to bear most of the 
burdens of a collective good, while others will tend to ride free. During the Afghanistan War, the 
collective good was defeating the Al Qaeda terrorist network, and denying it a safe haven in 
Afghanistan. The two other components of the collective good were toppling the Taliban regime, 
suppressing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal area.  
If the collective action theory is correct, we would expect that the United States would 
bear all or most of the military burdens of combating Taliban and stabilizing post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, while Germany and other NATO countries would ride free. This was not the case. 
Since the U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, several NATO allies, including 
Germany, joined the U.S. war efforts by contributing conventional and special forces to the U.S.-
led OEF mission, and the UN-mandated (and later NATO-led) ISAF mission. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to examine whether all the coalition members had made substantial 
contributions. But, it can be reasonably expected that some of the small coalition members did 
not have the ability and the willingness to make a robust contribution to the Afghanistan 
coalition. Despite that, their participation was important to show that the coalition was large, and 
it enjoyed the political support of a significant portion of the international community.  
As described in the preceding section, Germany was not a free-rider in Afghanistan. It 
made significant military and non-military contributions to the Afghanistan War.  The German 
participation in the Afghanistan War was significant, when compared with Germany’s check 
book diplomacy during the First Iraq War (1990-1991), and its non-participation in the Second 
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Iraq War (2003-present).82 Germany bore a large part of the financial burdens of the first 
intervention in 1990, but strongly opposed the second military intervention in Iraq in 2003.83
Several factors explain Germany’s strong contribution to Afghanistan. Like the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and other key NATO allies, Germany perceived fighting Al Qaeda 
and Taliban as a collective good, and made sustained efforts to the achievement of the public 
good, through direct military and non-military burden-sharing.  There were other motivations as 
well. The achievement of the private good was important for German elites. In the Afghanistan 
War, the private good was maintaining the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance by supporting a 
strong role for NATO in Afghanistan. This was evident in several NATO summits, and defense 
ministers’ meetings, in which Germany responded to allied requests for troop increase, albeit 
limiting the remit of the German forces to the northern part of Afghanistan.  
 By 
contrast, Germany not only committed troops in the Afghanistan War, but also coordinated 
international economic and military efforts at the Bonn and Berlin summits, as well as other high 
profile summits to steer the process of post-war reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.  
In summary, among the three systemic factors discussed above, the free-riding 
motivation of collective action dilemma cannot explain the German contribution to Afghanistan. 
Germany did not demonstrate a free-riding behavior in the Afghanistan War by avoiding the 
ISAF mission. Instead, it maintained the third largest military contingent to ISAF. However, one 
                                                            
82 Germany did not send any troops during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; but later it offered basing and 
overflight rights and trained Iraqi forces. For a detailed discussion on German policy on Iraq War, see Daniel F. 
Baltrusaitis, “Germany: Non-Coalition, but Cooperating,” in Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of 
Choice, (Boulder and London: First Forum Press, 2010), pp. 89-148. 
83 Germany contributed a total $11.5 billion to the First Iraq War coalition, of which 60 percent went to the 
United States. This was equal to one third of the budget for German military forces. Grunther Hellmann,  
“Absorbing Shocks and Mounting Checks: Germany and Alliance Burden-Sharing in the Gulf War,” in Friends in 
Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War, edited by Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 168.  
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could possibly argue that until 2007, Germany’s risk-averse strategy in Afghanistan revealed a 
free-riding tendency, by delegating the burdens of fighting insurgency to the American, British, 
Canadian, and Dutch forces. This chapter shows that in the absence of a free-riding motivation, 
alliance solidarity and balance of threat motivation provided two systemic incentives to 
encourage Germany to join and maintain the Afghan War coalition. As the burden-sharing model 
suggests, these systemic incentives were transmitted through the domestic political structures to 
produce a unique burden-sharing behavior for Germany. The remainder in this chapter examines 
the effect of German domestic politics on the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan.  
 
 Domestic Political Regime. At the domestic level, the first decision point is the chief 
executive.  My theoretical model suggests that states’ burden-sharing decisions are taken by the 
chief executives at the domestic front.84
The nature of a domestic political regime can be measured by looking into the chief 
executive’s decision-making power in the domain of foreign and security policy. Several 
government institutional factors influence the chief executive’s decision power in Germany. 
These are legal-constitutional provisions, parliamentary and judicial oversight, and elite 
consensus. Measuring legal and constitutional provisions is a straightforward task. One can look 
into the texts of the German laws and constitution, and examine the discretionary power given to 
 Hence, the nature of a country’s political regime, and the 
chief executive’s foreign policy authority would significantly shape its contribution to a wartime 
coalition. In the context of Germany’s Afghanistan policy, we are interested to see how 
Chancellors Schröder and Merkel confronted with two stark choices: a combat 
counterinsurgency role and a non-combat stabilization role.  
                                                            
84 Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical 
Inquiry,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1989), pp. 361-187.  
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the office of chancellor in the use of force.  Such legal texts will also define the parliamentary 
and judicial oversight of the government’s security policy. Finally, elite consensus is measured 
by the level of agreement between the governing and opposing political parties in Germany.  
David Auerswald suggests that chief executive’s decision-making power can be divided 
into three categories: strong, weak, and medium.85
 The German governments under Schröder (1998-2005) and Merkel (2005-present) 
demonstrate the third type of regime characteristics (medium executive), in which the chancellor 
and his (or her) war cabinet retain considerable discretion over the foreign policy decisions. 
However, the chancellor is constitutionally required to share the power with the parliament, 
Bundestag, in deciding the use of force in the execution of foreign policy. There are few 
 Drawing on Auerswald’s analysis, I argue 
that each type of executive power is likely to have a distinct burden-sharing preference for a 
wartime coalition. First, a strong chief executive is less likely to care about public opinion, and 
express a strong willingness to use military force for coalition purposes. Second, a weak chief 
executive is likely to fear losing elections if the conflict goes bad causing high troop casualties. 
This will encourage the weak executive to avoid joining the coalition in the first place. Third, in 
between these two possibilities, a chief executive with medium power may enjoy elite consensus, 
but confront two major obstacles—legal restrictions, and parliamentary oversight. The interplay 
of these domestic factors will strongly influence the way a country decides on and contributes to 
a coalition-led conflict. As the preceding section suggests, the systemic incentives of alliance 
commitment and balance of threat will transmit through the domestic political factors and 
national military capability to shape Germany’s contributions to Afghanistan. 
                                                            
85 David Auerswald, “Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Sept. 2004), pp. 641-643.  
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countries in the world, in which the parliament enjoys such use-of-force power.86
 My research found that Chancellors Schröder and his successor Merkel confronted at 
least three sets of domestic challenges, which structured their Afghan decisions. The first relates 
to the constitutional restrictions on the use of force for out of area operations. The second 
concerns the Bundestag oversight of force deployment decisions. The third involves party 
politics. As discussed below, these three sets of challenges are closely inter-related and not 
mutually exclusive.  
 The effect of 
such power sharing arrangement is enormous: it constrains the power of the chancellor and his or 
her war cabinet to flexibly deploy the armed forces and military assets for overseas missions.  
The first challenge came from the constitutional provisions. The Bundeswehr is widely 
regarded as a constitutional army. This is due to the fact that the German constitution, Basic 
Law, provides the domestic sources of legitimacy for the overseas deployment of German forces. 
The constitution is so powerful that deployment decisions can be challenged in the Federal 
Constitutional Court, and must be vetted in the Parliament.87
                                                            
86 For instance, the British Prime Minister does not have to seek a parliamentary mandate for the use of force. A 
mere notification to the Parliament is suffice. Similarly, the U.S. President enjoys considerable war powers, and his 
national security council has rarely been constrained by the Congress in major deployment decisions. However, the 
1973 War Powers Resolution restricts the power of the U.S. President to use military force without congressional 
approval. The Resolution requires the President to notify the Congress of a military action within 48 hours of the use 
of force. Without any congressional authorization, a president is required to terminate the use of force after 90 days. 
Historical evidence shows that U.S. presidents have often bypassed the congress in the use of force. For a concise 
analysis of the U.S. president’s war powers, see Noah Feldman, “Our presidential Era: Who can Check the 
President?, New York Times,  January 8, 2006, 
 Historically, Germany has been 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/magazine/08court.html?pagewanted=print, accessed April 1, 2011. Another 
piece by Feldman is also relevant here. See, “Whose War Powers?” New York Times, February 4, 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/magazine/04WWLN_lede.t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx, accessed April 1, 
2011. 
87 The German Federal Constitutional Court can decide whether the deployment of military forces and logistics 
are appropriate and consistent with the German constitution. For instance, in July 2007, the Constitutional Court 
dismissed the left party’s complaint that the Bundestag’s approval of the deployment of six Tornado reconnaissance 
aircraft in Afghanistan violates the constitution of Germany. The Court ruled that the deployment is constitutional, 
as it is part of NATO’s ISAF mission and thus consistent with Germany’s alliance commitment to NATO. See 
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defined as a ‘civilian power,’ and the German foreign policy has been described as a product of 
the ‘culture of restraint.’ This has largely resulted in the characterization of the Bundeswehr as a 
‘territorial army,’ whose central purpose is to ensure national and alliance defense, and not to 
engage in a war of aggression. During the Cold War era, the German governments maintained 
this civilian nature of foreign policy and did not venture into the deployment of military forces 
for any non-territorial, foreign intervention purposes. This was largely due to Germany’s limited 
sovereignty in the foreign and security policy domain during the Cold War era.88
After the restoration of German sovereignty and the reunification of East and West 
Germany in 1990, the Bundeswehr participated in several overseas missions in the post-Cold 
War era. The list includes, the peace keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian missions in 
Iraq (1991-1996), Cambodia (1992-1993), Georgia (1994), Somalia (1993-1994), former 
Yugoslavia (various times between 1992 and present), and East Timor (1999-2000). In the post-
9/11 era, Germany’s Afghanistan mission emerged as one of the most notable out of area 
operations for the Bundeswehr. Data on gradual troop increase and the adoption of an offensive 
military posture in northern Afghanistan show the importance of Germany’s Afghan mission.
  
89
The Basic Law provides for the deployment of Bundeswehr for international peace 
keeping and crisis management purposes listed above. The German Constitutional Court, in its 
July 12, 1994 decision clarified that Bundeswehr forces can be deployed for overseas military 
operations in the spirit of the collective security and defense commitment, enshrined in the 
German constitution the Basic Law. According to Article 24 (2) of the Basic Law,  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
“German Court Backs Tornado Deployment in Afghanistan,” Earth Times, July 3, 2007. 
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/78922.html, accessed December 23, 2010. 
88 Max Otte and Jürgen Greve, “A Tradition of Limited Sovereignty: The Foreign Policy Doctrine of the   
Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1990,” in A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 
1989-1999 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 13-58. 
89 Appendix 5.A provides a list of major German military deployments in the post-Cold War era.  
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With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of 
mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its 
sovereign powers as will bring about and security a lasting peace in Europe and 
among the nations of the world.90
Although the German forces participated in several post-Cold War peace missions in 
NATO, and ‘out of area’ operations, the legal and constitutional restrictions strongly constrained 
their burden-sharing behavior in Afghanistan. At least three aspects of Germany’s Afghanistan 
mission illustrate this. The first shows the  concentration of German forces in the relatively stable 
areas. The second demonstrates the effect of restricted rules of engagement on the operational 
efficiency of German soldiers. The third shows the possibility for intrusive domestic legal 
oversight for a German soldier’s military actions in Afghanistan.  
 
First, the German constitution prohibits the deployment of Bundeswehr in a war of 
aggression; however German military can participate in multilateral crisis management and 
peace keeping missions.91
                                                            
90 See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 
1949, as Amended by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 and Federal Statute of 23 September 1990. 
 With regard to the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan, the German 
public as well as the political elites understood two consequences of such constitutional 
provisions: one, the German forces could not participate in offensive military operations; and 
two, they can only participate in defensive reconstruction and stabilization operations. Broadly 
speaking, such strict interpretation assumes a dichotomy in military operations: offensive versus 
defensive military actions, and suggests that, when deployed, the German forces be solely 
focused on defensive operations. The deployment of German forces, as well as the location of 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt, accessed April 11, 2011. 
91 AICGS New Security Study Group, Redefining German Security, p. 11;  Stefanie Flechtner, “On a New 
Mission: The Foreign Missions of the Bundeswehr and German Security Policy,” Compass 2020: Germany in 
International Relations: Aims, Instruments, Prospects. (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftun, 2007), p. 5, fn. 4.   
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two German PRTs, in the relatively stable northern Afghanistan illustrates how constitutional 
rules and their rigid interpretations might have shaped Germany’s Afghan mission.92
Second, since the German Basic Law prohibits Bundeswehr deployment for offensive 
purposes, the German government placed several ‘national caveats,’ which constrained the 
ability of the soldiers and military assets to participate in offensive operations.
 
93 For instance, the 
German forces were widely criticized for not leaving their armed personnel carriers while on 
patrol, and not leaving their bases at night. Another problem was that German rules of 
engagement strongly discouraged the use of force, except for self-defense and for providing 
emergency relief to other allied forces. As described before, restrictions also applied to the 
German contingent of NATO Quick Reaction Forces and German military assets. For instance, 
the German medevac helicopters were required to return to the base before sunset.94 The German 
Tornado reconnaissance airplanes could be used for close air support combat operations, and 
only be deployed for offensive operations to provide emergency relief to other allied forces.95
Third, there were additional legal risks associated with operations involving the German 
soldiers. Any incident of civilian casualty in Afghanistan, involving a German soldier’s military 
action, was likely to trigger a legal inquiry in Germany. In such a case, the legal inquiry would 
be initiated by the Potsdam public prosecutor, and be followed up by the public prosecutor of the 
  
                                                            
92 See Colonel Gerd Bradstetter, “Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Concept –Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort?” USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle: US Army War 
College, 2005). 
93 For a discussion on national caveats and their effect on the operational ability of NATO forces in 
Afghanistan, see David P. Auerswald, Stephen M. Saideman, and Michael J. Tierney, “Caveat Emptor! National 
Oversight and Military Operations in Afghanistan,” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association 
Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, September 2007; Institute for the Study of War, “International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF),” http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/international-security-assistance-force-isaf, accessed 
December 22, 2010; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Resolution 336 on Reducing National Caveats,” Presented 
by the Defense Security Committee, November 15, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
94 Thomas Coghlan, “German Soldiers Deemed ‘Too Fat to Fight,” The Times, December 3, 2008. 
95 Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 75. 
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German soldier’s native region in Germany.96 Ironically, in both cases, public prosecutors in 
Germany, with no experience of the Afghanistan mission, had to deal with the legal case, making 
it an unnecessary legal restriction on the operational flexibility of soldiers on the ground.97 One 
such example was a trial in German courts following an alleged incident of civilian casualty 
involving German soldiers.98
The second challenge to the German chancellor’s executive power on use-of-force 
decisions came from the German Parliament, Bundestag. Obviously, parliamentary challenge is 
an offshoot of the legal-constitutional restrictions described above. German law requires that the 
federal government’s decision to deploy military forces must receive a “constitutional stamp” 
from the parliamentary majority.
 This brief discussion of constitutional restrictions shows the limits 
of the German chancellors’ power in deploying military forces and assets.  
99 German foreign policy making process regarding its 
Afghanistan strategy shows that both Schröder and Merkel governments were constrained by the 
parliamentary politics in shaping their policy.100
From the very beginning of Germany’s Afghanistan policy, Chancellor Schröder’s 
decision regarding the deployment of the Bundeswehr confronted the constitutionally designed 
  
                                                            
96 The Potsdam public prosecutor is involved in the investigation, because the German city Potsdam houses the 
operational command headquarters of the Bundeswehr. See Noetzel and  Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” 
p. 75. 
97 A senior German official in chancellery, interviewed by Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, made this 
observation. See: Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 76.  Thomas Coghlan 
98 Thomas Coghlan, “German Soldiers Deemed ‘Too Fat to Fight,” The Times, December 3, 2008. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5277034.ece, accessed December 23, 2010. 
99 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr, p. 56.  
100 The constitutional court decision also emphasized that troop commitment decisions of the German 
chancellor must receive the Bundestag consent. The purpose of such parliamentary check and balance system is two-
fold: to limit the power of the German chancellor to deploy Bundeswehr forces independently and to allow a 
parliamentary debate on the merits and demerits of overseas deployment. There is a cognitive and historic element 
to this constitutionally designed limit on German chancellor. Since the end of the Second World War, the German 
political psyche has been strongly against re-militarizing the country and participating in a war of aggression. A war 
of aggression is defined as an adventurous foreign military intervention, in which Germany’s existential security or 
core national interests are not at stake.  
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limits of parliamentary approval. This was evident when Schröder faced stiff opposition, even 
among his Social Democrat Party members, to a pledged deployment of 3,900 troops for the war 
on terrorism.101 The opposition was so strong that Schröder wanted to test the strength of his 
Afghanistan policy in a historically rare ‘no-confidence’ vote in the parliament.102 In doing so, 
Schröder tied the question of Bundeswehr deployment to the future of his ruling SPD-Green 
party coalition.103
On November 16, 2001, the German parliament voted on the twin issues of Bundeswehr 
deployment and the political fate of the Red-Green coalition. In the end, the parliament voted 
332 to 326 in favor of the Afghanistan deployment. The result of the vote showed how polarized 
the German political elites were on the question of Afghanistan deployment.
  
104 Elite 
fragmentation was also evident by the fact that over seventy Parliamentarians “who had 
supported the motion added to their vote a written explanation, mainly to qualify that they had 
substantial doubts about the military deployment, but voted ‘yes’ in order to keep the [ruling] 
coalition in power.”105
                                                            
101 Among the 3,900 soldiers, 1800 soldiers from naval forces, including naval air forces, will be deployed in 
the Horn of Africa, 800 will be deployed in Kuwait to operate nuclear, biological, and chemical detection tanks Fox, 
500 will be deployed as air transport forces, 450 as  logistical support forces, 250 as a medical unit, and only 100 
Special Forces be deployed as an anti-terrorism unit in Afghanistan.  See Dettke, Germany Says” No,” p. 130. 
  
102 Previously the Bundestag had tried only twice to pass no-confidence votes—the first in 1972 and the second 
in 1982. In the first instance, the SPD leaders failed to replace Chancellor Willy Brandt with a CDU leader. In the 
second instance, the CDU/CSU and FDP leaders in the parliament replaced Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with 
Helmut Kohl. The German constitution provides for a system of ‘constructive no-confidence’ voting system, which 
requires that in removing the sitting Chancellor, the parliament must also simultaneously agree on a successor for 
the Chancellor position. See “Germany: the Chancellor and the Cabinet,” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-
bin/query/r-4967.html, accessed January 1, 2011.  
103 By tying the future of his coalition government, Schroder presented a dilemma for his SPD parliamentarians, 
who opposed the military deployment: either to collapse their own government or to support a mission they oppose.  
104 Andreas L. Paulus, Quo vadis Democratic Control? The Afghanistan Decision of the Bundestag and the 
Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the NATO Strategic Concept Case, German Law Journal: Review of 
Developments in German, European and International Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January, 2002) 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=123, accessed December 22, 2010. 
105 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p. 86. 
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Six years later, when the Merkel government decided to deploy six Tornado 
reconnaissance aircrafts in 2007, the decision confronted a group of hostile parliamentarians.106 
In the end, the Bundestag approved the decision by 405 to 157 votes, with eleven abstentions.107 
Although the Tornado jets were capable of carrying laser-guided bombs, and surface-to-surface 
missiles, they were not allowed to participate in combat operations. German defense minister 
Franz Josef Jung said, “The [Tornado] mission is clearly and explicitly reconnaissance. These 
are the only capabilities we will use and no others”108 Critics in the German parliament raised the 
concern that the reconnaissance jets would relay geographical coordinates for potential bombing 
targets, and thus “could become complicit in attacks that result in civilian deaths.”109
The Tornado debate illustrates the German government’s balancing strategy between two 
competing demands: NATO’s call for contributing more troops and resources which could be 
used for offensive purposes, and Berlin’s pressure to keep a defensive posture for Bundeswehr’s 
Afghanistan mission. In the end, the German chancellors were forced to accept the parliamentary 
constraint in structuring the remit of the Bundeswehr troops and assets. In early December 2010, 
the Der Spiegel reported the effect of parliamentary politics in dealing with a NATO request:  
 
NATO has called on Berlin to contribute up to 100 personnel to a planned 
international deployment of AWACS reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan. 
                                                            
106 The Bundestag voted on the deployment of the Tornado jets in early March 2007, and they were deployed in 
northern Afghanistan in early April 2007. See The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), “German 
‘Tornado’ Aircraft Deploy to Mazar-e-Sharif,” NATO Press Release 2007#270, April 6, 2007. 
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2007/04-april/pr070406-270.html, accessed December 23, 2010.  
107 Meiers, “Crossing the Red Lines?, p. 23. 
108 Quoted in German weekly Der Spiegel. See: “Reluctant Reconnaissance: German Tornado Jets Depart for 
Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, April 3, 2007. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,475493,00.html, 
accessed December 23, 2010. 
109 “Help for NATO: German Parliament Approves Planes for Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, March 9, 2007. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,470895,00.html, accessed December 21, 2010; 
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Berlin looks set to refuse the request because the mission would probably require 
a parliamentary mandate, for which it would be hard to muster support.110
After the constitutional and parliamentary constraints, the third challenge to Germany’s 
Afghanistan mission came from the political parties and their attitude toward the use of force. 
Hence a brief discussion of the parliamentary parties, and their position on Afghanistan, will help 
explain how the German political parties structured the debate over Afghanistan policy, and thus 
influenced the chancellor’s use-of-force decisions.  
 
The lower house of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, was divided among four 
major groups, comprising six political parties: The conservative Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) and its Bavarian faction-- the Christian Social Union (CSU); the center left Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party; the far left Die Linke, and the center-right the 
Federal Democratic Party. The conservative CDU/CSU union and the center-left SPD were the 
largest political parties. Chancellor Schröder’s SPD led a coalition government with the Green 
Party from 1998 to 2005. Later Chancellor Merkel’s CDU/CSU led a grand coalition with the 
SPD from 2005 to 2009. In the 2009 federal elections, Merkel’s CDU/CSU union emerged as the 
largest party and formed a coalition government with the liberal FDP. This short description of 
German political parties suggest that coalition government is the norm in Germany, and 
historically either the CDU/CSU union or the SPD has formed the government with other junior 
parties, such as the Green or the FDP.  
Broadly speaking, most of the German political parties, with the exception of the far left 
Die Linke, supported Germany’s mission in Afghanistan. Supporters of the Afghanistan mission 
                                                            
110 “AWACS for Afghanistan: Germany May Refuse NATO Request for Help,” Der Spiegel, December 13, 
2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,734279,00.html, accessed December 15, 2010.  
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made two arguments: one, it was a humanitarian peace mission and Germany had a moral 
responsibility to take part in the mission; and two, the German national security and vital 
interests were protected by joining the war against international terrorism. Most of the 
CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP leaders shared this view. By contrast, the far left Die Linke opposed 
the Afghanistan War on the ground that the Bundeswehr mission was not to secure peace, but to 
fight a war. They also reasoned that the war would antagonize the Afghans, and make Germany 
less secure. The pacifist Green Party was divided between two factions—one supporting the 
Afghanistan mission, and the other opposing it. Critics of the war in the Die Linke and the Green 
Party were also joined by some leaders of the CDU/CSU and the SPD in opposing the German 
military intervention in Afghanistan.  
There were two effects of German party politics on the parliamentary mandate over 
Afghanistan policy. First, critics of the Afghanistan mission had largely failed to stop the 
Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan. Second, despite a subsequent failure to compel the 
withdrawal of German troops from Afghanistan, parliament members opposing the war had 
strongly limited the power of the German chancellor to shape the country’s use of force for 
offensive operations. The effect on Afghanistan strategy can be illustrated by the fact that each 
major deployment decision in a war had to be approved separately by the German Parliament. 
This meant that each year the German deployment to the NATO-led ISAF and the U.S.-led OEF 
missions had to be approved and extended by the Bundestag deputies (parliamentarians). The 
decisions regarding the deployment of some sensitive military assets, such as the Tornado 
reconnaissance aircrafts, also needed separate parliamentary approval.  
On several occasions, the German parliamentarians selectively supported some force 
deployments, while blocking the other force deployments. For instance, between 2001 and 2010, 
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all of the deployment and extension decisions regarding the German contingent of ISAF troops 
were passed with an overwhelming majority. However, the deployment of Tornado jets and the 
extension of the OEF mission received a significant blow in the German Parliament. This means 
that although the Tornado jets and German SOFs deployed to the OEF mission were capable of 
using lethal force against the Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents, they were not permitted 
to be used for combat operations. 
As described before, in March 2007, the decision of the Merkel government to deploy six 
Tornado reconnaissance aircrafts in northern Afghanistan created a heated debate in the 
parliament. Although the decision was approved at the end, it was opposed by nearly 30% of the 
Bundestag deputies. Out of 573 votes on the issue, 157 deputies voted against the deployment. 
This was the second largest divisive issue, after Chancellor Schröder’ November 2001 decision 
to deploy military forces as part of the war on terrorism was opposed by 326 parliamentarians – 
roughly 49% of the Bundestag deputies. 111
The negative votes on the Bundeswehr deployment in 2001 and the Tornado jet 
deployment in 2007 could not alter the German governments’ decision on force deployments. 
However, under pressures from opposition parties, in 2008, the Merkel government made some 
changes to Berlin’s contribution to the U.S.-led OEF mission. Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid 
explain how the Bundestag debate shaped the government decisions:  
  
The maximum number of soldiers involved in the operation (OEF) was reduced 
from 1400 to 800, and the allocation of 100 Special Operations Forces for 
Afghanistan was discontinued. Approval for the ISAF mandate, which is 
                                                            
111 By comparison, opposition to Bundeswehr deployment has rarely generated more than 20% veto from 
German parliamentarians. Appendix 5.B provides a list of Bundestag voting decisions on the German military 
mission in Afghanistan.  
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negotiated separately, has gone steadily down, although its confirmation has never 
yet been in serious jeopardy.112
 Why did Germany decide to withdraw its Special Force contingent to the OEF mission? 
The answer lies with the way Germany characterized the international and domestic legitimacy 
of the OEF mission. The German critics argued that the OEF lacked international legitimacy, as 
its deployment was not authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution. In addition, since the 
OEF was engaged in offensive military operations against the Taliban militias, participation of 
German Special Operations Forces (KSK commandos) in such combat operations was not 
authorized by the German constitution.  
   
In summary, the German chancellor’s power to use force in Afghanistan was challenged 
by three domestic sources: constitutional constraints over the use of force, intrusive 
parliamentary oversight of Bundeswehr mission, and party politics in the German parliament. 
Once cleared by the parliamentary mandate, and supported by the selective voting patterns of 
German elites, the German chancellors looked into the public opinion to get cues of their use-of-
force decisions. The next sub-section examines the influence of public opinion on Germany’s 
Afghanistan mission.  
Public Opinion. Domestic public opinion constitutes the second decision point in shaping 
Germany’s coalition policy in Afghanistan. The integrated burden-sharing model suggests that 
the strength of the chief executive’s decision power influences whether or not public opinion be 
counted. As the chief executives with medium decision power, both Schröder and Merkel were 
able to garner enough elite support to pursue the Afghanistan mission. However, due to a 
                                                            
112 Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 82.   
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political culture in the restraint of force, both of the German chancellors were expected to care 
about public opinion in making a crucial decision: whether to allow the German military to use 
force against the Taliban insurgents, or to pursue a purely defensive stabilization mission.  
The burden-sharing model predicts that since the Schröder and Merkel governments had 
medium executive power, Germany would follow a two-pronged strategy, which balances 
between elite consensus and unfavorable public opinion. Evidence supports the predictions of the 
burden-sharing model. First, consistent with the expectations of the German elites, who 
supported the war; Germany gradually increased its troop level in Afghanistan, and ignored the 
public opposition to such troop surge. Second, in line with the expectations of the mass public 
opinion, Germany maintained a strictly defensive posture for the Bundeswehr, with minimal or 
no combat role for the German troops, at least until 2009. One could possibly argue that due to 
legal-constitutional restrictions, Germany had no other options but to pursue a non-offensive 
military mission in Afghanistan. Hence the relationship between public opinion and a defensive 
mission in Afghanistan is just a coincidence, and does not imply a cause-and-effect relationship. 
I argue that such an observation is misleading. This is due to the fact that the under the leader of 
Chancellor Merkel’s, the CDU/CSU-led coalition government sought to have more discretionary 
power in the use of force.113
In determining the effect of domestic public opinion on Germany’s coalition policy in 
Afghanistan, this chapter reviews opinion data on four major issues. These relate to the use of 
 However, due to the lack of public and legislative support, it failed 
to gain such power. Hence, public opinion played an important role in influencing Germany’s 
options in Afghanistan.  
                                                            
113 Marcus Walker and John D. McKinnon, “Germany Considers Expanding Role of the Military in Security,” 
Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2008; “Germany’s Security Strategy: Thinking the Unthinkable,” The Economist, May 
8, 2008.  
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force as a counterterrorism strategy, troop levels, casualty sensitivity, and Afghan reconstruction. 
First, regarding terrorism, an overwhelming majority of Germans thought international terrorism 
as a serious or important threat to the EU and U.S. security. 114 Despite such heightened threat 
perception, most Germans opposed the use of military force for combating terrorism and 
insurgency in Afghanistan. Scott Erb’s remark on German public mood in the aftermath of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks is worth noting here. Erb claimed, “57 percent [Germans] believed that a 
counterattack by the United States on those responsible [for the 9/11 terrorist attacks] would be 
justified. The same percentage, 57 percent, also rejected the idea of German participation in such 
a counterattack.”115 Peter Katzenstein also notes about the fragile public support for the Afghan 
War: “in September 2001, 58 percent favored Germany’s military participation in the war against 
terrorism, a figure that by November 2001 had dropped to 35 percent,”116Defying such public 
opposition, in November 2001 the German parliament approved the decision on force 
deployment. Once Germany deployed the Bundeswehr forces to Afghanistan, public discontent 
over such force deployment increased over the years. In 2007, opposition to Germany’s combat 
role in Afghanistan was 75%, which declined to 62% in 2008, and rose to the highest 86% in 
2009 (See Figure 5.5).117
                                                            
114 The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Report 2006, p. 28.  
  
115 Erb, German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era, p. 193.   
116 Katzenstein, “Sonderbare Sonderwege: Germany and 9/11,” pp. 6-7. 
117 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends 2007: Topline Data, p. 32; German 
Marshall Fund of the United States Transatlantic Trends 2008: Topline Data, p. 33; German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2009, p. 36. 
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Source: Scott Erb; German Marshall Fund. 
 
Second, on the troop level, the German public strongly opposed the idea of troop 
increase, and instead preferred troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. In 2009 and 2010, only 7% 
Germans supported troop increase in Afghanistan. During the same time support for the 
maintenance of current troop level declined sharply from 35% in 2009 to 24% in 2010. By 
contrast, support for troop reduction increased slightly from 16% in 2009 to 17% in 2010. Most 
importantly, support for the withdrawal of German forces increased significantly, from 41% in 
2009 to 50% in 2010. 118 On the withdrawal question asked in 2010, nearly 45% Germans 
wanted their forces be brought home by 2011, while another 35% want immediate troop 
withdrawal. By contrast, only 20% Germans polled in 2010 wanted the country’s Afghan 
mission to continue, and they opposed the idea of setting a deadline for troop withdrawal.119
                                                            
118 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2009, p. 34. 
  
http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/2009_English_Top.pdf, accessed December 21, 2010; The German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2010, p. 41. 
http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/2010_English_Top.pdf, accessed December 21, 2010. 
119 German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends 2010: Topline Report, p. 42. 
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Despite such minority supports for the Afghan mission, a large majority of the German public 
continued to oppose the war.  
 
 Third, as the war related incidents of casualties and fatalities increased significantly since 
2007, there were growing public dissatisfactions over the Afghanistan War. Between 2002 and 
2010, 49 Germans lost their lives in Afghanistan. Another 202 soldiers and 4 policemen 
sustained injuries of various degrees. Of the 49 killed, 46 were army personnel and 3 police 
personnel. Although this troop fatality pales in comparison with other major NATO countries, 
such as the United States, and the United Kingdom, such NATO-centric comparison does not 
capture the level of sacrifice Germany made in Afghanistan. In order to get a better picture, we 
need to look at the historical data for German troop fatalities in overseas missions. Compared to 
Germany’s other post-Cold War era missions, the Afghanistan mission produced the largest 
casualties and fatalities for German soldiers.  Previously, only 2 German soldiers died in 
overseas missions: one in Cambodia in 1991 and the other in Georgia in 2001.120 Public opinion 
experts suggest that, increasing details of media reports on fallen soldiers had sparked a heated 
debate on the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan.121
Fourth, in contrast to consistently opposing the use of force, and insisting on the 
reduction or withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, most Germans supported civilian economic 
reconstruction and the training of Afghan security forces. Support for reconstruction efforts were 
  
                                                            
120 Gerhard Kummel and Nina Leonhard, Casualty Shyness and Democracy in Germany,” Security and  Peace, 
Vol.  22, No. 3 (2004), p. 121. http://www.security-and-peace.de/archiv/PDF/2004-3/SuF_03_2004_3.pdf, accessed 
March 20, 2011. 
121 European Security and Defense Assembly, Assembly of the European Union, Afghanistan – Explaining the 
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recorded 57% in 2007, 84% in 2008, and 55% in 2009.122
Public opinion data presented above raises an important question: why did the German 
public oppose the use of force and support a nation-building role for the German military forces 
deployed in Afghanistan? Foreign policy experts suggest the German public’s attitude toward the 
use of force has historically been influenced by a unique political culture, which discredits the 
past history of German militarism, and opposes the re-militarization of the German state.
 The declining support for economic 
reconstruction in 2009 might indicate that the post-war reconstruction mission in northern 
Afghanistan became  an increasingly risky task, largely due to the escalation of insurgent attacks 
on German soldiers.  
123
Kerry Longhurst argues that post war public opposition to militarism has to be 
understood in the context of Stunde Null, a political culture that implies “the total physical, moral 
and psychological devastation and trauma that prevailed in Germany at the close of the Second 
World War.”
  
124 Two factors shaped this pacific and anti-military nature of German public 
sentiment. At the external front, allied occupation destroyed the sources of German military and 
its industrial base to implant a peaceful and democratic foreign policy for Western Germany. At 
the domestic front, the German public legitimized the allied pressure for demilitarization, and 
overwhelmingly supported a new identity for the German state through economic reconstruction 
and development.125
                                                            
122 Transatlantic Trends 2007: Topline Data, p. 33; Transatlantic Trends 2008: Topline Data, p. 31; German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends: Topline Data 2009, p. 35. 
 This brief narrative of post-war German history indicates why most of the 
123 Ronald D. Asmus, Germany’s Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994 (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand, 1994), pp. 37-46; For a more nuanced discussion on the effect of the culture of restraint in 
defining Germany’s approach to foreign and security policy, see Hanns W. Maul and Sebastian Harnisch, Germany 
as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001)..   
124 Stunde Null means zero hour. It implies a unique German political culture, which stresses that the past is 
over, and will never re-appear. See Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, p. 26. 
125 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, pp. 26-28. 
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Germans supported a defensive reconstruction strategy, while opposing an offensive military 
posture for their forces.  
Opposition to the combat mission in Afghanistan was also fueled by the way the German 
people characterized their national interest vis-à-vis American interests in Afghanistan. For many 
German critics, “the operation [in Afghanistan] is often seen not as a German choice, but as a 
decision made by the Americans to serve their own national interest.”126Critics also view that the 
Afghanistan War “is a waste of resources, not a German problem.”127
The preceding discussion shows that the German public’s opposition to the use of force is 
rooted in a political culture of pacifism and anti-militarism. To what extent did the German 
decision makers respond to the anti-militaristic (or pacifist) public sentiment? 
 Thus, public opposition to 
the War in Afghanistan was perhaps associated with the anti-American sentiment. In the foreign 
policy domain, this anti-Americanism was demonstrated in public opposition to troop build-up.  
Data on Germany’s troop deployment and incremental fighting role suggest that public 
opinion had little or no effect in shaping the German decisions on Afghanistan. This is evident 
by the fact that despite weak public support for troop increase and strong support for immediate 
troop withdrawal, successive German governments made two unpopular decisions: (a) to 
increase the German military presence from 1,200 troops in 2001 to nearly 5,000 troops in 2010; 
and (b) to stay in Afghanistan until 2014, when NATO forces transfers over the security 
responsibility to the indigenous Afghan forces.128
                                                            
126 Noetzel and Rid, “Germany’s Options in Afghanistan,” p. 80. 
  
127 CIA Red Cell, “A Red Cell Special Memorandum,” Confidential/NOFORN, March 11, 2010, p. 3. 
http://mirror.wikileaks.info/leak/cia-afghanistan.pdf, accessed December 27, 2010. 
128 In 2010, a German government report revealed that, Germany supports NATO’s Lisbon Summit (November 
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What explains this apparent disregard for public opinion? Sarah Kreps argues that elite 
consensus among the German government and opposition parties explain its enduring 
commitment to alliance cohesion in Afghanistan. Kreps measures elite consensus by 
convergence among major political parties on the issue of Afghanistan mission. She argues that 
since public opinion was largely unfavorable to the Afghanistan mission, the major opposition 
party SPD could perceive it a wise electoral strategy to diverge from the ruling coalition of 
CDU/CSU. By diverging from CDU/CSU, the SPD parliamentarians could offer two policy 
options: to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr forces in Afghanistan; or to withdraw German 
soldiers from NATO’s ISAF mission. Ideally, any of these policy preferences would be 
consistent with the German public opposition to the Afghanistan War. However, the SPD did not 
pursue a strategy of diverging from the CDU/CSU policy in Afghanistan. Instead, the 
parliamentary voting pattern suggests that most SPD members supported the renewal and 
extension of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan.  
Elite consensus was strongly influenced by two systemic level incentives: alliance 
solidarity and balance of threat.129
Scholarly research and German policy statements confirm the effect of alliance 
commitment and threat convergence in cementing elite cohesion, and thus shaping Germany’s 
 In the German context, this means that despite negative public 
opinion, Germany’s longstanding commitment to NATO and its preference for a multilateral 
strategy offered strong incentives to pursue a robust coalition policy.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
NATO countries said 2014 is not a tight deadline for force withdrawal. Instead, NATO forces will be completely 
withdrawn if the security situation improves and the conditions on the ground permit. See “Progress Report on 
Afghanistan for the Information of the German Bundestag,” December 2010, pp. 2-3. 
http://www.germany.info/contentblob/2993062/Daten/1002930/16_AFGProgressRpt.pdf,  accessed January 2, 2011.  
129 Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion,” p. 201; James D. Morrow, Alliances and 
Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances. American Journal of Political 
Science Vol. 35 (1991), pp. 904-933.  
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Afghan policy. For instance, drawing on an interview with a senior leader in German military, 
Kreps notes that NATO’s invocation of Article 5 collective defense commitment was a 
“sufficient condition” for explaining Germany’s participation in the war on terrorism in general, 
and its military deployment in Afghanistan.130 A government report, released in 2010, also 
describes Berlin’s contribution to Afghanistan as part of a multilateral strategy taken “within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the international community.” 131 The 
report claims that the aim of German foreign policy was to improve the security, governance, 
and development of Afghanistan. The progress report also indicates the effect of shared threat 
perception in shaping Germany’s mission in Afghanistan.132
Although Germany’s alliance solidarity with NATO, and shared threat perception forged 
elite consensus, the effect of public opinion was not completely negligible. This was evident by 
the fact that consistent with the popular expectations, Germany increased its commitment to the 
economic reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, while resisting the NATO allies’ 
pressures for assuming a strong offensive military strategy. In resisting the pressures from 
NATO, the civilian leadership in Germany placed numerous restrictions to constrain the ability 
of German forces and military assets to participate in kinetic operations against the Taliban 
militias. 
  
133
In the case of Afghanistan, the political leadership categorically wants to avoid 
any German involvement in combat because the Afghan mission is unpopular and 
 As Hacke notes: 
                                                            
130 Interview conducted by Sarah Kreps with LtGen Johann-Georg Dora at the German Bundeswehr, May 25, 
2007. Cited in Kreps, “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion,” p. 205. 
131 “Progress Report on Afghanistan for the Information of the German Bundestag, December 2010,” p. 2. 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/557610/publicationFile/132010/101213-AFG-
Fortschrittsbericht.pdf;jsessionid=E394EF2D96D4E0B44395FCF2EC1B2852, accessed December 26, 2010.  
132 “Progress Report on Afghanistan for the Information of the German Bundestag, December 2010,” pp. 1-2. 
133 Kirsten Verclas, “Security and Stability: German and American Cooperation in Times of Transition,” AICGS 
Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2008). 
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because of the tendency to emotional pacifism amongst the people as a reaction to 
German history.134
In summary, the foregoing discussion suggests that under Chancellors Schröder and 
Merkel, Germany adopted a pragmatic strategy of balancing between its international 
commitments as well as domestic pressures. Internationally, Germany’s commitment to NATO 
and UN’s multilateral crisis management strategy called for a strong civilian and military role in 
Afghanistan. However, the domestic political factors, such as, constitutional restrictions, and 
unfavorable public opinion discouraged an offensive role for the German military forces in 
Afghanistan. The result was a compromise strategy with three components: (a) increased troop 
commitment; (b) restrictions on offensive operations; and (c) increased civil-military 
reconstruction efforts. What role did the German military forces play in executing a strategy 
devised in Berlin? How did the German military capability influence the country’s burden-
sharing outcome in Afghanistan? These questions on the relationship between military capability 
and burden-sharing behavior are important to ascertain whether feedbacks from certain burden-
sharing outcomes are taken into the German decision process on Afghanistan.  
 
 
Military Capability. In analyzing Germany’s coalition policy on Afghanistan, the third  
decision point is military capability. My burden-sharing model predicts that a strong chief 
executive ignores public opinion and takes a straight decision on the use of force in the pursuit of 
foreign policy. By contrast, a weak executive refrains from taking a politically risky decision on 
the use of force. In between these two forms of executives, the medium executive, such as, the 
                                                            
134 Christian Hacke, “Germany’s Foreign Policy Under Angela Merkel,” AICGS Advisor, August 8 
(Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2008), p. 2. 
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German chancellor balances between the competing demand of elite opinion, and mass public 
opinion. to shape the use-of-force decisions. At this point, regardless of public support or 
opposition, the crucial determinant is the strength of military capability. A strong military 
capability, lacking any national caveats, is likely to contribute to a robust military burden-sharing 
behavior, whereas weak capability is likely to result in a dismal burden-sharing performance.  
According to NATO, at least three factors determine the strength of the military 
capability: suitability, interoperability, and deployability.135
Second, interoperability refers to the ability of military services and assets to work 
together in a coalition environment. Joint military exercises and joint defense procurement can 
develop interoperable forces among alliance nations. Interoperability can also be enhanced 
 States with suitable, interoperable, 
and deployable military forces are likely to have a strong counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency capacity. Measuring capability is a straightforward task in the context of the 
ISAF and OEF missions. First, suitability refers to the availability of well-trained conventional 
forces or Special Forces, and appropriate military assets, such as helicopters and reconnaissance 
jets. These forces and assets were needed to fight Al Qaeda or Taliban militants, and stabilize 
Afghanistan. In addition to appropriate forces and assets, suitability also includes survivable, 
sustainable, and effective forces. Survivability is defined by the ability to protect forces from 
short term and long term threats. Sustainability implies the ability to maintain and supply forces 
in forward bases. Effectiveness refers to the ability to efficiently engage enemy forces.  
                                                            
135 According to NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), alliance military capability has five attributes: 
(a) mobility and deployability; (b) sustainability; (c) effective engagement; (d) survivability; and (e) interoperable 
communications. My definition of coalition capability combines sustainability, effective engagement, and 
survivability to refer to suitability. For NATO’s discussion of alliance capability concepts, see North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, “The Transformation of the Alliance: NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Handbook, 
(NATO Publications, October 8, 2002), chapter 2. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm, accessed 
January 3, 2011.  
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through assembling compatible command, control, communication, and information (C3I) 
systems.  In the Afghanistan War context, interoperability would only be an issue for the German 
forces, if they avoid participating in joint military operations with other coalition forces. Third, 
deployability refers to the military preparedness or combat readiness. It implies the ability to 
rapidly deploy military forces and assets in alliance territories as well as out of area operations.  
Did Germany possess a suitable, interoperable, and deployable military force, which 
could contribute to a strong burden-sharing behavior? There are two contrasting answers to this 
question. The German government claimed that the process of military transformation had 
focused on the deployment of a compatible and interoperable armed force to fulfill its alliance 
commitment.136 In contrast, critics contend that German military transformation had failed to 
develop a deployable, interoperable, and sustainable military force, which had strongly 
constrained its counterinsurgency capacity in Afghanistan. For instance, Franz-Josef Meiers 
observes that “German armed forces remain the least deployable, projectable, and sustainable of 
the leading allied powers.”137 Christian Hecke makes a similar observation: “Today and for the 
foreseeable future, the German armed forces remain the least deployable, mobile and sustainable 
of NATO’s and the EU’s leading armies.”138
                                                            
136 German Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), p. 25. 
 These pessimistic remarks show a weak military 
capability, which may fail to produce desired outcomes in Afghanistan. 
137 Meiers, “Crossing the Red Lines? The Grand Coalition and the Paradox of German Foreign Policy,” p. 15; 
Frank Gardinger, “German-American Disagreement on How to Deal with the Threat of Terrorism: The Role of 
National Political Culture and Implications for Transatlantic Relationship,” AICGS Advisor (Washington, D.C.: 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, December 2008), p. 3.  
138 Hacke, “Germany’s Foreign Policy Under Angela Merkel,” p. 2. 
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In short, most German experts suggest that Germany lacked a strong counterinsurgency 
capacity in Afghanistan. This capacity gap had seriously affected the operational performance of 
the Bundeswehr forces. In 2008, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer note that:  
[T]he Bundeswehr is critically short of specialized units which are in high 
demand during counterinsurgency operations. These include highly trained 
regular combat infantry, military assistance units and a greater number of special 
forces. The Bundeswehr also faces a chronic lack of platforms such as those 
required for tactical air mobility. In addition, legal restrictions heavily constrain 
the ability of German armed forces to operate according to multinational 
requirements: for example, air mobility is limited since fighting and transport 
capabilities have to be used according to the same operational restrictions as are 
applied to flight regulations during peacetime in Germany.139
 Benjamin Schreer argues that capacity gap is only part of the problem. He contends that 
German burden-sharing role in Afghanistan was seriously constrained by three other factors: the 
absence of a counterinsurgency doctrine, the lack of political strategic leadership, and the 
absence of historical memory of fighting insurgency and small wars.  
  
First, compared to the American and British counterinsurgency doctrines, the German 
military had no comparable counterinsurgency doctrine. In fact, Germany not only lacked a 
counterinsurgency doctrine, the German military and strategic community perceived 
counterinsurgency as an operational concept for reconstruction and development, and not as a 
strategic concept for the defeat of insurgent forces. Schreer notes that in the German political 
                                                            
139 Noetzel and Schreer, “All the Way? The Evolution of German Military Power,” p. 217.  
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discourse, counterinsurgency is a loaded term, a synonym for U.S.-dominated offensive military 
operations in Afghanistan, which should be avoided.140
 Second, the lack of a counterinsurgency doctrine was further complicated by the absence 
of strategic leadership to improvise the counterinsurgency capability of German military. Schreer 
notes that German defense ministry had rarely made any political, economic, and personnel 
investment to develop the Bundeswehr’s counterinsurgency capability.
 
141 An additional problem 
in the Afghanistan mission was the lack of inter-agency collaboration among various 
participating federal ministries.142
 Third, compared to other western military forces, such as the American, British, and 
French forces, which have had a strong record of fighting insurgency, the German military lacks 
any historical experience in fighting small wars and counterinsurgency campaigns. This is due to 
the fact that during the Cold War era, the Bundeswehr operated under a strictly defined 
conventional military doctrine, which focused on deterrence and territorial defense against a 
large-scale military aggression. Thus, fighting an unconventional war or insurgency was 
deliberately excluded from German military doctrine. After the Cold War, although the 
 The newly created Joint Commitment Staff, atzführungsstab, 
was expected to address the interagency coordination problems in the long run, but in the short 
run, the Bundeswehr’s capacity gaps limited the possibility for a strong offensive strategy in 
Afghanistan.  
                                                            
140 Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” p. 98. 
141 Ibid., p. 99. 
142 For instance, lack of coordination between the defense and development ministries has long plagued the 
operation of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects in northern Afghanistan.  In 2009, the newly appointed 
Development Minister Dirk Niebel announced that his ministry would make a strong effort to cooperate with the 
defense ministry’s operations in northern Afghanistan. See “Entwicklungspolitik – Niebel will Afghanistan-Hilfe an 
Bundeswehreinsatz koppeln,“ Zeit Online, December 28, 2009 . 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/niebel-will-afghanistan-hilfe-an-bundeswehreinsatz-
koppeln/1655346.html, accessed January 3, 2011.  
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Bundeswehr was deployed in several peacekeeping missions, those missions rarely posed any 
classical insurgency-related challenges to the German forces. This lack of historical learning was 
compounded by public skepticism toward the effectiveness of counterinsurgency in dealing with 
Afghanistan. Schreer notes that the German elites have often cited the American failure in 
Vietnam, and the Soviet disaster in Afghanistan to refer to the danger of having a German 
counterinsurgency doctrine for Afghanistan.143
Since 2007, the German forces in Afghanistan addressed these persistent problems – the 
lack of doctrine, absence of leadership, and lack of historical memory in two ways. First, by 
taking a bottom-up approach, the German commanders in northern Afghanistan pursued a 
strategy of incremental force projection by demonstrating “a greater willingness to conduct 
offensive operations against insurgency elements.”
  
144 Second, although there was no collective 
or institutionalized memory for fighting an insurgency, the German military appeared to have 
learnt from its experience in dealing with the increasing insurgent activities in northern 
Afghanistan.145
As described before, Operation Harekate Yolo illustrates this changing military attitude 
toward the offensive military operations. In May 2007, an estimated 2,000 Afghan and ISAF 
troops(mostly the German and Norwegian troops) launched a ground offensive against the 
Taliban insurgents in the Badakhshan, Badghis, and Faryab provinces. The goal was to secure 
and stabilize the areas from Taliban control, and move to the phase of reconstruction and 
development.  The Harekate Yolo was a significant operation for the German military. As 
  
                                                            
143 Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” p. 99. 
144 Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” p. 105.  
145 Robin Schroeder, “Can the Bundeswehr Learn to “Eat Soup with a Knife?” Assessing German 
Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan,” Paper prepared for the 7th Pan-European IR Conference of the 
Standing Group on International Relations, Stockholm, Sweden, Sept. 9-11, 2010, p. 28. 
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counterinsurgency experts John Nagl and Richard Weitz note, It was “the first large scale ground 
offensive conducted by the German military since World War II.”146
The first stage of the combat operation was quite successful. It cleared the area of Taliban 
insurgents, and paved the way for reconstruction and development. However, the second stage of 
the operation was not successful. This was due to the fact that the Berlin-based political and 
military leadership imposed tight operational restrictions on the German forces, which prohibited 
them from providing long term troop presence required for holding and building the secured 
areas.
 The German forces 
provided strategic leadership and logistic support, while the Norwegian forces contributed most 
of the combat element. The U.S. and Afghan forces attached to the mission provided the support 
role.  
147
The lessons of the Operation Harekate Yolo suggest that the German military forces in 
Afghanistan were capable of pursuing an offensive counterinsurgency strategy. However, it was 
the political restraints imposed from Berlin, which constrained the German forces’ ability to 
pursue offensive military operations. As discussed before, political constraints also limited the 
ability of the German Special Forces, Quick Reaction Forces, and Tornado jets to participate in 
offensive military operations. Such political constraints worked until 2007 in creating a largely 
defensive reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.  
  
After Operation Harekate Yolo, subsequent military operations in northern   Afghanistan 
– Operation Karez in 2008, Operation Oqab in 2009, and Operations Chachar Dhara in 2009 
and 2010 –indicated the German Army’s slow move toward a counterinsurgency strategy.  As 
                                                            
146 John Nagl and Richard Weitz, “Counterinsurgency and the Future of NATO,” Transatlantic Paper Series 
No. 1 October 2010 (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs), p. 11. 
147 Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” pp. 105-106. 
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stated before, due to pressures from soldiers on the ground, in July 2009, Germany began to 
designate its Afghan mission as a warlike situation and eliminated some of the national caveats 
imposed on German forces.148
Recognizing the weaknesses in Germany counterinsurgency capacity, the United States 
sent 2,500 soldiers to Kunduz in 2010. Among the 2,500 U.S. soldiers 1,000 were deployed for 
training Afghan security forces, and the rest on counterinsurgency operations. Critics observe 
that additional U.S. troops in the German area of operation would increase the pressure on 
Germany for taking more military risks of counterinsurgency. Otherwise, the German forces in 
northern Afghanistan would find themselves playing a supportive role.  
 Such relaxed rules of engagement improved the German forces’ 
sustainability, interoperability and deployability. This had resulted into a changed circumstance, 
in which the German troops would increasingly assume the military risks of fighting the Taliban 
insurgents in Afghanistan.  
In summary, Germany’s weak counterinsurgency capability has contributed to an 
insufficient burden-sharing role for the Bundeswehr forces in Afghanistan. Although Germany 
deployed several offensive military resources in Afghanistan, the lack of political leadership and 
legally constrained rules of engagement deprived the German forces of the opportunity to share 
the increasing risks of combat operations.  However, since 2009, relaxed rules of engagements 
and political authorization for the use of force caused some improvements in the ability of the 
German forces to take more military risks of counterinsurgency. In 2010, the deployment of 
2,500 U.S. troops to northern Afghanistan put an additional pressure on German the forces. The 
German forces now have two options: to take more risks of fighting the Taliban insurgents, or to 
                                                            
148 “Changing the Rules in Afghanistan: German Troops Beef Up Fight against Taliban,” Der Spiegel, July 9, 
2009. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,635192,00.html, accessed January 1, 2011.  
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play a supportive reconstruction role. The political constraints analyzed in this chapter indicate 
that Germany is less likely to choose the first option, and continue the path of a reconstruction 
mission.  
 
III. Summary and Conclusion 
Germany’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides support for my burden-
sharing model. In shaping Berlin’s Afghanistan policy, the German leaders were confronted with 
two systemic pressures: alliance solidarity and balance of threat. As a principal NATO member 
and a key U.S. ally, Germany joined the Afghanistan War by sending Bundeswehr forces in 
2002, placing most soldiers under the UN-mandated ISAF command, and only 100 Special 
Forces under the U.S.-led OEF command. Germany also played an important role when NATO 
assumed ISAF command in August 2003. NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment 
made it obligatory for Germany to join the coalition. However, Article 5 cannot predict what 
specific role a NATO member would play in the coalition, and whether it should remain 
supportive of the coalition. Germany’s alliance solidarity, defined as its longstanding 
commitment to NATO and transatlantic alliance, provides answers to these questions. After 
alliance solidarity, the threat of Islamist terrorism provided an additional incentive to support the 
Afghanistan War coalition. Evidence of the terrorist threat can be traced in the existence of Al 
Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell, which was responsible for the planning and execution of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. Another piece of evidence comes from the resurgence of Taliban activities in 
Bundeswehr-controlled northern Afghanistan.  
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 This chapter shows that the systemic pressures of alliance solidarity and balance of threat 
were transmitted through the German domestic political process, which strongly shaped the 
country’s Afghanistan policy. Figure 5.6 presents the German decision process regarding its 
burden-sharing role in Afghanistan.  
Figure 5.6 The German Decision Process on Afghanistan 
 
 
First, Chancellor Schröder and his successor Merkel were bound by the constitutional 
limits in designing their Afghan policy. The German constitution provides for the use of force for 
collective security purposes, but prohibits participation in a war of aggression. War is a loaded 
term in German political culture, which equates combat operations with a war of aggression. As 
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a result of such constitutional restrictions and a distinctively cultural connotation of war, the 
German parliament had to approve the force deployment decisions. In November 2001, 
Chancellor Schröder confronted stiff opposition, including a vote of no-confidence, in deploying 
troops to Afghanistan. Subsequent decisions on military deployment were approved in the 
parliament without any major political risks for the Schröder and Merkel governments. However, 
the parliamentary mandate restricted the use of force for combat operations. Instead, it 
authorized the use of force, including firepower, only for self-defense, and support for allied 
troops. As a result of such restrictive mandate, the German government imposed national 
caveats, and sold the Afghan mission to a skeptical public as a purely peace-keeping mission. 
Second, in the parliament, the German government enjoyed a relatively stable elite 
consensus in getting the legal mandate for Bundeswehr deployment. However, due to a largely 
pacific political culture, German public rejected the use of force, while providing support for a 
defensive reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan. This chapter has shown that the German 
government chose a balanced approach to elite consensus and public opinion. First, both 
Schröder and Merkel maintained a defensive stabilization role for Bundeswehr forces in 
Afghanistan. Second, they countered NATO allies’ pressures to redeploy Bundeswehr forces into 
the restive southern Afghanistan.  
 Finally, unlike the major NATO allies, such as Britain, and the United States, Germany 
lacked a strong military and a counterinsurgency doctrine. The imposition of tight rules of 
engagement further limited its ability to fight the Taliban insurgency. Such capacity gap was 
compounded by the lack of political and strategic leadership needed to transform the 
Bundeswehr from a territorial army to a rapidly deployable force with the ability to project 
power in out of area operations.  
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Recognizing Germany’s capacity gap, in 2010 the United States sent 2,500 soldiers in 
northern Afghanistan to fight Taliban and train Afghan forces. The deployment of U.S. soldiers 
to the German controlled northern Afghanistan showed the weakness in Berlin’s burden-sharing 
strategy. It is likely that until the much publicized 2014 deadline, when NATO forces are 
expected to transfer security to Afghan forces, the Bundeswehr will achieve only incremental 
progress in developing a full-fledged counterinsurgency capability. During this time (2011-
2014), training for the indigenous Afghan forces would be the only area, where the German 
military is likely to make an increased contribution.149
 
 This is due to the fact that unlike fighting 
the Taliban insurgency, rebuilding the Afghan forces can avoid the public outcry and political 
risks for an incumbent German government. NATO allies are slowly recognizing such German 
predicaments and adapting to the changing security situation in Afghanistan.  
                                                            
149 German Federal Government, “Paving the Way for a Responsible Handover” – Germany’s Engagement in 
Afghanistan after the London Conference, Berlin, January 25, 2010, pp. 7-10. 
http://www.germany.info/contentblob/2578134/Daten/641885/AFG_Plan_PostLondon_PDF.pdf, accessed January 
6, 2011. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PAKISTAN:  
AN UNCERTAIN PARTNER WITH CONFLICTED GOALS  
 
Pakistan’s contribution to the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan offers an interesting case to test 
the burden-sharing model. On September 13, 2001, President Pervez Musharraf joined the U.S.-
led coalition against terrorism.1 In less than two weeks, a U.S. Department of Defense joint task 
force negotiated with the Pakistani government a broad set of issues on which Pakistan could 
cooperate with the United States during the war in Afghanistan.2
                                                            
1 During an interview with PBS, Musharraf claimed that joining the Afghanistan War coalition was a “matter of 
principle,” and his Cabinet and corps commanders reached a similar conclusion. See: “Interview: President Pervez 
Musharraf,” PBS Frontline, May 14, 2002. 
 When the U.S.-led coalition 
countries invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, Pakistan provided the U.S. forces with access 
to air and land bases, blanket overflight and landing rights, and other critical logistical supports. 
Soon, the Pakistani forces entered the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to seal the borders and 
capture or kill Al Qaeda militias fleeing Afghanistan. Between October 2001 and December 
2010, the Pakistani forces carried out several high profile counterinsurgency campaigns in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (previously 
North West Frontier Province). The purpose of these military campaigns was two-fold: to 
stabilize Pakistan’s north-west region, and to complement the U.S. and coalition operations in 
Afghanistan. In 2004, the United States adopted a strategy of using unmanned aerial vehicles 
(widely known as drones) to target the terrorist and insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/musharraf.html, accessed February 28, 2011; 
“Pakistani Leader Claims U.S. Threat After 9/11,” New York Times, September 22, 2006. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html, accessed February 17, 2011. 
2 The DoD task force began negotiating Pakistan’s cooperation on September 24, 2001. See C.Christine Fair, 
Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 15. 
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area. Since 2008, the drone strikes had sharply escalated, and continued to expand its target 
areas. Pakistan either tolerated the drone strikes, or provided tacit intelligence and political 
support to carry out the U.S. drone strikes.  
 The Pakistan case is puzzling for several reasons. First, Pakistan’s participation in the 
Afghanistan War coalition marked a sharp departure from its friendly relations with the Taliban 
regime in Kabul. Second, although Pakistan overtly supported the U.S. and coalition war goals in 
Afghanistan, it did not completely abandon the Afghan Taliban militias residing in its territories. 
Instead, the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies had reportedly maintained a clandestine 
support with various Afghanistan-focused Taliban groups. Third and more interestingly, as the 
U.S. drone strikes in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa Province increased, Pakistan openly 
criticized the drone strikes, but provided tacit support to carry out the strikes.  
 What explains the puzzling phenomena of Pakistan’s entry into, and dubious support to, 
the Afghanistan War coalition? Conventional wisdoms focus on the neo-realist and strategic 
culture theories to analyze Pakistan’s coalition contribution. Simply speaking, the neo-realists 
look into the international level explanations, whereas the strategic culturalists focus on the 
domestic level and ideational factors in analyzing Pakistan’s coalition behavior. This chapter 
argues that the neo-realist and strategic culture theories offer partial explanations for analyzing 
Pakistan’s coalition behavior. In contrast, a neo-classical realist theory provides better 
explanations for analyzing and predicting Pakistan’s foreign and security policy toward the 
Afghanistan coalition. Taking a neo-classical realist position, my burden-sharing model offers an 
integrated framework to analyze Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. My 
analytical model examines the effect of three international systemic incentives: alliance 
dependence, balance of threat, and the free-riding motivation of collective action in shaping 
260 
 
Pakistan’s policy choices. It then investigates how the systemic incentives are transmitted 
through the domestic political processes to determine Pakistan’s coalition burden-sharing.  
For the neo-realists, the distribution of power in the South Asian sub-system, and 
Pakistan’s quest for a strategic parity with India would play a dominant role in structuring 
Islamabad’s policy preferences. Writing in the context of India-Pakistan nuclear proliferation, 
Kenneth Waltz once argued that Pakistan needed nuclear weapons to balance against India’s 
conventional military superiority.3 The same line of argument is used to explain Pakistan’s 
decisions to participate in the war on terrorism. In his memoir, In the Line of Fire, former 
Pakistani President Musharraf claims that he was compelled to join the U.S.-led coalition against 
terrorism to defend Pakistan’s national interests, and to counter India’s hegemonic ambitions in 
South Asia.4 Speaking of his decision process, Musharraf reasons that continued support for the 
Taliban regime could endanger Pakistan’s national security by prompting a collision with the 
United States, and by allowing India to take an advantage of such conflict. 5
                                                            
3 For a lively debate on nuclear proliferation in South Asia, see Scott D. Sagan, and Kenneth N. Waltz, The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2003), especially pages 88-
124. Sagan takes a pessimistic approach and argues that the possession of nuclear weapons is dangerous for India-
Pakistan relations. By contrast, Waltz takes an optimistic approach, and argues that nuclear weapons would act as a 
stabilizing factor in India-Pakistan relations. Leading South Asian experts concur with Waltz in predicting the 
stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. See: K. Shankar Bajpai, “Nuclear Exchange,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, June 24, 1993, p. 24; Shamshad Ahmad, “The Nuclear Subcontinent: Bringing Stability to South Asia,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 123-25. 
 By contrast, the 
decision to join the coalition would not only remove such dangers, but also enable Pakistan to 
protect its nuclear arsenal, and defend its interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Leading Pakistan 
4 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 201-203. Musharraf had 
earlier offered a similar view during his speech to the nation on September 19, 2001. See “Text: Pakistan President 
Musharraf,” Washington Post, September 19, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/pakistantext_091901.html, accessed February 25, 2011. 
5 Hassan Abbas and Husain Haqqani agree that Pakistan joined the Afghanistan War coalition to avoid a direct 
confrontation with the United States. See: Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drif Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and the 
America’s War on Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 217-222; Husain Haqqani, “The Role of Islam in 
Pakistan’s Future,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004-2005), p. 93. Haqqani wrote this article in his 
capacity as a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In April 2008, he was appointed 
Pakistani ambassador to the United States, and remained in that position as of writing this chapter in March 2011.  
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observers share a similar argument. Former Pakistani diplomat Shahid Amin notes that, 
“Realpolitik clearly demanded that Pakistan abandon its erstwhile support for the Taliban regime 
and join the U.S.-led coalition in the war against terror.”6 Rand national security experts Seth 
Jones and C. Christine Fair argue that although Pakistan joined the Afghanistan War coalition, 
Islamabad’s India-centric military doctrine often acted as a barrier to a full-fledged cooperation 
between Pakistan and the United States. They argue that Pakistan needed both “carrots and 
sticks” to provide effective support for the coalition. In the Afghanistan context, these carrots 
and sticks would include a mix of economic and military aid, as well as performance-based 
conditional assistance.7
Strategic culture theorists provide an alternative explanation. Contrary to the international 
systemic factors, strategic culturalists focus on the domestic level factors, and historical 
experience in analyzing Pakistan’s foreign policy decision-making process. 
  
8 Prominent 
Pakistani defense analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi contends that Pakistan’s dominant elite and their 
collective beliefs, norms and shared experience matter more in shaping its foreign policy.9
                                                            
6 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 316.  
 Peter 
Lavoy concurs with Rizvi, and contends that although Pakistan joined the coalition under threat 
from the United States, the strategic belief of Pakistan’s military-political leadership, its armed 
7 For a list of such carrots and sticks, see: Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2010), p. 134; In an earlier article, Seth Jones wrote about the importance of carrots and 
sticks in changing Pakistan’s policy of state-sponsored terrorism. See: Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” 
Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2007): 15-32.   
8 Colin Gray, “National Styles in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 
1981), pp. 21-47. Alastair Ian Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 
(1995), pp. 36-64; Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 1977). 
9 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture,” in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and 
Alliances (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War , College, 2002), 305.  
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forces, and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) would ultimately determine the country’s 
Afghanistan policy.10
Feroz Khan offers a similar view. He argues that Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions are 
not determined by a “net assessment of threat based on reality;” instead it’s “image of the self,” 
and the “image of the adversary” create a strategic milieu that explain the foreign policy choices 
for Pakistani leaders.
  
11 Khan stresses that, historically, Pakistan’s image of the adversary has 
focused on India in the east and Afghanistan in the west. India poses a long-standing threat to 
Pakistan’s territorial integrity, whereas Afghanistan’s rejection of the Durand Line undermines 
the sanctity of Pakistan’s western borders. Pakistan’s national security elites have sought nuclear 
deterrence with India, and a friendly regime in Afghanistan to mitigate its key security 
predicaments. The ruling elites in Islamabad believe that the latter goal—the pursuit of a friendly 
regime in Afghanistan—will provide it with a strategic depth in the event of a nuclear conflict 
with India.12
                                                            
10 Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture: A Theoretical Excursion,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, Issue 10 
(October 2005), p. 10.  
 This quest for strategic depth has resulted into a policy that encourages Pakistan’s 
military and intelligence leadership to see various Afghan Taliban groups as a potential ally in 
future Afghanistan.  
11 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 
10 (October 2005), pp. 1-12.  
12 Hassan-Askari Rizvi describes Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth. He notes, “Pakistan’s territory lacks depth 
and the main railroad link from south to north (Karachi to Peshawar) runs parallel to the India-Pakistan border; at 
several points it is within 60 miles of the Indian border or the Line of Control in Kashmir. Three Pakistani cities 
(Lahore, Sialkot, Kasur) are situated very close to the border, and there are hardly any natural barriers like rivers and 
mountains on the India-Pakistan border, especially in the Punjab area. No Pakistani military airfield with the 
exception of Quetta is more than 150 miles from the Indian border. Such a situation creates serious handicaps for the 
security managers because an adequate defense of these population centers and communication lines calls for 
confronting the troops of the adversary right on the border or in the adversary’s territory.” See: Rizvi, “Pakistan’s 
Strategic Culture,” pp. 311-312. On the issue of Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan, see: Ahmad 
Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 25.  
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This chapter shows that the neorealist and strategic culture theories provide a useful 
starting point for analyzing Pakistan’s coalition contribution. However, each of them tends to 
ignore an important level of analysis, and hence fails to provide sufficient explanations for 
analyzing why Pakistan joined the U.S.-led coalition, yet emerged as an uncertain partner in the 
war on terrorism.  Combining the theoretical insights of neo-realism and strategic culture, I offer 
a neo-classical realist explanation of burden-sharing behavior. I argue that Pakistan’s dependence 
on a bilateral alliance with the United States, and its changing perception of Al Qaeda terrorist 
threat provided two systemic incentives to join and support the Afghanistan War coalition. These 
systemic incentives were channeled through the domestic political processes, in which Pakistan’s 
chief executive’s decision power and the strength of its military capability strongly determined 
the course of its Afghanistan policy. I develop a neo-classical realist model of burden-sharing, 
and show a better causal process linking the systemic and domestic level intervening variables to 
predict and explain the burden-sharing behavior of Pakistan. 
 This chapter has three sections. The first section details Pakistan’s diplomatic, military, 
and reconstruction contributions to the War in Afghanistan. The second section tests the burden-
sharing model in analyzing Pakistan’s contributions. The third section summarizes the key 
research findings.  
 
I. Pakistan’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan  
This section examines Pakistan’s military and non-military contributions to the war on terrorism. 
It has several interesting findings. First, it shows that Pakistan has mostly pursued a reactive 
diplomacy toward the U.S.-led coalition. Next, it shows the challenges to Pakistan’s 
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counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The third focuses on 
Pakistan’s indirect economic contribution, such as hosting a large refugee population, and 
increased trading exchange, to support the Afghan reconstruction and stabilization process.  
 
 Diplomatic Contribution. Pakistan was a frontline state in the war on terrorism. President 
Musharraf joined the U.S.-led coalition, and wanted to make a strong political contribution to the 
war on terrorism. His concept of ‘enlightened moderation’ stressed that the Muslim nations in 
the world should reject terrorism and focus on internal socio-economic development. At the 
same time, the Western countries, especially the United States, should focus on resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the Indo-Pak Kashmir dispute.13
 Pakistan’s reactive diplomacy was evident in Islamabad’s interactions with Kabul and 
Washington in addressing the issues of fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban, and contributing to 
Afghan reconstruction and development. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
 Although Musharraf’s vision for 
a proactive diplomacy gained some currency among the Muslim nations at the Organization of 
Islamic Conference, Pakistan largely pursued a reactive diplomacy to support the Afghanistan 
War coalition. A reactive diplomacy is defined here as one, in which a country merely responds 
to the principal actors in the international system. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
provide a comprehensive account of Pakistan’s diplomatic contributions to the Afghanistan War 
coalition. Instead, it focuses on the key summits and meetings among the Afghan, Pakistani, and 
U.S. presidents. The purpose is to examine how Pakistan dealt with the U.S. and Afghan 
concerns over key issues regarding the war on terrorism.  
                                                            
13 For a brief discussion on Musharraf’s ideas on enlightened moderation, see: Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 
pp. 297-299. 
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in the United States, Musharraf condemned the terrorist attacks, and called for international 
cooperation to suppress the “modern day evil” of terrorism.14 Soon after the attacks, Musharraf 
came under serious pressures from the U.S. government, to join the coalition against terrorism. 
On September 13, 2001, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage handed a list of seven 
demands to Pakistan’s ISI chief General Mahmoud Ahmad, who was then visiting Washington 
on an official trip. The list stressed that Pakistan should stop Al Qaeda at the border, provide the 
United States with unconditional landing permission, offer land and naval access to U.S. forces, 
break diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, and cut off recruits and supplies to 
the Taliban.15 Armitage reportedly threatened—an allegation he denied—that if Pakistan failed 
to comply with the U.S. demands, it would be bombed back to the stone age.16 Fearing a strong 
reprisal from the United States, Musharraf complied with the U.S. demands by breaking off 
diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, and joining the U.S.-led coalition against 
terrorism.17
 Under the administration of President Musharraf, Pakistan claimed that it was playing a 
constructive role as a coalition partner. Initially, Mushrraf pursued a failed diplomacy to 
persuade the Taliban leader Mullah Omar to transfer Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the 
U.S. authorities.
  
18
                                                            
14 “Arafat Horrified by Attacks, but Thousands of Palestinians Celebrate; Rest of World Outraged,” Fox News, 
September 12, 2011. 
 After the U.S.-led coalition forces began a massive bombing of Afghanistan 
on October 7, 2001, the anti-Taliban militias, belonging to the Northern Alliance joined them in 
a ground offensive. By December 2001, the Taliban regime completely collapsed, and the United 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,34187,00.html, accessed February 17, 2011. 
15 Bob Woodward, Bush At War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 58-59. 
16 “US ‘Threatened to Bomb’ Pakistan,” BBC News, September 22, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5369198.stm, accessed March 7, 2011.  
17 Musharraf described this was a rational, rather than emotional decision. His reasoning process was described 
in a memoir. See: Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 201-203. 
18 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 216.  
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Nations moved ahead to form an interim government for Afghanistan. Pakistan insisted that the 
moderate Taliban be included in a post-Taliban regime.19
 As the War in Afghanistan progressed, Musharraf met with Presidents Bush and Karzai 
and pressed for a common position on the war in Afghanistan. In early 2002, Musharraf visited 
Afghanistan and expressed his willingness to fight terrorism and contribute to Afghan 
reconstruction.
 Pakistan also noted that the Pashtun 
communities needed to be well represented in the Afghan government to balance against any 
domination by the Northern Alliance leaders. The Bonn Summit in December 2001 elected 
Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader, as the head of an interim Afghan government, but the interim 
administration also included many powerful Northern Alliance leaders.  
20 In 2003, a Tripartite Commission was formed to promote dialogue among 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States.21
During his bilateral and trilateral meetings with the Afghan and U.S. presidents, 
Musharraf stressed that Pakistan was committed to the U.S. and coalition strategy in 
Afghanistan. For instance, Pakistan supported the conduct of Afghanistan’s October 2004 
presidential elections. It assisted the Afghan authorities in the conduct of votes in Afghan 
refugee camps in Pakistan.
 The purpose of the Commission was to discuss 
issues of common concern, such as cross-border terrorism and insurgency perpetrated by the Al 
Qaeda and Taliban militants.  
22
                                                            
19 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation,” Asia Report No. 62 
(Kabul/Brussels: ICG, August 5, 2003). 
 Pakistan also deployed its military forces to fight a growing 
insurgency in its Waziristan tribal agency. President Bush admired the contribution made by 
20 Nadeem Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy Unchanged,” Asia Times, April 10, 2002. 
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD10Df04.html, accessed February 25, 2011.  
21 Barnett R. Rubin, and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” Special Report, 
No. 176 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, October 2006), p. 18. 
22 Marvin Weinbaum, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood, Special Report no. 
162 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 2006), p. 10. 
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Musharraf, and especially, the Pakistani military forces in the fight against terrorism. In 
December 2004, during his meeting with Musharraf, Bush said:   
[Pakistani] army has been incredibly active and very brave in southern Waziristan 
flushing out an enemy that had thought they had found safe haven…His army has 
suffered casualties and for that we want to thank their loved ones for the sacrifice 
that their family has made.23
 Musharraf continued to claim that his country was pursuing a constructive role during the 
war on terrorism. However, cross-border insurgent attacks, and Afghan criticism raised 
important questions regarding the credibility of Pakistani claims. In September 2005, during a 
visit to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in Tampa, Florida, Musharraf 
met CENTCOM chief General John Abizaid, and stressed the need for continued cooperation in 
the fight against terrorism. During his meeting with General Abizaid, Musharraf claimed that 
Pakistan was supporting the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
 
24 Despite the U.S. and coalition 
operations in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas, 
insurgent attacks on U.S. and NATO forces increased significantly during the summer of 2005. 
For instance, attacks from improvised explosive devices (IED) were responsible for one in every 
five coalition troop deaths.25
The Afghan President Karzai bluntly held that Pakistan was sponsoring insurgents in its 
territory. In February 2006, during a visit to Islamabad, Karzai insisted that top Taliban leaders 
 The U.S. and NATO officials often claimed that the Pakistan-based 
Afghan Taliban groups were responsible for these increasing attacks on coalition forces.  
                                                            
23 “Bush Defends Pakistan’s Efforts in Terror War,” Fox News, Dec. 4, 2004. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,140500,00.html, accessed Feb. 16, 2011.  
24 “Musharraf and Abizaid Vow to Clamp Down on  Terrorists,” Daily Times, September 20, 2005. 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_20-9-2005_pg7_38, accessed February 17, 2011. 
25 See Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera, and Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Afghanistan Index, 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, October 19, 2010), pp. 10-11. 
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were using Pakistan as a safe haven for attacking Afghanistan. Musharraf rejected the allegation. 
In March 2006, Bush met Karzai in Kabul and agreed on Pakistan’s need to improve its security 
measures against Al Qaeda and Taliban.26 After his Kabul visit, Bush met with Musharraf in 
Islamabad, and asked the Pakistani president to be tough on terrorism. During a joint press 
conference, Bush said he went to Pakistan “to determine whether or not the president 
(Musharraf) is as committed as he has been in the past.”27 Karzai went public again in May 
2006, when he said that the Pakistan-based madrassa (Islamic seminary) students were going to 
Afghanistan to wage a holy war.28 In June 2008, Karzai bluntly said that Pakistan’s military 
intelligence was fuelling terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan.29 Frustrated by the cross-
border Taliban attacks, Karzai warned that he would send Afghan troops to Pakistan to fight the 
Taliban militias.30
Islamabad’s diplomatic response was two-fold: to deny any state-sponsorship of 
terrorism; and to accuse Afghanistan of destabilizing Pakistan. In March 2006, Musharraf told 
that Karzai gave him “old and outdated” information on Taliban leaders. In September 2006, 
Musharraf warned that the problem of Taliban insurgency was rooted in Afghanistan, and Karzai 
  
                                                            
26 The Afghan and U.S. presidents were perhaps concerned about the resurgence of Taliban, and the growing 
insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. Since 2002, troop fatalities from improvised explosive devices (IED) registered a 
sharp increase. In 2002 and 2003, IED-caused deaths accounted for only 10% and 2% of all U.S. and coalition troop 
fatalities. This increased significantly to 23% in 2004 and 18% in 2005. See Brookings Afghanistan Index, October 
2010, p. 11. 
27 Sami Yousufzai, Ron Moreau, and Zahid Hussein, “A Risky Feud,” Newsweek, March 20, 2006. 
http://www.newsweek.com/2006/03/19/a-risky-feud.html, accessed February 16, 2011. 
28 “Karzai Blames Pakistan Over Taliban Attacks,” ABC News, May 19, 2006. 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200605/s1642872.htm, accessed February 17, 2011. 
29 “Karzai blames Pakistan for Recent Attacks,” Montreal Gazette, July 14, 2008. 
http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/story.html?id=fafff98a-f97a-40f0-9029-9a7271efbbbc, accessed February 
17, 2011. 
30 Declan Walsh, “Karzai Threatens to Send Troops Into Pakistan,” Guardian, June 16, 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/16/afghanistan.pakistan, accessed February 17, 2011. 
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needed to do more to improve the security situation in his country.31 In his memoir, Musharraf 
writes, “Pakistan’s own stability is linked with peace in Afghanistan. The Afghan government 
needs to focus more on improving security inside its own country instead of blaming others.”32 
Musharraf accused that Afghanistan and India were fomenting insurgency in Pakistan’s 
resource-rich Balochistan Province.33
As the disputes between Karzai and Musharraf grew, normalization of Afghan-Pakistan 
relations became a top priority for the United States. On September 27, 2006, Karzai and 
Musharraf met with Bush at the White House. The U.S. officials claimed that the purpose of the 
meeting was to defuse the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to devise a long-term 
common strategy for the prosecution of the war on terrorism.
 
34 Hussein Haqqani, currently 
Pakistani ambassador to the United States, and then a faculty member at the Boston University, 
offered a pessimistic analysis of the Karzai-Musharraf-Bush meeting. Haqqani noted that such 
personal diplomacy could only produce results if backed by “meticulous intelligence work and 
diligent diplomacy at a lower level.”35
                                                            
31 “Pakistan Critises Afghan Action,” BBC News, September 21, 2006. 
 Afghanistan and Pakistan lacked such operational 
cooperation at the lower level. The lack of such cooperation would continue to affect coalition 
operations against terrorism. A positive change in the Af-Pak relations was expected in August 
2007, when Kabul hosted a joint Afghan-Pakistan peace jirga, (tribal council). The peace jirga 
was attended by 700 people, including senior political, religious, tribal, and business leaders 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5366128.stm, accessed February 17, 2011. 
32 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 272. 
33 Sami Yousufzai, Ron Moreau, and Zahid Hussein, “A Risky Feud,” Newsweek, March 20, 2006. 
http://www.newsweek.com/2006/03/19/a-risky-feud.html, accessed February 16, 2011. 
34 Glenn Kessler and Michael A bramowitz, “Bush Brings Afghanistan, Pakistan to the Table,” Washington 
Post, Sept. 27, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/26/AR2006092601565.html, 
accessed February 16, 2011. 
35 Quoted in Kessler and A bramowitz, “Bush Brings Afghanistan, Pakistan to the Table. 
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from both countries.36
Under the government of Asif Zardari, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan 
improved significantly, albeit at the behest of U.S. diplomacy. In 2009, Pakistan joined several 
trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and the United States to review the progress in the war on 
terrorism, and to identify mutual areas of cooperation. During a trilateral meeting in May 2009, 
Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan to reform the old 
transit trade agreement. The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton termed the MoU a “historic 
event”, which would bring more foreign investment to both countries. 
 The purpose of the jirga was to adopt a common approach to dealing with 
Afghanistan. 
37
Prior to the trilateral meeting in Istanbul and the trade agreement in Kabul, President 
Karzai visited Islamabad in March 2010 to improve the relations between two neighboring 
countries. What explains such diplomatic move by Karzai, who was overtly critical of Pakistan’s 
role only a few years ago? According to Teresita Schaffer, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary 
of state for South Asia, Karzai made a strategic move to normalize the relations with Pakistan. 
 The MoU allowed 
shipping trucks to be transported to each other’s territories. Diplomatic relations between Kabul 
and Islamabad further improved in September 2010, when a U.S.-Afghan-Pakistan trilateral 
meeting was held in Istanbul to discuss agricultural cooperation between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. This agricultural dialogue was followed by the signing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) in October 2010. The APTTA would boost transit trade and 
regional economic growth in both countries, and draw more foreign investments.  
                                                            
36 Afghanistan Embassy – Islamabad, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations,” Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs., 
February 20, 2011. http://islamabad.mfa.gov.af/af-pk-relations.asp, accessed February 20, 2011.  
37 Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, “U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Consultations II” Washington, 
D.C., May 6, 2009. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/05/122706.htm, accessed February 15, 2011.  
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As U.S. President Barack Obama declared that U.S. troops might begin withdrawal in 2011, if 
the conditions on the ground permit, Karzai had “concluded that it is in his interest to work more 
closely with the Pakistanis.”38
The United States considered such improvement in Af-Pak relations essential to the 
success of U.S. and coalition-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan’s 
archrival, India, was concerned that Karzai’s Pakistan visit would alter the balance of power, by 
marginalizing Indian interest in Afghanistan. Iran and Afghanistan’s northern neighbors were 
also concerned that the diplomatic thaw in Af-Pak relations might bring Taliban to the 
negotiating table, which would be detrimental to the interests of non-Pashtun Afghans, such as 
the Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups.
  
39 The U.S. officials, including former special 
representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, met with their Indian 
counterparts to assuage New Delhi’s security concerns. They stressed that improved relations 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan need not be perceived as detrimental to the Indian national 
interest.40
In summary, Pakistan pursued a reactive diplomacy to support the Afghanistan War 
coalition. Islamabad’s most crucial contribution was to sever the diplomatic relations with the 
Taliban regime. This was a U-turn in Pakistani foreign policy, which had patronized the Taliban 
since 1996. After the fall of the Taliban regime, Pakistan did not host any major international 
conferences, like the Bonn Summit or the London Conferences on Afghanistan. Instead, it stayed 
  
                                                            
38 Gary Thomas, “Afghan-Pakistan Relations Thaw, For Now,” VOA News, July 23, 2010. 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Afghan-Pakistan-Relations-Thaw-For-Now-99130364.html, accessed 
February 20, 2011.  
39 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Neighboring Countries Wary of Thaw in Afghan-Pakistan Relations,” Washington 
Post, July 25, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/AR2010072303316.html, 
accessed February 20, 2011.  
40 Chandrasekaran, “Neighboring Countries Wary of Thaw in Afghan-Pakistan Relations.” 
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on the sideline, and mostly responded to the U.S. war strategy in bilateral and trilateral forums 
attended by Kabul and Washington. Pakistan consistently denied that it hosted the three major 
Afghan insurgent groups—Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the 
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin network. For U.S. and NATO leaders, Islamabad could make a strong 
contribution if it would have acknowledged the existence of these groups, and have brought them 
into a process of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.  
 
Offensive Military Contribution. In the military realm, Pakistan pursued a dual approach 
to support the Afghanistan War coalition. This dual approach consisted of providing the United 
States with access to vital military assets, and deploying the military forces to fight terrorism and 
insurgency in the Pak-Afghan border areas. While access to the military assets offered important 
support to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Pakistani forces’ weak combat 
performance had often undermined the coalition success in Afghanistan. Recognizing the 
deficiencies in Pakistan’s military operations, the United States relied on the increased use of 
armed drones to target the terrorist sanctuaries in the FATA. Pakistan openly criticized the 
attacks, but secretly supported them with targeting intelligence and a blanket approval. 
Pakistan’s military contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition can be grouped into four 
categories: (a) granting the United States access to military assets for coalition purposes; (b) 
increasing troop deployment along the Pak-Afghan borders; (c) sustained military offensives in 
the Pak-Afghan border areas: and (d) support for U.S. drone strikes in the FATA and the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province. These four categories of contributions are analyzed below. 
First, Pakistan responded to the U.S. demands for counterterror cooperation by providing 
U.S. military forces and intelligence operatives blanket flyover and landing rights, and access to 
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Pakistani military bases. Pakistan also cut the logistical supply to the Afghan Taliban regime. 
The Musharraf government gave the United States access to Pakistani ports to deliver foods, 
water, and other non-lethal supplies to the coalition forces in landlocked Afghanistan.41
Figure 6.1 The Pakistan Army Disposition 
  
 
Source: Stratfor Global Intelligence; adapted from Sameer Lalwani, Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency 
Campaign: A Net Assessment (Washington, D.C.: The New American Foundation, September 2009), p. 41.  
                                                            
41 Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation With Pakistan and India, p. 15. 
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Second, as the U.S.-led forces invaded Afghanistan in early October 2001, Pakistan 
deployed its military and paramilitary forces, and intelligence operatives along the Afghan-
Pakistan borders. It set up nearly 1,000 border posts and interdicted hundreds of Al Qaeda and 
Taliban militants fleeing from Afghanistan.42
Figure 6.2 shows Pakistan’s troop deployment figures from 2001 to 2010. It reveals that 
two major types of Pakistani forces were deployed in the tribal areas: the paramilitary Frontier 
Corps and the regular armed forces. A salient feature in Pakistani troop deployment in the tribal 
areas was the increased deployment of the Pakistan Army, which was involved in a protracted 
war against the Al Qaeda terrorist group, and the Taliban insurgents. At least two factors 
contributed to this growing deployment of the Pakistani Army to the border areas near 
Afghanistan. First, the paramilitary Frontier Corps was limited to only 60,000 personnel. As a 
result,, additional troops had to be generated from the regular armed forces, since the civilian 
police forces were not capable of clearing areas occupied by insurgents. Second, the Frontier 
Corps was poorly resourced and lacked the sophisticated weapons to fight the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban militants. The Pakistani government recognized this capacity gap in the paramilitary 
 Pakistan also conducted nearly 80 military 
operations in the northwest tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan. Figure 6.1 shows the disposition 
of the Pakistan Army in the FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It indicates that the 
XI Corps and its 7th and 9th infantry divisions are mainly responsible for prosecuting the war on 
terrorism in the border areas. 
                                                            
42 According to a senior Pakistani diplomat to the United Nations, Pakistan set up 938 military posts along the 
Afghan borders. Brookings data show that in 2010, Pakistan had 831 military posts along the Afghan borders. See: 
“Statement by Ambassador Amjad Hussain B. Sial, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Sixth 
Committee during 65th UN General Assembly on agenda item 107: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism 
(6 October 2010).” http://www.pakun.org/statements/Sixth_Committee/2010/10062010-01.php, accessed February 
16, 2011; Also see Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of 
Reconstruction and Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 30, 2011), p . 8 
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force, and addressed this gap by deploying more conventional and Special Forces from the 
Pakistan Army.  
Figure 6.2 The Pakistani Forces Deployed to the Afghanistan Border Areas 
 
         Source: Adapted from Brookings Pakistan Index, January 30, 2011. 
Third, the Pakistani forces were engaged in frequent military offensives against the Al 
Qaeda and Taliban militias. Seth Jones and C. Christine Fair find that between 2001 and 2010, 
Pakistani forces conducted nearly a dozen major operations in the FATA and NWFP.43
                                                            
43 For a detailed discussion on the Pakistani offensives in the Afghan border areas, see Jones and Fair, 
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 33-84.  
 Broadly 
speaking, these operations had three principal goals: (a) to capture or kill senior Al Qaeda leaders 
and to help overthrow the Taliban regime; (b) to capture or kill senior leaders of Al Qaeda 
affiliated foreign fighters, such as the Arab, Chechen and Uzbek militias; and (c) to clear the 
areas controlled by the Pakistani Taliban groups, such as Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrek-e-Taliban 
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Pakistan (TTP), and Maulana Sufi Mohammed’s Tehrek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
(TNSM).44
 
   
Pakistan’s operations against the militants in the tribal area began in support of the U.S.-
led OEF mission.45 These operations were concentrated in several tribal agencies (administrative 
districts), such as Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. In October 
2001, the Frontier Corps soldiers in the Bajaur Agency engaged the Al Qaeda and Taliban 
militias fleeing Afghanistan. In December 2001, when the U.S.-led coalition forces in 
Afghanistan were engaged in the Battle of Torabora to hunt down Al Qaeda leader bin Laden, 
the Pakistani forces arrested a number of fleeing Al Qaeda and foreign militias in the Khyber and 
Kurram Agencies. After the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, and the Battle of 
Kandahar in December 2001, the U.S.-led OEF forces launched Operation Anaconda, the first 
major ground offensive in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province, in March 2002. Across the border in 
North and South Waziristan, Pakistan reinforced its troop deployment to stop the infiltration of 
fleeing militants. In 2002, soldiers from Pakistani military, Special Armed Services Group, and 
the Frontier Corps launched several offensives in North and South Waziristan Agencies, Khyber 
Agency, and the Balochistan Province.46
                                                            
44 A summary of the major Pakistani military operations in the war on terrorism is available in Jones and Fair, 
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 76.  
  
45 In the context of the Afghanistan War, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was conceived as a U.S.-led 
offensive counterterrorism mission. By contrast, the UN-backed and later NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) was launched as a defensive stabilization mission. The two missions merged in 2006, when 
ISAF completed the expansion of its area of operation to include the whole of Afghanistan. The two missions are 
now commanded by U.S. General David Petraeus.   
46 For a detailed discussion, see Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, “Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and the War against 
Terrorism –Part Two,” Terrorism Monitor, August 11, 2008; Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 41-
45.  
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In a nutshell, in 2001 and 2002, Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led OEF mission was 
extremely important in achieving two principal goals of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. 
Using access to Pakistani military bases, and airspaces, as well as ground transportation routes, 
the United States launched an effective military campaign that destroyed Al Qaeda’s training 
facilities, and toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military offensives also 
complemented the OEF mission in Afghanistan in capturing and killing Al Qaeda and foreign 
militias. Despite making such important contributions to the OEF mission, Pakistan’s support 
had limited effect in containing the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban insurgency. As described 
above, during the earlier phases of the war on terrorism, the Pakistani internal security operations 
in the northern border areas were mainly focused on capturing or killing the Al Qaeda militants. 
One of the major limitations of such Al Qaeda-centric operations was that both the Pakistani and 
U.S. governments overlooked the urgency of containing the Taliban militias, and protecting the 
population in the tribal areas. According to Jones and Fair, Pakistan’s military offensives in 
North and South Waziristan, and the adjacent tribal agencies can best be characterized by ad hoc 
‘internal security’ operations. This means that Pakistan did not employ a coherent 
counterinsurgency strategy, which would clear the areas controlled by the Taliban insurgents, 
and secure the population centers for reconstruction and stabilization purposes.47
In June 2002, the Pakistani forces began Operation Al Mizan to suppress the Al Qaeda 
terrorists and the Taliban insurgents in South Waziristan.
  
48
                                                            
47 Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 44-45.  
 It was a large-scale military 
campaign that involved nearly 80,000 Pakistani forces from the paramilitary Frontier Corps, 
48 According to Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, the Pakistan-led Operation Al Mizan in the FATA coincided with the 
U.S.-led Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. Pakistan deployed two infantry divisions, comprising 74,000 troops in 
the Waziristans, whereas the U.S.-led forces deployed nearly 12,000 troops across the borders in Afghanistan. The 
operation resulted in the death of 302 militants, 221 soldiers, and the arrest of 656 militants. See: Ashraf, “Pakistan’s 
Frontier Corps and the War against Terrorism.” 
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Special Arms Services Groups, and army infantry, aviation, engineering, and signals corps. The 
campaign lasted until 2006, and involved several tactical operations targeting the Al Qaeda and 
Taliban compounds, and training grounds.49
The initial phase of Al Mizan focused on capturing or killing the Al Qaeda militias. In 
2003, the local administration in South Waziristan identified several tribesmen hosting a few Al 
Qaeda militants. The Pakistani forces engaged the Al Qaeda militants and their tribal hosts in a 
fierce battle. Using guerilla warfare tactics, the militants attacked the Pakistani army camps in 
Wana, and ambushed the Frontier Corps soldiers. In retaliation, the Pakistani forces launched 
three major tactical offensives: Operation Wana in March 2004, and Operation Shakai Valley in 
June 2004, and Operation Dila Khula in September 2004.
 Several assassination attempts against Musharraf 
and the growing insurgency in the FATA encouraged Pakistan to conduct such a prolonged 
military campaign.  
50
After the tactical offensives in South Waziristan, the Pakistani forces concentrated on 
North Waziristan. The military operations in North Waziristan targeted Al Qaeda terrorists and 
 Soldiers from the Pakistan Army, 
Air Force, Special Operations Task Force, and Frontier Corps were deeply involved in the 
operations. They targeted the Chechen and Uzbek terrorists, and the local Taliban militias 
belonging to Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP. The effect of the operations was enormous. They 
destroyed the terrorist command and control, propaganda machine, and logistic network. The Al 
Qaeda and Taliban militias suffered 350 fatalities and 800 arrests. The Pakistani forces had to 
pay a heavy price during these operations. Nearly 300 Pakistani soldiers were killed during the 
South Waziristan campaigns in 2004.  
                                                            
49 Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 46-56. 
50 These tactical offensives were part of a much broader and strategic offensive named Operation Mizan. For a 
discussion on the three tactical offensives, see: Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 268-271. 
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their compounds in the towns of Mir Ali and Miran Shah, where they used an effective 
propaganda campaign against the Pakistani forces. The terrorist propaganda depicted the 
Pakistani forces as infidels fighting an American War.51
Jones and Fair argue that Operation Al Mizan had low success. The Pakistani forces in 
North and South Waziristan failed to clear the areas from Al Qaeda and Taliban control, and did 
not have enough force to hold territories recovered from terrorists and insurgents. This inability 
to hold territories often resulted into a flawed strategy of singing peace deals. For instance, 
between April 2004 and September 2006, the Pakistani government signed two peace 
agreements with the Taliban insurgents. The peace deals gave the tribal leaders and Taliban 
militias a de facto control over the tribal territories. In return, they gave a non-verifiable 
assurance that the Arab and foreign militias belonging to Al Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban 
militias would not be allowed to operate from their territories.  
 The Pakistani and U.S. forces used 
precision airstrikes to target Al Qaeda hideouts in North Waziristan. 
In January 2008, the Pakistani forces launched Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan. 
The Pakistan Army used tanks, bulldozers, and artillery to destroy the areas controlled by 
Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network. The government forces applied the method of collective 
punishment, which alienated local tribesmen. Under the provisions of collective punishment, 
members of an entire group suffer a severe punishment for the misdeed of a tribal or group 
member. The operation also displaced 200,000 people. Due to such adverse humanitarian 
consequences, Operation Zalzala is considered an unsuccessful campaign, which ignored 
winning the hearts and minds of people. After Zalzala, the Pakistani forces focused on the 
northern most Bajaur Agency, where they began Operation Sher Dil in September 2008, which 
                                                            
51 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 272. 
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lasted until the next year. Prior to the Bajaur operation, local pro-Taliban militias unleashed a 
reign of terror, in which they killed government forces, and destroyed   security check points. 
The government responded heavily by deploying the Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps 
soldiers. The Pakistani forces used aerial bombings, bulldozers, and tanks to destroy the terrorist 
and insurgent camps. They also raised local tribal fighters to fight against anti-government 
militias and foreign militias. The Operation Sher Dil gained some tactical successes. For 
instance, the major Taliban-controlled areas were cleared, and the Taliban fighters suffered a 
huge blow. However, the Pakistani security forces failed to hold the territories after clearing 
them.  
So far, I have discussed Pakistan’s military offensives in the FATA bordering 
Afghanistan. These operations had mostly targeted the foreign Al Qaeda terrorists, and their 
local collaborators. The next two operations were carried out in the Swat Valley and its adjacent 
areas, located in the geopolitically important Pakhtunkhwa province. The Pakistani Taliban 
groups were the principal targets of these operations. Between 2007 and 2009, the Pakistani 
forces launched a three-staged Operation Rah-e-Haq in the Swat Valley. During the first stage, 
in November 2007, the local police conducted cordon-and-search operations. During the second 
stage, in July 2008, the search and cordon continued, while the military used attack helicopters 
and artillery strikes to destroy the terrorist camps. In the third stage, in January 2009, the military 
enforced a shoot-on-sight curfew. The Pakistani Taliban group TNSM retaliated fiercely, forcing 
the government to sign a peace deal, known as the Malakand Accord.52
                                                            
52 For a discussion on the peace deal in Swat Valley, and its implications for Pakistan’s fight against terrorism, 
see: Mukhtar Khan, “The Return of Shari’a Law To  Pakistan’s SWAT Region,” in Pakistan’s Troubled Frontier, 
edited by Hassan Abbas (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 2009), pp. 203-208. 
 Like the earlier peace 
deals in North and South Waziristan, the Malakand Accord agreed to institute Islamic law and 
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justice system in the Swat Valley. In return, the Taliban would stop attacking the Pakistani 
forces. Operation Rah-e-Haq was a serious failure for the Pakistani government. Instead of 
fighting terrorism and insurgency, the government was accused of pursuing a policy of appeasing 
the religious militants. The U.S. and its NATO allies severely criticized the Swat deal as it would 
provide a breathing space for the Al Qaeda and Taliban militias.  
After Operation Rah-e-Haq, the Pakistani forces launched Operation Rah-e-Rast in May 
2009. This time the targets were the Al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban insurgents in Swat, 
Buner, and Lower Dir. The Pakistani forces took a heavy-handed approach, and used helicopter 
gunships, fighter aircrafts, and artillery strikes to destroy Taliban targets. Although the Taliban 
militias were defeated in some areas, the operation displaced many local people, and alienated 
the tribesmen due to the provision of collective punishment. After clearing the major insurgent 
strongholds, the military retained some soldiers to hold the territory. After the military offensives 
were over, the greatest challenges were resettling several hundred thousand internally displaced 
people, and providing them with civilian-led development assistance. 
In June 2009 the Pakistani security forces concentrated on South Waziristan to defeat 
Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network. The anti-TTP offensive—Operation Rah-e-Nijat— began in 
the fall of 2009 and lasted for a few weeks. After the failed offensives and fragile peace accords 
in South Waziristan in the previous years, the purpose of Rah-e-Nijat was to eliminate Baitullah 
Mehsud’s TTP network, which had spread a reign of terror with numerous suicide attacks 
throughout the country, and systematic attacks on military and police targets. The United States 
had also targeted the TTP for its strong connection to fueling the insurgent attacks in 
Afghanistan. In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone strike. In January 
2010, his successor Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in another drone strike. The Pakistani forces 
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achieved a modest success in securing some areas controlled by the TTP militias. However, 
holding those areas appeared to be a challenging task.  
In 2009 and 2010, the Pakistani forces engaged in a sustained offensive in 2009 and 
2010, in the Kurram and Orakzai agencies in FATA. The operation in Kurram began in 
September 2009 and ended in June 2010. By contrast, the offensives in Orakzai began in March 
2010 and ended in June 2010. In both operations, the Pakistan Frontier Corps and the armed 
forces clashed with local Taliban and foreign Al Qaeda fighters. The government security forces 
used helicopter gunships and fighter jets to crush the insurgency. In the end, the security forces 
claimed success in clearing the areas, and holding them. Compared to the earlier failures in 
North and South Waziristan, and the Swat Valley, the military offensives in Kurram and Orakzai 
agencies proved to be more successful. This was due to increased pressures from the United 
States, and increasing level of intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Pakistani forces. The 
U.S. provided military equipments had also had positive contribution toward these operations. 
The fourth and final military contribution involves Pakistan’s secret support for the U.S. 
drones strikes in the FATA. Between 2001 and 2004, the emergence of FATA as a terrorist 
sanctuary alarmed the U.S. policymakers. In order to destroy the terrorist safe haven in FATA, 
they had to choose between two strategies: to attempt military incursions, or to launch precision 
airstrikes from pilotless combat aircrafts, such as the Predator drones. The first option was very 
dangerous, as Pakistan vowed to resist any military incursions into its sovereign territory. The 
second option was relatively safe, as it could avoid putting military boots on the ground, and thus 
reduce the likelihood of more U.S. troop casualties 
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Since June 2004, the United States had increasingly used Predator drones to strike the 
Pakistani tribal areas. My research shows that between June 2004 and December 2010, the 
United States carried out nearly 230 drone strikes, which killed at least 1,337 people, including 
militants and innocent civilians.53 Although the Bush administration introduced the drone strikes 
in Pakistan, the total number of such strikes, and their target areas increased significantly after 
Obama assumed U.S. presidency. During Obama’s tenure, in 2009 and 2010, the U.S. forces 
carried out nearly 80% of all drone strikes in Pakistan.54
In summary, until 2009, Pakistan had mostly pursued a weak counterinsurgency strategy 
in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa Province. Initially, the U.S.-led OEF mission in Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan’s internal security (counterterrorism and counterinsurgency) operations in the Afghan 
border areas focused on Al Qaeda militants, and spared the Taliban militias. This strategic 
neglect of the Taliban, coupled with the inability to hold territories, had resulted in growing 
 Pakistan provided tacit support to 
facilitate the drone strikes. The Pakistani government criticized the drone strikes openly, but 
offered secret support to coordinate the attacks.  The tacit support included the contribution of 
Pakistani intelligence agents to share secret information on drone targets. The drones, which 
were engaged in targeting Pakistani territories, were reportedly flown from Pakistan’s Shamsi 
airbase, where employees from private contractor Blackwater/Xe Services were believed to load 
the missiles into the unmanned aircraft systems.  
                                                            
53 According to Brookings Pakistan Index data, between 2004 and 2010, the U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan 
killed between 1,337 and 2,152 people. For a yearly breakdown of the total deaths from U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan, see Livingston and O’Hanlon, Brookings Pakistan Index, p. 8. 
54 Among the 230 drone strikes between 2004 and 2010, nearly 70% strikes targeted North Waziristan, and 22% 
targeted South Waziristan. The rest of the strikes targeted terrorists in other FATA agencies, and Pakhtunkhwa 
districts. For yearly data on U.S. drone strikes, and the target areas of the drone strikes, see Livingston and 
O’Hanlon, Brookings Pakistan Index, pp. 6-7. Also see, “Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the 
Drone,” New America Foundation, February 24, 2010; A.S.M. Ali Ashraf, “U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: 
Increasing Trends, Questionable Legitimacy, and the Issue of Tacit Cooperation,” Pakistan Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2010), pp. 1-46. 
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Talibanization of the country, especially, in the FATA. The United States responded to the 
terrorist sanctuary in FATA by increasing the drone strikes to kill senior leadership of Al Qaeda 
and Taliban. While the drone strikes had selectively targeted the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, 
the Pakistani ground offensives had more ambitious goals: to clear the territories, and to establish 
the writ of the government.  
 
Defensive Civil-Military Reconstruction Contribution. Pakistan’s contribution to the 
reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan was sharply different from the contributions 
made by the United Kingdom and Germany. Whereas the British and German governments were 
deeply involved in rebuilding the Afghan national security forces, and reconstructing the 
provincial level economy, the Pakistani government had made three distinct contributions. These 
included a relatively small commitment of foreign aid for Afghan reconstruction; the hosting of a 
large number of Afghan refugees, and the increasing volume of bilateral trade.  
First, after the fall of the Taliban regime, the flow of foreign aid provided direct support 
to the Karzai regime to reconstruct Afghanistan. In November 2001, Islamabad co-hosted an 
NGO meeting on Afghan reconstruction, co-sponsored by the United Nations Development 
Program, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.  NGO participants at the Islamabad 
meeting found that the Pakistani government officials were not seriously involved in the 
discussion process, despite the fact that Islamabad had a huge stake in post-war developments in 
Afghanistan.55
                                                            
55 Noor Ul Haq and Asifa Hasan (eds), IPRI Factfile: Post-Taliban Reconstruction in Afghanistan (Islamabad: 
Islambad Policy Research Institute, December 31, 2005), p. 36-41. 
 Pakistan had also participated in several international donor conferences on 
Afghanistan. Despite attending such international meetings, Pakistan did not commit a huge 
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economic aid to Afghanistan. Perhaps its economy was too weak to offer a generous amount of 
foreign aid to Afghanistan. According to one estimate, since 2001, Pakistan had contributed a 
meager $300 million to Afghan reconstruction efforts. These pales in comparison with India’s 
more than $1.3 billion aid to Afghanistan. 56
Second, the United Nations and Pakistani officials recognized the importance of hosting a 
large refugee population. After the U.S. and coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in October 
2001, an estimated 300,000 Afghans took refuge in Pakistan. These new refugees joined the 
existing 2.7 million Afghans refugees, who had fled to Pakistan since the Soviet forces invaded 
Kabul in 1979.
 For the governments in Kabul and Islamabad, 
although Pakistan’s financial assistance to Afghanistan was significantly smaller, Pakistan made 
a crucial contribution by hosting a large Afghan refugee population.    
57
According to the UNHCR Pakistan, by 2003, nearly 1.9 million Afghan refugees were 
voluntarily repatriated. In 2008, Pakistan hosted nearly 1.8 million Afghan refugees. The large 
majority of them lived in over 80 refugee camps, mostly located in the Pakhtunkhwa province, 
and 12 in the Balochistan province – both close to the Afghan borders. The Punjab Province – far 
 In 2003, a tripartite agreement among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began the voluntary repatriation of Afghan 
refugees from Pakistan. At that time, the goal was to complete the repatriation process by 2005, 
which never materialized.  
                                                            
56 International commitment to Afghanistan during the years 2002-2010 reached $90 billion. The United States 
contributed $56 billion; the EU: $12billion, Japan: $1.8  billion, India: $1.3 billion, Iran: $300 million, and Pakistan: 
$300 million. Russia concluded a $10bn debt settlement. See Gulshan Sachdeva, “Afghan Reconstruction 
Rethinking International Role,” South Asia Defense and Strategic Review, January 22, 2011. 
http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=281, accessed February 17, 2011. 
57 The Afghan refugees constituted the largest refugee population in Pakistan. In contrast to the 3 million 
Afghanistan refugees, Pakistan was also a hosting nearly 2,000 non-Afghan refugees and asylum seekers. They were 
of Somali, Iraqi, and Iranian origin. See The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “About UNHCR 
Pakistan, http://un.org.pk/unhcr/about.htm, accessed February 20, 2011.  
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from the Afghan border— also hosted an Afghan refugee camp.58 In 2008, the UNHCR 
estimated that it could take three to five years to complete the repatriation of Afghan refugees. 
The UNHCR would seek $135 million for hosting the refugees in Balochistan and the 
Pakhtunkhwa camps.59 The World Refugee Survey 2009 reported that Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan lived a sub-standard life in Pakistani slums and refugee camps, and they lacked the legal 
rights to own properties. The Survey also reported that Afghan refugees in the Pakhtunkhwa 
province were mostly involved in the transportation business, but they lacked any legal 
permission to own trucks.60
Senior leaders in the Pakistani government had frequently noted the issue of Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan. In February 2011, Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mahmoud Qureshi told 
the Gulf News: 
  
We hosted Afghans during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), we 
hosted the Mujahideen, we opened our doors to Afghanistan. And, we protected 
millions of refugees, and even today there are more than three million Afghan 
refugees living in Pakistan. We are contributing to Afghanistan's reconstruction 
both in financial and human terms and we share a long border, common religion, 
common tribes and culture - but India does not. 61
 Qureshi’s remark shows that Pakistan not only projects itself as a strong coalition partner 
in Afghanistan, it also claims to have contributed more than India to Afghan reconstruction and 
 
                                                            
58The United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 - Pakistan, 17 June 
2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a40d2af1cc.html, accessed 14 March 2011. 
59 The United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 – Pakistan.  
60 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 2009 – Pakistan. 
61 “Role in Afghanistan Different for Pakistan, Different for India,” Afghanistan Net, February 7, 2011. 
http://www.afghanistannews.net/story/741230, accessed February 17, 2011. 
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development processes. Although the Afghan President Karzai once rebuked Pakistan for 
sponsoring the Taliban, the official document in the Afghan foreign ministry recognizes 
Pakistan’s crucial contribution. According to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
The assistance of Pakistan government in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan in various areas have helped Afghanistan overcome some hard-ships. 
For the time being a huge number of Afghanistan refugees are still in Pakistan and 
the government of Pakistan in collaboration with the Afghan Ministry of Refugee 
and Repatriation and the UNHCR work for the volunteer and peaceful return of 
Afghans.62
Third, after contributing a small amount of foreign aid, and hosting a large refugee 
population, Pakistan’s increasing volume of trading exchanges with Afghanistan had certainly 
had a positive effect on Afghan economy. This increasing bilateral trade can be attributed to 
intergovernmental cooperation. For instance, during Musharraf’s 2002 visit to Afghanistan, 
Islamabad and Kabul formed a joint ministerial commission to promote strong economic and 
trade relations between the two countries. Both Musharraf and Karzai discussed starting off 
airflights between the two countries, and the use of Pakistani sea ports for materials to be used in 
Afghanistan reconstruction.
  
63
According to a report by Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, in 2006, bilateral trade 
between Kabul and Islamabad stood at about $2 billion. This included $1.2 billion of Pakistani 
 Although a tense relationship between Karzai and Musharraf 
developed later, especially in 2006, Pakistan consistently remained the top trading partner for 
Afghanistan.  
                                                            
62 Afghanistan Embassy – Islamabad, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations,” Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
http://islamabad.mfa.gov.af/af-pk-relations.asp, accessed February 20, 2011.  
63 Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policy Unchanged.” 
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export to Afghanistan, and $700 million of Afghan export to Pakistan. These figures do not 
include transit trade between the two countries.64 The report also claimed that in 2006, an 
estimated 60,000 Pakistanis worked in Afghanistan. Of them, more than 10,000 crossed the 
borders on a daily basis. 65 The signing of the transit trade agreement in 2010 was believed to 
increase the bilateral trade between the two countries, which would contribute to the stabilization 
of Afghan economy. The Afghan-Pakistan-U.S. tripartite negotiations over agricultural 
cooperation held in Turkey in 2010 would also contribute to Afghan economic development.66
 In summary, Pakistan made three major contributions to the Afghan War coalition. First, 
President Musharraf broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, and provided the United 
States with overflight and landing rights, and access to military bases. During his tenure, 
Musharraf had largely pursued a reactive diplomacy that responded to the U.S. demands for 
increased cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province. 
Musharraf also contributed to the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan tripartite commission to find 
common grounds on the coalition goals in Afghanistan. After Musharraf left office, President 
Zardari continued the path of his predecessor.  Second, Pakistan deployed its military and 
paramilitary forces and intelligence operatives to seal the borders with Afghanistan, and to fight 
a protracted counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas. Pakistan had also provided tacit 
support to facilitate U.S. drone strikes in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa province. Third, after 
diplomatic and military efforts, Pakistan had contributed to the Afghan reconstruction and 
stabilization efforts. Unlike the NATO countries, such as Britain and Germany, which had 
  
                                                            
64 Rubin, and Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 17. 
65 Rubin, and Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 18. 
66 “Remarks by Hillary Clinton at the Hague International Conference on Afghanistan,” The Hague, 
Netherlands, March 31, 2009. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/03/121037.htm, accessed February 15, 2011. 
. 
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committed a huge foreign aid, supported the reconstitution of Afghan security forces, and 
engaged in economic reconstruction at the Afghan provinces, Pakistan had made three distinct 
contributions to Afghan reconstruction process. The most important Pakistani contribution was 
hosting 3 million Afghan refugees, of which more than half did not return to their homeland, and 
were residing in more than 80 refugee camps in Pakistan. Pakistan committed a small amount of 
foreign aid, but remained the largest trading partner of Afghanistan. Since 2001, Pakistan’s 
imports from and exports to Afghanistan increased significantly, and this would complement the 
coalition goal of post-war reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.  
 
II. Explaining Pakistan’s Contributions to the War in Afghanistan  
This section uses the integrated burden-sharing model to analyze Pakistan’s contribution to the 
Afghanistan War coalition. It shows how the international systemic incentives were transmitted 
through the domestic political processes to determine Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior. First it 
examines three systemic level factors—alliance dependence, balance of threat, and the free-
riding motivation of collective action—to see if they presented any incentives to join and to 
support the Afghanistan War coalition. Next, it reviews how the system-induced incentives were 
channeled through three domestic level factors – the office of the chief executive, public opinion, 
and military capability – in shaping Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan.  
 
 Alliance Dependence. Alliance dependence presented the first systemic level incentive to 
influence Pakistan’s coalition policy. Pakistan is not a member of the U.S.-led NATO alliance. 
But, it is considered a strong non-NATO ally in the war on terrorism. Lacking a formal 
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membership with NATO, Pakistan was free from NATO’s Article 5 collective security 
commitment, which made it an obligation for an alliance member to contribute to the 
Afghanistan War. Despite that, Pakistan’s dependence on the informal and bilateral alliance with 
the United States offered a strong incentive to shape Islamabad’s decisions regarding 
Afghanistan. 67
According to Bennett et al, alliance dependence presents a dilemma for a state: if it joins 
a coalition effort, it might be entrapped; if it does not join the coalition, it might be abandoned. 
Entrapment refers to a situation, when “one becomes entangled in a conflict central to an ally’s 
interests but peripheral to one’s own in the hope that the gains in preserving the alliance will 
outweigh the risks and costs of future war.”
  
68 In contrast, abandonment implies a situation, 
“whereby one’s ally realigns with one’s adversary or fails to fight the adversary.”69
  A close look at the U.S.-Pakistan relations, especially in the post-9/11 era, suggests that 
Pakistan faced the dilemma of abandonment and entrapment: if it failed to provide strong 
support, the United States might realign with India (and thus abandon Pakistan). In contrast, if 
 The politics 
of abandonment and entrapment worked well during the Cold War era, when the ideological 
confrontation between the two superpowers strongly shaped the foreign and security policy of 
NATO and Warsaw Pact members.  
                                                            
67 Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, pp. 54-64. 2004; The United States 
Government Accountability Office, Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan: 
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2009), pp. 11-45. 
68 Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, Friends in Need: Burdensharing in the Persian Gulf 
War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 12. 
69 Bennett et al, Friends in Need, p. 12. 
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Pakistan feared entrapment, it might offer the less controversial military and nonmilitary 
assistance, instead of providing direct combat support to the war on terror.70
How do we measure alliance dependence, especially, in the context of a U.S.-led war 
time coalition? Bennett et al, and Seth Jones suggest that alliance dependence is measured by a 
state’s economic, military, and political ties to the United States, or aid dependence on the 
United States.
  
71 It is often associated with two strategies: carrots and sticks. A state might be 
offered some positive incentives to join a coalition. Conversely, it might be presented with some 
negative incentives, such as the withdrawal of certain benefits, or the threat of use of force to 
compel it to join the coalition.72
Pakistan was presented with at least two systemic incentives: a negative incentive and a 
positive incentive. The negative incentive came as early as September 2001, in the form of a 
coercive pressure from the United States to abandon the Taliban regime and to join the coalition 
of the willing in Afghanistan. This was evident in 2001, when the Bush administration threatened 
Pakistan to “be prepared to be bombed,” and to “be prepared to go back to the Stone Age”, if it 
did not join the U.S.-led coalition.
  
73
The positive incentives for joining the U.S.-led coalition were also significant. Initially, 
the United States lifted several sanctions which prohibited the provisions of U.S. foreign 
assistance to countries of nuclear proliferation concern, and where a military coup had ousted a 
 Former Pakistani President Musharraf wrote in this memoir 
that he had war gamed the United States as an adversary, and determined that Pakistan could be 
attacked by the U.S. forces if Islamabad took a firm decision not to join the coalition.  
                                                            
70 Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, pp. 14-15. 
71 Bennett et al, Friends in Need, p. 13. 
72 Bennett et al, Friends in Need, pp. 12-13; Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” pp. 26-27. 
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civilian government.74 Later, in 2004, the United States granted Pakistan the “non-NATO ally” 
status, making Islamabad eligible for “priority delivery of defense material” as well as other 
military assistance.75
 
 
Figure 6.3 Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY 2002-FY 2011 
 
Source: Adapted from Brookings Pakistan Index, January 31, 2011, p. 29. 
 
The sustained flow of U.S. military aid provided an important incentive for continued 
Pakistani support to the coalition.76
                                                            
74 Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, p. 11, fn 3-4. 
 Between 2001 and 2010, the United States provided Pakistan 
with nearly $20 billion direct aid. Of the $20 billion aid, $14 billion was given as security-related 
75 “Bush Names Pakistan ‘Major Ally,” BBC News, June 17, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3814013.stm, 
accessed March 13, 2011.  
76 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), pp. 49-50. 
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aid, and the rest of the $6 billion as economic aid. Figure 6.3 presents the trend in U.S. overt 
foreign aid to Pakistan.77
[U.S. aid covered] a broad range of Pakistani military operations, including navy 
support for maritime patrols and interdiction operations; air force support for 
combat air patrols, reconnaissance and close air support missions, airlift support, 
and air traffic control; army military operations in the FATA…These activities 
include Operation Al Mizan, a major deployment of the Pakistan Army to combat 
Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militants in the North West Frontier Province and 
the FATA that began in 2001 and has continued in various phases to date.
 It shows that the U.S. aid had mainly reimbursed Pakistan’s combat 
operations and military support in the Af-Pak border areas. In 2009, a report from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed how the U.S. aid had covered Pakistan’s 
counterinsurgency expenses. The GAO report notes:  
78
 
  
In addition to reimbursing for Pakistan’s military operations in the FATA, the United 
States was providing anti-terror assistance to “fortify” Pakistan’s military and law enforcement 
capacity, especially, the capability of Pakistan’s interior ministry, its counter-narcotics force, and 
the Frontier Corps in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa regions.79
                                                            
77 Livingston and O’Hanlon, Brookings Pakistan Index, January 30, 2011, p. 29. 
 The U.S. support for Pakistan also 
included plans for the enhancement of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps capability, by raising 16 Corps 
units, each with 650 personnel, capable of carrying counterinsurgency operations in the FATA. It 
also included the creation of border coordination centers along the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders, 
78 GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Areas with Afghanistan, p. 19. 
79 C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), pp. 58, 72-73; GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and 
Developing Pakistan’s Border Areas with Afghanistan, p. 28. 
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and the provision of equipments, such as, bullet proof helmets, and bulletproof vests for 
Pakistani security forces.80
As Obama came to power in the United States, he declared a quick end to the Iraq War, 
and prioritized fighting the War in Afghanistan. Obama’s unique contribution was to declare a 
comprehensive Af-Pak strategy, which reinvigorated U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan, and gave 
an equal emphasis to fighting the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan’s FATA. Compared to the 
Bush administration, which mainly focused on security related operations in the FATA, Obama 
increased the economic aid for Pakistan to ensure the development and stabilization of FATA. 
The stabilization of FATA was considered critical to the overall success of the War in 
Afghanistan. Obama’s emphasis on FATA had two effects on the flow of U.S. aid to Pakistan. 
First, compared to the previous three years, U.S. economic and non-security related aid to 
Pakistan nearly tripled in 2009.  Second, the increasing volume of economic aid narrowed the 
gap with the security-related aid. For instance, the $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar bill passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 2009 ensured that the United States would strike a balance between the security 
and development needs in Pakistan. This was emphasized in the bill’s stated goal of building 
democratic institutions and economic reconstruction of Pakistan. The bill imposed tight 
conditions upon Pakistan, requiring it to improvise its fight against the terrorist and insurgents in 
the FATA, and ensuring civilian supremacy over military leadership.
  
81
                                                            
80 GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Areas with Afghanistan, 20. 
  
81 Such aid conditionalities have long been proposed by security experts. See Jones, “Pakistan’s Dangerous 
Game,” pp. 24-29. For a discussion on the Kerry-Lugar bill, see “US Senate Passes Kerry Lugar Bill to Triple Aid to 
Pakistan,” Times of India, September 25, 2009. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-09-
25/us/28101474_1_kerry-lugar-bill-afghanistan-and-pakistan-pakistani-people, accessed March 8, 2011; Omar 
Waraich, “How a U.S. Aid Package to Pakistan Could Threaten Zardari,” Time, October 8, 2009. 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1929306,00.html, accessed March 8, 2011.  
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In summary, Pakistan’s dependence on the Untied States presented it with a strong 
incentive to join and to support the Afghanistan coalition. Between 2001 and 2010, the United 
States offered Pakistan two incentives: a positive incentive, and a negative incentive. The 
positive incentive included a sustained flow of security-related and economic aid. Pakistan 
needed this aid to modernize its military capability and to fight the insurgency in the FATA. The 
negative incentive prompted Pakistan to join the coalition, and encouraged that it provide 
continued support to the coalition. The United States threatened the use of force to compel 
Pakistan to abandon the Taliban regime. As the War in Afghanistan progressed, the U.S. forces 
conducted limited cross-border attacks and violated Pakistani sovereignty to press that the 
Pakistani forces remain proactive against the Al Qaeda and Taliban militias operating in the 
border. The United States also escalated the drone strikes in the FATA to eliminate the senior 
leadership of Al Qaeda and Taliban.  
After alliance dependence, did balance of threat present any incentive to encourage 
Pakistan’s participation in the coalition? This question is addressed below with reference to the 
various state and non-state centric threats to Pakistani national security. 
 
Balance of Threat. After alliance dependence, balance of threat presented the second 
systemic level incentive to influence Pakistan’s coalition contribution. Following the analysis of 
Patricia Weitsman, my burden-sharing model suggests that symmetric threats or convergent 
threat perception forges coalition cohesion by encouraging a fair distribution of burdens among 
the coalition members.82
                                                            
82 Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente,” pp. 79-113. 
 Did Pakistan and the United States face similar kinds and levels of 
threat, which could encourage a strong Pakistani support for the U.S.-led coalition? The answer 
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is no. Historically, both Pakistan and the United States have had conflicting perceptions of 
international threats. These conflicting perceptions have often adversely affected their mutual 
cooperation.  For instance, with regard to the traditional state centric threat, the United States 
perceives China’s military modernization and resource-focused diplomacy as a source of 
“complex global challenge,” and India as a major regional ally in South Asia.83 By contrast, 
Pakistan does not consider China as a threat, while it has always perceived India as a top national 
security threat. This India-centric threat perception has historically influenced Pakistan’s military 
preparedness, force structure, and above all, the Afghanistan policy.84
During the nine years of the Afghanistan War (2001-2010), the United States and 
Pakistan differed quite sharply on the nature of non-state threats, especially from various factions 
of the Taliban insurgents. The United States perceived Al Qaeda terrorists, Taliban militants, and 
  
                                                            
83 According to U.S. National Intelligence Strategy 2009, “China shares many interests with the United States, 
but its increasing natural resource-focused diplomacy and military modernization are among the factors making it a 
complex global challenge.” See U.S.  Office of the Director for National Intelligence, The National Intelligence 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence), p. 3. 
By contrast, India is seen as a key U.S. ally in the global war on terrorism. See: Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions, 
p. 65. According to South Asia expert at the Congressional Research Service, K. Alan Kronstadt, “Washington and 
New Delhi have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on shared values such as democracy, 
pluralism, and rule of law. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for full civilian 
nuclear energy cooperation, are underway.” See K. Alan Kronstadt, India-US Relations (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service), p. 1.  
84 Pakistan’s India-focused threat perception is premised on three core beliefs: (a) India has a conventional 
military superiority over Pakistan, and Indian armed forces are in a constant state of readiness to divide the Pakistani 
state; (b) India’s clandestine agents are instigating an ethnic separatist insurgency in Pakistan’s Baluchistan 
province; and (c) India’s alignment with the post-Taliban Afghanistan is part of a hostile strategy to isolate Pakistan 
in Central and South Asia. Pakistan’s threat perception vis-à-vis India is best captured in the words of a senior 
Pakistani scholar Farrukh Saleem, who wrote that: “In effect, some 80 to 90 per cent of our military assets are 
deployed to counter the threat from India. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and sees its inventory of 
6,384 tanks as a threat. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian air force and sees its inventory of 672 combat aircraft 
as a threat. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and notices that six out of 13 Indian corps are strike corps. 
The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and finds that 15, 9, 16, 14, 11, 10 and 2 Corps are all pointing their 
guns at Pakistan. The Pakistan army looks at the Indian army and discovers that the 3rd Armoured Division, 4 
RAPID Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade have been deployed to cut Pakistan into two halves. The Pakistan army 
looks at the Taliban and sees no Arjun Main Battle Tanks (MBT), no armoured fighting vehicles, no 155 mm Bofors 
howitzers, no Akash surface-to-air missiles, no BrahMos land attack cruise missiles, no Agni Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missiles, no Sukhoi Su-30 MKI air superiority strike fighters, no Jaguar attack aircraft, no MiG-27 ground-
attack aircraft, no Shakti thermonuclear devices, no Shakti-II 12 kiloton fission devices and no heavy artillery.” See: 
Farrukh Saleem, ‘Where is the Pakistan Army?’ The News, April 26, 2009. 
http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=174334, accessed March 10, 2010. 
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their local sympathizers belonging to a broad category of transnational Islamist militancy, and 
wished to fight all of them with equal importance. Pakistan did not share such threat perception. 
While it agreed on the threat posed by the Arab and foreign-origin Al Qaeda terrorists, it 
disagreed on the threat posed by two major factions of the Taliban insurgents – the Afghan 
Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan perceived the first group a potential ally in 
Afghanistan, whereas the second group as a serious threat to its internal and national security. 85
These differences over threat perception had a negative effect on Pakistan’s coalition 
contribution.
                           
86
If divergent threat perception explains Pakistan’s reduced commitment to the Afghanistan 
coalition; what, then, accounts for Pakistan’s entry into the coalition, its military support to the 
U.S.-led OEF mission, and its support for U.S. drone strikes in the Af-Pak border area?  
  The United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan alleged that Pakistan had 
tolerated the presence of three Afghan-focused Taliban groups—the Quetta Shura Taliban, the 
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin faction, and the Haqqani Network. The Pakistani military and its 
premier intelligence agency ISI had also reportedly collaborated with these Taliban groups in the 
planning and execution of terrorist and insurgent attacks against Indian and NATO targets in 
Afghanistan. By contrast, Pakistan had consistently targeted the Pakistani Taliban groups—
especially the TTP and TNSM in South Waziristan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.                                
There are three possible answers, some of which have already been discussed in this 
chapter.  First, the coercive pressure from the United States prompted Pakistan’s entry into the 
                                                            
85 Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. 
Forces, Afghanistan, Commander’s Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, International Security 
Assistance Force, August 30, 2009), pp. 10-11. 
86 Prem Mahadevan, ‘Selective Counterterrorism in Pakistan, ISN Security Watch, December 21, 2009; Jones, 
“Pakistan’s Dangerous Game,” pp. 15-26. For a description of various Afghan and Pakistan-based insurgent groups, 
see: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge 2010), pp. 341-342. 
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coalition. Pakistan had long supported the Taliban regime, and did not want to withdraw this 
support when the United States decided to invade Afghanistan. As President Musharraf claimed, 
the United States had used the threat of bombing to compel Pakistan to join the coalition.  
Second, after joining the coalition, Pakistan agreed with the United States on the threat 
posed by Al Qaeda’s foreign militants, especially, the Arab, Chechen, and Uzbek militias, who 
had infiltrated into the FATA, fleeing the attacks in Afghanistan. Such threat convergence 
encouraged Pakistan to pursue intelligence and military-led operations to balance against the 
terrorist threat in the border areas near Afghanistan.87
 Third, the growing incidence of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings in Pakistan 
exposed Islamabad’s heightened sense of vulnerabilities from terrorism. This Pakistani threat 
perception converged with the pre-existing U.S. perception that Al Qaeda and its affiliated 
groups posed the most pressing threat to international security. Pakistan responded to the 
growing threats of conventional terrorist and suicide attacks by taking a two-pronged strategy: a 
pro-active counterinsurgency strategy in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa Province, and 
clandestine support for U.S. drone strikes.  
 Pakistan’s cordon and search operations in 
2001 and 2002 in support of the Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as the Pakistani armed 
forces’ Operation Al Mizan in the 2002-2006 years show how shared threat perception had 
positively influenced Pakistan’s coalition contribution.  
Rhetorical statements from Pakistani political and military leadership confirm the threat 
convergence, and its effect on Pakistan’s coalition behavior. In his memoir, Musharraf notes that 
                                                            
87 Seth Jones and C. Christine Fair argue Pakistan’s military offensives and intelligence-led operations in 2002 
and 2003 had mostly targeted Al Qaeda and spared the Taliban militias. This was due to the fact that the United 
States perceived the Taliban a “spent force”, while Pakistan was not interested in fighting the Taliban, which was 
created and nurtured with the active support of Pakistani military. See Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in 
Pakistan, p. 45. 
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a key reason for joining the U.S.-led coalition was Pakistan’s fear of Talibanization. This is what 
prominent Pakistani journalist Ahmad Rashid describes as descending into chaos.88 Musharraf 
observes that Pakistan was a frontline state in the fight against terrorism because it “had been a 
victim of sectarian and external terrorism for years, and certainly had no desire to be 
“Talibanized.”89 Musharraf’s successor, President Zardari made a similar case to justify 
Pakistan’s commitment to the war against terrorism. In September 2008 Zardari stressed that, 
“The war on terror is Pakistan’s war, and we are its greatest victims…We are confronting the 
terrorist threat in our tribal areas as well as in our cities. Soldiers are arrayed in the field against 
the Taliban and al Qaeda…”90 Later, in June 2009, during an interview with Der Spiegel, the ISI 
chief General Ahmed Shuja Pasha noted that “Terror is our enemy, not India.”91
These rhetorical statements reflected the growing dangers posed by terrorism and 
insurgency. Figure 6.4 shows the data. It reveals that, since 2007, terrorism and insurgency-
related fatalities in Pakistan registered a sharp increase, when compared with the fatality data for 
the pre-2007 years. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, nearly 6,000 civilians were killed in 
terrorism and insurgency related incidents in Pakistan. This was nearly three times higher than 
the 1,600 civilians killed in the years between 2003 and 2006. Similarly, between 2007 and 
2009, nearly 2,300 Pakistani security personnel were killed in terrorism and political violence. 
This was a three-fold increase from the 600 security personnel killed in the years between 2003 
and 2006.  
  
                                                            
88 See “Waziristan: The Last Frontier,” The Economist, January 2, 2010, pp. 17-20; Ahmed Rashid, Descent 
into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 
2009), pp. 265-292. 
89 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 223. 
90 Asif Ali Zardari, ‘Pakistan Will Prevail Against Terrorism, Boston Globe, September 25, 2008.  
91 Susanne Koelbl, ‘Pakistan’s New Intelligence Chief: “Terror Is Our Enemy, Not India,” Interview with Der 
Spiegel, June 1, 2009. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,599724,00.html, accessed March 9, 2010. 
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     Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute for Conflict Management. 
 
Pakistan took a heavy handed approach to dealing with terrorism and insurgency. For 
instance the number of military and paramilitary forces deployed to the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa 
province increased more than twofold from 60,000 in 2002-2003 to 150,000 in 2009. As the U.S. 
and NATO forces in Afghanistan gradually increased, Pakistan also increased its military boots 
on the ground. Unlike some of the NATO countries, which placed national caveats to restrict the 
use of lethal force, the Pakistani forces were not restricted by such caveats to operate in the tribal 
area. Instead, Pakistan’s increasing tendency to use lethal force had killed a huge number of 
terrorists and insurgents. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, more than 13,000 terrorists and 
insurgents were killed in Pakistani operations. This was more than twelve times higher than the 
total 1,000 terrorists killed between 2003 and 2006.   
The escalation in suicide attacks might also have contributed to Pakistan’s support for the 
coalition strategy, especially, U.S. drone strikes in the Pak-Afghan border region. Figure 6.5 
shows the possibility for an association between suicide terrorism in Pakistan, and Islamabad’s 
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increased support for the U.S. drone strikes. For the United States, the surge in drone strikes was 
associated with the increasing level of insurgency in Afghanistan, which had targeted the U.S. 
and NATO forces. These strikes were premised on the belief that by successfully eliminating the 
Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, the United States could minimize the likelihood of future 
attacks on U.S. mainland, and U.S. citizens and interests overseas.92 For Pakistan, although the 
drone strikes violated its sovereignty, it offered a direct benefit by punishing the TTP terrorists, 
who were responsible for most of the suicide attacks. This mutual interest might have 
encouraged Pakistan to support the escalation of the drone strikes. 
 
Source: Author’s database. 
Does the upward trend in suicide attacks and drone strikes indicate causality? Or, was it 
just a mere coincidence? I argue that the growing trends in suicide terrorism and drone strikes 
may indicate a cyclical relationship. This means that increasing suicide attacks had contributed to 
                                                            
92 Critics have long argued that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan might have had counterproductive effects, by 
fuelling anti-Americanism and retaliatory terrorist strikes in the United States. Such concerns appeared a reality in 
May 2019, when Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-born naturalized U.S. citizen conspired to set off a car bomb in New 
York’s busiest Times Square area. Senior officials in the Pakistani government speculated that the Times Square 
bomb plot was perhaps a planned retaliation by Pakistani Taliban group Tehrek-e-Taliban. See Zahid Hussain and 
Tom Wright, “Suspect’s ties to Pakistan Taliban Probed,” The Wall Street JournalMay 6, 2010. 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703322204575226472828026444.html, accessed September 20, 
2010. 
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a surge in drone strikes, which in turn had led to a further escalation of the suicide attacks. For 
Pakistan, this is essentially a cyclical relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism. Figure 
6.6 shows the cyclical relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism in Pakistan.  
Figure 6.6 Terrorism-Counterterrorism Dynamics in Pakistan 
 
A brief narrative of the Red Mosque incident and its effect shows how this cyclical 
relationship between terrorism and counterterrorism evolved in Pakistan. In 2007, the Pakistani 
special forces engaged with armed Islamists in a fierce battle to take control over the Red 
Mosque from pro-Taliban clerics Maolana Abdul Aziz Ghazi and his brother Maolana Abdul 
Rashid Ghazi (Maolana is a title given to Islamic religious scholars).93
                                                            
93Both clerics maintained close contacts with Al Qaeda and Taliban elements. Abdul Aziz Ghazi was killed 
during the commando operation in the Red Mosque, and Abul Rashid Ghazi was imprisoned after he attempted to 
escape the operation. See Syed Shoaib Hasan, ‘Profile: Islamabad’s Red Mosque,’ BBC News, July 27, 2007. 
 The battle ended with 
more than 100 killed, mostly pro-Taliban militants, and a few security personnel. The storming 
of the Red Mosque had a direct effect on Pakistan’s war on terrorism. The government’s earlier 
peace agreement with the Waziristan-based Taliban forces broke down, and Taliban-directed 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm, accessed March 9, 2010. 
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suicide attacks increased sharply in the Pakhtunkhwa province, and the FATA regions—partly in 
response to the Red Mosque incident, and partly in response to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency 
campaigns in the FATA.94 Most of the Taliban-directed attacks in Pakistan had targeted the 
security forces, law enforcement officials, and innocent civilians, prompting a strong 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency response from the Pakistani government.95
The drone strikes were mostly unpopular among the Pakistani people, due to concerns 
over sovereignty and civilian casualties. However, the Pakistani government provided tacit 
support for these strikes. The nature of this tacit support included a blanket approval for all U.S. 
drone strikes, and intelligence sharing on specific high value terrorist targets.
 
96
                                                            
94 According to Imran Khan, a Pakistani cricketer-turn politician, and the founder of Tehrek-e-Insaaf 
(Movement for Justice) Party, the origin of suicide bombing in Pakistan can be traced back to Pakistan’s militarized 
counterterrorism strategy and its overt support for U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. During an interview 
with Democracy Now, Khan opined that “Well, there was no terrorism in Pakistan, we had no suicide bombing in 
Pakistan, ’til Pakistan sent its troops on—under pressure from the US. Musharraf, General Musharraf, capitulated 
under the pressure and sent Pakistani troops into the tribal area and Waziristan. So it was that that resulted in what 
was the new phenomenon: the Pakistani Taliban. We had no militant Taliban in Pakistan, until we got in—we were 
forced into this US war on terror by a military dictator, not by the people of Pakistan. And people never owned this 
war. People always thought that this is not our war, and quite rightly, because we did not have any terrorism in 
Pakistan, as subsequently grew.” For a detailed transcript of the interview, see: ‘Pakistani Opposition Politician 
Imran Khan on US Drone Attacks, the “Massive Human Catastrophe” in the Swat Valley and the Escalation of War 
in Afghanistan,’ Democracy Now, June 24, 2009. 
 The central 
purpose of the Pakistani government’s support for the drone strikes was to punish the Pakistani 
Taliban (especially Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP network) for subverting the Pakistani state. The 
desired outcome of such drone strikes was a less cohesive insurgent network with limited ability 
to threaten the social fabric of Pakistan.  
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/6/24/pakistani_opposition_politician_imran_khan_on, accessed March 9, 
2010.  
95 Amir Mir, “Pakistan Tops Iraq, Afghanistan in Suicide Bombing Deaths,” The News, September 15, 2008. 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=135813, accessed March 9, 2010. 
96 An official with the ISI acknowledged Pakistan’s tacit support for U.S. drone strikes. See Declan Walsh, 
“Pakistan Blocks NATO Supply Route to Afghanistan,” Guardian, September 30, 2010. A retired officer with 
Pakistan Army referred to Pakistan’s blanket approval behind the drone strikes. See Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi, 
“US-Pakistan Alliance Hits Snags,” World Security Network, November 10, 2008. 
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=16728, accessed March 8, 2011.  
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For Washington, Islamabad’s policy of tacit support for the drone strikes was necessary, 
but not sufficient in eliminating the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants. This was due to the fact that 
Pakistan’s clandestine support for the Afghan Taliban had adversely affected the coalition war 
strategy in Afghanistan. Pakistan nurtured a friendly attitude toward the Afghan Taliban groups 
to gain a strategic depth in future, especially, after the U.S. and NATO forces withdraw from 
Afghanistan. A strategic depth would allow it to counter any Indian incursion into Pakistani 
territory. Thus, Pakistan’s differences with the United States over the threats of Afghan Taliban 
had seriously undermined the purpose of the Afghanistan War coalition.  
 In summary, balance of threat presented the second systemic incentive to encourage 
Pakistan’s coalition participation, albeit on a limited scale, when judged from U.S. expectations. 
The U.S.-Pakistan threat perception converged on the nature of threat posed by the Al Qaeda and 
various Pakistani Taliban groups. Such threat convergence presented a systemic incentive for 
improved intelligence sharing and joint targeting against the South Waziristan-based Pakistani 
Taliban group TTP, whose principal leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone strike in 
August 2009, and Baitullah’s successor Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in another drone strike in 
January 2010. Despite such threat convergence, the United States and Pakistan continued to 
differ on the nature of threat posed by the Afghan Taliban groups. Such differences had seriously 
constrained Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition.  
 
Collective Action.  The free-riding motivation of the collective action theory did not 
present any systemic level incentive to determine Pakistan’s coalition contribution. The concept 
of collective action refers to group motivation for the pursuit of a collective good, which is non-
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excludable.97
 Pakistan did not face the incentive of free-riding in the war on terrorism. As described in 
the previous section, although the United States offered it a huge financial aid, Pakistan did not 
ride free. Instead, it made diplomatic, military, and economic contributions to support the 
coalition goals. Despite the strong public opinion against cooperation with the United States, 
Pakistan continued to be the main transit country for fuel and logistical supplies to U.S. and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan.
 In analyzing international cooperation, the collective action hypothesis assumes 
shared policy preferences for a public good, such as regional stability, and a terror-free world. 
The theory also posits that, in dealing with international security threats, such as Al Qaeda and 
Taliban, large states and great powers are likely to make substantial contributions, whereas small 
states and weak powers will tend to be free riders. If the collective action hypothesis is correct, 
we would expect the United States to carry most of the burdens of counterterrorism, while 
Pakistan would be a free-rider.  
98
                                                            
97 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965). 
 It had also deployed more than 100,000 regular army in the 
western border with Afghanistan—a decision which required to reduce troops along the eastern 
border with India. Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the 
northwestern border areas had serious implications. It further radicalized a section of the 
Pakistani society, fuelling more terrorist attacks against the Pakistani civilians and security 
98 According officials in the U .S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), until 2009, 80% of  non-lethal 
supplies bound for U.S. forces in Afghanistan were transported via the Pakistani port of Karachi and on Pakistani 
routes. After several high profile Taliban attacks in the U.S. and NATO supplies in the Pakistani route, especially 
the December 2008 attack on a NATO convoy, which destroyed 160 trucks, the United States introduced the 
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which relied on the use of the rail, road, and water routes of the former 
Soviet republics for the transshipment of supplies to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. By early 2010, nearly 30% of 
cargoes flowing into U.S. forces in Afghanistan were shipped through the NDN. Despite that, Pakistan accounted 
for nearly 50% of Cargo supplies for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.   
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forces. The effect was growing suicide attacks, and frequent terrorist attacks, which destroyed 
the fabric of the Pakistani society.  
 Pakistani analysts claim that the cost of the war on terrorism to Pakistan was much higher 
than the economic aid it received from the United States. According to Talat Masood, a 
respected defense analyst, the cost of the war to Pakistani economy was $28 billion, measured by 
the depressed economic growth rate.99 Former Pakistani finance and foreign minister Sartaz Aziz 
offers a similar estimate. Aziz finds that the direct and indirect economic cost of the war on 
terrorism to Pakistan was 2083 billion Rupees (equivalent to $26 billion) from 2004 to 2009. 
This indicates an average $4.3 billion annual cost, which is substantially higher than the $2 
billion annual concessionary aid Pakistan received from the United States since 2001.100 Aziz 
notes that the indirect costs were much higher (83%) than the direct costs (17%) of the war. The 
indirect costs accounted for the loss of exports, foreign investment, and industrial outputs; 
whereas the direct costs comprised the costs associated with the values of human lives lost or 
injured, the value of property or infrastructure destroyed or damaged, and the security 
spending.101
Several factors explain why Pakistan did not ride free, and instead incurred a huge cost of 
the war on terrorism. These involve the pursuit of two private goods: fighting terrorism in its 
own territory and securing U.S. foreign aid. Since the terrorist group Al Qaeda and its various 
Taliban associates posed a direct threat to Pakistan, the leadership in Islamabad perceived 
 
                                                            
99 Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan,” Terrorism Monitor 
(Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, No. 5, February 4, 2010. 
100 For a detailed breakdown of the Pakistani government’s estimate of the cost of war on terror, see: Sartaz 
Aziz, “The Economic Costs of Extremism,” in Pakistan’s Quagmire: Security, Strategy, and the Future of the 
Islamic Nuclear Nation, Edited by Usama Butt and N. Elahi (New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 80. This figure was 
produced by the Government of Pakistan. See: Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper II, September 2008. 
101 Aziz, “The Economic Cost of Extremism,” pp. 80-81. 
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fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban an important private good. However, without a direct U.S. 
intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan was not willing or able to pursue this private good with a 
large-scale military deployment to the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province.  In the end, Pakistan 
was deeply involved in the pursuit of fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban, which seemed quite 
contradictory with its sympathetic attitude toward the Afghan Taliban groups. The pursuit of 
another private good had also motivated Pakistan to support the coalition. This was evident in 
Pakistan’s interest in securing a non-NATO ally status, which had brought a huge inflow of U.S. 
aid, and military equipments, such as the much awaited F-16 fighter aircrafts.102
 In summary, among the three systemic factors, the free-riding motivation of collective 
action did not present any systemic incentive to structure Pakistan’s coalition behavior. By 
contrast, alliance dependence and balance of threat presented two systemic incentives to 
encourage Pakistan’s support for the Afghanistan War coalition. How were these systemic 
incentives transmitted through Pakistan’s domestic political processes, and the constraints posed 
by its military capability? The remainder of this chapter answers this question by reviewing the 
effect of Pakistan’s domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability on its 
Afghanistan policy.  
  
 
Domestic Political Regime. At the domestic level, the office of the chief executive is the 
first decision point in explaining Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. My 
burden-sharing model predicts that a chief executive with strong decision making power will 
                                                            
102 In 2005, the United States agreed to provide Pakistan with the F-16 fighter jets to modernize the capability of 
Pakistan Air Force to fight terrorism in the Pak-Afghan border areas. The first three of the 18 F-16 jets arrived 
Pakistan in June 2010, and the rest were expected to be delivered by the end of 2010. See “Pakistan Gets First 
Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets from U.S.,” CNN News, June 26, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-
26/world/pakistan.fighter.jets_1_pakistani-air-force-fighter-jets-f-16?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed March 8, 2011.  
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ignore the mass public opinion, and look at the military capability to design its Afghanistan 
policy. By contrast, a weak regime is likely to care more about unfavorable public opinion, and it 
would avoid any involvement in Afghanistan. In between these two possibilities, a chief 
executive with medium power will balance between the competing demands of elite opinion and 
mass public opinion.  
In Pakistan, President Musharraf enjoyed a centralized decision-making power. After his 
departure, President Zardari and his army chief Kayani exercised a strong control over the 
Afghan policy. Compared to the British and German cases, where the legal-constitutional 
provisions and parliamentary politics determined the institutional decision power of the chief 
executive, the Pakistan case shows the otherwise. In Pakistan, democratic institutions mattered 
less than the military, which played an important role in defining the power of the chief 
executives in making foreign policy decisions.  
In a western democratic country, at least three factors determine the power of the chief 
executive to determine its policy on coalition burden-sharing. These include legal-constitutional 
restrictions, legislative oversight, and elite consensus. In the British case discussed before, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and his successors Gordon Brown, and David Cameron were considered to 
be strong executives due to three reasons: they enjoyed the royal prerogative to declare war, and 
support a coalition; the parliamentary oversight process did not constrain their ability to design 
the Afghanistan mission; and the elite consensus among major parliamentary parties served 
Britain’s Afghanistan policy well. By contrast, in the German case, Chancellors Gerhard 
Schröder and Angela Merkel were categorized as the medium executive. This was due to the fact 
that, although they enjoyed elite consensus on the Afghanistan War, their decisions on 
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Germany’s military contribution were seriously constrained by the constitutional limits, and 
parliamentary oversight process.  
Pakistan has never had a western-style democratic government. Thus, the three criteria 
for measuring the strength of a chief executive described above do not apply to Pakistan. Instead, 
the relative importance of the country’s armed forces, and its premier intelligence agency ISI vis-
à-vis the civilian leadership have historically defined the role of its chief executive in the 
decision making process. This is due to the fact that, since its independence from the British 
colonial rule in 1947, a large part of Pakistan’s political history has been dominated by the 
military-controlled governments.103 The frequent military interventions have often been justified 
as a necessary cure to deal with Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient civilian leadership. The 
Pakistan Army’s meddling into politics has created a parochial political culture, in which the 
military dictators or military-backed civilian rulers exercise strong control over the country’s 
foreign and security policy. By contrast, the civilian rulers, who lack the Army and ISI support, 
have a weak control over the country’s foreign policy making process.104
During the nine years of the Afghanistan War (October 2001-December 2010), Pakistan 
was ruled by Pervez Musharraf and Aisf Zardari. Both Musharraf and Zardari were strong chief 
executives, who had ignored the public opposition to the war, and decided to support the U.S. 
 
                                                            
103 Since 1947, Pakistan has experienced four military dictators: Field Marshall Ayub Khan (October 1958-
March 1969), General Yahya Khan (March 1969-December 1971), General Zia-ul-Haq (September 1978-August 
1988), and General Pervez Musharraf (October 1999-August 2008).  
104 According to a report by Sunday Times (London), “Without the army’s backing - and the cooperation of the 
ISI, Pakistan’s military intelligence agency - the war against the Taliban is hopeless. There are enough Pakistanis, 
particularly in the tribal borderlands, who feel Musharraf was wrong to get involved in what they see as an 
American war against Islam. See: “Profile: Asif Ali Zardari,” Sunday Times, September 7, 2008. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4692223.ece, accessed February 28, 2011.  
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war efforts in Afghanistan.105
How did Musharraf come to power, and how did he exercise his political control? 
Answers to these questions would offer useful insights to Musharraf’s decision process. 
Musharraf was the army chief, when he came to power in October 1999, by orchestrating a 
military coup against the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Soon he formed a 
national security council to run the country.
 As a military dictator, Musharraf centralized the executive power. 
His control over the military forces and the ISI gave him enormous power to decide Pakistan’s 
Afghanistan policy. By contrast, Zardari shared some of the decision-making power with his 
Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani. Unlike Musharraf, Zardari lacked the military support, but his 
decision-making power came from the parliament, where his People’s Party led a coalition 
government.  Zardari was previously imprisoned for eleven years, and was charged with 
corruption cases. These negative issues – the lack of military support, and corruption 
allegations—could make Zardari a weak executive. However, due to the restoration of 
democracy after Musharraf’s resignation, Zardari was constitutionally a powerful president, and 
exercised his effective control over the Prime Minister through the disciplines of party politics.  
106 Musharraf held the position of the head of state 
until August 2008. Initially, he assumed the position of the Chief Executive for the first two 
years. Since June 2001, he held the position of the President of Pakistan.107
                                                            
105 Musharraf resigned on August 18, 2008, and Zardari was sworn in as president on September 9, 2008. In 
between this period, the chairman of Pakistani Senate (upper house of the  parliament) Muhammad Mian Soomro 
assumed the position of acting president. See: “Bhutto Widower Wins Presidency,” BBC News, September 6, 2008. 
 During his tenure as 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7600917.stm, accessed February 26, 2011 
106 “Musharraf Names Ruling National Security Council, Dates for Election Not Yet Set,” The Independent, 
October 25, 1999. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/musharraf-names-ruling-national-security-
council-739979.html, accessed February 28, 2011. 
107 Musharraf declared himself president in June 2001. He promulgated a legal framework order to activate the 
1973 Constitution, and pave the way for parliamentary elections in 2002. On January 1, 2004, Musharraf won a 
confidence vote that extended his presidency until 2007.  On October 6, 2007, Musharraf won a controversial 
presidential election. However, the Pakistani Supreme Court said it was yet to  decide whether Musharraf’s 
candidacy was legal. The legal debate arose over the issue of whether Musharraf could run the election while being 
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a president, Musharraf abrogated the Constitution, issued several presidential decrees, and ruled 
the country with a relatively strong control. He retained the position of the chief of army staff 
until November 2007. In November 2008, Musharraf appointed his confidant General Ashfaq 
Kayani as the army chief. Prior to assuming the position of army chief, Kayani had held the 
position of the director general of ISI.  
During his reign as Pakistan’s chief executive and president, Musharraf confronted strong 
political oppositions from two major parties – Benajir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 
and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML).108 Despite such opposition, Musharraf 
managed to co-opt a group of Islamist parties. He forced Bhutto and Sharif to leave the country, 
and imprisoned their senior party leaders. Musharraf held parliamentary elections in 2002 and 
2008. To ensure effective control in the parliament, his political strategy split Sharif’s Muslim 
League to form the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam).109 Musharraf exerted his political 
influence to patronize a coalition of Islamist parties--Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), which 
acted as the main opposition party in a defunct parliament.110
According to Pakistani defense expert Shuza Nawaz, Musharraf exercised a “highly 
personalized decision-making process,” in which he ignored the key institutions, such as the 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the army chief. See: “Musharraf Wins Presidential Vote,” BBC News, October 6, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7031070.stm, accessed March 1, 2011.  
108 The PPP is a center-left political party, and PML (Nawaz) is a center-right party.  
109 For a quick overview of Pakistan’s political parties, see: Livingston and O ‘Hanlon, “Brookings Pakistan 
Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security,”  January 30, 2011,  p. 15. 
110 For an excellent discussion on how this political co-option works in Pakistani politics, see: Ayaz Amir, “The 
Problem of Spine in Pakistani Politics,” Dawn, September 26, 2003. According to Amir, historically, Pakistani 
military dictators have established their political control with the support of four influential sections of the civil 
society: (a) a section of the political elites which declares the dictator as a savior; (b) a pliant judiciary that 
legitimizes the dictator’s rule; (c) a group of the country’s best legal scholars, who work with the judiciary to 
provide a legal cover for the military coup; and (d) the spontaneous support of a section of media journalists who 
praise the junta as “the messiah” – the savior of the nation. For further discussions on Pakistan’s party  politics, see 
Haris Gazdar, “Letter from South Asia: Pakistan’s Precious  Parties,” Economic and Political Weekly, February 9. 
2008, pp. 8-9. Hasan Askari Rizvi, “The Military and Politics in Pakistan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 
Vo. 26, No. 1-2 (1991), pp. 27-42.  
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parliament and the cabinet, in choosing Pakistan’s key policies on Afghanistan.111 Evidence 
supports the dominant role played by Mushrraf in deciding Pakistan’s entry into and support for 
the Afghanistan coalition. Regarding entry into the coalition, Musharraf claims “I made a 
dispassionate, military-style analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons.”112 He notes 
that he feared “There would be a violent and angry reaction if we [Pakistan] didn’t support the 
United States.”113 Musharraf suggest that three factors influenced his decisions on Afghanistan. 
First, Pakistan’s weak economic and military strength, and heterogeneous society would not be 
able to survive a direct military confrontation with the United States. Second, if Pakistan ignored 
participation in the coalition, its arch-rival India could have taken an advantage by undermining 
Pakistan’s interests in Kashmir. To make things worse, the United States could invade Pakistan 
to destroy its nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are Pakistan’s strategic assets against India’s 
conventional superiority, and Pakistan had an abiding interest not to jeopardize its nuclear 
security. Third, Pakistan had long supported the Taliban for geo-strategic reasons. However, 
after the 9/11 terrorist attack, supporting the Taliban government in Afghanistan would no longer 
serve Pakistan’s geo-strategic interests. Instead, it would have invited a military confrontation 
with the United States. Musharraf concludes that Pakistan’s “self-interest and self-preservation 
were the basis” of his decisions. 114
The foregoing discussion shows Musharraf’s decision to join the Afghanistan War 
coalition. Between October 2001 and August 2008, Musharraf made two other decisions to 
  
                                                            
111 Shuja Nawaz notes that a personalized decision making process relies on anecdotal information rather than 
rigorous analysis of the pros and cons of an issue. Nawaz contends that both Musharraf and his successor Zardari 
exercised such parochial decision process, which gave utmost importance to centralization of power at the office of 
chief executive. See: Shuja Nawaz, “In Pakistan, Great Expectations…As Yet Unfulfilled,” New Atlanticist, May 
13, 2009. http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/pakistan-great-expectations-unfulfilled, accessed March 1, 2011.  
112 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 201. 
113 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, p. 201. 
114 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, pp. 204. 
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support the coalition. These included deploying the Pakistani armed forces to the FATA and 
Pakhtunkhwa Province, and to support the U.S. drone strikes. What was the logic behind 
Musharraf’s troop deployment in the tribal areas? Why did he support the drone strikes? On the 
first question, Musharraf claims, he deployed military and paramilitary forces to combat the Al 
Qaeda terrorists and stop the Talibanization of Pakistan. He also stresses that his military forces 
knew where the threat was coming from, and they took “very deliberate decisions” based on the 
intelligence on where the threat was high and where it was low.115
Did Musharraf count on his cabinet or the parliament in deciding Pakistan’s policy in the 
war on terrorism? Musharraf claimed he did.
 On the second question, 
Musharraf never publicly claimed that he supported the drone strikes. He had, perhaps, 
reluctantly accepted it under compulsions from the United States.  
116 Critics reject such claim.  In August 2009, nearly 
a year after Musharraf resigned from presidency, a seasoned Pakistani politician noted that, 
Musharraf never “took his cabinet into confidence on several key issues, including the war on 
terror.”117 This means that during his tenure as Pakistan’s President, Musharraf had almost 
single-handedly decided the country’s policy on contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition. 
Such decision-making style was consistent with his conviction that “decision-making is an 
individual process” and the role of the leader matters more, “irrespective of any amount of 
discussion” on a particular issue.118
                                                            
115 “Fareed Zakaria GPS, Interview with Pervez Musharraf,” CNN News, May 17, 2009. 
  
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0905/17/fzgps.01.html, accessed February 28, 2011. 
116 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, pp. 204. 
117 “Musharraf Never Consulted Cabinet in Almost 99.9 Percent of Political Decisions,” The Indian News, 
August 3, 2009. http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/musharraf-never-consulted-cabinet-in-almost-999-
percent-of-political-decisions_100226705.html, accessed February 28, 2011.  
118 Rory McCarthy and Luke Harding, “Interview with General Pervez Musharraf,” Guardian, May 16, 2001. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/may/16/pakistan.rorymccarthy1, accessed February 28, 2011. 
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Like Musharraf, Zardari also exercised strong control over the decisions on Pakistan’s 
coalition contribution. His personalized style of decision making had two implications. First, he 
ignored the 1973 Constitution, and ignored the powers of the parliament and the prime 
minister.119 Second, he directly coordinated the military and security issues with the Army Chief 
Ashfaq Kayani. According to Shuja Nawaz, Zardari’s personalized decision process showed that 
Pakistan lacked “the institutional mechanism for national security analysis and decision making 
with a clear central command authority.”120 Nawaz contends that this lack of institutional 
mechanism was evident in the fact that the cabinet committee on defense had rarely discussed 
key security issues, such as the plight of refugees and internally displaced people in the conflict-
ridden Swat Valley. In addition, the chairman of the chiefs of staff was often ignored in making 
important decisions on security issues.121 Former Pakistani diplomat Javaid Husain argues that, 
the personalized decision process is nothing but the result of longstanding military rule. Echoing 
Nawaz, Hussein stresses that the frequent military take overs in Pakistan have meant that the 
executive branch, not the parliament, controls the foreign policy making process. 122
                                                            
119 According to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, the president is the head of state and the prime minister is 
the head of the government. The Constitution holds that the president will act with the advice of the cabinet or the 
prime minister. It also holds that the prime minister can act directly or through the federal ministers. Despite such 
constitutional provisions, successive prime ministers in Pakistan have often been thwarted by military juntas and 
assertive presidents to establish effective control over the country’s domestic and foreign policy. For instance, 
during Musharraf’s ten years’ of rule (October 1999-August 2008), Pakistan had five prime ministers – none of 
whom enjoyed any significant decision making powers. Since November 2002, Musharraf’s prime ministers were 
Zafrullah Khan Zamali (November 21, 2002-June 26, 2004); Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain (June 30, 2004-August 20, 
2004); Shaukat Aziz (August 20, 2004-November 15, 2007); Muhammad Mia Soomro (November 16, 2007-March 
25, 2008); and Yousaf Raza Gilani (March 25, 2008-present). The first four belonged to Musharraf’s PML (Quaid) 
Party, whereas the last belonged to Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party. Although Zardari made some amendments to 
the Constitution to share the power with Prime Minister Gilani, the latter did not hold any significant power on the 
foreign policy process, especially on Afghanistan. This was due to Zardari’s centralization of power in the realm of 
foreign and security policy.  
 
120 Nawaz, “In Pakistan, Great Expectations … As Yet Unfulfilled.” 
121 Ibid. 
122 The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan provides for a strong role for the parliament in the foreign policy making 
process. The Parliament can pass non-binding resolutions on foreign policy, and hold hearings in the standing 
committees on foreign affairs, or ask questions to the chief decision-makers. This can enable the parliament to play 
315 
 
After President Zardari, General Kayani was the most important decision maker on 
Pakistan’s Afghan policy.123 Although Kayani showed an interest to depoliticize the military, he 
was deeply involved in a power struggle with the civilian government. In January 2008, he 
passed an official directive, which ordered military officers to refrain from contacting politicians. 
In February 2008, he ordered the withdrawal of military officials from civilian administrative 
positions.124 Despite making such key decisions to distance the army from politics, Kayani 
retained considerable power in shaping the country’s crucial decisions on foreign and security 
policy.125
At least three pieces of evidence illustrate the influence of General Kayani on Pakistan’s 
domestic politics. First, in September 2008, Kayani appointed Lt. General Ahmed Shuja Pasha as 
the new director general of the ISI.  By making the appointment decision on Pasha, Kayani 
resisted the interior ministry attempt to transfer the control of ISI into the civilian government.
  
126 
Second, in November 2009, Kayani pressured President Zardari to transfer the control of nuclear 
command authority to the office of the prime minister.127
                                                                                                                                                                                               
an indirect role in the foreign policy process. However, the parliament has rarely assumed such important role due to 
repeated military interventions, which have weakened the role of parliament in overseeing critical issues of defense 
and foreign policy. See: Javaid Husain, “The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan,” PILDAT Briefing 
Paper, No. 12 (2004), p. 8.  
 The transfer of the nuclear command 
123 This view was confirmed in a diplomatic cable written by U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson. See 
“WikiLeaks: Scenesetter for Gen Kayani’s Visit to Washington,” NDTV, December 2, 2010. 
http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks:-india-cables/wikileaks-scenesetter-for-gen-kayani-s-visit-to-washington-
69929, accessed March 6, 2011.  
124 Salman Masood, “New Pakistan Army chief Orders Military Out of Civilian Government Agencies, 
Reversing Musharraf Policy,” New York Times, February 13, 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/world/asia/13pstan.html?_r=1&ref=world, accessed February 26, 2011. 
125 Julie McCarthy, “Pakistan’s Military Shapes Relationships with U.S.,” NPR, December 21, 2010. 
126 Jane Perlez, “Pakistani Military Names Spy Agency Chief,” New York Times, September 30, 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/asia/01pstan.html, accessed February 26, 2011. 
127 B. Raman, “Why Did Zardari Keep  Himself Out of Nuclear Command Authority?” South Asia Analysis 
Group Paper, No. 3533. December 4, 2009. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3533.html, 
accessed February 24, 2011; Sabrina Tavernise and David E. Sanger, “Pakistan’s Leader Cedes Nuclear Office, New 
York Times, November 28, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/world/asia/29pstan.html, accessed February 
24, 2011.  
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authority indicated the military’s perception that Zardari was too unreliable to maintain the 
safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Third, President Zardari believed that the military was 
involved in a coup to overthrow him. This trust deficit between the president and the army 
became more apparent, after the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that the 2007 National 
Reconciliation Ordinance was unconstitutional. The Ordinance dropped the corruption charges 
against Zardari and some of senior ministers in PPP government.128
Did the Pakistani Army influence the country’s current Afghanistan policy? If yes, how 
did it do so? The answer is straightforward. The Pakistan Army continued to exert a strong 
influence over the country’s Afghanistan policy through its powerful intelligence agency ISI.
  
129
                                                            
128The National Reconciliation Ordinance provided for the return of late Prime Minister Benajir Bhutto and the 
withdrawal of more than 80,000 corruption cases, including against Zardari, and senior leaders of his PPP 
government. This created a controversy over whether the judiciary or the elected government was in control of 
Pakistan. See: Robert Windrem, “Power Struggle Threatens Pakistan’s Leader,” NBC News, November 16, 2009; 
Saeed Shah, “Pakistan in Crisis As ‘Creeping Coup’ Unfolds,” The Age, December 20, 2009. 
 
The ISI’s involvement in Afghanistan affairs was nothing new. During the Afghan War against 
the Soviet forces (1979-1989), the Pakistani ISI and the American CIA (Central Intelligence 
Agency) actively supported the Afghan mujahideens (resistance fighters). The two agencies 
provided the Afghan mujahideens with funds, weapons, and training to expel the Soviet forces 
http://www.theage.com.au/world/pakistan-in-crisis-as-creeping-coup-unfolds-20091219-l6lf.html, accessed March 
1, 2011. Kayani also thinks that the opposition leader Sharif is unreliable. Sharif’s past decisions to fire two army 
chiefs—General Jahangir Karamat and General Pervez Musharraf—had cost him the trust of the army as a political 
institution. See: T.V. Rajeswar, “WikiLeaks highlights Threat From Pak, India Needs to Review Its Security 
Measures,” The Tribune, December 14, 2010. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20101214/edit.htm, accessed 
March 1, 2011.  
129 Hassan Abbas, “Reform of Pakistan’s Intelligence Services,” The International News, March 15, 2008; 
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 97-130; Hasan-
Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 192-194; Hilary Synnot, 
Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of  Instability (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), pp. 57-
61. 
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from Afghanistan.130 In the same vein, the ISI had developed strong contacts with Islamist 
militant groups to counter the Indian forces in Kashmir.131
After Pakistan joined the war on terrorism, President Musharraf tasked the ISI to support 
the war efforts against the Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. The Pakistani government asserts that 
the ISI had made a strong and positive contribution to support the U.S. war efforts in 
Afghanistan. Despite such Pakistani claims, the United States and its NATO allies allege that the 
ISI had maintained a policy of selectively supporting some Afghan-focused Taliban groups, 
which had undercut the U.S. and coalition strategy in Afghanistan.
  
132
Many in Washington even suspect that members of Pakistan's Inter Services 
Intelligence spy agency are actively supporting Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders and 
may be tipping them off about planned attacks. So while U.S. strikes on Pakistani 
 Media reports indicate that 
the United States escalated the drone strikes to counter the rise of Taliban insurgency, which had 
enjoyed a direct support from the ISI. In September 2008, two months after the United States 
intensified the drone strikes in Pakistan, the Time magazine revealed:  
                                                            
130 Author’s interview with a retired ISI chief, July 2009; C. Bernstein, “Arms for Afghanistan,” The New 
Republic, July 18, 1981, pp. 8-10; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central 
Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,  2000), pp. 183-195. 
131The list of key Kashmir-focused militant groups includes the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba. Pakistan’s deadly connections with 
Al Qaeda and Islamist militant groups drew widespread attention during the Mumbai terrorist attacks in India 
(November 2008), allegedly carried out by the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT). See Daniel 
Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. 155-185; Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, and David Kilcullen, Triage: 
The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, 
2009), p. 25. 
132Jayshree Bajoria, and Eben Kaplan, “The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations,” Backgrounder 
(Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, July 26, 2010); David J. Kilcullen, “Testimony Before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Afghanistan, July 27, 2010, p. 3; Frederic Grare, Pakistan-Afghanistan 
Relations in the Post-9/11 Era,” Carnegie Papers, No. 72 (October 2006), pp. 5-7; Sean M. Maloney, “A Violent 
Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province 2003-07,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 
Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 202-203;  
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soil may be controversial, the theory goes, they are the only option for tackling a 
threat the Pakistani security forces are unable to neutralize.133
Why and how did Pakistani army support the Islamist groups as an instrument of foreign 
policy? To answer this question, one needs to look into the Pakistani elites, who articulate the 
role of Islam in defining their national identity. According to Feroz Khan, Pakistan is a Muslim 
country, and thus, Islam has a strong role in its foreign policy. Khan contends that: 
  
The Pakistani military and strategic elites are from the same stock. Since the birth 
of the Pakistani army there have been three sources of motivation: Regiment, 
Nation, and Faith. A soldier fights for his Nation (Pakistan) and upholds the pride 
of his Regime (British tradition), and he sacrifices in the cause of Islam (in the 
name of God)…The Pakistani Army derives its strength and morale from all these 
sources, but most importantly its over-arching cause is the omnipresence of God 
in every facets of a Muslim life. When a soldier dies in the line of duty, he is 
revered for having embraced the highest form of death—Shahadat.134
 In summary, President Musharraf, and his successor Zardari maintained a strong control 
over the country’s Afghanistan policy. Due to a long history of military intervention in domestic 
politics, Pakistan’s civilian institutions, especially the parliament, and the ministry of foreign 
affairs, lost their influence in the foreign policy making process. By contrast, the army and its 
premier intelligence agency ISI consolidated their power in the foreign policy decision making 
process. Backed by the support of the military and the ISI, Musharraf exercised a personalized 
  
                                                            
133 Aryn Baker, “US Stepping Up Operations in Pakistan,” Time, September 10, 2008. 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840383,00.html, accessed September 19, 2010.  
134 Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan,” p. 4; a similar view is found in Husain 
Haqqani’s seminal work on political Islam in Pakistan. See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and 
Military (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 
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decision process to make Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. Zardari lacked the trust of the military, 
and the control over the ISI. However, like Musharraf, he also bypassed the institutional 
channels, such as the constitutional provisions, the parliament, and the cabinet ministers, and 
directly coordinated with Army Chief Kayani in deciding Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. 
Bypassing the democratic oversight mechanism, Musharraf and Zardari supported the 
Afghanistan War coalition in a way that balanced between two competing factors: U.S. demands 
for a broad-based cooperation in the war on terrorism, and Pakistan’s interests in selectively 
fighting some terrorist groups, while supporting the others in an attempt to achieve a strategic 
depth in Afghanistan. How and why did the Pakistani leaders ignore the unfavorable public 
opinion, and continue to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism? The remainder 
of the chapter addresses this question. 
 
Public Opinion. My burden-sharing model predicts that Pakistan’s powerful chief 
executives will ignore the public opinion in choosing the country’s Afghanistan policy. Evidence 
supports the prediction of my theoretical model. Both Musharraf and Zardari regimes 
encountered strong public oppositions to the war on terrorism. A deep sense of anti-
Americanism, coupled with a strong influence of political Islam, fueled such public resentment. 
Despite growing oppositions at home, neither Musharraf nor Zardari altered the course of their 
policy of supporting the Afghanistan coalition. This is largely due to three factors described 
above: the systemic incentives of alliance dependence and convergent threat perception, and the 
lack of institutionalized restraints in the foreign policy making process.  
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Why did public opinion play no role in shaping Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan? I 
answer this question in three stages. First, I present the data on Pakistan’s public opinion 
regarding the war on terrorism. Second, I examine why the Pakistani public had consistently 
opposed the U.S.-led coalition war in Afghanistan and U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. Finally, I 
discuss why unfavorable public opinion did not have any effect on Pakistan’s burden-sharing 
behavior in Afghanistan.  
I examine the Pakistani public opinion on several issues. These include: (a) the Musharraf 
government’s decision to join the Afghanistan War coalition; (b) the U.S.-led war on terrorism; 
(c) Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States on the war against terrorism; (d) U.S. drone 
strikes in the tribal areas; and (e) Pakistani military offensives in the FATA. Together, they offer 
a broad overview of Pakistani public attitudes toward the war on terrorism. Most of the data 
came from media reports, and opinion polls conducted by the International Republican Institute, 
and the Pew Global Attitudes Project.  
First, Pakistan’s pro-Islamist and centrist political parties opposed the decision made by 
Musharraf to bandwagon with the United States in the war on terrorism.135
                                                            
135 Philip Smucker and Ben Fenton, “Moderate Held After Supporting Anti-U.S. Protests,” The Telegraph, 
November 2, 2001. 
 Opposition to the war 
was significantly higher in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, as well as near the Pakistani 
military bases, where the U.S. forces were granted access for logistical support. For instance, on 
October 9, 2001, two days after the U.S.-led OEF forces began bombing on Afghanistan, 
Pakistan’s border towns saw a massive show down of pro-Taliban demonstrations. The 
demonstrators rejected the military invasion of Afghanistan as an aggression on a Muslim nation. 
At that time, Musharraf claimed that a vocal minority was involved in the protest, while the large 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1361300/Moderate-held-after-
supporting-anti-US-protests.html, accessed March 2, 2011.  
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majority was behind his decision to join the war on terrorism.136 Later, on October 15, 2001, 
nearly 4,000 protesters in southwestern Jacobabad city clashed with Pakistani security forces. 
The protest took place on the eve of U.S. secretary of state Collin Powell’s visit to Islamabad. 
Powell’s visit was aimed to bolster the public standing of Musharraf, who had just granted the 
U.S. forces access to two airports for coalition operations in Afghanistan.137 Despite such 
grassroots opposition, in December 2001, opinion leaders in Pakistan viewed the coalition 
operation in Afghanistan worth the risk it posed to their government. 138
Second, as the war progressed, the Pakistani public continued to harbor unfavorable 
attitude toward the Afghanistan war coalition. Figure 6.7 presents the data on Pakistani public 
opinion attitude toward the U.S.-led war on terrorism. It shows that, in 2002 a plurality of 
Pakistani public opposed the war, while a small minority supported it. Since then, the majority of 
Pakistanis continued to oppose the war. In 2003, opposition to the war on terrorism increased to 
74%, and then continued to decline until 2006, and increased again to 56% in 2009. By contrast, 
support for the war remained constant (16%) in 2003 and 2004, and then increased in the next 
two years to 22% and 30% respectively, and then declined sharply to 13% and 16% in 2007 and 
2009.  
  
                                                            
136 Alexis Spillius and Phillip Smucker, “Pakistan Border Towns Erupt in Pro-Taliban Demonstrations,” The 
Telegraph, October 9, 2001.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/1358935/Pakistan-border-
towns-erupt-in-pro-Taliban-demonstrations.html, accessed Marc h2, 2011.  
137The Shahbaj airbase in Jacobabad was allowed for the U .S. forces to use for long term logistics and support 
operations. See Alex Spillius, “Riot Police Open Fire on Airport Protesters,” The Telegraph, October 15, 2001. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/1359524/Riot-police-open-fire-on-airport-
protesters.html, accessed March 2, 2011.  
138 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say 
Opinion Leaders,” December 19, 2001. http://pewglobal.org/2001/12/19/america-admired-yet-its-new-vulnerability-
seen-as-good-thing-say-opinion-leaders/2/, accessed March 2, 2011.  
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Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, various reports between 2002-2009. 
 
Third, since 2006, a growing number of Pakistanis viewed that their country should not 
cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism. Figure 6.8 presents the data on 
Pakistani attitude toward cooperation with the United States. It shows that in September 2006, 
43% Pakistanis opposed cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism. Such 
opposition more than doubled to 89% in January 2008, and remained as high as 80% in July 
2009.  By contrast, during the 2006-2009 period, support for U.S.-Pakistan cooperation declined 
from 46% in 2006 to 18% in 2009.  
Fourth, a large number of Pakistanis expressed their displeasure of the U.S. drone strikes 
in their sovereign territory. Figure 6.9 presents the Pakistani opinion data on drone strikes. It 
shows that in 2009 and 2010, the majority of Pakistanis (56%-58%) considered such strikes 
unnecessary in fighting extremist groups During this time, an overwhelming majority of 
Pakistanis (90% or more) thought that drone attacks killed too many civilian people. On the 
question of their government’s involvement behind the drone strikes, in 2009 a slight majority 
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(58%) of Pakistanis believed the drone strikes were carried out without the approval of the 
Pakistani government. This registered a nine percent drop to 49% in 2010, indicating a growing 
number of Pakistanis suspected their government might have approved of the drone strikes.  
 
Source: International Republican Institute, 2009.  
 
 
Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, 2009-2010. 
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Fifth, in 2009 and 2010, nearly one in two Pakistanis (49%-53%) supported their army-
led counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Although 
support for the use of their army in the fight against extremism was higher (60%) in Punjab, a 
large number of people (42%-43%) in the tribal area had also supported such campaigns.139 Most 
Pakistanis also favored a reduced role for the United States in fighting terrorism and insurgency 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For instance, in 2010, 53% Pakistanis favored that the United States 
should provide financial and humanitarian aid to Pakistan where extremist groups operate. This 
was down from 72% support in 2009.140 Regarding the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in 
Afghanistan, a large majority of Pakistanis (65%-72%) viewed that Coalition forces be 
withdrawn from the country as soon as possible.141
It is hard to generalize the opinion data presented above. However, several discernible 
features can be drawn from the data. The most obvious is that, a large majority of Pakistanis 
expressed their opposition to the U.S.-led war on terrorism. They recognized that U.S. drone 
strikes were killing too many civilians, and such strikes were unnecessary in fighting terrorism. 
A large majority of Pakistanis also disagreed that their country should cooperate with the United 
States in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. They also wanted reduced U.S. involvement 
in fighting extremism in Pakistan. On the whole, with the exception of opinion leaders, and 
senior leaders in the governments, the majority of Pakistanis opposed their country’s entry into 
and support for the Afghanistan War coalition.  
 
                                                            
139 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pakistani Public Opinion: Growing Concerns About Extremism, 
Continuing Discontent with U.S. (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, August 13, 2009) p. 13; The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, America’s Image Remains Poor: Concern About Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan (Washington, 
D.C.: Pew Research Center, July 29, 2010), p. 14. 
140 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, America’s Image Remains Poor, p. 13. 
141 Ibid. 
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The Pakistani public’s unfavorable attitude toward cooperation with the United States 
stemmed from at least two inter-related factors. The first concerns a strong sense of anti-
Americanism. The second concerns the role of political Islam in domestic and foreign policy. On 
the first issue, Pew opinion data reveal that most Pakistanis had consistently shown unfavorable 
view toward the United States. In 2002, 69% Pakistanis had a negative view of the United States, 
which decreased to 56% in 2006, then jumped to 68% in 2010.142
From 1979 to 1989, we fought a war with the US in Afghanistan against the 
Soviet Union. And we won mainly because of ISI…But then the US left us all 
alone with 30,000 mujahedeen brought by them. Even Osama bin Laden was 
brought by the US, who else? They all came to fight the Soviet Union. So, did 
anybody in Washington develop a strategy for what to do with these people after 
1989? No, nobody helped Pakistan for the next 12 years until 2001. We were left 
high and dry, with 30,000 mujahedeen holed up, no rehabilitation, no resettlement 
for them. No assistance was given to Pakistan — instead sanctions were imposed 
against us. Forty F-16s, for which we had paid money, were denied to us. Four 
million Afghan refugees had also come to Pakistan. The mujahedeen coalesced 
into al-Qaida and our social fabric was being completely destroyed. This is why 
 Such unfavorable view 
originated from the belief that the United States cared little about Pakistan’s long-term national 
interests. General Musharraf refers to the historical memory of Pakistani people to explain the 
root causes of anti-Americanism and opposition to Pak-U.S. counterterror cooperation. In 2009, 
during an interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel, Musharraf told:  
                                                            
142 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Concern About Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan, p. 16. 
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the people of Pakistan felt used by the Americans, and this is why Pakistanis 
dislike the US and this war [on terrorism].143
 Second, the process of Islamization also influenced the public attitude toward the war on 
terrorism. Pakistan was founded as a state on the basis of its Islamist identity. However, its 
founder Muhammad Ali Zinnah maintained a secular policy for the nascent state. Since the 
military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), successive governments in Pakistan have 
used Islam as a “legitimizing and unifying force for the evolving nation.”
 
144 Zia’s regime 
coincided with the anti-Soviet Afghan war, during which the Islamist parties, such as the Jamiat-
i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) played an active role in organizing the Afghan 
resistance forces (Mujahideens). After the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, in the early 
1990s, the JUI-run Pakistani madrassas in the Af-Pak border areas collaborated with the ISI and 
the Afghan Pashtuns to create the Taliban movement. During the 1990s, Pakistan’s Islamist 
parties, especially the JI, had supported various armed groups operating in the Kashmir Valley. 
The JUI-trained Taliban movement controlled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, whereas the JI-
supported militants engaged in a protracted low intensity campaign against the Indian forces in 
Kashmir.145
After Musharraf joined the war on terrorism, Pakistan abandoned its old policy of 
supporting the Taliban, and sponsoring the Kashmiri militants.
  
146
                                                            
143 “Spiegel Interview with Pervez Musharraf, Der Spiegel, June 7, 2009. 
 This had angered the JUI and 
the JI, which had joined other Islamist parties to form a combined Islamist platform—the 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,628960,00.html, accessed February 28, 2011. 
144 Iftikhar Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism, and the Building of a Nation (Northampton, MA: Olive 
Branch Press, 2010), p. 131.  
145 Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism, and the Building of a Nation, p. 132.  
146 Zafar Abbas, “Musharraf Denounced Over Kashmir,” BBC News, June 11, 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2038486.stm, accessed March 3, 2011.  
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Muttahida Majlis--e Amal (MMA, Combined Action Forum). During most of Musharraf’s 
military regime, the MMA was criticized by the mainstream People’s Party and Muslim League 
(Nawaz) as Musharraf’s ‘blue-eyed party.’ Despite their connection with Musharraf, leading 
MMA leaders, especially from JUI and JI, continued to take an anti-American stance, and 
opposed Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism.147
 Why did Musharraf and Zardari disregard public opinion, and continue to support the 
United States in the fight against terrorism? Part of the answer lies in the systemic level 
incentives, and part in the character of Pakistan’s domestic political regime discussed before. 
Among the systemic factors, alliance dependence and convergent threat perceptions provided 
two strong incentives for Pakistan to join and support the U.S.-led coalition. As Musharraf and 
Zardari centralized the decision making power into the office of the president, they bypassed the 
parliamentary politics, and the public opinion to respond directly to the systemic incentives. 
Neither of the presidents could ignore the U.S.  pressure for supporting the coalition, nor could 
 In fact, 
Pakistan’s mainstream Islamist parties, which had participated in the electoral politics during the 
Musharraf regime, had denounced Musharraf for abandoning the country’s Islamic identity, and 
supporting the United States in the war on terrorism. A major weakness of these mainstream 
Islamist parties was that they had no control over the extremist Islamist groups, such as, 
Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistani Taliban network, TTP. The TTP had introduced suicide terrorism, 
and was involved in an aggressive campaign of terror, targeting the Pakistani security forces and 
state institutions. The TTP used its terrorist attacks in retaliation for Pakistani military offensives 
in the FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa province.  
                                                            
147 Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism, and the Building of a Nation, p. 132; Aamer Ahmed Khan, 
“Whos’s Afraid of the Six Party Alliance?” BBC News, August 17, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4156808.stm, accessed March 3, 2011. 
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they shirk from the coalition by withdrawing Pakistani forces from the Pak-Afghan borders. As 
public concerns over the drone strikes surfaced in the media, the Musharraf and Zardari 
governments took a shrewd strategy: they openly criticized the strikes, but privately supported 
them.148
 In summary, the Pakistani public was extremely critical of the war on terrorism. They 
opposed Musharraf’s decision to join the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, and 
consistently demanded an end to Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in the war on terrorism. The distrust 
over U.S. strategic interests, coupled with the influence of political Islam, strongly influenced 
such public attitude toward the war. Presidents Musharraf and Zardari ignored the skeptical 
public sentiment at home, and instead responded to the systemic incentives in joining the U.S.-
led coalition. How did Pakistan’s military capability structure the country’s contribution to the 
Afghanistan War coalition? This question on the effect of Pakistan’s military capability on 
coalition burden-sharing is addressed below.  
  
 
Military Capability. At the domestic level, military capability represents the final 
decision point in explaining a country’s coalition contribution. My burden-sharing model 
suggests that a determined chief executive looks at the stock a country’s military capability to 
determine whether his (or her) country will pursue a precisely defensive or offensive strategy, or 
a mix of both, to serve the coalition purposes. If the country possesses a strong military force, it 
                                                            
148 For a discussion on CIA-ISI intelligence cooperation behind drone strikes and other sensitive issues in U.S.-
Pakistan counterterror cooperation, see Jeremy Schahill, “The (Not So) Secret U.S. War in Pakistan,” CBS News, 
December 3, 2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/03/opinion/main7112935.shtml, accessed March 3, 
2011.  On August 20, during a meeting between Pakistani prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and U.S. Ambassador 
Anne W. Patterson, Gilani told, “I don’t care if they do it [carry on the drone strikes] as long as they get the right 
people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” See “US Embassy Cables: Pakistan Backs US 
Drone Attacks on Tribal Areas,” Guardian, November 30, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-
cables-documents/167125, accessed March 3, 2011.  
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can assume a greater burden-sharing role, unless its national interests diverge with coalition 
interests. By contrast, if the country has a weak military force, it is likely to assume a poor 
burden-sharing role, unless it provides vital logistical support, such as access to airfields, bases, 
sea ports, which are located near the coalition battlefield, 
Following the definition of NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative, this dissertation 
measures the strength of military capability by looking at three inter-related issues: deployability, 
suitability, and interoperability of a country’s military forces and assets.149
In the context of Pakistan’s coalition contribution, deployability refers to the speed at 
which Pakistan’s armed forces and military assets could be deployed to the tribal areas in the 
FATA and the Pakhtunkhwa Province to counter the Al Qaeda terrorists, and the Taliban 
insurgents. By contrast, suitability refers to the availability of military, paramilitary, and special 
operations forces for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency purposes. For Pakistan, the 
deployability and suitability of its security forces for unconventional war (counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency) purposes was always conditioned by the nature of its relations with the arch-
rival India. This means that a potential conflict with India would give Pakistan an incentive to 
prepare its soldier for a conventional enemy-centric war, instead of a population-centric 
unconventional war in the tribal area. The potentiality for such a conflict with India would also 
 Since Pakistan is not 
a NATO member, and it did not contribute troops to Afghanistan, the criterion of interoperability 
is not relevant here. However, the issues of deployability and suitability remain extremely 
important.  
                                                            
149 For NATO’s discussion of alliance capability concepts, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The 
Transformation of the Alliance: NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Handbook, (NATO Publications, 
October 8, 2002), chapter 2. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0205.htm, accessed January 3, 2011. 
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prompt Pakistan to redeploy its forces from the western borders with Afghanistan to eastern 
borders with India.  
What military burdens did Pakistan share as a member of the Afghanistan War coalition? 
What effect did Pakistan’s military capability have on its burden-sharing role, and the subsequent 
decision processes on the Afghanistan coalition? On the first question, this chapter has already 
identified four major military contributions made by Pakistan. These are:  
(a) Strong logistical support for the United States and NATO;  
(b) Increasing troop deployment in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province;  
(c) Sustained military operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province; and  
(d) Tacit support for drone strikes in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.  
Among the four contributions listed above, the first and the second—logistical support 
and troop surge—were precisely contingent upon the political consent of Pakistan’s federal 
government. Both contributions were strong and significant, when judged in light of the U.S.-led 
coalition countries fighting in Afghanistan. Although the NATO logistics supply had come under 
frequent attacks by the Taliban and Al Qaeda militias, Pakistan remained the largest transit route 
for NATO’s non-lethal supplies, such as foods, water, vehicles. Nearly 80% of NATO supplies 
for coalition forces in Afghanistan was passed through Pakistan.150
                                                            
150 Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper, “Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route,” New York Times, 
September 30, 2010. 
 This was an irreplaceable 
contribution made by Pakistan. The size of the troops deployed by Pakistan along the Afghan 
border areas was also significant, and as large as the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. By 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/01/world/asia/01peshawar.html, accessed March 9, 2011. 
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the end of 2010, NATO had an estimated 131,000 troops in Afghanistan. At that time, Pakistan 
had a roughly equal size of troops in its tribal area bordering Afghanistan.  
The fourth contribution—support for U.S. drone strikes—was directly associated with 
Pakistan’s weak capability. As described below, Pakistan lacked an effective counterinsurgency 
capacity, which resulted in numerous failed offensives. Pakistan also lacked the indigenous 
combat drone technology. Due to such deficiencies in offensive military capability, Pakistan was 
unable to conduct the drone strikes on its own. Although the Pakistani government criticized the 
drone strikes on the grounds of sovereignty breach, senior leaders in the government privately 
acknowledged the utility of the drone strikes, as such strikes often complemented Pakistani 
counterinsurgency operations.  
If military risk-sharing is used as a benchmark for evaluating coalition burden-sharing, 
then the Pakistani forces’ military offensives in the tribal areas were perhaps the most important 
contribution made by Islamabad to the Afghanistan War coalition. Although the decisions to 
launch operations were taken by the chief executives, in consultation with the army chief, it was 
the capability of the Pakistani military that significantly determined the outcome of the 
operations. An analysis of the outcome of such operations is important to examine if they 
provided any feedback to the decision makers to alter the course of Pakistan’s coalition policy. 
Given the fact that, Pakistan and other coalition countries were engaged in a protracted war 
against terrorism, it is reasonable to expect the effect of certain feedbacks on Pakistan’s decision 
process.151 In the military jargon such feedbacks are usually defined as learning and 
adaptation.152
                                                            
151 For an analysis of feedback effects in foreign  policy, see A.I. Dawisha, “Foreign Policy Models and the 
Problem of Dynamism,” British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1976), pp. 128-137; J. 
 
332 
 
The analysis below focuses on the effect of military capability on Pakistan’s security 
operations in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Since we defined military 
capability, in terms of deployability and suitability, the central question is whether Pakistan had a 
readily deployable and suitable security force, which could contribute to a strong 
counterinsurgency mission in the tribal area. In order to answer this question, we need to look 
into the inter-linkages among Pakistan’s military doctrine, military capabilities, and operational 
performance in the tribal areas.  
The consensus view is that Pakistan lacked an official counterinsurgency doctrine, and 
the Pakistani security forces were ill equipped to fight a protracted insurgency. This lack of 
doctrine and the capacity gap had significantly determined the outcomes of, and subsequent 
decisions on, Pakistan’s military offensives in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province.153 Sameer 
Lalwani identifies two major outcomes in Pakistani counterinsurgency operations: repeated 
failures from 2002 to 2008, and modest success from 2009 to 2010.154
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Bandyopadhyaya, A General Theory of Foreign Policy (Mumbai, India: Allied Publishers, 2004), pp. 25-26; Frank 
Gardinger, Dirk Peters, and Herbert Dittgen, “Feedback Effects in US Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” 
Paper prepared for the panel America’s Mid East Policy at the WISC Conference in Istanbul, 24-27 August 2005;  
 Jones and Fair offer a 
similar view. Their study shows that Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations in 2009 and 2010 
152 Most of the contemporary literature on military organizational learning and adaptation focus on the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars, and the counterinsurgency in Pakistan. See Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation 
and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010), pp. 567-594; Sameer 
Lalwani, “The Pakistan Military’s Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009,” CTC Sentinel, January 31, 2010; 
Chad Serena, From Spectrum to Beam in Iraq Organizational Adaptation: Combat, Stability, and Beyond, Ph.D. 
Dissertation (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 2010); Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creaging and 
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2006).  
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No. 3 (March 2009), pp. 7-9; David J. Kilcullen, “Terrain, Tribes, and Terrorist: Pakistan, 2006-2008,” Brookings 
Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, No. 3 (September 10, 2009); C. Christine Fair and Seth Jones, 
“Pakistan’s War Within,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 6 (2009), pp. 161-188; Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in 
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154 Sameer Lalwani, “Pakistan's COIN Flip,” New America Foundation, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative 
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had medium success, compared to the low success in most operations from 2002 to 2008.155 
Success in the counterinsurgency campaign is defined as the ability of the security forces to 
‘clear, hold, and build’ territories occupied by insurgents. This three-staged clear-hold-build 
counterinsurgency doctrine is derived from the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), 
developed by General David Petraeus, and applied in Iraq, and later tested in Afghanistan. 156
How did the lack of doctrine and the lack of capacity shape the outcome of Pakistan’s 
security operations in the tribal area? Several causal processes can be identified to answer this 
question.  
  
First, the Pakistani military was reluctant to develop a formal counterinsurgency doctrine, 
which had severely constrained its ability to fight the Pakistani Taliban militants, and their 
Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda allies. The linkage between a doctrine and the outcome of military 
operations is pretty straightforward. A counterinsurgency doctrine provides for a comprehensive 
civil-military strategy for defeating and containing an insurgency, and protecting the population. 
The most glaring example of a modern counterinsurgency doctrine is the U.S. doctrine, codified 
in FM 3-24. It departs from on an enemy-centric strategy, and focuses on a population-centric 
strategy. The western counterinsurgency doctrines, including the U.S. doctrine, stress the need 
for “political over military solutions, population security over enemy targeting, ground forces 
over air power, and small rather than large force deployment for missions (such as patrols,  
intelligence-gathering, and development assistance).”157
                                                            
155 Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, p. 76. 
  
156 See United States Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
pp. 174-187; Alexander Alderson, “Learning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and  Practice,” 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 6 (2007), pp. 12-19.  
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Pakistan not only lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine; it had consistently resisted the 
U.S. pressures for developing an official doctrine on the ground that its main threat came from 
India, not from the tribal areas. According to Ahmed Rashid, in 2008 the Chairman of the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mulen had failed to persuade Pakistan to build a 
counterinsurgent force of two brigades to two divisions to fight the insurgency in the FATA.158 
The Pakistan Army rejected the proposal, saying a potential war with India would dominate its 
military preparedness. This means, the Pakistani military continued to prioritize defending the 
plains of Punjab and Sindh from a potential Indian aggression, rather than fighting an insurgency 
in the mountains of FATA.159
The Pakistani military’s reluctance to adopt an official counterinsurgency doctrine 
stemmed from its unfriendly relations with India. The two countries fought three conventional 
wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and a conflict over Kashmir in 1999 (the Kargil conflict). 
Tensions between them escalated in 2001 and 2008, after the Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant 
groups Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) launched two high profile 
terrorist attacks in India. After the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, New Delhi 
threatened a military action against Pakistan for its alleged involvement in the attack. Pakistan 
denied any responsibilities for the attack, but banned the LeT and the JeM in January 2002. It 
also cracked down on the top LeT and JeM leaders.
  
160
                                                            
158 Rashid, “Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” p. 8. 
 This did not assuage the concerns of 
India, which deployed nearly 700,000 troops along the Pakistan border by May 2002. Islamabad 
159 Ibid. 
160 “Jaish-e-Mohammad: A Profile,” BBC News, February 6, 2002. 
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responded by deploying nearly 400,000 troops along the India border during the same time.161 
Tensions defused after international mediation persuaded the two countries to withdraw their 
troops during the fall of 2002.162
In November 2008, after the LeT attack on Mumbai, India threatened a military attack on 
Pakistan, which alerted the Pakistani military for a possible redeployment along the Indian 
border.
  
163 Although the situation did not escalate too much, the Pakistan Army continued to 
perceive a high level threat due to India’s offensive military doctrine. In 2004, India departed 
from its longstanding defensive military doctrine to an offensive military doctrine. The new 
doctrine, widely known as the ‘Cold Start,’ is a limited war doctrine, which plans for a swift 
retaliatory conventional strike in Pakistan to destroy Pakistan’s vital military assets, including 
the nuclear arsenal. 164 The Pakistani military asserts that its long history of conflicts with India, 
coupled with the latter’s offensive military doctrine provided a reasonable justification for not 
abandoning a conventional military doctrine, in favor of a new population-centric 
counterinsurgency doctrine.165
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Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2009). 
164 Praveen Swami, “Gen. Padmanaban Mulls Over Lessons of Operation Parakram,” The Hindu, February 6, 
2004. http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm, accessed March 9, 2011; For an 
authoritative analysis on India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, see: Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The 
Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2007/08), pp. 158-190.  
165 Cyril Almeida, “Kayani Spells Out Threat Posed by India Doctrine,” Dawn (Karachi), February 4, 2010.  
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With no counterinsurgency doctrine to follow in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa, the 
Pakistan Army had emphasized on targeting the enemy, not securing the population. It also 
deployed large infantry battalions, rather than small military units for massive fighting and 
excessive use of force purposes.166 Using a conventional war doctrine during the military 
operations in the tribal areas, the Pakistani forces deployed “heavy artillery, helicopter gunships, 
and fighter-bombers to blanker the [target area] with firepower.”167
Second, the lack of capacity had also influenced the outcome of Pakistan’s 
counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s conventional military forces 
deployed in the Afghan border areas lacked knowledge of the tribal culture, demography, terrain, 
and language. 
These enemy-centric 
operations had often produced collateral damage, killing innocent civilians and their property, 
and displacing many people. In most cases, although the initial ground offensives and massive 
firepower cleared the target areas, the Pakistani military lacked enough forces to hold the 
territories. The result was a serious disaster. On several occasions, the conventional ground 
offensives were followed by ceasefires and fragile peace agreements (in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 
and 2009). The militants used these peace agreements as a window of opportunity to regroup, 
and prepare for future conflicts with the security forces. Until 2008, the net result of Pakistan’s 
military campaigns in the tribal area was repeated failures to contain the insurgency. Table 6.1 
summarizes the outcomes of Pakistan’s major counterinsurgency operations. 
168
                                                            
166 Jones and Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, pp. 35-36; Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” p. 4; Kilcullen, 
“Terrain, Tribes, and Terrorist: Pakistan, 2006-2008.”  
  They were also seen as intruders into the tribal society, and an occupying force 
in the tribal area, which had alienated the local population. This lacking in the conventional 
167 Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” p. 3. 
168 Sameer Lalwani, Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment (Washington, 
D.C.: New America Foundation, 2009), p. 37. 
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military forces could be offset by the paramilitary Frontier Corps soldiers, who were mostly 
drawn from the tribal agencies, and thus familiar with the demographics, social structures, 
terrain, and language of the tribal region. However, the Frontier Corps was not trained as a 
combat force. Its operational doctrine and strategy focused on patrolling the frontiers and 
countering cross-border smuggling – which were mostly non-kinetic operations. As a result, 
fighting insurgency was largely an unfamiliar task for the Frontier Corps personnel. In 2008, the 
Pakistani Army agreed to allow 70 U.S. officers to train the Frontier Corps soldiers in 
counterinsurgency warfare. The Pakistani army chief Kayani also ordered the paramilitary force 
to be better equipped to fight the insurgency in the FATA.169
Fourth, the Pakistani military’s capacity gap could be overcome by enlisting the tribal 
lashkars (fighters) or the deployment of civilian police. The civilian police deployment was 
simply impossible, given the limited human resources, equipment, and training possessed by the 
police. However, the lashkar option was tested by the Pakistani military. Since 2008, the 
Pakistani security forces had enlisted the support of armed tribal lashkars in waging a successful 
 Third, the capacity gap in Pakistani 
security forces had seriously affected their morale and commitment to fight the Taliban 
insurgents. Media reports indicate that many Army and Frontier troops deserted and defected in 
the midst of counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban. Some soldiers in the FATA 
recognized that the Taliban militias shared the same Islamic religious belief with the majority of 
Pakistanis. They doubted whether fighting the Tablian would be consistent with their Islamic 
motto, which focused on Iman, Taqwa, and Jihad (Faith, Piety, and Holy War) as the three 
pillars of the Pakistan Army.  
                                                            
169 “Pakistan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” p. 8. 
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counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal regions.170
The foregoing discussion suggests that the lack of an official counterinsurgency doctrine 
and the lack of well equipped forces had resulted in serious debacles in Pakistan’s military 
operations in the FATA and Pakhtunkhwa province. This was a standard picture of Pakistani 
operations from 2002 to 2008 (See Table 6.1). Things began to change in 2009 and 2010, with 
medium success in counterinsurgency operations in Swat and South Waziristan.  
 The tribal lashkars scored moderate success 
in pushing the Taliban out of the tribal areas, and supporting the Pakistan army’s 
counterinsurgency operations. However, the lashkar tactics had its own weaknesses. For 
instance, the tribal fighters were lightly armed, and could only sustain a low-intensity conflict 
against a fragmented Taliban cell. Confronting a cohesive Taliban insurgency was not the task of 
the tribal lashkars, and doing so would require a massive ground support from Pakistani army, 
which was not available. Moreover, the Pashtun tribal code forbids a tribal man fighting “under 
another clan’s leadership.” This tribal code limited lashkar recruitment along certain clans. In the 
long run, inter-tribe rivalry, and defections also appeared to be a major problem among the tribal 
lashkars. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
170 Evidence of tribal lashkars’ participation in the fight against the Taliban insurgency can be found in the 
military operations in South Waziristan, Orakzai, Swat, Lakki Marwat, Khyber, Hangu, Buner, Bajaur, Kurram, 
Peshawar, and Dir. See, Lalwani, Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment, p. 
39. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of Pakistan’s Key Counterinsurgency Operations, 2001-2010 
Month/Year Success Failure  Peace Deal 
June 2002  South Waziristan  
March 2004  South Waziristan  
April 2004   South Waziristan 
Feb. 2005   South Waziristan 
Sept. 2006   North Waziristan 
Sept. 2007  South Waziristan  
Oct.-Nov. 2007  Swat Valley  
Feb. 2008   North Waziristan 
May 2008   Swat Valley 
Sept. 2008 Bajaur Agency   
2008 (Several Months)   Swat Valley  
Jan. 2009   Swat Valley 
Jan.-March 2009  Swat Valley  
Apr.-June 2009 Swat Valley   
June-Oct. 2009 South Waziristan   
Sept. 2009-June 2010 Kurram and Orakzai 
Agencies 
  
 
Note: This table shows three types of outcome of a counterinsurgency operation: success, failure, and 
peace deal. The names inside the cells represent administrative districts from the FATA and the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Province, where the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces were involved in a protracted 
counterinsurgency campaign from 2002 to 2010.  
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What contributed to the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations in 2009 and 
2010? To what extent were the lessons from the past operations taken into the decision process to 
effect positive changes in Pakistan’s burden-sharing behavior? Lalwani identifies two major 
factors—a bottom-up counterinsurgency approach, and a higher force ratio—in explaining 
Pakistan’s changing burden-sharing decisions and outcomes. First, after the successful operation 
in Bajaur in 2008, the Pakistani military went through a process of “learning by doing,” and 
gradually adopted a hybrid approach.171 The hybrid approach combined the insights from a 
conventional war doctrine and blended it with a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine. 
Since, the Pakistani military did not have a formal counterinsurgency doctrine, an informal, ad 
hoc, and hybrid counterinsurgency strategy emerged from a bottom-up approach, which focused 
on incorporating the knowledge and experience of the junior army officers. Lalwani writes, 
“[C]aptains through colonels, who had drawn lessons from successful bottom-up 
experimentation in the Bajaur campaign (late 2008-early 2009), were brought into the decision-
making process.”172
Second, using the hybrid counterinsurgency doctrine, the Pakistani military launched 
Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat (May 2009), and Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan (fall 
2009).  In both operations, the Pakistani military maintained higher troop levels to clear and hold 
territories. In Swat, the army cleared out the population before targeting the terrorists.  It used 
 This bottom-up counterinsurgency doctrine emphasized on the collection of 
detailed intelligence on the terrain, militant leaders, and their support base; separating the 
civilian population from the  militant targets; conducting psychological operations, and 
intelligence sharing with the United States. 
                                                            
171 Lalwani, “Pakistan’s COIN Flip,” pp. 1, 6-9. 
172 Ibid, p. 7. 
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dispersed force to flush out the militants from the capital city Mingora. After the clear phase, the 
military moved to hold the areas, and resettle the displaced people. The next major offensive was 
in South Waziristan, where the Pakistani military relied on the deployment of 30,000-60,000 
troops to eliminate the 10,000-15,000 strong Pakistani Taliban, TTP. Since the major target of 
the operation was Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistani Taliban TTP, the Pakistani forces neutralized 
two powerful factions—Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur. The move was criticized by the 
United States and NATO, but Pakistan used the age-old ‘divide and rule’ policy to weaken and 
to defeat the TTP. The Pakistani military used psychological warfare campaign by distributing 
leaflets, denouncing false jihad. It targeted the terrorist leadership and sanctuary, using 
operational intelligence data from the United States. In less than two months, the military 
defeated the TTP. However, several challenges remained significant. The civil-military actors 
had to decide how to re-settle the displaced people. They also needed to explore how the security 
forces would hold the territory. 
 In summary, since October 2001, Pakistan had made four principal contributions to share 
the military burdens of Afghanistan War coalition. First, Pakistan provided access to military 
bases, airspaces, and more importantly, offered largest route for the transfer of NATO logistics. 
Second, Pakistan’s deployment of nearly 150,000 military and paramilitary troops along the 
Afghan border was large enough to compare with the U.S. and NATO’s estimated 140,000 
troops deployed by 2010. Third, since 2002, Pakistan had engaged in a protracted 
counterinsurgency campaign in the FATA and its adjacent Pakhtunkhwa Province. This 
protracted counterinsurgency campaign brought two outcomes: limited success until 2008, and 
higher success in 2009 and 2010. My research finds that from 2002 to 2008, Pakistan’s neglect 
for a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine and weak military capability produced low 
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success, in which the Taliban-controlled areas were often cleared for a brief period, without 
follow-up operations to hold and build those areas. After going through a process of ‘learning by 
doing,’ in 2009, the Pakistan Army adopted a hybrid counterinsurgency doctrine, which blended 
the insights from the enemy-centric conventional military doctrine with population-centric 
counterinsurgency doctrines. This hybrid doctrine was developed as a bottom-up approach, in 
which junior army officers (from captain to colonel) with operational experience in the FATA 
were incorporated into the decision-making process. The net result was positive. Drawing the 
lessons from the Bajaur campaign (2008), in 2009 and 2010, the Pakistani military launched two 
successful campaigns in Swat and South Waziristan. The Swat and South Waziristan campaigns 
showed the Pakistani army’s improved capability for clearing and holding territories, previously 
controlled by the insurgents. Despite such successes, Pakistan was yet to develop a political 
solution to deal with the insurgency. Finally, as the United States escalated the drone strikes in 
the FATA, Pakistan offered quiet approval and intelligence support on selected targets to 
coordinate such strikes.  
 
III. Summary and Conclusion 
Pakistan’s contribution to the Afghanistan War coalition provides support for my burden-sharing 
model. Pakistan joined the coalition in 2001 as a non-NATO ally, and provided diplomatic, 
economic, and military supports to maintain the coalition. Pakistan’s military contribution to the 
coalition included logistics support for the U.S. and NATO forces, counterinsurgency campaigns 
in the northwest tribal areas, and support for U.S. drone strikes. Although Pakistan did not 
contribute any boots on the ground in Afghanistan, it had set up nearly 1,000 military posts along 
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the Afghan borders to interdict Al Qaeda and Taliban militants and deployed upto 150,000 
troops by 2009 in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. These Pakistani troops included 
conventional ground and air forces, special operations forces, and the paramilitary border forces. 
In 2009 and 2010, senior Pakistani diplomats to the United Nations claimed that Pakistan had 
lost more than 20,000 civilians and 2,500 military personnel during the war on terrorism. 
Pakistan experts estimate the total cost of the war to be $28-$50 billion.173
 This chapter examines the Pakistani decision process on Afghanistan. It asks a central 
research question: Why did Pakistan join the Afghanistan War coalition, and why did it maintain 
a dubious role to support the coalition? My research finds that two international systemic 
incentives encouraged Pakistan to join and support the coalition. These were an alliance 
dependence on the United States, and balance of threat.  
 
First, Pakistan’s dependence on an informal and bilateral alliance with the United States 
offered two inter-related incentives—a negative incentive and a positive incentive—to 
participate in the Afghanistan War coalition. The negative incentive included the threat of 
punitive military actions, and the positive incentive included economic and military assistance. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Bush administration threatened Pakistan 
to take  military actions if Islamabad did not cut off the diplomatic relations with Afghanistan’s 
Taliban regime. Pakistan joined the coalition as early as September 2001 to avoid a potential 
collision with the United States. Initially, Pakistan provided critical logistical support for the 
                                                            
173 Military analyst Talat Masood gave the $28 billion estimate. By contrast, Pakistani Ambassador to the UN 
Amjad Sial gave the $50 billion estimate on the cost of war on terrorism to Pakistan. Sial’s estimate may not have 
subtracted the roughly $20 billion military and economic aid  given by the  United States to Pakistan from 2001 to 
2010. See: Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan,” Terrorism 
Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, No. 5, February 4, 2010; Statement by Ambassador Amjad Hussain B. 
Sial, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Sixth Committee during 65th UN General Assembly on 
agenda item 107: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (6 October 2010).”  
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coalition forces in Afghanistan, without charging any user fee or signing any formal agreements, 
which is a standard procedure for giving such privileges.174
Second, after alliance dependence, balance of threat presented the second systemic 
incentive to encourage Pakistan’s support for the coalition. My research finds that Pakistan 
agreed with the United States on the threat posed by the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban 
groups, but disagreed on the threat posed by the Afghan Taliban group. This convergence and 
divergence in threat perception had strongly influenced Pakistan’s contribution to the coalition. 
The United States and its NATO allies found that Pakistan was proactively pursuing the first two 
groups—the Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, while secretly supporting the third group—the 
Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s support for the third group was premised on the belief that the 
Pashtun-origin Afghan Taliban group could be an ally in future Afghanistan, after the withdrawal 
of U.S. and NATO troops from the country.  
 However, since 2001, the United 
States had provided economic and military aid to Pakistan to encourage its continued coalition 
support. This U.S. aid included the $20 billion economic and military assistance, Pakistan 
received from 2001 to 2010. The lion share of this aid, nearly $14 billion, was given to reimburse 
for Pakistan’s military operations in the tribal areas. Pakistan also achieved the non-NATO ally 
status, which allowed it to receive sensitive military technologies for its contribution to the war 
on terrorism.  
This chapter has shown that these systemic incentives of alliance dependence and balance 
of threat were channeled through the Pakistani domestic political processes and capability 
constraints, in which the chief executive and the military power had a strong effect on the 
                                                            
174 Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, p. 15. 
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country’s coalition behavior. Figure 6.10 presents the Pakistani decision process regarding the 
Afghanistan War coalition.  
Figure 6.10 The Pakistani Decision Process on Afghanistan 
 
First, President Musharraf and his successor Zardari enjoyed strong executive power, and 
ignored the unfavorable public opinion in deciding the country’s Afghanistan policy. Both of 
them exercised a personalized decision-making process, which lacked any effective institutional 
constraints from the constitution and the parliament. This personalized decision process stemmed 
from a parochial political culture, in which the Pakistan Army and its powerful intelligence 
346 
 
agency ISI had effectively marginalized the ministry of foreign affairs and the parliamentary 
committees on defense and external affairs, in the  foreign policy making process.175
Second, after Musharraf and Zardari decided to conduct counterinsurgency operations in 
the Pak-Afghan border regions, Pakistan’s military capability was the ultimate determinant of 
such operations. This chapter has shown that Pakistan lacked a formal population-centric 
counterinsurgency doctrine, which had severely constrained the ability of its forces to clear, hold, 
and build territories, occupied by the Taliban insurgents, and their Al Qaeda allies.  As a result, 
until 2008, most Pakistani operations in the tribal areas, especially in North and South 
Waziristans, and the Swat Valley had produced weak or low success against the insurgents. The 
signing of ceasefires and peace agreements with the militants had further worsened the scenario, 
as the Taliban militias used the peace deals as an opportunity to regroup and launch fresh attacks. 
Things began to change in 2009, when the Pakistani military applied a bottom-up approach to 
fight the insurgency in Swat. Drawing on the lessons from past operations, the military deployed 
greater number of military personnel to clear and hold the territory. The operations in Swat and 
South Waziristan in 2009 and 2010 had shown that improved capability and an operational 
counterinsurgency doctrine would produce important success in defeating the Taliban and 
securing the population. 
 The effect 
of such parochial political culture was straightforward: presidents Musharraf and Zardari 
bypassed the domestic institutions, such as the cabinet meetings, and the parliamentary debates 
and almost unilaterally decided to support for the Afghanistan War coalition. One of their most 
important decisions was to share the military burdens of the Afghan War coalition by conducting 
counterinsurgency operations in the FATA and its neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province  
                                                            
175 Omar Sharifi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Toward Afghanistan From 1947-2008,”  
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In summary, from 2002 to 2008, the military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas had 
primarily focused only on clearing areas. Because of a lack of doctrine, and the capacity deficits, 
military offensives during that time had ignored the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ phases of 
counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistan Army learnt from its past mistakes, and adapted to 
the deteriorating security situations by introducing a hybrid counterinsurgency doctrine, and 
investing more resources to conduct security operations in the tribal areas. The result was a 
resounding success against the Taliban insurgents in 2009 and 2010. This success was evident in 
the ability and willingness of the Pakistani forces in Swat and South Waziristan to clear and hold 
territories. The U.S. and NATO Commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus praised 
Pakistan’s success in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border areas. He also 
stressed the need for more coordinated military operations in both sides of the Durand Line.176
Pakistan’s success in future military offensives in the tribal areas would depend on 
investing in civilian-led development and stabilization operations. The United States recognized 
this civilian aspect counterinsurgency operation, and since 2009, it began to invest more in 
civilian reconstruction efforts. This included resettling hundreds of thousands of civilians 
displaced by the military operations. Since 2009, the United States had also intensified the drone 
strikes in the tribal areas of FATA, and threatened to conduct similar strikes in the Quetta city of 
the Balochistan Province, where the Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar was believed to be 
sheltered. Although Pakistan had tacitly supported the drone strikes in the FATA and its adjacent 
areas, it is likely to resist such drone strikes in the Quetta city to protect the Afghan Taliban 
leader. Unless Pakistan abandons its support for the various factions of Afghan Taliban groups, 
 
                                                            
176 “Gen. Petraeus Praises Pakistan’s War Efforts,” USA Today, December 27, 2010. 
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20101227/petraeus27_st.art.htm, accessed March 13, 2011. 
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especially the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, it 
is likely to be defined as an uncertain partner with conflicted goals.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION: 
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
This dissertation examines the external and domestic sources of a country’s coalition behavior. It 
argues that neither neo-realism nor strategic culture theories of IR provide sufficient explanations 
for analyzing the varied level of coalition contributions made by states. It claims that a neo-
classical realist theory of coalition politics better explains the diverse coalition commitments 
made by states. Taking a neo-classical realist position, this study presents and tests a coalition 
burden-sharing model. The burden-sharing model suggests that international systemic incentives 
are transmitted through the domestic political processes to produce unique burden-sharing 
behaviors and outcomes for states. The empirical findings from Britain, Germany, and Pakistan 
support the utility of my burden-sharing model. 
 The empirical findings in the preceding three chapters offer some theoretical and policy 
implications. On the theoretical ground, this study shows the utility of middle-range theories of 
foreign policy, which shows the causal linkages between international systemic factors and the 
domestic level intervening variables to predict and explain the foreign policy behaviors of states. 
K. J. Holsti once defined foreign policy as the study of “actions of a state toward the external 
environment and the conditions – usually domestic—under which those actions are formulated.”1
                                                            
1 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall), p. 21. 
 
In a similar vein, Robert Putnam has defined foreign policy as a two-level game, played by 
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actors at both the international and domestic-levels.2
  
  The findings in study support the Holsti 
and Putnam theses that foreign policy decision processes involve a dynamic interaction between 
domestic and international level factors.  
I. Theoretical Implications 
This study specifies three external level independent variables –   alliance dependence, balance 
of threat, and collective action; and three domestic-level intervening variables –domestic 
political regime, public opinion, and military capability, and shows a  unique causal process that 
predict contingent generalizations from state behavior. The theoretical implications of this 
research can be discussed in reference to the independent and intervening variables. 
 Alliance Dependence Changes over Time. Alliance dependence was a salient feature 
during the Cold War era international politics. The geopolitical confrontation between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union, and the existence of the rival alliances—NATO and Warsaw 
Pact – made it difficult for countries to shirk from alliance commitment. This is no longer the 
case in the post-Cold War era. My research shows that alliance solidarity, instead of alliance 
dependence, presented an important incentive for Britain and Germany to participate in the 
Afghanistan War coalition.3
                                                            
2 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1988): 427-460. 
 The effect of such change—from alliance dependence to alliance 
solidarity—is enormous. It means that major U.S. allies in the NATO may no longer be 
amenable to the U.S. pressures and demands for greater burden-sharing in coalition operations. 
3 For an interesting discussion on NATO’s alliance solidarity, and its potential to form a risk community, see 
Veronica M. Kitchen, The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security And Identify (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010); Also see, M.J. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2009) 
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This was evident in the fact that, in response to U.S. requests for troop surge, and participation in 
offensive military operations, only a handful of NATO countries responded positively, while 
others continued to ignore it. There is one caveat to such broad generalization. In the absence of 
a more detailed analysis of all or most of the ISAF coalition countries in Afghanistan, it is hard 
to reject the utility of alliance dependence as an explanatory variable in predicting coalition 
behavior.  
In contrast to the major NATO allies, such as Britain, and Germany, small NATO 
countries, or NATO aspirants are likely to be influenced by alliance dependence. Non-NATO 
allies are also likely to respond to the incentives and constraints presented by the dependence on 
the United States. Pakistan is a glaring example of this. This study finds that Pakistan’s 
dependence on the U.S. aid, and its fear of abandonment by the United States had influenced its 
decision to join and to support the coalition. Pakistan also feared entrapment into a U.S.-led 
coalition. This is why it did not allow a large U.S. military footprint in its territory, nor did it 
contribute troops to Afghanistan. This means that the classical dilemma of abandonment versus 
entrapment may continue to shape the coalition behavior of non-NATO allies, and countries 
dependent on U.S. military and economic aid. 
States also Balance against Non-State Threats. Stephen Walt once argued that states do 
not necessarily balance against a power, they balance against a growing threat.4
                                                            
4 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
 Walt’s balance 
of threat theory refers to the traditional power struggle between rival states, seeking either to 
defend their security or to expand their influence. Do states also pursue a balancing act against 
the offensive power of a non-state threat? The answer is yes. This study shows that Britain, 
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Germany, and Pakistan confronted the threats from two major non-state actors: the transnational 
Islamist group Al Qaeda, and the various Taliban insurgent groups.  
Although Al Qaeda did not represent any monolithic terrorist group, nor did the Taliban, 
a fair degree of collaboration and cooptation is assumed between the Al Qaeda core and 
affiliated groups and the Taliban insurgents. For instance, the British authorities found that one 
of the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings had received terrorist training in Pakistan.5 The 
German and U.S. authorities found a strong connection between Al Qaeda’s Hamburg Cell and 
the core leadership of Al Qaeda.6 Pakistan has seen a strong collaboration between the South 
Waziristan-based Tehrek-e-Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.7
Walt suggests that several factors contribute to the rise of a threat. These are aggregate 
power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions. Although Walt used 
these factors to show the gravity of threat from a traditional state actor, such criteria can still be 
used for the non-state actors. This is evident in European intelligence reports, which claim the 
existence of thousands of Al Qaeda affiliated or radical Islamist individuals, who have the 
aggressive intentions, and the ability to execute terrorist attacks in Europe. In 2008, the Europol 
report on terrorism stated that the Afghan-Pakistan border areas continued to provide a sanctuary 
for European and global Islamist terrorists.
  
8
                                                            
5 See “How Many More Are Out There?” BBC News, April 30, 2007.  
 For Pakistan, although the various Kashmiri militant 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/6607647.stm, accessed December 1, 2010; “Crawley Plotter  
Organized 7/7 Terror Camp,” The Telegraph, April 30, 2007. 
6 John Tagliabue, and Raymond Bonner, “A Nation Challenged: German Intelligence; German data Led U.S. 
Search for More Suicide Hijacker Teams,” New York Times, September r29, 2001. 
7 “German, Terrorist Cell Found in Hamburg Where 9/11 Attacks Conceived,” The Telegraph, October 7, 2009. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/6267615/Terrorist-cell-found-in-Hamburg-where-
911-attacks-conceived.html, accessed November 2, 2010. 
8 Europol, TE-SAT 2008: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (The Hague, the Netherlands: Europol 
Corporate Communications, 2008), p. 25. 
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groups have historically received political and military supports from Islamabad, the post-2001 
influx of Al Qaeda and Taliban militias from Afghanistan posed a serious threat to its internal 
security. The existence of thousands of Taliban militias and sympathizers, and Al Qaeda’s 
foreign militias in Pakistan has had a negative effect: the rise of suicide bombings, and 
subversive attacks against the state institutions.  
This brief discussion suggests that terrorists and insurgents can pose threats to national 
security. States are likely to balance against such threats by using a range of military and non-
military options. That being said, the role of state-centric threat has not diminished. India still 
figures highly in Pakistani military preparedness. China is perceived by the United States as a 
regional contender of power and influence.  
Free-Riding May Not Be a Generic Problem of Coalition Operations. By 2010 the 
United States deployed up to 100,000 troops and shared the largest burdens of offensive and 
defensive operations in Afghanistan. This does not mean that coalition partners shirked from 
their commitment or tended to ride free in Afghanistan. This was evident in the data on 
economic and human costs of the war on terrorism, shared by Britain, and Pakistan. In 2009-
2010, Britain’s war related funding in Afghanistan rose to $6 billion, which was nearly 10% of 
its defense budget. At that time, Pakistan’s war on terrorism-related costs was estimated at $4.3 
billion, which was higher than the annual $2 billion U.S. aid it received for the military 
operations in the Taliban-infested tribal areas. 9
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2008.pdf
 Troop fatality data also indicate the greater risk-
, 
accessed July 27, 2009. 
9 For different estimates on Pakistan’s cost of the war on terrorism, see Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s 
Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan,” Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, No. 5, 
February 4, 2010; Also see “Statement by Ambassador Amjad Hussain B. Sial, Deputy Permanent Representative of 
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sharing by coalition partners. The United States lost nearly 1,500 troops in the nine years of the 
war on terrorism. During this time, Britain lost 350 troops, and Pakistan lost 2,500 troops. 
 Does this mean all countries in the Afghanistan War coalition maintained a fair 
distribution of the economic and military burdens of the coalition operations? The answer is no. 
A comparison between Britain and three major European countries would show this issue of the 
burden-sharing problem. In 2009-2010, while Britain spent nearly $6 billion in Afghanistan, 
France spent only $500 million, Germany $800 million, and Italy $350 million. This was 10% of 
the total defense budget for the UK, and less than 6% of the combined defense budgets of 
France, Germany, and Italy.10
 Data on offensive military operations might indicate the free-riding tendency among a 
number of states, such as Germany and Italy, which have historically resisted redeploying forces 
into southern Afghanistan. In fact, only a handful of coalition countries in Afghanistan – the 
United States, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands – fought fiercely for 
coalition purpose. By contrast, a large majority of states did not participate in offensive 
operations, either because they cared less about military offensives, or because they believed in 
the utility of a defensive stabilization mission. Some countries might have deliberately decided 
not to participate in military offensives to avoid the troop casualties, and domestic public 
dissatisfactions.  
  
 The foregoing discussion shows that some countries tend to share more burdens than 
others. For coalition leaders, this is likely to persist in future operations, and diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Pakistan in the Sixth Committee during 65th UN General Assembly on agenda item 107: Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism (6 October 2010).”  
10 See, Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, and Carina Solmirano, “Military Expenditure,” in SIPRI Yearbook 
2010 (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), pp. 193-194.   
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coordination with allies should target achieving greater cost and risk-sharing commitments from 
the coalition partners.  
Domestic Politics Matter. This dissertation shows that under conditions of similar 
systemic incentives, differences in domestic political regime can explain why countries choose a 
wide range of options to support a coalition. Using David Auerswald’s typology of the domestic 
political regimes, my research identifies three categories of chief executive strength: strong, 
weak, and medium. I argue that the chief executives’ strength should be understood in terms of 
their relative autonomy from legal-judicial-parliamentary constraints, as well as the pressures 
from mass public or foreign policy elites.  
 The British case represents a strong chief executive, in which Prime Minister Tony Blair 
and his successors Brown and Cameron enjoyed royal prerogative in the declaration of war, and 
the use of force in foreign policy. None of them confronted any major legislative or judicial 
constraints, which could restrict decisions on Afghanistan. Enjoying the elite consensus in the 
parliament, the British prime ministers literally ignored public oppositions to the War in 
Afghanistan, and continued to support the U.S. and coalition efforts.  
 The German case shows a medium type of executive, which had enjoyed elite consensus 
on the deployment of military force, but lacked the constitutional and parliamentary mandate to 
use force for offensive purposes. As a result of such restrictive mandate, the German government 
imposed national caveats, and sold the Afghan mission to a skeptical public as a purely peace-
keeping mission. It was not until 2009, when the German government dropped some of the 
national caveats. It did so, not because of an offensive counterinsurgency doctrine, but because 
of the pressures from tactical level commanders.  
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The Pakistani case shows a strong chief executive. Unlike Britain and Germany, where 
the chief executive’s power was determined the presence or absence of legal-constitutional 
constraints, Pakistani presidents did not confront any such institutional barrier to decision 
making. My research shows that President Musharraf and his successor Asif Zardari exercised a 
personalized decision process, which ignored the national security council or the parliament in 
choosing the country’s coalition policy. Unlike liberal democratic countries in the West, Pakistan 
has a parochial political culture, in which the army and its powerful intelligence agency ISI 
strongly influence the country’s foreign and security policy.  This strong influence of the army 
and the ISI stems from Pakistan’s India-centric threat perception, the Kashmir dispute, and its 
past involvement in Afghanistan.  
The effects of such diverse executive strength are enormous. In the British case, it means 
that successive British prime ministers – from Tony Blair to David Cameron—remained 
committed to an Anglo-American special relationship, will be the most enthusiastic supporter of 
U.S.-led coalition operations. Due to the royal prerogative they enjoy over the use of force, the 
British prime ministers will continue to pursue a personalized foreign policy style to determine 
whether and how to share the burdens of a coalition operation. For Germany, the case is quite 
different: any coalition leader, including the United States, has to recognize the institutional 
constraints placed on the German chancellors. Due to a strong pacific and anti-war political 
culture, Germany is likely to be less enthusiastic about coalition operations, unless they are 
defensive in nature, and authorized by a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. In 
the Pakistani case, the army and the ISI are likely to seek a strategic depth in Afghanistan, 
especially after the U.S. and NATO forces leave the country. This means Pakistan does not see 
any incentive in cutting the relationship with the three Afghan Taliban groups—the Quetta Shura 
357 
 
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin network. Despite harboring 
support for the Afghan Taliban groups, Islamabad is likely to pursue a strong counterterrorism 
strategy against Al Qaeda and an ad hoc counterinsurgency strategy against the indigenous 
Taliban—the Pakistani Taliban network.  
Public Opinion Hardly Matters. Contrary to the popular myth that democratic countries 
respond to public opinion, this dissertation find that public opinion has a mixed, and often 
negligible effect, on the decision process of the coalition countries. In general the large majority 
of the domestic publics in Britain, Germany, and Pakistan opposed their country’s troop 
deployment, and demanded immediate troop withdrawal. In Britain and Germany, unfavorable 
public opinion stemmed from the concerns over civilian casualties in Afghanistan, and the safety 
of their troops. In Pakistan, public disapproval of the war was associated with the historical 
distrust over U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world, and U.S. diplomacy toward Pakistan. 
Despite unfavorable public attitudes toward the U.S.-led Afghanistan War, the British, German, 
and Pakistani governments gradually reinforced their troops in Afghanistan. Among the three 
cases, only Germany paid attention to mass public opinion, which favored a defensive 
reconstruction role for the Bundeswehr forces in northern Afghanistan. 
Military Capability and Organizational Learning Matter. My research shows that 
countries with a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine, adequate troops, and sufficient 
resources are more able to pursue a strong burden-sharing behavior. The most interesting finding 
is that, in Afghanistan, this strong burden-sharing role commenced around 2008. Between 2002 
and 2008, the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani forces in their tribal 
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areas, went through a process of failure, learning, and adaptation.11 After the tactical level 
commanders and their experiences were taken into the decision process, the outcome of the long 
war in Afghanistan changed slowly with securing, holding, and building territories, previously 
occupied by the Taliban insurgents.12
The NATO Lisbon summit in 2010 declared that 2014 is a conditional deadline for the 
withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
  
13
 
 This dissertation shows that by 2014, Germany 
will continue to pursue a defensive strategy, with limited participation in offensive operations. 
After the Dutch government withdrew its forces in August 2010, and Canada planning to 
withdraw its troops in 2011, Britain will be the only major coalition partner in Afghanistan 
willing and able to fight the insurgency. Should Pakistan change its attitude toward the Afghan 
Taliban groups? If history is any guide to future, the answer is no. Its quest for strategic parity 
with India would provide it an incentive to keep the Taliban connection tight.  
II. Policy Implications 
Several policy implications flow from the central research findings in this study. They focus on 
the U.S. leadership in the transatlantic alliance, threat assessment, the issues of caveats, security 
concerns of a reluctant ally, recognition of domestic constraints, public diplomacy and military 
capability and doctrines.  
                                                            
11 Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand, 2006-2009,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010), pp. 567-594. 
12 Sameer Lalwani, “The Pakistan Military’s Adaptation to Counterinsurgency in 2009,” CTC Sentinel, January 
31, 2010; Chad Serena, From Spectrum to Beam in Iraq Organizational Adaptation: Combat, Stability, and Beyond, 
Ph.D. Dissertation (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 2010). 
13 The North Atlantic Council, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and 
Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Oraganization, Adopted by the Heads of State and 
Government in Lisbon,” November 19, 2010. http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, 
accessed January 4, 2011.   
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Emphasis on U.S. Leadership. The United States has led the coalition operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is likely to lead future operations around the world. This leadership 
role comes from the unprecedented military capability and the global reach of the U.S. forces.14
Streamlining the threat assessment process. The empirical evidence in this study shows 
that states are interested in balancing against a perceived threat.
 
The U.S. allies in NATO, such as, Britain, France, and Germany are most likely to partner with 
the United States in sharing the burdens of coalition operations. Since alliance dependence may 
have reduced role in the post-Cold War era, an emphasis transatlantic alliance solidarity would 
better serve the U.S.-led coalitions. For out of area operations, the political and military support 
of the regional actors would be crucial. The United States will need to provide military and 
economic aid to encourage the participation of non-NATO allies and informal allies.  
15
Shared understanding of the national caveats. The Afghanistan War coalition suggests 
that each troop contributing country has its own national caveats. These caveats are designed in 
their national capitals, and are often kept secret. According to Auerswald et al, coalition 
 Success in coalition operations 
would require a shared understanding of the threat, and a fair degree of consensus on how to deal 
with the threat. It is likely that non all coalition partners will share the same level of threat 
perception. A multinational threat assessment process might remove some of the divergent threat 
perceptions. This would facilitate greater alliance solidarity, and improve the chances for 
wartime contribution for coalition purposes. 
                                                            
14 Thomas Donnelly, and Frederick Kagan, Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New 
Battlefields (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2010). 
15 Patricia Weitsman, “Wartime Alliances Versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the 
Multilateral Prosecution of Wars,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2010, pp. 111-136. 
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countries may develop a process that allows them to understand each other’s caveats. It will help 
them plan and coordinate ground offensives with countries that have minimal or no caveats.16
Addressing the security concerns of a reluctant ally. The Pakistani case shows that some 
countries will be reluctant to fully cooperate with the coalition due to irreconcilable differences 
over the national security interests. Pakistan has at least two major security concerns: peaceful 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute, and legitimization of the Durand Line—the borders between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. For obvious reasons, Pakistan would give more priority to addressing 
these concerns than supporting a U.S.-led coalition. It is important for the United States and its 
key allies to recognize such security predicaments, and seek diplomatic resolutions of both 
issues.
  
17
Recognition of domestic constraints. The domestic institutional constraints are likely to 
discourage some countries to participate in offensive operations. This means that some 
governments would show two opposing behavior: reluctant to participate in offensive military 
operations, but interested in defensive and post-conflict reconstruction operations. Coalition 
leaders need to understand this dichotomous attitude toward a multilateral mission, and make 
contingency plans to avoid any political friction over the military and non-military burden-
sharing.
  
18
Importance of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy involves communicating with a 
foreign public. It uses persuasion, rather than coercion to garner the support of the international 
  
                                                            
16 See David P. Auerswald, Stephen M. Saideman, and Michael J. Tierney, “Caveat Emptor! National Oversight 
and Military Operations in Afghanistan,” Presented to American Political Science Association National Meeting, 
Chicago, APSA 2007.  
17 C. Christine Fair discusses this issue in more detail in her research monograph. See C. Christine Fair, The 
Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004) 
18 For an excellent discussion on how ISAF acts as mechanism to mitigate the frictions over military strategies, 
see Christopher Coker, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Cooperation, Afghanistan and Strategic 
Culture,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 151, No. 5 (2006), pp. 14-19. 
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community for one’s foreign and security policy.19
Emphasis on doctrine and capability. Military doctrines provide important guidelines 
about the goals of a mission, and the ways and means used to achieve those goals. It is important 
for coalition countries to have compatible military doctrines to attain the goals of a mission.  
 Military coalitions need to have a better 
public diplomacy campaign to ensure that the domestic publics in coalition countries are well 
informed of the goals of a military intervention, the strategy being applied, and the measures 
taken to protect civilians.  
This study finds that the War in Afghanistan is a perfect example of “mission creep” – a 
term that refers to the expansion of a military operation from its original goals. In 2001, the U.S.-
led coalition invaded the country to defeat Al Qaeda, and to deny it a safe haven, and to topple 
the Taliban regime. After these initial war goals were achieved by 2002, the U.S.-led coalition 
had slowly embraced the notion of nation-building in Afghanistan.20
The mission creep in Afghanistan had required a doctrinal transformation: from an 
enemy-centric counterterrorism doctrine to a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine. The 
first focuses on capturing and killing the enemy, while the second concentrates on securing, 
holding, and building the civilian population centers. The coalition members in Afghanistan did 
not adopt a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine until 2008-2009. The British, German, 
and Pakistani cases show that the adoption of such population-centric doctrine brought important 
success for coalition operations in Helmand, Kunduz, and the Af-Pak border areas, respectively. 
  
                                                            
19 A leading proponent of public diplomacy, Joseph Nye Jr., has strongly advocated that the United States uses 
public diplomacy and soft power to attain its foreign policy goals. Nye argues that the combination of soft power or 
persuasion, and hard power of coercive power will make it a smart power, which is critical to winning the war on 
terrorism. See Joseph Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annal of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 616, No. 1 (2008), pp. 94-109. 
20 Amitai Etzioni, “Mission Creep and Its Discontents,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 18, No.2 (2011), pp. 3-15); 
Bobby Ghosh, “Afghan Mission C reep: Back to Nation-Building,” Time, August 19, 2009. 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917232,00.html, accessed March 30, 2010.  
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 Once a compatible military doctrine is adopted, the next task is to deploy suitable and 
interoperable forces to achieve the coalition objectives. Success in military coalitions does not 
come simply from the aggregation of forces, as conventional wisdom might dictate, but the 
appropriated deployment of military forces and assets from the host and coalition nations. This 
means, some missions might require more conventional and special operations forces from 
coalition countries, while others might require more indigenous forces. Since failures are an 
inevitable part of coalition operations, it is important that coalition countries make the best use of 
the centers of lessons learned.  
 
III. Summary and Conclusion  
Military coalitions are an enduring feature of international politics. This dissertation examines 
the international and domestic sources of a country’s coalition behavior. It shows that neither the 
international factors nor the domestic factors alone can explain why countries join and support a 
coalition. Instead, the interactions of external and internal factors provide better explanations of a 
country’s coalition policy. This means, under conditions of international systemic incentives, 
variations in a country’s domestic political processes can better explain why it joins a coalition 
and how it contributes to support the coalition. Within the domestic political processes, the chief 
executive’s decision power and the ability of a country’s military forces are the most important 
factors. Academic theorists should further explore the complex decision processes of the chief 
executives. The focus should be on how the institutionalized versus personalized decision 
process affect the outcome of a country’s burden-sharing behavior. The military analysts should 
examine the effect of military doctrines and capabilities on coalition operations. The two streams 
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of research should not proceed in isolation of each other. Instead, there is much room for 
bridging the gap, as Alexander George says, between the scholarly and policy communities. This 
dissertation is simply a step toward that bridge.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1. A U.S. and Coalition Countries Providing Troops to ISAF, Jan. 2002-Dec. 2010 
 
Year 
2002a 2003b 2004 b 2005 b 2006 c 2007 d 2008 d 2009 d 2010 d 
Source: 
CDI 
Source: 
SIPRI 
Source: 
SIPRI 
Source: 
SIPRI 
Source: 
IISS 
Source: 
ISAF 
Source: 
ISAF 
Source: 
ISAF 
Source: 
ISAF 
 Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania 
        Armenia 
    Australia Australia Australia Australia Australia 
Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria Austria 
 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan 
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgiium Belgiium Belgiium Belgiium 
       Bosnia & 
Herzegovin
a 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovin
a 
Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria 
 Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada 
 Croatia Croatia Croatia Croatia Croatia Croatia Croatia Croatia 
 Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Czech  
Rep.  
Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark 
 Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia Estonia 
Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland 
France France France France France France France France France 
     Georgia Georgia Georgia Georgia 
Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany 
Greece Greece Greece Greece Greece Greece Greece Greece Greece 
  Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary 
  Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland Iceland 
 Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland Ireland 
Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy 
     Jordan Jordan Jordan Jordan 
 Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia Latvia 
 Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania 
 Luxembo
urg 
Luxembo
urg 
Luxembou
rg 
Luxembou
rg 
Luxembou
rg 
Luxembou
rg 
Luxembou
rg 
Luxembou
rg 
 Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia Macedonia 
        Malaysia 
        Mongolia 
        Montenegr
o 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
Netherlan
ds 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway 
 Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland Poland 
Portugal  Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal 
Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania Romania 
      Singapore Singapore Singapore 
  Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia 
  Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia 
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Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain 
Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden 
 Switzerlan
d 
Switzerlan
d 
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland    
        Tonga 
Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey 
      Ukraine Ukraine Ukraine 
      U.A.E. U.A.E. U.A.E. 
U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. 
 U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
Total: 18 
countries 
with 5,000 
troops 
Total: 31 
countries 
with 5,500 
troops 
Total: 35 
countries 
with 8,500 
troops 
Total: 35 
countries 
with 9,000 
troops 
Total: 35 
countries 
with 32,825 
troops 
Total: 39 
countries 
with 41,144 
troops 
Total: 41 
countries 
with 50,700 
troops  
Total: 41 
countries 
with 71,026 
troops 
Total: 48 
count. with 
130,930 
troops 
Note: NATO member states are shown in bold letters. 
 
Sources:  
a Center for Defense Information, FACT SHEET: International  Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, February 14, 
2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/isaf.cfm, accessed October 24, 2010. 
b Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
various issues, 2004-2006. 
c International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2007: The Annual Assessment of Global Military 
Capabilities and Defense Economics (London: IISS).  
d International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat Archives,’ http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/isaf-placemat-
archives.html, accessed October 24, 2010; 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat Archives,’ Updated November 15, 2010. 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/15%20NOV.Placemat%20page1-3.pdf, accessed December 16, 2010. 
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APPENDIX 4.A Selected NATO Countries: Economic and Military Strength, 2009   
Country GDP 
 
Defense 
Budget 
 
Military 
Expenditure 
as % of 
GDP 
Active 
Military 
Strength 
Military 
Forces in 
Afghanistan 
Troops in 
Afghanistan 
as % of Total 
Active 
Military  
Strength 
United States $13.8 trillion 
 
$ 690.3 billion 5.0% 1,580,255 67,000* 4.24%* 
Canada $1.47 trillion $20.19 billion 1.4% 65,722 2,830 4.30% 
United 
Kingdom 
$2.26 trillion $62.4 billion 2.8% 175,690 9,000 5.12% 
Germany $3.4 trillion $46.5 billion 1.4% 250,613 4,365 1.74% 
France $2.87 trillion $47.8 billion 1.7% 352,771 3,095 0.88% 
Italy $1.51 trillion $23.0 billion 1.5% 293,202 2,795 0.95% 
Netherlands $860 billion $13.0 billion 1.5% 46,882 2,160 4.60% 
Poland $465 billion $8.63 billion 1.8% 100,000 1,910 1.91 
Australia $1.23 trillion $24.2 billion 2.0% 54747 1350 2.46% 
Spain $1.03 trillion $11.7 billion 1.1% 128,013 1,000 0.78% 
Turkey $960 billion $9.9 billion 1.0% 510,600 720 0.14% 
Denmark $337 billion $4.58 billion 1.4% 26,585 690 2.60% 
Norway $2.44 trillion $5.94 billion 0.24% 24,025 480 1.99% 
Czech Republic $205 billion $3.19 billion 1.6% 17932 480 2.68% 
Note: *In 2010, the United States deployed additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. This made the total number of 
U.S. troops to 100,000, which was 6.7% of the nearly 1.5 million U.S. troops.  
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge for IISS). 
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APPENDIX 5.A Bundeswehr deployment in the post-Cold War Era, 1991-2000 
Operation German Contribution  
Bundeswehr Deployment in Overseas Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Missions 
UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) (1991-
1996 
Air Force performed all flights for UNSCOM personnel 
for almost six years;  
German experts participated in inspections 
UN Peacekeeping Operation (Chapter VI) in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) (1992-1993) 
One medical unit (about 150 soldiers) and a field 
hospital 
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (1994) Ten soldiers 
UN Humanitarian Intervention (Chapter VII) in Somalia 
(USOM) (1993-1994) 
1,700 soldiers (about 600 naval and 120 air force 
personnel) 
International Humanitarian and peacekeeping operations 
in the former Yugoslavia 
Airlift to Sarajevo (1992-1996) 
Air drops to Bosnia (1993) 
IFOR (1995-1996) 
KFOR (1999 to date) 
Humanitarian assistance in Macedonia and Albania   
(2001) 
International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) 
(Established by the UN Security Council with the task of 
supporting the  political transition toward independence 
(1999-2000) 
The Bundeswehr dispatched transport aircraft and 
medical personnel. 
Bundeswehr Deployment in Overseas Peace Enforcement Missions 
Enforcement of sanctions against Yugoslavia as part of 
the WEU/NATO "Sharp Guard" operation 
Two naval vessels; 
Three reconnaissance aircraft. 
Operation "deny flight" to implement the no-fly zone 
over Bosnia-Herzegovina 
484 soldiers; 
Three NATO AWACs reconnaissance aircraft.1  
NATO planning for the extraction of UN-PROFOR in 
Bosnia in 1994, which had the purpose of protecting 
and supporting the Franco-British Rapid Reaction Force 
14 Tornado aircraft; 
Up to 12 transport aircraft; 
Naval units provided for "Sharp Guard"; 
Medical unit with 530 men and a field hospital in 
Croatia 
Summer 1995 NATO intervention against Bosnian Serbs German Tornado aircraft flew their first combat 
missions.2 
NATO air war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999 14 Tornado aircraft.3 
Notes:  
1German participation was challenged by the opposition and part of the ruling coalition (FDP) but subsequently 
cleared by the Constitutional Court. 
2The Bundestag cleared the operation with a vote of 386:258 (with eleven abstentions) on June 30, 1995, but the 
government ruled out the deployment of ground troops on historical grounds. 
3Contrary to all previous missions (including UNOSOM II, which took place with a mandate from the UN 
Security Council based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter), in this case there was no mandate from the UN Security 
Council to legitimize German participation. The Bundestag cleared German participation with a vote of 500:62, with 
eighteen abstentions, on October 16, 1998. 
Source: AICGS New Security Study Group, Redefining German Security: Prospects for Bundeswehr Reform. 
German Issues, No. 25 (September 2001), p. 13.  
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APPENDIX 5.B German Parliamentary Debate over Military Deployment in Afghanistan, 2001-2010  
Year Parliamentary Votes on Military Deployment Elite Consensus or Fragmentation 
2001 • Nov. 16, 2001: The sharply divided Bundestag voted to deploy German forces to 
Afghanistan 
332 MPs voted for; 326 against  
2002 • Dec. 20, 2002: Bundestag extends the ISAF mission in Kabul; endorses the joint Dutch-
German lead in ISAF; and approves the deployment of up to 2,500 Bundeswehr soldiers in 
Afghanistan. 
Bundestag approved the mission with an 
“overwhelming majority” 
2003 • Oct. 24, 2003: Bundestag approved extension of German forces under ISAF, not OEF, in 
Afghanistan 
• Nature of mission: 1800 Bundeswehr personnel stationed in Kabul; another 230 will be sent 
to Konduz; additional German troops be deployed to give ‘protective component’ to the 
economic and political reconstruction of Afghanistan beyond Kabul 
SPD-Green coalition got the support of the 
main opposition CDU/CSU; few dissenting 
votes – only FDP and Left parties voted 
against  
2004 • Sept. 30, 2004: Bundestag approved the extension of German forces’ mission in 
Afghanistan 
Bundestag approved the mission with an 
“overwhelming majority” 
2005 • Sept. 28, 2005: German Parliament approved an extension and enlargement of 
Bundeswehr’s mission in Afghanistan  
• Mandate includes – 
o one year  extension of Afghanistan mission, including the deployment of an 
addition 750 German troops, who will join the existing 2250 troops 
o Assumption of command in the northeastern sector of Afghanistan (ISAF-RC-
North), which would require opening a new base in Mazar-i-Sharif city 
Bundeswehr mission was approved by an 
“overwhelming majority” of MPs 
2006 • Sept. 28, 2006: German Parliament approved the Bundeswehr’s ISAF mandate, which 
allowed the deployment of upto 3,000 German soldiers 
• Nov. 10, 2006: Bundestag approved Bundeswehr’s OEF mandate, which allows the 
deployment of up to 1,800 soldiers in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East for a year 
• Bundestag also extended the deployment of 100 SOF commandos (KSK) in Afghanistan 
 
436 MPs voted for, 101 against, and 26 
abstained during the Nov. 10, 2006 voting 
2007 • Sept. 19, 2007:  Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cabinet agrees to renew the mandate of 3000 
troops and 6 Tornado spy jets in Afghanistan for one year. 
• Oct. 12, 2007: Bundestag approved a one-year extension of the Bundeswehr deployment in 
Afghanistan 
• April 2007: Germany sent Tornado reconnaissance jets to Afghanistan 
• Germany currently has 3,000 troops under the ISAF command, in northern Afghanistan  
• March 9, 2007: German Parliament voted to send 6 to 8 Tornado jets to Afghanistan; The 
Tornado mission will cost an additional 35 million Euro. 
In the 613-seat Bundestag, 454 voted for, and 
79 against the Afghanistan mission; 48 MPs 
abstained; Only the Left Party opposed the 
mission, while Green party supported it 
 
On the Tornado vote, 405 MPs voted for, 157 
against, and 11 abstained  
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• The Tornado mandate precludes German participation in combat mission 
2008 • Oct. 16, 2008: Bundestag approved the extension of German forces’ presence in 
Afghanistan, and decided to send an additional 1,000 troops; Mission extended for 14 
months, until Dec. 1,3, 2009 
• The 100-strong German SOF, will be withdrawn from OEF; German officials noted that 
although the  German SOF were attached to OEF, they were not taking part in any combat 
mission 
442 MPs voted for,  96 against, and 32 
abstention; Fairly “non-controversial debate” 
(Belkin 2008: 20)  
2009 • Dec. 3, 2009: Bundestag approved the extension of German troops presence in Afghanistan 
until Dec 13, 2010;  
• Foreign minister Westerwelle said the debate on troop size is inappropriate, as Germany 
and other NATO allies in Afghanistan are set to debate the right strategy in Afghanistan, 
and that the upcoming London conference in January 2010 is not a “donor conference” but 
a strategy conference 
• July 2009: 300 German forces engaged in a  combat mission in Afghanistan, defined as the 
first German ground offensive since WWII (SHAFR, Sept. 1, 2009; Pond, Aug. 7, 2009) 
445 of 593 votes cast, a large majority of 
Bundestag MPs approved the extension of 
Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan  
Little opposition against the mandate; one 
FDP leader in the state of Schleswig-Holstein 
says, “I will, as in the past, vote against it.” He 
added that Bundeswehr’s Afghan mission is 
duplicitous, and that if the Germans are 
serious, they will “need to be in Pakistan too.” 
2010 • Feb. 26, 2010: Bundestag voted to increase 850 troops to join the existing 4,500 German 
troops in Afghanistan (500 for additional  troops, 350 as a flexible contingent)  
Large majority of CDU/CSU, FDP, and 
opposition SPD agreed on the extension; Out 
of 622 MPs, 429 voted in favor of the surge; 
111 voted against; 46 Abstention 
 
Note: The number of parliamentary votes supporting or opposing the deployment of German armed forces is shown, whenever such date are available from print 
and electronic media sources. In other cases the phrase ‘overwhelming majority’ is used to refer to the large number of supporting votes as opposed to fewer 
vetoes on deployment decisions.  
Sources: Martin Kreickenbaum, “German Paliament Expands Army Mandate in Afghanistan,” World Socialist Web Site, November 6, 2003. 
http://www3.wsws.org/articles/2003/nov2003/kabu-n06.shtml, accessed December 21, 2010; Lucas Adler, “German Army to Relieve US Troops in 
Afghanistan,” World Socialist Web Site, February 25, 2005. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/feb2005/afgh-f25.shtml, accessed December 21,2010; “German 
Papers: More Germans for Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, September 29, 2005. http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,377275,00.html, accessed December 21, 
2010; Justus Leicht, “German Parliament Extends Participation in the War on Terror,” World Socialist Web Site, November 27, 2006. 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/nov2006/germ-n27.shtml, accessed December 21, 2010; “German Cabinet Agrees to Renew Afghan Mission,” Reuters, Sept. 
19, 2007. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1999944, accessed December 23, 2010; “Staying the Course: German Parliament Extends Afghanistan Troop 
Mandate,” Der Spiegel, October 12, 2007. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,511119,00.html, accessed December 21, 2010; “Help for NATO: 
German Parliament Approves Planes for Afghanistan,” Der Spiegel, March 9, 2007. http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,470895,00.html, accessed 
December 21, 2010; Paul Belkin, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” CRS Report for Congress, October 23, 2008, p. 20. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112055.pdf, accessed December 21, 2010; Jan-Thilo Klimisch, “Afghanistan: Germany Extends Troop Mandate 
While Fighting PR Battle at Home,” Eurasia Insight, October 16, 2008. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101708a.shtml, accessed 
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December 21, 2010; Sebastian Fischer, Matthias Gebaur, and Severin Weiland, “Bundestag Debate on Afghanistan: Defense Minister Calls Kunduz Air Strike 
‘Inappropriate,’” Der Spiegel, December 4, 2009. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,665132,00.html, accessed December 21, 2010; 
“Afghanistan,” Auswaertiges Amt, December 4, 2009. http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/MilitaerischesEngagement.html?nn=354882, accessed December 21, 2010; Is 
Germany at War? Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Sept. 1, 2009. http://www.shafr.org/2009/09/01/is-germany-at-war/, accessed Dec. 21, 
2010; Elizabeth Pond, “Opinion: Germany’s Combat Revival,” Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 7, 2009. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0807/p09s02-coop.html, accessed December 21, 2010; Afghanistan: German Lawmakers Approve Troop 
Increase for Afghanistan” Deutsche Welle, February 26, 2010. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5287629,00.html, accessed December 21, 2010. 
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